Proximity Is Not Enough: Sixth Circuit Requires Clear Predicate Felony and Nexus to Apply §2K2.1(b)(6)(B) Enhancement

Case: United States v. Guanterio Logan, No. 24-3264 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2025) (not recommended for publication)

Panel: Cole, Stranch, Readler, Circuit Judges; opinion by Judge Cole; Judge Readler dissenting

Introduction

In United States v. Logan, the Sixth Circuit vacated a 110-month sentence for a felon-in-possession conviction after finding the district court erred in applying the four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). That provision increases a defendant’s offense level if he “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” The ruling reinforces two bedrock limits in the Sixth Circuit:

When the “other felony offense” is drug possession, mere proximity between a firearm and drugs does not suffice; the court must find that the firearm actually facilitated or had the potential to facilitate the possession offense.
When the government (or probation) invokes the “drug trafficking” shortcut in Application Note 14(B), the court must first find—by a preponderance of the evidence—that trafficking actually occurred.

The case arose from a traffic stop in Summit County, Ohio, during which officers found a handgun in a bag near where Logan sat, a jar of marijuana, a digital scale, and 6.19 grams of methamphetamine on Logan’s person. Although the Presentence Report recommended the enhancement (and the district court adopted that recommendation), both the defense and the government opposed it at sentencing. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the parties, holding that the record and the district court’s explanation did not satisfy § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).

Summary of the Opinion

The court vacated Logan’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, concluding that the district court:

Failed to clearly identify which “other felony offense” it relied upon to apply § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)—simple possession or trafficking—despite adopting the PSR and also invoking generalizations about drug trafficking.
Could not apply the enhancement based on drug possession because the record did not establish that the firearm facilitated or had the potential to facilitate possession of 6.19 grams of methamphetamine.
Could not apply a trafficking-based enhancement because the record did not support, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Logan was engaged in drug trafficking.
Committed procedural error that was not harmless, as the enhancement changed the Guidelines range and there was no indication the court would have imposed the same sentence without it.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Standards of review and procedural reasonableness:
- United States v. Angel, 576 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2009): Reinforces appellate review of Guidelines calculations as part of procedural reasonableness; acknowledges preponderance standard at sentencing.
- United States v. Morris, 71 F.4th 475 (6th Cir. 2023): District courts must properly calculate the Guidelines and adequately explain the sentence.
- United States v. Mukes, 980 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2020): Legal interpretations of Guidelines reviewed de novo; factual findings for clear error.
- United States v. Seymour, 739 F.3d 923 (6th Cir. 2014) and United States v. Shanklin, 924 F.3d 905 (6th Cir. 2019): Emphasize “due deference” to district courts on the nexus assessment but recognize the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry.
“In connection with” in possession cases versus trafficking cases:
- United States v. Hardin, 248 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2001): Proximity alone does not automatically justify the enhancement; more is needed in possession cases.
- United States v. Shields, 664 F.3d 1040 (6th Cir. 2011): For possession offenses, the firearm must actually or potentially facilitate the crime (mere co-location with modest drug amounts is insufficient).
- United States v. Ennenga, 263 F.3d 499 (6th Cir. 2001): Recognizes protection of a “large and valuable stash” as a facilitation theory; the larger and more valuable the stash, the stronger the inference.
- United States v. McKenzie, 410 F. App’x 943 (6th Cir. 2011): Small drug amounts undermine the facilitation inference.
Evidence indicative of trafficking:
- United States v. Hampton, 769 F. App’x 308 (6th Cir. 2019): Trafficking supported by multiple separate bags of methamphetamine of substantial weight and significant street value.
- United States v. Cantrell, 807 F. App’x 428 (6th Cir. 2020): Trafficking supported by two bags containing 7.75 grams and 150 grams of methamphetamine.
- United States v. Granado, No. 23-1171, 2024 WL 731128 (6th Cir. Feb. 22, 2024): Digital scales are instruments of the drug trade; however, scale evidence often appears alongside additional trafficking indicators (e.g., residue, messages, packaging).
- United States v. Richardson, 510 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2007): Prior record demonstrating trafficking can bear on knowledge and participation; here, Logan’s prior record reflected possession, not trafficking.
Explanation requirements and harmless error:
- United States v. Nichols, 802 F. App’x 172 (6th Cir. 2020) and Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): District courts must provide a meaningful explanation when applying contested enhancements.
- United States v. Alvarado, 95 F.4th 1047 (6th Cir. 2024) and United States v. McCarty, 628 F.3d 284 (6th Cir. 2010): Misapplication requires remand unless the error is harmless; different Guidelines ranges coupled with no clear indication of the same sentence typically foreclose harmlessness.

Legal Reasoning

The court framed the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) inquiry in two steps: (1) identify the “other felony offense” (which can be uncharged and proven by a preponderance of the evidence) and (2) determine whether the firearm was used or possessed “in connection with” that offense. Application Note 14(A) equates “in connection with” to whether the firearm “facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, another felony offense.” Application Note 14(B) adds a narrow shortcut for drug trafficking: if the predicate is a trafficking offense, proximity of the firearm to drugs or paraphernalia can suffice. But Note 14(B) does not eliminate the threshold requirement that trafficking must be proven in the first place.

1) Ambiguity about the predicate felony

The district court adopted the PSR, which based the enhancement on felony possession of methamphetamine. Yet the court’s oral remarks suggested a trafficking rationale, invoking general truths about drug dealers commonly possessing firearms. The appellate panel found the explanation “far from satisfactory,” leaving uncertainty as to which predicate offense the district court relied upon—contrary to the requirement to give a meaningful explanation for a contested enhancement.

