Public Interest Exception to Mootness in Foster‐Care Medical Consent Appeals

Introduction

In Margaret M. Testarmata v. State of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services, Office of Children’s Services (Supreme Court No. S-19033, May 21, 2025), the Alaska Supreme Court addressed whether a parental appeal of an administrative decision is moot when the child in foster care reaches majority during the appeal, and whether the “public interest exception” to mootness may override that mootness. The appellant, Margaret Testarmata, challenged the Office of Children’s Services’ (OCS) conclusion that a foster parent validly consented to a tetanus shot for her then-minor daughter. By the time her judicial appeal reached the superior court, the daughter had turned 18 and the superior court dismissed the case as moot. Testarmata invoked the public interest exception to mootness and sought a trial de novo. The superior court denied both reliefs, and the Supreme Court affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court held, by a 3-justice panel, that:

Mootness: The appeal became moot when Testarmata’s daughter turned 18, as there was no longer a live controversy the court could resolve.
Public Interest Exception: Applying the three-factor test from Fairbanks Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Fairbanks—(1) likelihood of repetition, (2) likelihood of review being repeatedly circumvented, and (3) public importance—the court exercised its discretion not to apply the exception. Although the issue (parental consent for emergency tetanus shots in foster care) is important and likely to recur, it is not likely to evade review, because most foster-care medical-consent appeals will not be mooted by the child’s imminent majority.
Public Interest Litigant Status: The court confirmed that a prior superior court order waiving Testarmata’s cost bond did not equate to a declaration that she was a “public interest litigant,” a status narrowly confined to earlier attorney-fee rules and since abrogated by statute.
Trial de Novo: Because the appeal was moot, Testarmata was not entitled to a trial de novo under Alaska Appellate Rule 609(b).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) – Governs citation of memorandum opinions by the Supreme Court.
Rosen v. State Board of Public Accountancy, 689 P.2d 478 (Alaska 1984) – Early recognition of “public interest litigant” status in cost bond waivers.
Fairbanks Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Fairbanks, 48 P.3d 1165 (Alaska 2002) – Articulated the three-factor test for the public interest exception to mootness.
Kodiak Seafood Processors Ass’n v. State, 900 P.2d 1191 (Alaska 1995) – Earlier statement of the same three-factor test.
Young v. State, 502 P.3d 964 (Alaska 2022) – De novo review standard for mootness determinations and application of the public interest exception.
Peter A. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children’s Services, 146 P.3d 991 (Alaska 2006) – Applied the public interest exception in an OCS medical-consent context.
Alaska Appellate Rule 601(b) – Authorizes superior court review of final agency decisions.
Alaska Appellate Rule 609(b) – Discretion to grant a trial de novo in appeals from administrative agencies.

Legal Reasoning

The Court first reaffirmed the basic mootness doctrine: an issue is moot when no present, live controversy remains that the court can remedy. It then turned to the public interest exception, which permits courts to decide technically moot controversies when three factors justify intervention: (1) the issue is capable of repetition yet evading review, (2) application of mootness may repeatedly circumvent judicial review, and (3) the issue is of significant public importance.

On factor 1, Testarmata argued that any child in OCS custody who has not had a tetanus booster within five years could face involuntary immunization, a scenario likely to recur. The Court agreed the issue broadly is one that could recur.

On factor 2, Testarmata noted that appeals involving imminent majority would evade review by becoming moot once the child turns 18—as happened in her case and in her daughter’s prior flu‐shot grievance. The Court held, however, that only a narrow subset of OCS appeals (those filed shortly before a child’s eighteenth birthday) would be mooted, while most appeals would proceed to adjudication. Thus, the Court concluded the second factor did not support the exception.

On factor 3, the Court recognized the issue’s “public importance”—ensuring proper parental consent for medical care of foster children—but concluded that importance alone does not compel excusing mootness when the likelihood of repeated evasion is low.

Separately, Testarmata contended that the superior court had already recognized her as a “public interest litigant” by waiving her cost bond. The Supreme Court explained that “public interest litigant” status—once relevant only to attorney-fee shifting—was abrogated by statute in 2003 and has no bearing on the mootness analysis.

Impact

This decision narrows the circumstances under which the public interest exception to mootness will apply in Alaska administrative‐law appeals:

It emphasizes that mere importance and potential recurrence do not suffice; the appeal must also be likely to evade review broadly, not just in a single case context.
Appellants in OCS medical‐consent disputes should file appeals well in advance of a child’s eighteenth birthday to preserve judicial review.
Cost bond waivers no longer confer any special “public interest litigant” designation in Alaska courts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mootness: A legal rule that courts only decide live controversies. If nothing remains for the court to resolve, the case is moot and must be dismissed.
Public Interest Exception: An exception to mootness: courts may hear some moot cases if (1) the issue keeps recurring, (2) it often escapes review by becoming moot, and (3) it’s very important to the public.
Trial de Novo: A new trial in the superior court on the full merits of an administrative appeal, rather than just a review of the agency record.
Public Interest Litigant Status: An outdated concept that once allowed fee-shifting and cost bond waivers, but now eliminated by law and irrelevant to mootness.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s memorandum opinion in Testarmata v. OCS clarifies that Alaska courts will not lightly apply the public interest exception to mootness. Even when an issue is important and likely to recur—such as whether foster parents may validly consent to tetanus shots for children in OCS custody—courts will require a strong showing that similar appeals will habitually evade review. This decision underscores the need for timely appeals in administrative matters and affirms that cost bond waivers alone do not confer any special public-interest privileges.