Public-Access Rule for Deceased/Missing Foster-Child CPA and Adoption Records; Kema Narrowing of “Legitimate Purpose” Overruled

Case: Public First Law Center v. Viola
Court: Supreme Court of Hawaiʻi
Date: September 30, 2025
Posture: Original proceeding (petition for writ of mandamus/prohibition)

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I. Introduction

This decision addresses when (and how) Hawaiʻi family courts may disclose otherwise confidential records from (1) Child Protective Act (“CPA”) proceedings under HRS chapter 587A and (2) adoption proceedings under HRS chapter 578, when the child at the center of the case is deceased (or, as the opinion frames the broader rule, is missing, near-fatally harmed, critically injured, or deceased), and the records contain information about other minor children (“Siblings”).

Parties and context. Petitioner Public First Law Center sought access to the CPA and adoption records of Isabella P. Kalua (formerly Ariel Sellers), a foster child later adopted, reported missing in 2021 and judicially determined in probate to have died in August 2021. Respondents included the family court judge (Hon. Matthew J. Viola), DHS, the adoptive father, guardians ad litem, and CASA. The Siblings—through counsel—did not oppose disclosure so long as identifying information about them was redacted. DHS and the adoptive father opposed disclosure, relying heavily on confidentiality statutes and on Kema v. Gaddis.

Key issues. (1) Whether HRS § 587A-40 permits public access to CPA records based on “legitimate purpose” (notwithstanding sibling-related content), and whether Kema v. Gaddis restricts “legitimate purpose” to the child’s best interests. (2) Whether adoption records may be unsealed for “good cause” under HRS § 578-15 when intertwined with a CPA case involving a deceased foster child. (3) What role redaction and protective mechanisms play in reconciling confidentiality with disclosure.

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II. Summary of the Opinion

The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court holds that HRS § 587A-40(a) authorizes disclosure of CPA records to non-parties when a foster child is missing, has suffered a near fatality, has been critically injured, or has died, because such disclosure can serve a “legitimate purpose.” The Court further holds that sibling privacy and safety interests can be protected through targeted redactions.

The Court overrules Kema v. Gaddis to the extent it equated “legitimate purpose” with “best interests of the child,” thereby unduly narrowing disclosure authority. “Legitimate purpose” may exist for reasons unrelated to advancing the child’s best interests (e.g., public scrutiny of system failures after a foster-child death), so long as disclosure is carried out in a manner consistent with safety and well-being protections.

As to adoption records, the Court holds that “good cause” exists to release adoption records connected to an underlying CPA case when the adopted foster child is missing, near-fatally harmed, critically injured, or deceased, and the Court recognizes the family court’s authority to unseal such records to a non-party.

Procedurally, the Court exercises its supervisory powers, conducts in camera review, performs its own redactions, and orders public release of the redacted CPA and adoption files. Because the Court itself grants the functional relief, it deems the petition moot and “deny[ies]” the petition in that sense—while still ordering disclosure through supervisory authority.

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III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Kema v. Gaddis (91 Hawaiʻi 200, 982 P.2d 334 (1999))

Kema is the central precedent—and the primary obstacle to disclosure as argued by DHS and the adoptive father. In Kema, the Court interpreted the predecessor statute (HRS § 587-81) and held that “legitimate purposes” were limited to those furthering the best interests of children subject to CPA jurisdiction. DHS invoked Kema to argue that sibling information was “inextricably intertwined” with Ariel’s, and that disclosure—even with redactions—should be denied.

Here, the Court disaggregates two ideas that Kema treated as essentially the same: (i) the existence of a “legitimate purpose” for access and (ii) the need to safeguard children’s interests through confidentiality tools. The Court preserves Kema’s protective impulse (redaction to prevent sibling harm), but rejects its doctrinal narrowing of “legitimate purpose.”

