Prospective Relief and the Redundant-Remedies Doctrine in Texas Administrative Law:
Reynaldo “Rey” Gonzalez, Jr., M.D., J.D. v. Texas Medical Board

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Reynaldo “Rey” Gonzalez, Jr., M.D., J.D. v. Texas Medical Board, No. 24‑0340 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2025), sits at the intersection of administrative law, constitutional free-speech protections, and professional regulation. Although the opinion does not decide whether the Texas Medical Board (TMB) may constitutionally police political campaign speech, it lays down an important procedural and remedial principle:

When a litigant seeks prospective declaratory or injunctive relief that “goes beyond reversal” of a specific agency order, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) action is not barred by the redundant-remedies doctrine, even if the same constitutional or ultra vires theories could have been asserted in a prior, time-limited petition for judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

At the same time, the Court reaffirms a structural constraint on agency power: an administrative rule cannot create judicial review where no statute authorizes it. Thus, a party who disclaims reliance on the APA cannot use an agency rule alone to obtain substantial-evidence review of an agency order.

The case arose when Gonzalez, a licensed attorney who holds a medical degree but is not licensed to practice medicine, ran for Congress Branding himself as “Dr. Gonzalez” and describing himself as a “physician.” The TMB treated this as an unlicensed-practice problem rather than an election matter, issued a cease-and-desist order, and threatened substantial civil penalties. Gonzalez responded with a multi-front attack—statutory, constitutional, and ultra vires—on the Board’s authority and on the constitutionality of the Occupations Code. The lower courts mostly refused to reach the merits, invoking jurisdictional and remedial doctrines. The Supreme Court corrected that path, reopening the courthouse door for most of Gonzalez’s claims.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Parties and Regulatory Context

The Texas Medical Board is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine. Its responsibilities include:

• preventing the unlicensed practice of medicine, and
• ensuring that licensed physicians comply with standards of care.

The Board’s authority traces back to the Republic of Texas’s early “Medical Practice Act” of 1837, which created the Board of Medical Censors. Over time, that authority has evolved into the current Medical Practice Act and related provisions, including the Healing Art Identification Act and Texas Occupations Code § 104.004, the statute Gonzalez directly challenges.

Reynaldo “Rey” Gonzalez, Jr. holds both an M.D. and a J.D. He chose to practice law, not medicine. He:

• earned a medical degree from an accredited medical school,
• never obtained a license to practice medicine in Texas,
• is licensed to practice law,
• taught as an adjunct professor at the University of Texas, and
• was a member of the American Board of Legal Medicine.

Despite his lack of a medical license, Gonzalez identifies strongly with his medical training. His campaign materials reflected that self-conception.

B. The Campaign Speech That Triggered Enforcement

While running for a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives, Gonzalez:

• used the campaign moniker “Dr. Gonzalez,” and
• referred to himself explicitly as a “physician.”

His candidate profile explained:

By God's grace I am a physician and an attorney. I adopted a motto years ago which appears on my office's logo. It says in Latin, "Vocatus ad Sanandum," which means, "Called to Heal." My calling to serve in medicine was to heal the sick. My calling to serve in law is to heal my fellow man who is wronged by a third party. My most recent calling, to serve in the United States House of Representatives, is to contribute to the healing and a return to civility to our nation.

A complaint alleged that, by such statements, Gonzalez was:

• falsely “holding himself out as a physician,” and
• improperly calling himself “Dr. Gonzalez.”

Notably, this was—so far as TMB was aware—the first time in its history it had disciplined someone for speech made on the campaign trail, a role more commonly associated with election officials or ethics commissions than with a professional licensing board. The opinion analogizes this to Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2016), where the Fifth Circuit struck down a similar effort by the Texas psychology board to restrict a candidate’s campaign use of the title “psychologist.”

C. The TMB Proceeding and Cease-and-Desist Order

TMB opened an investigation to decide whether Gonzalez’s speech constituted the unlicensed practice of medicine or otherwise violated:

• the Medical Practice Act, and
• the Healing Art Identification Act.

