Protective Orders in Rhode Island Remain Governed by a Preponderance Standard Despite Temporary Firearm Surrender

I. Introduction

In Alicia Andrew v. Richard Adorno (R.I. Jan. 15, 2026), the Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed a recurring and practically significant question at the intersection of civil protective-order practice and firearm regulation: whether a court may heighten the plaintiff’s burden of proof from the usual civil standard (“preponderance of the evidence”) to “clear and convincing evidence” when the requested protective order would trigger a temporary loss of firearm possession under Rhode Island law.

The parties were Alicia Andrew (complainant/plaintiff), who sought protection based on an alleged sexual assault, and Richard Adorno (respondent/defendant), who appealed and proceeded pro se in Superior Court. The key issue on appeal was not whether the alleged assault occurred, but what evidentiary standard governs civil protective-order proceedings—especially when firearm surrender may result.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The District Court issued an ex parte temporary order and later entered a final protective order (three-year duration), including firearm surrender language linked to G.L. 1956 § 11-47-5. On de novo appeal, the Superior Court applied a “clear and convincing evidence” standard, reasoning that temporary firearm restrictions implicated the Second Amendment in a manner analogous to Rhode Island’s “extreme risk” proceedings. Applying that heightened standard, the trial justice found the defendant more credible in a “he said, she said” case and dismissed the complaint.

The Supreme Court vacated. It held that the Superior Court committed an error of law by elevating the burden of proof. The Court ruled that a preponderance of the evidence standard governs domestic assault and sexual assault protective-order proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that a qualifying protective order can temporarily restrict firearm possession under § 11-47-5(b). The case was remanded for a new hearing using the correct standard.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Warwick Sewer Authority v. Carlone, 45 A.3d 493 (R.I. 2012): Cited for the proposition that alleged errors of law are reviewed de novo. This framed the Supreme Court’s role as deciding the legal standard independently.
Lett v. Providence Journal Company, 798 A.2d 355 (R.I. 2002) (quoting Votolato v. Merandi, 747 A.2d 455 (R.I. 2000)): Used to reinforce that legal questions are reviewed de novo because the Supreme Court is best positioned to decide them.
Beagan v. Rhode Island Department of Labor & Training, 253 A.3d 858 (R.I. 2021) (quoting Powers v. Warwick Public Schools, 204 A.3d 1078 (R.I. 2019)): Cited for principles of statutory interpretation—chiefly, the Court’s objective of giving effect to legislative purpose.
Thibaudeau v. Thibaudeau, 947 A.2d 243 (R.I. 2008): The Court’s key Rhode Island reference point on the burden of proof for protective orders. There, the Court “tacitly approved” a preponderance standard when it quoted the hearing justice’s finding “by a fair preponderance of the evidence” and found no clear error. Although Thibaudeau predated PRIFA, it anchored the Court’s conclusion that Rhode Island protective-order practice did not historically require a heightened evidentiary burden.
In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010)): Invoked for the canon that when the legislature includes language in one statutory section but omits it in another, courts presume the omission was deliberate. This supported the Court’s refusal to “read in” a heightened burden.
Simeone v. Charron, 762 A.2d 442 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Elder v. Elder, 84 R.I. 13, 120 A.2d 815 (1956)): Cited for judicial restraint in statutory construction—courts are not entitled to write omitted policy choices into statutes; if change is desirable, it belongs to the legislature.
Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927 (D.C. 1991); Steckler v. Steckler, 492 N.W.2d 76 (N.D. 1992); Frizado v. Frizado, 651 N.E.2d 1206 (Mass. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Zullo v. Goguen, 672 N.E.2d 502 (Mass. 1996); Felton v. Felton, 679 N.E.2d 672 (Ohio 1997): Cited collectively for the proposition that, by statute or judicial interpretation, jurisdictions “uniformly apply a preponderance” standard in domestic violence and abuse protective-order contexts.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)): Cited to acknowledge that “clear and convincing evidence” sometimes applies in civil cases to protect weighty interests (e.g., significant liberty deprivations or stigma). The Court used these decisions to show the category exists—but does not apply automatically in every civil matter touching constitutional rights.
People v. Jason K., 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 443 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010): Cited for the specific point that the potential loss of an important constitutional right does not, by itself, make the preponderance standard unconstitutional under due process principles.
Turner v. Turner, 317 P.3d 716 (Idaho 2023) and Roper v. Jolliffe, 493 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015): The Court treated these as the closest analogues directly addressing Second Amendment implications on protective-order proof burdens. Both approved preponderance standards, emphasizing (i) the temporary nature of firearm restrictions and (ii) the safety stakes for protected persons.