2) If the predicate is possession, proximity is insufficient

Sixth Circuit law draws a sharp distinction between possession and trafficking:

For possession, courts cannot rely on co-location alone. The government must show the firearm actually or potentially facilitated the possession offense (e.g., by protecting a “large and valuable stash”).
The record here contained no evidence of drug purity or street value and no finding that 6.19 grams of methamphetamine constituted a “large and valuable stash.”
Although there was a jar of marijuana and a scale in the car, the marijuana quantity and value were unknown, and marijuana under 200 grams is a misdemeanor in Ohio—so it could not serve as the felony predicate.
Logan’s written acceptance-of-responsibility statement offered a non-drug-specific explanation: he carried the firearm for self-protection while traveling through dangerous areas. Without contradicting evidence, that statement undercut any inference that the gun was for protecting drugs.

On these facts, the court concluded that the government did not establish the requisite nexus for a possession-based enhancement.

3) If the predicate is trafficking, the record did not prove trafficking occurred

The government itself told the district court it could not prove trafficking by a preponderance. The usual trafficking indicia—multiple baggies, drug residues on a scale, significant cash, communications reflecting sales, or quantities strongly exceeding personal use—were absent. The scale was found near the marijuana, not the methamphetamine, and the record lacked evidence tying it to meth distribution (such as residue or packaging). Logan’s record reflected prior possession, not trafficking. Absent a proven trafficking predicate, the shortcut in Application Note 14(B) (where proximity suffices) could not be invoked.

4) Procedural error and harmlessness

The enhancement increased Logan’s total offense level from 21 (77–96 months) to 25 (110–137 months). Because the error altered the Guidelines range and the record contained no indication the district court would have imposed the same sentence without the enhancement, the procedural error was not harmless. Vacatur and remand for resentencing were therefore required.

The Dissent

Judge Readler would have affirmed. He concluded that the record demonstrated two other felonies—state felony possession of methamphetamine and federal possession with intent to distribute—and that Logan possessed the firearm “in connection with” either offense.

On the predicate felonies: The dissent viewed 6.19 grams of methamphetamine, a digital scale, and a pistol as sufficient to infer trafficking intent, citing the scale as a hallmark of dealing and noting that dealers often arm themselves.
On the nexus: For possession, the dissent endorsed an “emboldenment/protection” rationale—i.e., a gun can facilitate possession by emboldening the offender to carry drugs in public or by providing protection (citing out-of-circuit authorities). For trafficking, once trafficking is found, proximity suffices under Application Note 14(B).
On explanation: The dissent considered the enhancement “conceptually straightforward” and deemed the district court’s explanation adequate, given that we review factual findings for clear error and afford due deference on the nexus assessment.

The majority diverged on the core evidentiary inferences: it refused to infer trafficking from a modest quantity and a scale unconnected to the methamphetamine, and it declined to apply an emboldenment theory for possession absent evidence of a valuable stash or a gun-for-drugs nexus.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although not precedential, Logan is a current and concrete application of existing Sixth Circuit constraints on § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). It has several practical consequences:

Clear identification of the predicate felony is essential. District courts should say plainly whether the enhancement rests on possession or trafficking and articulate the supporting facts. Adopting a PSR while invoking trafficking generalities invites reversal.
Possession cases require a real nexus. Where quantities suggest personal use, courts should expect evidence that the firearm protected a “large and valuable stash” or otherwise facilitated possession. Generic references to the drug-gun connection are inadequate.
Trafficking requires proof before proximity. Application Note 14(B)’s proximity shortcut applies only after trafficking is established by a preponderance. Indicators include packaging, residues on a scale, large amounts of currency, communications evidencing sales, or quantities/value clearly exceeding personal use.
Probation and the government should build a record. If a PSR recommends § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), it should specify the predicate offense and marshal concrete facts indicating either facilitation (for possession) or trafficking indicia. Reliance on a state indictment, without more, is insufficient.
Defense strategies. Emphasize personal-use quantities, lack of trafficking indicia, and alternative explanations for gun possession. Object to ambiguity about the predicate offense and insist on express findings.
Harmless-error stakes are high. Because the enhancement can materially increase the Guidelines range, misapplication will rarely be harmless absent an explicit statement that the same sentence would be imposed regardless.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“In connection with.” The firearm must have helped, or had the potential to help, commit the other felony. For possession cases, this usually means proof that the gun protected a valuable stash or otherwise made the possession offense safer or easier.
Application Note 14(B)—the “proximity” shortcut. This shortcut applies only to trafficking offenses. If the predicate is trafficking, a gun found near drugs or paraphernalia typically satisfies the nexus.
Preponderance of the evidence. The government must show that it is more likely than not that the facts supporting the enhancement are true—lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Uncharged offenses can count. The “other felony offense” need not be charged or result in a conviction; it just must be proven by a preponderance.
Procedural reasonableness and explanation. A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the court miscalculates the Guidelines or fails to adequately explain key decisions, including contested enhancements.
Harmless error. Even if there is an error, an appellate court will affirm if it is certain the error did not affect the outcome. Where an enhancement changes the Guidelines range, harmlessness is hard to show without a clear alternative explanation from the district court.

Conclusion

United States v. Logan underscores and sharpens Sixth Circuit doctrine limiting § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B): proximity between a firearm and drugs does not carry the government’s burden in possession cases, and courts may not rely on the trafficking proximity shortcut without first proving trafficking. The decision also spotlights the need for district courts to clearly identify the predicate felony and articulate the specific facts that establish either facilitation or trafficking. On remand, the district court must recalculate the Guidelines without the misapplied enhancement or, if the government renews its request, make the detailed findings this opinion requires. In the broader sentencing landscape, Logan serves as a cautionary reminder: enhancements must be grounded in precise factual findings tied to the correct legal framework—not in general assumptions about the drug-gun nexus.