After giving Gonzalez a hearing, the Board concluded that he had violated these statutes and issued a cease-and-desist order. The order required Gonzalez to:

• stop using the titles “doctor,” “physician,” and “Dr.” (as in “Dr. Gonzalez”) unless he “designat[ed] the authority giving rise to th[ose] title[s]”, and
• face civil penalties of up to $5,000 per violation if he failed to comply.

Practically, this meant that in campaign materials and perhaps even in live speeches he would either have to:

• disclose that he has a medical degree but is not licensed to practice medicine in Texas, or
• avoid using “doctor” and “physician” altogether.

Gonzalez sought rehearing, which was overruled by operation of law. Eighty-one days after that, he filed suit in the Travis County district court.

D. Gonzalez’s Claims in the Trial Court

Gonzalez’s petition was wide-ranging but, as the Supreme Court notes, ultimately boiled down to four core contentions:

1. Substantial-evidence challenge: The evidence did not support the cease-and-desist order.
2. As-applied constitutional challenge: Texas Occupations Code § 104.004 is unconstitutional as applied to his campaign speech.
3. Facial constitutional challenge: Section 104.004 is facially unconstitutional because it prevents anyone with a medical or other doctoral degree from truthfully describing their education and training.
4. Ultra vires claim: TMB acted beyond its statutory authority by regulating him at all, because he is not licensed to practice medicine and did not practice or attempt to practice medicine in Texas.

He requested:

• reversal (setting aside) of the cease-and-desist order,
• a declaration that TMB exceeded its statutory authority,
• temporary injunctive relief halting enforcement of the order while the case was pending, and
• “such other and further equitable relief” as he might be entitled to at law or in equity.

E. Lower Court Dispositions

TMB moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion as to all claims.

The Third Court of Appeals (Austin) largely affirmed, but it held that the facial constitutional challenge to § 104.004 was not barred by the redundant-remedies doctrine and remanded that single claim for further proceedings. The court concluded that the other claims—substantial-evidence, as-applied constitutional, and ultra vires—were either untimely under the APA or constitutionally barred by redundant remedies.

Gonzalez petitioned for review. TMB did not file a cross-petition, so the partial remand in favor of Gonzalez (on the facial challenge) was not itself at issue in the Supreme Court.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

Justice Sullivan, writing for the Court (with Justice Hawkins not participating), issued a mixed ruling:

• On the redundant-remedies doctrine: The Court held that Gonzalez’s as-applied constitutional claim and his ultra vires claim seek prospective relief that “goes beyond reversal” of the cease-and-desist order. Therefore, they are not barred by the redundant-remedies doctrine, even though he could have raised similar arguments in a timely petition under the APA. The court of appeals erred in dismissing these claims.
• On substantial-evidence review: Gonzalez’s substantial-evidence challenge was properly dismissed for want of jurisdiction. There is no statute authorizing direct judicial review of this type of cease-and-desist order outside of the APA, and an agency rule cannot create such jurisdiction.
• On remand: The Court:
  • reversed the court of appeals in part,
  • affirmed in part, and
  • remanded to the district court for proceedings on:
    • the facial constitutional challenge to § 104.004,
    • the as-applied constitutional challenge, and
    • the ultra vires claim.

The Court pointedly concluded: “If the Texas Medical Board thinks it has the power to police campaign speech, it will have to defend that position on the merits.”

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Patel v. Texas Department of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015)

Patel is the central administrative-law precedent in this opinion. There, eyebrow-threading practitioners challenged certain cosmetology licensing requirements as unconstitutional. Two aspects of Patel are relevant:

1. Scope of the APA remedy vs UDJA claims.
   The Court in Patel emphasized that on appeal from an administrative decision, “[t]he available remedies on appeal from an administrative finding are limited to reversal of the particular orders at issue.” The plaintiffs, however, sought prospective injunctive relief against future enforcement of the challenged statutes and regulations. Because that relief extended beyond the mere reversal of existing citations, their UDJA action was permitted and was not barred by the redundant-remedies doctrine.
2. “Goes beyond reversal of an agency order.”
   Patel used this phrase to describe the kind of relief that can justify a parallel UDJA/constitutional challenge even where APA review is theoretically available. The Gonzalez Court adopts this framework and applies it directly: if the plaintiff wants more than the undoing of a particular order, the APA remedy is not “redundant.”

