Protecting Symbolic Expression: Supreme Court Upholds Flag Protection Act of 1989 as Unconstitutional

Protecting Symbolic Expression: Supreme Court Upholds Flag Protection Act of 1989 as Unconstitutional

Introduction

The case of United States v. Eichman et al. (496 U.S. 310, 1990) represents a pivotal moment in First Amendment jurisprudence concerning symbolic speech and national symbols. The appellants, including Michael Eichman and others, were prosecuted under the Flag Protection Act of 1989 for burning the United States flag as a form of political protest. The central issue revolved around whether this Act, which criminalized the desecration of the American flag, violated the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in TEXAS v. JOHNSON (491 U.S. 397, 1989), which deemed similar state laws unconstitutional, Congress enacted the Flag Protection Act of 1989 in an attempt to constitutionally safeguard the flag from desecration. However, when individuals were prosecuted under this new federal statute, challenges arose regarding its constitutionality, leading to this landmark Supreme Court review.

Summary of the Judgment

In a unanimous decision delivered by Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Courts' rulings that the Flag Protection Act of 1989 infringed upon the First Amendment rights of the appellants. The Court held that the Act's restriction on flag desecration was inherently content-based, targeting expressive conduct related to the message conveyed by the flag's destruction. Consequently, the Act was subjected to stringent scrutiny and ultimately deemed unconstitutional as it could not justify the infringement on free speech without reference to the regulated speech's content.

The Court emphasized that while the government has a legitimate interest in preserving the flag as a national symbol, such interests must not suppress the expressive value of actions like flag burning. The decision underscored that even deeply offensive speech cannot be prohibited solely because it is disagreeable to society.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment heavily relied on the precedent set by TEXAS v. JOHNSON (491 U.S. 397, 1989), where the Court previously invalidated a state law prohibiting flag desecration, recognizing such acts as protected expressive conduct under the First Amendment. Additionally, the Court referenced BOOS v. BARRY (485 U.S. 312, 1988), which emphasized that restrictions on expression must not pertain to the content of the regulated speech. Other notable citations included CHAPLINSKY v. NEW HAMPSHIRE (315 U.S. 568, 1942) concerning unprotected speech categories and SPENCE v. WASHINGTON (418 U.S. 405, 1974) regarding symbolic speech.

These precedents collectively established that expressive conduct, even when offensive, is shielded by the First Amendment. The reliance on these cases underscored the Court's commitment to protecting symbolic speech from governmental suppression based on its content or offensive nature.

Legal Reasoning

The Court's reasoning centered on the principle that the government cannot restrict speech based on its content without meeting rigorous constitutional standards. Although the Flag Protection Act did not explicitly reference the content of the expression, the Court interpreted the Act's underlying intent to protect the flag's symbolic integrity as a content-based restriction.

The Act criminalized various forms of flag desecration, implicitly targeting actions that conveyed disrespect towards national symbols. The exemption for disposing of "worn or soiled" flags indicated a content-driven approach, distinguishing between respectful and disrespectful treatment based on the act's communicative intent.

Applying the precedent from Johnson, the Court determined that the government's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity was directly related to the suppression of expressive conduct. As such, the Act failed to pass the strict scrutiny test, which demands that any content-based regulation serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.

Impact

This judgment reinforced the robust protections afforded to symbolic speech under the First Amendment, setting a clear boundary against governmental attempts to suppress expressive acts based on their content or perceived offensiveness. The decision affirmed that even actions symbolizing dissent, such as flag burning, are protected forms of political expression.

Future cases involving national symbols or expressive conduct will cite United States v. Eichman as a pivotal authority in upholding free speech protections. The ruling serves as a precedent, ensuring that laws aimed at protecting national symbols cannot infringe upon constitutional freedoms unless they meet the highest standards of justification and alignment with constitutional principles.

Additionally, the decision underscores the judiciary's role in safeguarding expressive rights, emphasizing that societal outrage or disrespect towards specific expressions do not invalidate the protections guaranteed by the Constitution.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Symbolic Speech: Actions that communicate a message without using words, such as flag burning, are considered protected speech under the First Amendment.
  • Content-Based Restriction: Government regulations that target speech because of the ideas expressed are subject to strict scrutiny and are often unconstitutional.
  • Strict Scrutiny: The highest level of judicial review, requiring the government to prove that a law serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
  • Expressive Conduct: Actions that intend to convey a particular message or viewpoint, recognized as a form of protected speech.
  • First Amendment: The constitutional amendment that protects freedoms concerning religion, expression, assembly, and the right to petition.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Eichman et al. reinforces the inviolable nature of the First Amendment's protections for freedom of speech, extending robust safeguards to symbolic acts of expression. By invalidating the Flag Protection Act of 1989, the Court affirmed that governmental interests in preserving national symbols cannot override constitutional freedoms, even when the expressions in question are offensive to many.

This judgment underscores the principle that the essence of free speech lies in protecting not just popular or agreeable expressions, but also those that challenge, offend, or provoke societal norms. As such, the ruling serves as a cornerstone for future cases addressing the intersection of national symbolism and expressive conduct, ensuring that the foundational liberties enshrined in the Constitution remain steadfast against legislative overreach.

Case Details

Year: 1990
Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Judge(s)

William Joseph BrennanJohn Paul StevensByron Raymond WhiteSandra Day O'Connor

Attorney(S)

Solicitor General Starr argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Dennis, Deputy Solicitor General Roberts, and Michael R. Lazerwitz. William M. Kunstler argued the cause for appellees in both cases. With him on the brief in both cases were Ronald L. Kuby, David D. Cole, Nina Kraut, and Kevin Peck. Charles S. Hamilton III, by appointment of the Court, 495 U.S. 902, filed a brief in No. 89-1434 for appellee Strong. Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States Senate by Michael Davidson, Ken U. Benjamin, Jr., and Morgan J. Frankel; for Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., by Kenneth S. Geller, Andrew J. Pincus, and Roy T. Englert, Jr.; Page 312 for Governor Mario M. Cuomo by Evan A. Davis; and for the Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc., by Robert L. Barr, Jr., and G. Stephen Parker. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Charles Fried, Kathleen M. Sullivan. Norman Dorsen, and Steven R. Shapiro; for the Association of Art Museum Directors et al. by James C. Goodale; for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People by Charles E. Carter; for People for the American Way et al. by Timothy B. Dyk, Glen D. Nager, and Elliot M. Mincberg; and for Jasper Johns et al. by Robert G. Sugarman and Gloria C. Phares. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Speaker and Leadership Group of the United States House of Representatives by Steven R. Ross, Charles Tiefer, Michael L. Murray, Janina Jaruzelski, and Robert Michael Long; and for the American Bar Association by Stanley Chauvin, Jr., Randolph W. Thrower, and Robert B. McKay.

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