B. Legal Reasoning

Issue narrowed to a pure question of law. The Court expressly declined to decide whether Ms. Andrew should ultimately receive a protective order. The appeal was confined to identifying the correct burden of proof—a legal question reviewed de novo.
Statutory structure: chapter 37.2 relief and firearm consequences. The Superior Court treated the matter under G.L. 1956 chapter 37.2 of title 11 (Sexual Assault Protective Orders). Although chapter 37.2 does not expressly list firearm surrender as a remedy (in contrast to § 15-15-3(a)(4) and § 8-8.1-3(a)(4)), it authorizes any relief “including, but not limited to” enumerated options (§ 11-37.2-2(a)). The Supreme Court concluded that this relief provision “implicates” § 11-47-5(b), which restricts firearm rights when a person is subject to certain civil protective orders entered with notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Legislative intent after PRIFA: no heightened burden added. The Court emphasized that the Protect Rhode Island Families Act, P.L. 2017, chs. 374, 385 (PRIFA) expanded courts’ authority to require firearm surrender during protective orders, but did not alter the proof standard for obtaining those orders. Applying the inclusion/omission canon (In re Proposed Town of New Shoreham Project; Kucana v. Holder), the Court found it decisive that the General Assembly did specify “clear and convincing evidence” in other PRIFA-related contexts—particularly when a restrained person seeks restoration of firearm rights: § 15-15-3(j) and § 8-8.1-3(j). That targeted use of a heightened standard underscored that the legislature knew how to require it when desired and chose not to do so for issuance of protective orders.
Constitutional interests acknowledged, but not treated as automatically requiring clear and convincing evidence. The Superior Court elevated the burden based on Second Amendment implications. The Supreme Court rejected that move as a matter of doctrine and practical design: the mere presence of a constitutional interest does not compel a heightened burden in every civil proceeding (People v. Jason K.), and heightened burdens in civil cases are typically reserved for more severe or enduring deprivations (Santosky v. Kramer; Addington v. Texas).
Temporary nature and procedural safeguards weigh against heightening the standard. The Court found it important that Rhode Island’s firearm restrictions in this setting are temporary—coextensive with the protective order (here, up to three years under § 11-37.2-2(d)). It also emphasized that restrained individuals have pathways to challenge and seek earlier restoration of firearm rights, citing § 8-8.1-3(c) (hearing within fifteen days of surrendering firearms). These features made the deprivation meaningfully different from permanent or highly stigmatizing civil sanctions that often trigger clear-and-convincing proof.
Alignment with national practice and the two closest Second Amendment-specific appellate decisions. The Court viewed nationwide practice as overwhelmingly preponderance-based for protective orders and found direct support in Turner v. Turner and Roper v. Jolliffe, both of which rejected arguments for a heightened standard based on temporary firearm restrictions and stressed the safety consequences of denying protection.

C. Impact

Clarifies the statewide rule. Trial courts may not unilaterally increase the burden of proof for domestic assault or sexual assault protective orders to “clear and convincing evidence” based on firearm consequences. The governing standard is preponderance of the evidence.
Reduces forum-level variability and “standard-shopping.” By correcting a Superior Court practice of importing an “extreme risk” burden into protective orders, the decision promotes uniformity across District and Superior Court protective-order litigation.
Separates “issuance” and “restoration” burdens in the PRIFA scheme. The Court’s reasoning highlights a legislative design choice: protective orders may issue on a preponderance showing, while restoration of firearm rights (where expressly provided) may demand clear and convincing evidence. Future litigants should expect courts to respect that asymmetry rather than collapse the stages.
Frames Second Amendment arguments in protective-order cases. The decision does not minimize Second Amendment interests, but it channels those interests into statutory procedure and temporariness analysis rather than permitting categorical burden escalation. Future challenges are likely to focus on notice/opportunity-to-be-heard compliance, duration, and restoration procedures rather than proof standard inflation.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Preponderance of the evidence: The ordinary civil standard: the factfinder must believe it is more likely than not that the claim is true (often described as “51%”).
Clear and convincing evidence: A higher civil standard requiring a stronger degree of certainty than “more likely than not,” used in selected contexts involving especially weighty or enduring consequences.
De novo review: Appellate review without deference on the legal question; the Supreme Court decides the issue anew.
Ex parte temporary protective order: A short-term order issued without the respondent present, typically to stabilize safety risks until a hearing can be held.
Protective-order-triggered firearm restriction: Under § 11-47-5(b), being subject to certain protective orders (issued after notice and an opportunity to be heard) can temporarily restrict firearm possession for the duration of the order.
Statutory “inclusion/omission” canon: If the legislature uses specific language in one part of a statute but not another, courts presume the difference was intentional; courts generally will not add the missing language themselves.

V. Conclusion

Alicia Andrew v. Richard Adorno establishes a clear rule for Rhode Island: civil protective orders—whether pursued under domestic assault or sexual assault protective-order statutes—are adjudicated under a preponderance of the evidence standard, even though such orders may temporarily restrict firearm possession under § 11-47-5(b). The Supreme Court grounded this holding in statutory text and structure (including PRIFA’s selective use of “clear and convincing” language), interpretive canons, persuasive national authority, and the temporary, reviewable nature of the firearm restriction. The judgment was vacated and remanded for a new hearing applying the correct standard.