In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court reads Patel to mean that:

• The test is whether the alternative remedy (e.g., APA review) would give the same relief, not whether it would allow litigants to raise the same claims or theories.
• Thus the doctrine is properly labeled the “redundant-remedies” doctrine, not the “redundant-claims” doctrine.

2. Jones v. Turner, 646 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. 2022)

Jones concerned the relationship between UDJA actions and other causes of action. The Court there recognized that a UDJA claim can be improper when the plaintiff “could be awarded relief” in another cause of action “that would render a declaratory judgment redundant.”

The Gonzalez opinion cites Jones to reinforce that courts should look at the practical relief available elsewhere; if the plaintiff can obtain everything he needs in another cause, there is no reason to proceed under UDJA. But here, because APA review is limited to the specific cease-and-desist order and cannot confer broad prospective relief, Jones does not bar Gonzalez’s declaratory claims.

3. City of Corpus Christi v. Public Utility Commission, 51 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2001)

This decision shows that facial constitutional challenges can, in fact, be raised in the context of a judicial review of a contested-case proceeding. In Gonzalez, the Court uses City of Corpus Christi to establish that Gonzalez’s facial challenge to § 104.004 could have been raised in a timely APA petition. But it then makes a critical move: the ability to raise the challenge in APA review is not dispositive of redundancy. The question is whether APA review could have provided the same relief. Here, it would not: it would only address the specific order, not TMB’s future use of § 104.004 against Gonzalez’s campaign speech.

4. City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009)

Heinrich is the foundational Texas case on ultra vires suits. It holds that:

• sovereign immunity does not bar suits to require state officials to comply with statutory or constitutional limits on their authority, but
• such suits must be brought against the state officials in their official capacities, not against the state or its agencies directly.

The Gonzalez Court invokes Heinrich not to dispose of the ultra vires claim, but to signal what must happen on remand: Gonzalez may (and likely must) amend his pleadings to name appropriate state actors in their official capacity as defendants, rather than proceeding solely against the TMB as an institutional party.

5. Continental Casualty Insurance Co. v. Functional Restoration Associates, 19 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. 2000)

Continental Casualty provides the key jurisdictional rule for Gonzalez’s substantial-evidence claim:

“It is well recognized under Texas law that there is no right to judicial review of an administrative order unless a statute provides a right or unless the order . . . violates a constitutional right.”

And:

“[A]n agency's rulemaking power cannot validly expand or create district court jurisdiction beyond that given in the Legislature's own enactments.”

Gonzalez explicitly disclaimed reliance on the APA and instead relied on a now-repealed Board rule, former 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 187.83(f), as creating a right of substantial-evidence review with no filing deadline. Continental Casualty makes clear that this is jurisdictionally impossible; no agency rule can authorize a court to undertake substantial-evidence review where no statute does.

6. Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner, 369 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1963)

Falkner recognized the notion that in some contexts the Texas Constitution itself may imply a right to judicial review of administrative action. The Gonzalez opinion mentions Falkner only to note that Gonzalez does not argue that he has such an inherent constitutional right here. Therefore, the Court does not explore that question and instead rests jurisdiction solely on statutory authorization (or the lack of it).

7. Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2016)

While Serafine is not a Texas Supreme Court decision, it is a powerful federal analog. The Fifth Circuit held that the Texas State Board of Examiners of Psychologists violated a political candidate’s First Amendment rights by restricting her use of the title “psychologist” in her campaign.

