Public-Official Misuse of Authority as “Serious Crime” Misconduct Warrants Substantial Suspension; Remorse Not Established by Unsown Character Letters Alone (Matter of Richman)

1. Introduction

Matter of Richman is an attorney-discipline proceeding in the Appellate Division, Second Department, arising from Steven H. Richman’s misdemeanor convictions for two counts of official misconduct under Penal Law § 195.00(1). Richman, admitted in 1984, served for decades as general counsel to the Board of Elections in the City of New York (BOE).

The core issues were (1) whether the convictions constituted a “serious crime” justifying interim suspension and final discipline under Judiciary Law § 90(4)(f) and 22 NYCRR 1240.12, and (2) what level of final discipline was appropriate given mitigation (public service, lack of prior discipline, character letters) and aggravation (abuse of public office and public trust).

The petitioner was the Grievance Committee for the Second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Judicial Districts. The respondent was Steven H. Richman. A Special Referee conducted the post-suspension hearing and issued a report recommending public discipline.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court confirmed the Special Referee’s report, denied Richman’s cross-motion to disaffirm the portion discounting his remorse, and imposed a two-year suspension effective immediately, with reinstatement eligibility no earlier than July 14, 2027.

While acknowledging mitigation (numerous character letters, long government career, and no disciplinary history), the court emphasized that Richman abused his position as BOE general counsel for personal interest, which the court viewed as a serious breach of the public trust that undermines confidence in lawyers and government.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The opinion does not cite any prior disciplinary decisions by case name. Instead, it relies on the statutory and regulatory framework governing attorney discipline for criminal convictions:

Judiciary Law § 90(4)(f): Authorizes interim suspension upon conviction of a “serious crime” and provides the mechanism for subsequent proceedings to determine final discipline.
22 NYCRR 1240.12(b)(2) and (c)(2)(ii): Implements interim suspension and post-conviction procedures (including the show-cause hearing).
22 NYCRR 1240.15: Sets compliance duties for suspended attorneys (e.g., cessation of practice, notices, affidavit of compliance).
22 NYCRR 1240.16: Governs reinstatement applications and the proof required.
Penal Law § 195.00(1): Defines the underlying criminal offense—official misconduct—centered on unauthorized acts relating to one’s public office intended to obtain a benefit.

In effect, the “precedential” force of Matter of Richman is not in extending a line of cited cases, but in the court’s application of these disciplinary rules to a fact pattern involving misuse of public office, and in its approach to mitigation (especially claimed remorse).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Confirmation of the Special Referee’s report

The post-conviction hearing exists to give the respondent an opportunity to show why a final order of discipline should not be imposed. Here, the court held that Richman did not demonstrate a basis to avoid a public disciplinary order stemming from the two-count conviction.

B. Remorse and the evidentiary weight of character letters

A notable feature of the opinion is its treatment of “remorse.” The Special Referee found that counsel’s argument that Richman acknowledged a “lapse in judgment” was not supported by the plea record, and further noted that Richman did not testify or provide sworn testimony at the hearing. The Appellate Division agreed, denying the cross-motion aimed at reversing the Referee’s discounting of remorse.

The decision signals a practical evidentiary principle in discipline hearings: while character letters can support general mitigation, they may not substitute for sworn, record-based acknowledgment of wrongdoing when the issue is whether remorse has been affirmatively demonstrated—especially where the plea allocution, as described, does not contain the claimed statement.

C. Selection of a two-year suspension: balancing mitigation and public-trust aggravation

The court explicitly weighed:

Mitigating factors: Richman’s long public-service career; extensive professional contributions; numerous character letters; lack of prior discipline.
Aggravating factors: The misconduct involved abuse of a government position (BOE general counsel); unauthorized use of BOE offices; and conduct undertaken for “personal interest,” which the court treated as a violation of public trust.

The court’s reasoning emphasizes that when lawyer misconduct occurs in the capacity of a public official, it is “especially harmful” to public confidence—not only in the bar, but in government and governance. That concern drove the conclusion that a meaningful period of suspension (two years) was necessary notwithstanding substantial biographical mitigation.

3.3. Impact

Discipline for public-official misconduct: The opinion reinforces that misuse of governmental authority for personal benefit—particularly involving access to government premises and leverage over subordinates—will be treated as a major aggravating factor in lawyer discipline, even if the conduct is framed as “not legal work.”

How to prove mitigation (especially remorse): Future respondents should expect that claims of remorse will be scrutinized against the plea allocution and the hearing record. Reliance on third-party letters alone may be insufficient where the tribunal is looking for direct, sworn acceptance of wrongdoing.

Serious crime pathway: The decision illustrates the procedural “serious crime” track—interim suspension under Judiciary Law § 90(4)(f) and 22 NYCRR 1240.12, followed by a Referee hearing and final discipline—providing a roadmap for how misdemeanor convictions can still yield substantial attorney sanctions when the conduct implicates public trust.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Serious crime” (discipline context): A category of criminal conviction that triggers expedited disciplinary consequences, including interim suspension, followed by a proceeding to decide final discipline.
Official misconduct (Penal Law § 195.00(1)): In general terms, a public servant commits official misconduct by performing an act related to the office while knowing the act is unauthorized, typically to obtain a benefit.
Special Referee: A judicial officer appointed to conduct a hearing, receive evidence, and issue a report with findings and recommendations; the Appellate Division makes the final disciplinary decision.
Unconditional discharge: A criminal sentence where the defendant is not incarcerated or placed on probation, but the conviction stands and statutory surcharges/fees may apply. It does not prevent professional discipline.
Character letters: Letters attesting to reputation and good works; useful for mitigation, but not necessarily proof of remorse or accountability unless tied to reliable, record-supported admissions.

5. Conclusion

Matter of Richman underscores that criminal misuse of public office by a lawyer—especially conduct leveraging authority over others and unauthorized use of government facilities for personal interest—warrants significant discipline because it directly erodes public trust. The Second Department’s two-year suspension reflects a balancing of strong mitigation against the heightened institutional harm caused by public-official misconduct. The decision also serves as a caution that remorse, as a mitigating factor, must be demonstrated through the record—preferably via sworn testimony or clear allocution—rather than inferred solely from character references.