Public Reprimand for Prolonged Probate Neglect Under SCR 20:1.3; Full Costs Required Absent Exceptional Circumstances

Public Reprimand for Prolonged Probate Neglect Under SCR 20:1.3; Full Costs Required Absent Exceptional Circumstances

Introduction

Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Bryant H. Klos (2026 WI 1) is a Wisconsin Supreme Court attorney-discipline decision addressing prolonged lack of diligence in a probate “Special Administration” and the resulting sanction. The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed a one-count complaint alleging that Attorney Bryant H. Klos violated SCR 20:1.3 (diligence) by failing to complete the legal work necessary to conclude an estate proceeding that had remained open for over a decade.

The key issues were: (1) whether the stipulated facts proved a violation of SCR 20:1.3 by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence; (2) what level of discipline was appropriate (OLR sought a 60-day suspension; the respondent sought a public reprimand); and (3) whether costs should be assessed in full or reduced based on the respondent’s claimed early acceptance of responsibility.

Summary of the Opinion

The court, reviewing the matter under SCR 22.17(2) because no appeal was filed, adopted the referee’s findings derived from two stipulations, agreed that the OLR proved a violation of SCR 20:1.3, and imposed a public reprimand. The court also ordered Attorney Klos to pay full costs of the disciplinary proceeding, finding no basis to depart from the general rule.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Framework for sanction analysis

  • In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Charlton, 174 Wis.2d 844, 875-76, 498 N.W.2d 380 (1993): The court relied on Charlton’s familiar sanction considerations—seriousness, nature and extent of misconduct; protection of the public and courts; impressing upon the lawyer the seriousness of the misconduct; and deterrence. Charlton served as the court’s explicit standard for determining the appropriate level of discipline independent of the referee’s recommendation.
  • In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Scanlan, 2006 WI 38, ¶72, 290 Wis. 2d 30, 712 N.W.2d 877: The referee cited Scanlan’s set of factors to evaluate sanction. While the court did not reproduce Scanlan’s factor list, it accepted the referee’s reliance on it as consistent with Wisconsin’s structured, factor-based approach to discipline.

2) Standards of review in attorney discipline

  • In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125: Used to reaffirm that the supreme court affirms a referee’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, while reviewing legal conclusions de novo. This is important in stipulated cases: the court still performs an independent review, but it will ordinarily adopt supported, stipulated findings.
  • In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686: Cited for the proposition that discipline is determined independently by the court, “benefitting from” the referee’s recommendation. Widule underlines that the referee’s recommendation is influential but not controlling—particularly relevant here, where OLR sought a harsher sanction.

3) Analogous discipline for lack of diligence

  • In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gonzalez, 2018 WI 104, 384 Wis. 2d 300, 919 N.W.2d 559: The court found Gonzalez “analogous and persuasive” in concluding that a public reprimand can appropriately address lack of diligence. Gonzalez involved diligence failures in two matters (e.g., failure to prepare a court order; failure to enter municipal not guilty pleas), demonstrating that public reprimand may be suitable even where the misconduct affects clients’ legal interests.
  • Public Reprimand of Sarah Clemment, No. 2011-6: Also deemed “analogous and persuasive,” involving lack of diligence where the attorney failed to appear at a client’s final immigration hearing and failed to timely advance the client’s interests. By citing Clemment, the court signaled that reprimand-level discipline can be consistent with serious lapses in diligence where the overall factor balance (including mitigation and prior history) warrants it.

Legal Reasoning

1) Proof of the violation (SCR 20:1.3)

The court accepted the parties’ stipulations and concluded the record established, by “clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence,” that Attorney Klos failed to act with “reasonable diligence and promptness” as required by SCR 20:1.3. The stipulated timeline reflected prolonged inactivity, repeated extensions to close the estate, delayed distribution of recovered funds, failure to complete necessary steps to liquidate or transfer remaining assets (including failing to obtain death certificates needed for a stock transaction), and ongoing failure to disburse funds received in 2022 or to claim remaining property.