The Gonzalez opinion cites Serafine to underscore how unusual it is for professional licensing boards to wade into the realm of core political speech. The citation strongly foreshadows that any ultimate ruling on the merits will have to engage seriously with robust First Amendment and Texas Constitution free-speech protections for campaign speech, even when that speech overlaps with professional titles.

8. Other Authorities

• King Street Patriots v. Texas Democratic Party, 521 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. 2017): cited for the “usual judicial practice” of deciding as-applied constitutional challenges before facial ones, which highlights the awkward posture of the court of appeals’ remand on only the facial challenge.
• Starr v. Ferguson, 166 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. 1942): cited on the scope of relief permissible under a general prayer (“such other and further relief”)—used here to suggest that Gonzalez may have leeway to reshape his requested relief on remand.
• Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 53.1: requires any party who wants to alter the court of appeals’ judgment to file a petition or cross-petition for review. Because TMB did not cross-petition, the partial remand for Gonzalez’s facial challenge stands.
• Hamilton & Jewett, The Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act: Contested Cases and Judicial Review, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 285 (1976): discussed in a footnote regarding the definition of “contested case” under the APA. The Court notes there is scholarly support for limiting “contested cases” to statutorily mandated hearings, but it ultimately declines to resolve that question.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Redundant-Remedies Doctrine Properly Focuses on Remedies, Not Claims

The central analytical error the Court identifies in the court of appeals’ opinion is a misreading of Gonzalez’s petition combined with a misapplication of the redundant-remedies doctrine.

The court of appeals characterized all Gonzalez’s claims (other than the facial constitutional challenge) as simply challenges to the cease-and-desist order. On that view, because he could have brought a timely APA petition challenging the same order on the same theories, his UDJA claims were supposedly “redundant” and therefore barred.

The Supreme Court rejects this on two grounds:

1. Gonzalez’s pleadings seek more than reversal of the order.
   The Court reads his as-applied constitutional and ultra vires claims as seeking forward-looking protection against any adverse TMB action based on his using “doctor” or “physician” in his campaign. As the opinion explains, a declaration that:
   • the statutes do not apply to Gonzalez, or
   • their application to his campaign speech is unconstitutional,
   would:
   • shield him from future sanctions, not just the existing order, and
   • constitute relief that “goes beyond reversal” of the cease-and-desist order.
2. The key question is remedy, not the mere availability of claims in APA review.
   Even if Gonzalez could have raised every one of his constitutional and ultra vires arguments in a timely APA petition (which he likely could), the APA’s remedial power is limited to:
   • affirming the order,
   • reversing it, or
   • remanding it for further administrative proceedings.
   That is, the APA can only address the “particular orders at issue” (quoting Patel). It cannot, in a single contested-case review, grant sweeping prospective declarations constraining future agency enforcement decisions. Because Gonzalez’s UDJA claims seek such broader, prospective relief, that relief is not obtainable via APA review, and therefore the UDJA action is not redundant.

This significantly clarifies the redundant-remedies doctrine: the doctrine bars a UDJA action only when the other statutory scheme affords the same breadth and kind of relief, not merely when it allows the same legal arguments to be raised.

2. As-Applied vs Facial Challenges and the Order of Adjudication

The court of appeals remanded only the facial constitutional challenge to § 104.004. The Supreme Court notes this “would've put the district court in an awkward position” because standard judicial practice is:

• decide as-applied challenges first, and
• address facial challenges only if necessary.

This reflects the principle from King Street Patriots and U.S. Supreme Court precedent (Board of Trustees v. Fox) that courts should avoid broader-than-necessary constitutional rulings. By restoring Gonzalez’s as-applied claims, the Court re-aligns the case with this usual sequence.

3. Pleading Issues, General Prayers, and Opportunity to Amend

TMB argued that Gonzalez’s petition did not actually plead a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief on constitutional grounds. The Court sidesteps the full merits of that argument:

• It notes that under Texas pleading rules (as illustrated by Starr v. Ferguson), a party may sometimes obtain any relief consistent with the pleadings and the evidence under a general prayer for relief.
• More importantly, it observes that TMB did not cross-petition for review, so the partial remand already in place (for the facial challenge) remains, and the case is headed back to district court regardless.
• On remand, Gonzalez is “free to file an amended petition” to add any claims for prospective relief and to name additional defendants as appropriate (per Heinrich).