2. Honolulu Civ. Beat Inc. v. Dep't of the Att'y Gen. (151 Hawaiʻi 74, 508 P.3d 1160 (2022))

The family court relied on Honolulu Civ. Beat Inc. v. Dep't of the Att'y Gen. for the proposition that over-redaction can justify withholding an entire record if redactions leave an “incomprehensible mishmash.” The Supreme Court distinguishes that logic from the statutory inquiry under HRS § 587A-40(a): once a “legitimate purpose” exists, the family court must justify nondisclosure with specific findings tied to actual harms or legal bars—not a generalized concern that the record might be “incomplete” or “misleading.”

3. Alpha, Inc. v. Bd. of Water Supply (154 Hawaiʻi 486, 555 P.3d 173 (2024))

Alpha, Inc. v. Bd. of Water Supply supplies the interpretive framework: begin with statutory text, identify ambiguity, and consult legislative history/purpose to discern intent. The Court uses Alpha to justify resort to federal-funding alignment and legislative history when construing the undefined phrase “legitimate purpose.”

4. Interest of R Children (145 Hawaiʻi 477, 454 P.3d 418 (2019)) and In Interest of FG (142 Hawaiʻi 497, 421 P.3d 1267 (2018))

These cases provide doctrinal context for how Title IV-E and CAPTA function as federal funding frameworks for state child welfare systems and their confidentiality requirements. The Court uses them to ground the proposition that Hawaiʻi’s CPA is designed to conform to federal conditions—including those authorizing (and, in CAPTA’s fatality context, effectively demanding) public disclosure in certain tragic outcomes.

5. State v. Rogan (156 Hawaiʻi 233, 573 P.3d 616 (2025))

State v. Rogan is cited for the judiciary’s inherent power over its records and the systemic values served by accessible records: transparency, accountability, informed public discussion, and judicial integrity. Although Rogan is not a family-court confidentiality case, it functions as a structural-value anchor: when statutes allow disclosure, courts should not treat confidentiality as absolute, but as a presumption subject to calibrated exceptions.

6. Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Med. Ctr. (138 Hawaiʻi 14, 375 P.3d 1252 (2016))

The Court analogizes privacy protections in medical records to sibling privacy interests in child welfare files. The citation supports the proposition that privacy rights are constitutionally weighty (Article I, Section 6), but can be accommodated by tailoring disclosure—here, through redaction—rather than categorical withholding.

7. Pack v. Kings Cnty. Hum. Servs. Agency (107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)) and In re Keisha T. (44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 822 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995))

These California authorities are used illustratively to show (i) disclosure may be denied where it risks harm to a child and (ii) courts in other jurisdictions have permitted disclosure of confidential juvenile records in contexts such as constitutional criminal-defense needs. They reinforce the Court’s approach: disclosure is not automatic, but the decision must be reasoned, specific, and attentive to countervailing safety/legal constraints.

8. “Good cause” and supervisory power authorities: Chen v. Mah; Rivera v. Cataldo; Gannett Pac. Corp. v. Richardson; In re Doe; Doe v. Doe

• Chen v. Mah (146 Hawaiʻi 157, 457 P.3d 796 (2020)) supplies the flexible, circumstance-dependent understanding of “good cause.”
• Rivera v. Cataldo (153 Hawaiʻi 320, 537 P.3d 1167 (2023)) and Gannett Pac. Corp. v. Richardson (59 Haw. 224, 580 P.2d 49 (1978)) justify use of supervisory power for matters of “considerable public importance” and to provide procedural direction to lower courts.
• In re Doe (96 Hawaiʻi 73, 26 P.3d 562 (2001)) and Doe v. Doe (98 Hawaiʻi 144, 44 P.3d 1085 (2002)) support inherent court powers to manage litigation and implement justice-oriented orders—here, empowering family courts to require DHS to undertake redaction work and manage an objections process.