2) Why the sanction was a public reprimand (not suspension)

Although the OLR’s requested 60-day suspension was characterized as “not unreasonable,” the court concluded that a public reprimand best fit the sanction factors in this record. The court emphasized mitigation: (1) no prior discipline and (2) lack of financial motive. Those factors “tip[ped] this case away from suspension and in favor of public reprimand.”

The referee’s contextual observations reinforced the reprimand outcome without excusing the misconduct. The referee noted complicating circumstances: amended orders due to incorrect third-party information; a protracted multi-claimant distribution process; erroneous payments from the State’s Unclaimed Property Fund; and personal/professional disruptions (death of a close family member, illness of a partner, and the COVID-19 pandemic). The referee treated these as context rather than defenses, and the court ultimately agreed that reprimand-level discipline appropriately reflected the total balance of aggravation and mitigation—consistent with the “court’s policy of progressive sanctioning.”

At the same time, the court underscored the seriousness of the failure: allowing an estate matter to remain open for fifteen years (with eight years occurring during OLR scrutiny) was described as a “professional failure as to diligence and responsibility,” warranting a public sanction.

3) Costs: full assessment absent exceptional circumstances

The court adopted the referee’s conclusion that there were “no exceptional circumstances” to justify deviating from SCR 22.24’s general rule that the respondent pays costs. The referee rejected the argument that OLR’s refusal to offer a consensual reprimand under SCR 22.09 warranted a reduction. The referee also pointed to litigation posture: despite cooperation in producing substantial file materials, Attorney Klos did not formally respond to discovery requests, and he “put the OLR to its burden of proof” and asserted multiple affirmative defenses.

Impact

  • Diligence in probate administration: The decision reinforces that prolonged failure to complete estate administration tasks—collecting assets, executing routine paperwork steps, disbursing funds, and closing the estate—can amount to an SCR 20:1.3 violation even where the matter is complicated and involves third-party errors.
  • Sanction calibration and progressive discipline: The court’s use of analogous reprimand cases and emphasis on lack of prior discipline signal that, in diligence-only matters without dishonesty or selfish motive, the court may select a public reprimand over suspension when mitigation is strong—while still publicly marking the misconduct as serious.
  • Costs remain the norm: The opinion underscores the practical reality that cost reductions are unusual; cooperation or early resolution arguments must overcome a high “exceptional circumstances” threshold to depart from the default cost-shifting rule.
  • Stipulated discipline still receives structured review: Even without an appeal, the court reiterates standards of review and independently determines sanction, providing guidance for future stipulated dispositions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • SCR 20:1.3 (diligence): Requires lawyers to pursue a client’s matter with reasonable promptness and follow-through. In practical terms, it is not enough to start a case; lawyers must keep it moving and complete necessary steps to protect and advance the client’s interests.
  • “Clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence”: The evidentiary standard used in Wisconsin attorney discipline—more demanding than “more likely than not,” but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • Stipulation and “no contest” plea in discipline: A stipulation is an agreement about facts and/or factors, used to streamline adjudication. A “no contest” plea means the lawyer does not contest the charge; the referee must still ensure there is an adequate factual basis supporting misconduct.
  • Public reprimand vs. suspension: A public reprimand is a formal, public disciplinary sanction that does not remove the lawyer’s license. A suspension temporarily removes the right to practice. The court selects between them by weighing harm, culpability, prior history, and deterrence/protection needs.
  • Costs in discipline (SCR 22.24): Wisconsin generally requires the respondent-attorney to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding; deviation requires “exceptional” justification.

Conclusion

2026 WI 1 affirms that prolonged, unresolved probate administration—marked by long periods of inactivity, delayed distributions, and failure to finalize remaining asset recovery—constitutes lack of diligence under SCR 20:1.3. Even where the record includes complicating third-party issues and personal setbacks, the court treats such circumstances as context, not excuse, and imposes a public sanction to protect the public and the legal system. At the same time, the opinion illustrates Wisconsin’s progressive sanctioning approach: absent prior discipline and absent a dishonest or selfish motive, a public reprimand may be deemed sufficient, while full costs will ordinarily be assessed unless truly exceptional circumstances exist.

Case Details

Year: 2026
Court: Supreme Court of Wisconsin

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