The Court thus ensures that any defect in the framing of the pleadings can be corrected in the trial court, rather than being used as a jurisdictional shortcut to avoid constitutional review altogether.

4. Substantial-Evidence Review: No Jurisdiction Without Statute

The Court takes a notably different, and simpler, path than the court of appeals in affirming the dismissal of Gonzalez’s substantial-evidence claim.

The court of appeals had held:

• the cease-and-desist hearing was a “contested case” under the APA because the agency actually conducted a hearing, and
• Gonzalez’s petition for review was therefore subject to the APA’s 30-day filing deadline for judicial review, which he missed.

The Supreme Court chooses not to decide whether the proceeding was a “contested case.” Instead, it notes that Gonzalez himself disclaimed reliance on the APA in favor of a TMB rule. His theory was that:

• former 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 187.83(f) created a right to judicial review of a cease-and-desist order, in Travis County,
• with no statutory deadline akin to the APA’s 30-day requirement.

That argument fails for a basic structural reason drawn from Continental Casualty:

• Courts need statutory (or constitutional) authorization to review an agency order; a rule alone cannot confer that jurisdiction.

Accordingly:

• Because Gonzalez did not invoke the APA’s statutory review mechanism, and
• Because no other statute authorizes the kind of substantial-evidence review he sought,

the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear that claim, and its dismissal is affirmed. The result is that Gonzalez cannot use this lawsuit to have a court second-guess whether the Board’s cease-and-desist order was supported by substantial evidence in the record. His surviving claims are instead directed to the Board’s authority and the constitutionality of the underlying statute as applied to his speech.

C. Impact and Implications

1. Clarifying the Redundant-Remedies Doctrine in Texas

This opinion significantly refines how Texas courts should apply the redundant-remedies doctrine:

• Focus on remedy, not claim: The fact that the same constitutional or ultra vires claims could have been raised in an APA petition is not enough to bar a UDJA action. The question is whether the APA action could give the same breadth of relief.
• Prospective relief as a separate category: When a plaintiff seeks prospective declaratory or injunctive relief that governs future conduct or future enforcement, that relief ordinarily “goes beyond reversal” of a single agency order and is not redundant of APA review.
• Failure to timely file an APA petition is not necessarily fatal to all constitutional relief: While a missed APA deadline forecloses direct review and reversal of a specific order, the decision suggests it does not automatically bar a separate UDJA or ultra vires action that seeks to prevent future unconstitutional applications of the statute or future ultra vires actions.

Going forward, regulated parties who are time-barred from seeking APA review may still have avenues for:

• as-applied constitutional challenges that seek forward-looking relief, and
• ultra vires claims limiting how agencies can apply their statutes prospectively.

Of course, they may not use UDJA to obtain what would effectively be belated APA review of an existing order’s evidentiary support. That remains foreclosed.

2. Agency Limits: Rules Cannot Create Judicial Review

The Court strongly reinforces legislative supremacy over jurisdiction:

• Only statutes (and sometimes constitutional provisions) can authorize judicial review of an agency order.
• Agencies cannot use rulemaking to enlarge or engineer new judicial review pathways that the Legislature did not enact.

This has practical implications:

• Regulated parties must be cautious not to rely solely on agency rules as a basis for judicial review of agency orders.
• Practitioners should identify and plead the (usually in the APA or in the agency’s enabling act) that authorizes judicial review.
• Attempting to bypass the APA by relying on a rule (as Gonzalez did) will likely result in dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

3. Litigation Strategy: Structuring Claims Against Agency Action

The decision implicitly instructs litigants on how to structure challenges to agency action:

• Direct review (APA): Use this to attack a specific order based on:
  • lack of substantial evidence,
  • procedural error in the contested case, or
  • constitutional or statutory violations in that particular proceeding.
  This is time-limited and record-based.
• UDJA / ultra vires suits: Use these for:
  • prospective limitations on agency authority (ultra vires),
  • facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to statutes or rules as they govern future conduct, especially where no current contested case is pending, or
  • relief that cannot be achieved solely by reversing a single order.
  These must typically be brought against officials in their official capacity.

