Public Official Immunity Does Not Extend to University Administrators: Hwang v. Cairns

Introduction

Hwang v. Cairns is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, filed on May 23, 2025, addressing the scope of public official immunity in the context of administrators at a state‐funded university. The plaintiff, Dr. James Hwang, a former surgeon at the UNC Burn Center, sued his division chief and Medical Director, Dr. Bruce Cairns, for tortious interference with contract and slander per se after Dr. Cairns allegedly initiated a human‐resources complaint that led to a five‐month withholding of Dr. Hwang’s incentive payment. The central question was whether Dr. Cairns, in his dual roles at UNC-Chapel Hill, could claim public official immunity for the acts underlying the suit.

On discretionary review from a unanimous, unpublished Court of Appeals decision that had affirmed summary judgment for Dr. Cairns, the Supreme Court unanimously held that he was not a “public official” entitled to immunity, thereby reversing the lower courts and remanding for further proceedings.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court first reaffirmed the general doctrine: public officials are immune from personal liability for torts committed in the exercise of discretionary acts within their governmental duties, but this immunity does not automatically extend to all public employees. Citing Miller v. Jones (1945) and Isenhour v. Hutto (1999), the Court reiterated that only those positions (1) created by the constitution or statutes (or by an authorized delegate), (2) vested with a portion of sovereign power, and (3) involving the exercise of judgment and discretion qualify as “public official” positions.

Applying those criteria, the Court found that Dr. Cairns’s roles as division chief and Medical Director at the UNC Burn Center were statutory or administrative positions subordinate to boards and supervisors, lacking a direct delegation of sovereign power. Although he exercised professional judgment and discretion, that alone does not confer “public official” status under North Carolina law. As a result, Dr. Cairns could not shield himself behind public official immunity. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Miller v. Jones (224 N.C. 783 (1945)): Established that employees of governmental agencies do not enjoy public official immunity because they lack the sovereignty‐related justifications for nonliability.
Smith v. State (289 N.C. 303 (1976)): Held that a hospital medical superintendent, although appointed by statute, was not a public official because he was subordinate to a state board that set policy and retained sovereign authority.
Isenhour v. Hutto (350 N.C. 601 (1999)): Clarified that municipal school crossing guards were not public officials since the legislature had not delegated sovereign power to them, even though they performed important public duties.
Hord (264 N.C. 149 (1965)): Articulated the two‐part test for public official status—creation by statute or authorized delegation, and exercise of sovereign power.
Smith v. Hefner (235 N.C. 1 (1952)) and Meyer v. Walls (347 N.C. 97 (1997)): Defined public official immunity and its exceptions (acts outside official duties, malice, corruption).

Legal Reasoning

The Court applied the established three‐factor test to Dr. Cairns’s positions:

Statutory Creation or Authorized Delegation: Dr. Cairns’s roles were created by university administrative bodies (the Board of Governors, the UNC-CH Board of Trustees, the Health Care System Board of Directors), not directly by the General Assembly or constitution. Those bodies exercise sovereign power but may not further delegate it to create new public‐official positions.
Exercise of Sovereign Power: Although Dr. Cairns supervised employees and managed clinical operations, he acted under layers of institutional control. He did not independently exercise a portion of the State’s sovereign legislative, judicial, or policy‐making power.
Discretionary Judgment: While he undoubtedly used professional judgment in patient care and staffing, discretionary acts alone do not confer immunity absent the exercise of sovereign authority.

These findings led the Court to conclude that Dr. Cairns was a public employee, not a public official, and thus could not invoke public official immunity. As summary judgment had been granted solely on that ground, the Court reversed and remanded.

Impact

This decision clarifies and restricts the scope of public official immunity in North Carolina by:

Reaffirming that university and other administrative employees, even in high‐level roles, will not automatically be deemed “public officials.”
Requiring courts to apply a strict three‐part test before conferring immunity.
Encouraging administrators at public institutions to recognize that allegations of negligence or defamation may be actionable if they do not fall within the narrow confines of sovereign power.

Future litigants will rely on Hwang v. Cairns to distinguish between true public officers (e.g., elected officials, judicial officers, police chiefs) and agency employees, ensuring accountability for tortious conduct outside the legitimate exercise of sovereign duties.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Public Official vs. Public Employee: A “public official” holds a position created by the constitution or statute in which the State grants a portion of its sovereign power. A “public employee” works for a government agency but lacks that statutory grant of sovereignty.
Sovereign Power: The authority to make policy, enact or enforce laws, or carry out core governmental functions. Supervisory or administrative duties alone do not equal sovereign power.
Discretionary Act: An act requiring judgment or choice, as opposed to a ministerial act, which follows a fixed rule. Discretionary acts are protected only if exercised under sovereign authority.
Summary Judgment: A pretrial ruling that ends a case when no genuine factual dispute exists and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. All evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non‐moving party.

Conclusion

Hwang v. Cairns establishes that high‐level administrators at public universities are not automatically immune from personal liability under the doctrine of public official immunity. A position must be statutorily created or authorized, vested with sovereign power, and involve a true exercise of discretionary governmental authority to qualify. Dr. Cairns’s roles at UNC-Chapel Hill, though significant, failed these tests. By reversing the grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court has reinforced accountability for government employees acting outside the narrow realm of sovereign policymaking, shaping the landscape of tort claims against public‐sector administrators in North Carolina.