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B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Court’s construction of “legitimate purpose” in HRS § 587A-40(a)

The Court begins with text: CPA records may be made available to non-parties only by court order, upon determining access is “in the best interests of the child or serves some other legitimate purpose.” Because “legitimate purpose” is undefined, the Court deems the phrase ambiguous and turns to legislative history and statutory purpose.

The Court’s interpretive pivot is federal alignment. It traces the CPA’s history (Act 171 (1983), Act 135 (2010), Act 28 (2012)) to show an enduring legislative intent not to jeopardize federal aid and to conform with Title IV-E and CAPTA. CAPTA, in particular, requires state plans to include provisions for “public disclosure of the findings or information about the case” when abuse/neglect results in a child fatality or near fatality.

From this, the Court articulates a state-law rule: in cases involving a foster child who is missing, near-fatally harmed, critically injured, or deceased, disclosure serves at least two “legitimate purposes”:

• Federal-compliance purpose: construing “legitimate purpose” to include these disclosures aligns state practice with CAPTA/Title IV-E conditions.
• Transparency/public-education purpose: disclosure informs the public about how agencies and courts responded to abuse/neglect and placement/adoption decisions.

2. Redaction as the mechanism that reconciles disclosure with child safety and privacy

The Court rejects the family court’s conclusion that redaction would necessarily produce a misleading “incomplete” record and therefore defeat disclosure. Instead, the Court reframes the inquiry: once a legitimate purpose exists, the family court must make specific findings if it is to deny disclosure, such as concrete risk of harm to a child, or other federal/state legal protections (e.g., reporter identity confidentiality, vital records).

Redaction is not treated as discretionary window-dressing; it is the doctrinal bridge that makes “public disclosure” compatible with child welfare’s core commitment to safety and well-being. The Court emphasizes redacting sibling identifiers and other information that could create a clear inference of sibling victimization or risk.

3. Partial overruling of Kema v. Gaddis

The Court’s key doctrinal move is to separate: (a) the statutory authorization for disclosure based on “legitimate purpose” from (b) the protective duty to safeguard minors and family safety.

It holds that Kema “conflated” legitimate purpose with best interests by limiting legitimate purpose to best-interest-serving ends. The Court therefore overrules Kema to the extent it imposed that limitation. But it preserves Kema’s compatibility with this decision insofar as sibling protection through redaction remains essential.

4. “Good cause” to unseal adoption records under HRS § 578-15

Adoption records, like CPA records, are confidential but may be opened upon “good cause.” The Court uses Chen v. Mah to emphasize that “good cause” depends on context, and then supplies the controlling context: the adoption records are “inextricably intertwined” with the CPA record because the adoption arose from foster placement.

The Court’s rule is functional: where the underlying CPA file must be disclosed for a legitimate purpose in the missing/near fatality/critical injury/death scenario, “good cause” exists to disclose the connected adoption record as well—again with protective redactions.

5. Supervisory power and the Court’s hands-on remedy

Rather than merely remanding with instructions, the Court uses supervisory authority to (i) review the 975-page record in camera, (ii) perform redactions itself, (iii) establish an objections process for affected participants, and (iv) order public filing of redacted records. It also provides operational guidance for family courts, including authority to order DHS to prepare redactions and manage party objections.

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C. Impact

1. A new disclosure baseline in child-fatality (and related) foster-care cases

The most immediate impact is doctrinal: the decision establishes that foster-child death (and the broader set—missing, near fatality, critical injury) is categorically capable of satisfying “legitimate purpose” under HRS § 587A-40(a), and can also supply “good cause” under HRS § 578-15 for adoption records intertwined with CPA proceedings. This shifts the center of gravity from “confidential unless exceptional” to “confidential, but disclosable with tailored protection where public scrutiny is warranted.”