The case thus models a two-track approach to agency disputes: one track for direct review under the APA, and another for broader constitutional or ultra vires challenges under UDJA.

4. Professional Regulation and Campaign Speech

Although the Court does not resolve the First Amendment and Texas constitutional questions, it unmistakably:

• underscores the novelty and sensitivity of a medical board regulating campaign speech, and
• signals that the Board’s claimed authority will undergo full judicial scrutiny on remand.

The reference to Serafine v. Branaman and the closing admonition about TMB’s claimed power to police campaign speech raise several likely merits questions:

• Is the use of titles like “doctor” or “physician” by degree-holders unlicensed in the profession, in a political campaign, properly characterized as “unlicensed practice” or “false advertising,” or is it core political speech?
• What level of scrutiny should apply? Federal law generally treats:
  • core political speech as subject to strict scrutiny or close judicial review, and
  • commercial or professional-speech regulations under a more deferential standard.
  The Texas Constitution’s free-speech protections, under Article I, § 8, may be more protective than the First Amendment in some contexts.
• Are disclaimers (e.g., stating that the candidate has an M.D. but is not licensed) a less restrictive means that the Board must consider before banning or penalizing particular titles?

The Court’s willingness to allow Gonzalez’s constitutional and ultra vires claims to proceed signals that professional licensing boards cannot take for granted their power to regulate political messaging by degree-holders who are not licensees. Future trial-court and appellate decisions in this case will likely shape the boundaries between professional regulation and electoral speech in Texas.

5. Order of Constitutional Adjudication and Judicial Restraint

By restoring Gonzalez’s as-applied challenge alongside his facial challenge, the decision furthers judicial restraint principles:

• Courts should first determine whether the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the particular plaintiff in the particular factual setting (here, a congressional campaign by an unlicensed M.D.).
• Only if a statute is so flawed that it cannot be constitutionally applied in a broad swath of cases should courts declare it facially unconstitutional.

Thus, on remand, the district court is likely to address:

• whether § 104.004 can constitutionally be enforced against Gonzalez’s specific speech in this campaign, and
• only then, whether the statute is facially invalid in a broader sense (e.g., as to other degree-holders, contexts, or uses of titles).

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

The Texas APA (Government Code ch. 2001) sets:

• rules for how agencies conduct formal hearings (“contested cases”), and
• how courts review those decisions.

APA judicial review is usually:

• limited in time (a short filing deadline, often 30 days),
• based primarily on the agency’s record, and
• focused on whether the agency’s decision was lawful and supported by substantial evidence.

2. Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA)

The UDJA (Civil Practice & Remedies Code ch. 37) lets people ask courts to:

• declare their rights under statutes, ordinances, contracts, etc., and
• determine whether a statute or rule is valid.

It is a flexible tool for obtaining prospective guidance, but it cannot be used to circumvent specific, limited review procedures (like the APA) when those would grant the same relief.

3. The Redundant-Remedies Doctrine

Under this doctrine, courts will not allow a UDJA action if another statutory scheme already provides a remedy that would:

• fully address the plaintiff’s injury, and
• result in effectively the same relief.

Gonzalez clarifies that the focus is on the relief, not simply on the legal theories: if another procedure would merely overturn one order but not restrain future enforcement or clarify future rights, a broader UDJA claim for prospective relief is not “redundant.”

4. Ultra Vires Suits

“Ultra vires” means “beyond the powers.” An ultra vires suit alleges that a government official:

• acted without legal authority, or
• misused lawful authority in a way that violates statutory or constitutional limits.

These suits:

• are brought against the official (not the agency or the state),
• seek prospective relief (to stop the unlawful conduct), and
• are not barred by sovereign immunity to that extent.

5. Facial vs As-Applied Constitutional Challenges

• As-applied challenge: argues that a law is unconstitutional in the way it was applied to a specific person or situation. Success means the government may not apply the law in that particular manner, but the law may still be valid in other contexts.
• Facial challenge: argues that a law is unconstitutional in all or nearly all of its applications. Success usually means the law is invalid across the board, or at least vastly narrowed.

Courts prefer to decide as-applied challenges first, because they are narrower and avoid unnecessarily striking down statutes in all contexts.

6. Substantial-Evidence Review

In APA judicial review, a court does not re-try the case or weigh witness credibility anew. Instead, under “substantial-evidence” review, the court asks:

• Is there more than a mere scintilla of evidence in the record that reasonably supports the agency’s decision?

If such evidence exists, the decision stands, even if the court might have reached a different conclusion on a blank slate. Gonzalez’s attempt to secure this kind of review failed for jurisdictional reasons.

7. Contested Case

A “contested case” under the APA is generally an agency proceeding in which:

• legal rights or privileges are to be determined after an opportunity for an adjudicative hearing, typically one required by statute.

Whether TMB’s voluntary decision to hold a hearing turned this cease-and-desist matter into a “contested case” was debated, but the Supreme Court ultimately did not need to resolve it because of Gonzalez’s own litigation posture.

8. Cease-and-Desist Orders

A cease-and-desist order is an administrative command to stop certain conduct, often backed by penalties for noncompliance. Here, it required Gonzalez to stop using “doctor,” “physician,” and “Dr.” without a specific disclosure of authority, backed by a $5,000-per-violation penalty.

9. Jurisdiction

“Jurisdiction” is a court’s legal power to hear and decide a case. Without a statutory or constitutional basis for jurisdiction, the court must dismiss a claim. In Gonzalez, the trial court had jurisdiction over:

• constitutional challenges and ultra vires claims (through UDJA and Texas sovereign-immunity doctrines), but
• not over a free-standing substantial-evidence review of the order, which lacked statutory authorization.

VI. Conclusion: Significance in the Broader Legal Context

Gonzalez v. Texas Medical Board is, on its surface, a procedural and jurisdictional decision, but it carries substantial implications for administrative law and free-speech litigation in Texas. Its key takeaways include:

• Redundant-remedies doctrine refined: The Supreme Court clarifies that UDJA and ultra vires actions are not barred simply because a plaintiff could have raised the same arguments in an APA petition. The inquiry focuses on whether the APA could have provided the same remedy. Prospective relief restraining future enforcement often goes beyond what APA review can accomplish.
• Agency rulemaking limits reaffirmed: Agencies cannot create judicial review mechanisms that the Legislature has not conferred. Reliance on agency rules alone to secure substantial-evidence review will be jurisdictionally fatal.
• Path cleared for constitutional scrutiny of TMB’s regulation of campaign speech: Gonzalez’s as-applied and facial challenges to § 104.004, and his ultra vires claim, must now be heard on the merits. TMB will need to justify its attempt to police the use of “doctor” and “physician” in a political campaign by a person who holds a medical degree but is unlicensed.
• Guidance for litigants: The opinion provides a roadmap for structuring challenges to agency action: use APA review for specific orders, and UDJA/ultra vires claims for broader, prospective constitutional and authority-based disputes.

Perhaps most importantly, the Court’s closing line encapsulates the decision’s broader message:

“If the Texas Medical Board thinks it has the power to police campaign speech, it will have to defend that position on the merits.”

In that sense, the opinion is both a doctrinal refinement of Texas administrative law and a gateway to a significant future confrontation between professional regulation and constitutional protections for political expression. The eventual merits resolution—still to come on remand—will likely shape how far Texas agencies can go in regulating how candidates describe their professional credentials in the political arena.