2. Narrowing confidentiality absolutism; expanding judicial obligation to justify nondisclosure

The family court’s “misleading/incomplete” rationale is disapproved as a stand-alone basis to deny access once a legitimate purpose is found. Going forward, courts should expect to articulate specific, harm- or law-based grounds if they deny access in these circumstances. This invites more structured orders and a record suitable for appellate review.

3. Redaction practice becomes a central procedural battleground

The decision will likely increase litigation over the scope of redactions: what counts as “information about the Siblings,” what creates a “clear inference” of risk, and what collateral identifiers must be masked. The Court’s express statement that its own redaction choices “have no precedential value” preserves flexibility but also ensures continued contestation.

4. Administrative and workload implications

The Court acknowledges the “substantial burden” on family courts and supplies a practical workflow—most notably, empowering family courts to order DHS to prepare redacted versions, circulate them for objections, and file a redaction memorandum. This effectively institutionalizes a disclosure pipeline for high-profile or high-stakes child welfare cases.

5. Interaction with public-records culture and systemic reform

By tying disclosure to public understanding of “the response of agencies and the family court,” and citing Ariel’s case in connection with Act 86’s Mālama ʻOhana Working Group, the Court frames transparency as a tool of systemic accountability—likely influencing how advocates, journalists, and policymakers seek and use child welfare information within confidentiality constraints.

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IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• CPA confidentiality vs. disclosure (HRS § 587A-40(a)). CPA proceedings are generally closed to the public, but courts may let non-parties see records if doing so is either in the child’s best interests or serves “some other legitimate purpose.” This case clarifies that “legitimate purpose” can include public accountability after a foster-child death (and related crises), not just the child’s best interests.
• “Best interests” vs. “legitimate purpose.” “Best interests” is the child-centered welfare standard. “Legitimate purpose” is broader. After this decision, a court may allow access for public-interest reasons even if it is not specifically to further a child’s best interests—so long as the court protects children through redactions/protective orders.
• “Good cause” (HRS § 578-15). Adoption files are sealed, but a court may open them if the requester shows “good cause”—a flexible standard depending on context. Here, the context (adoption arising from a CPA placement) plus the foster-child death/related crisis supplies good cause.
• Redaction. Redaction means blacking out sensitive parts while releasing the rest. The Court treats redaction as the key method to protect minor siblings and family privacy while still permitting public access.
• In camera review. The court reviews documents privately (not in public) to decide what can be released and what must be protected.
• Writ of mandamus/prohibition. Extraordinary remedies asking an appellate court to order a lower court to do something (mandamus) or to stop doing something (prohibition). Here, the Supreme Court effectively grants the substantive outcome via supervisory authority.
• Supervisory power. The Supreme Court’s authority to guide lower courts and, in exceptional matters of public importance, to impose procedures and remedies beyond ordinary appellate correction.
• Federal backdrop: Title IV-E and CAPTA. These are federal funding statutes. CAPTA, in particular, conditions grants on states having provisions that allow public disclosure of findings or information in child fatality/near-fatality cases. The Court uses this to interpret Hawaiʻi’s “legitimate purpose” broadly enough to accommodate those federal expectations.

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V. Conclusion

Public First Law Center v. Viola reorients Hawaiʻi’s confidentiality-disclosure balance in child welfare and adoption records when tragedy (or comparable crisis) strikes. The Court clarifies that HRS § 587A-40(a) permits disclosure for “legitimate purposes” that extend beyond the “best interests of the child,” expressly overruling Kema v. Gaddis on that point. It also holds that “good cause” supports unsealing adoption records intertwined with CPA proceedings in the same missing/near fatality/critical injury/death circumstances.

Equally significant is the Court’s procedural message: confidentiality is protected not by categorical denial, but by targeted redaction, specific harm-based findings when withholding is necessary, and structured processes (potentially DHS-driven) to implement disclosure responsibly. The decision thus establishes a transparency-forward, safety-sensitive framework likely to shape how Hawaiʻi courts, DHS, advocates, and the public navigate access to the most consequential child welfare files.