Prospective Relief and the Limits of the Redundant-Remedies Doctrine: Commentary on Gonzalez v. Texas Medical Board

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Reynaldo "Rey" Gonzalez, Jr., M.D., J.D. v. Texas Medical Board, No. 24‑0340 (Tex. Oct. 31, 2025), is, on its face, a jurisdictional and procedural ruling. Yet beneath that surface it reshapes an important part of Texas administrative law: the “redundant‑remedies” doctrine and its interaction with the Texas Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA).

The case arises from an unusual context. The Texas Medical Board (TMB)—whose traditional mandate is to regulate medical practice—used its enforcement powers to restrict what a congressional candidate with an M.D. degree could say about himself on the campaign trail. The Court does not resolve the underlying free‑speech and statutory‑authority disputes, but it makes a significant doctrinal contribution by clarifying when litigants may pursue:

ultra vires claims against state officials, and
facial and as‑applied constitutional challenges under the UDJA,

even when they could also have sought review of an agency order under the APA—and even when they missed the APA’s 30‑day deadline.

The decision also reinforces a basic structural rule: administrative agencies cannot manufacture judicial review jurisdiction by rulemaking; only statutes or constitutional guarantees can do that.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Factual Background

Rey Gonzalez holds both a medical degree (M.D.) and a law degree (J.D.). Although he completed medical school, he never obtained a license to practice medicine in Texas. Instead, he pursued a legal career, taught as an adjunct at the University of Texas, and was a member of the American Board of Legal Medicine. He is licensed as an attorney but not as a physician.

While running for a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives, Gonzalez:

used the title “Dr. Gonzalez,” and
described himself as a “physician.”

His campaign materials, including a candidate profile, emphasized a vocational narrative grounded in both medicine and law. He wrote:

“By God's grace I am a physician and an attorney. I adopted a motto years ago which appears on my office's logo. It says in Latin, ‘Vocatus ad Sanandum,’ which means, ‘Called to Heal.’ My calling to serve in medicine was to heal the sick. My calling to serve in law is to heal my fellow man who is wronged by a third party. My most recent calling, to serve in the United States House of Representatives, is to contribute to the healing and a return to civility to our nation.”

A complaint was lodged with the Texas Medical Board alleging that these representations amounted to:

“holding himself out as a physician” without a medical license, and
improper use of the title “Dr.”

The Board viewed this as a violation of:

the Medical Practice Act, and
the Healing Art Identification Act, codified at Texas Occupations Code § 104.004.

B. Agency Proceedings and Cease-and-Desist Order

TMB opened an investigation into whether Gonzalez’s campaign statements constituted the unlicensed practice of medicine or otherwise fell within its regulatory jurisdiction. TMB afforded Gonzalez a hearing, after which it concluded that he had violated the Medical Practice Act and § 104.004.

The Board issued a cease‑and‑desist order commanding Gonzalez to:

stop using the titles “doctor,” “physician,” and “Dr.” (as in “Dr. Gonzalez”),
unless he “designat[ed] the authority giving rise to th[ose] title[s].”

In practical terms, this meant that if Gonzalez wanted to continue using those titles, he would need to clarify—on campaign materials and arguably even in speeches—that:

he holds an M.D., but
he is not licensed to practice medicine in Texas.

TMB warned him that violations of the order could draw civil penalties of $5,000 per violation. Gonzalez moved for rehearing; when that motion was overruled by operation of law, he waited 81 days and then filed suit in Travis County District Court.

C. Gonzalez’s Claims in District Court

Gonzalez’s live petition was somewhat sprawling, but the Supreme Court distilled it into four main claims:

Substantial-evidence challenge: The cease‑and‑desist order was not supported by substantial evidence.
As‑applied constitutional challenge: Occupations Code § 104.004 is unconstitutional as applied to him.
Facial constitutional challenge: § 104.004 is facially unconstitutional because it allegedly bars anyone with a medical or other doctoral degree from truthfully describing their education and training.
Ultra vires claim: TMB exceeded its statutory authority by regulating him at all, because he is not licensed to practice medicine and has not attempted to practice or hold himself out as practicing medicine in Texas.

He requested:

reversal or setting aside of the cease‑and‑desist order,
declarations that TMB exceeded its statutory authority,
temporary injunctive relief stopping enforcement of the order, and
“such other and further equitable relief to which the plaintiff is entitled both at law and in equity.”

D. Rulings Below

The district court dismissed all claims for want of jurisdiction.

The Third Court of Appeals (Austin) largely affirmed, relying heavily on the “redundant‑remedies doctrine.” It held:

Gonzalez’s ultra vires and as‑applied constitutional claims were barred because he could have sought judicial review of the cease‑and‑desist order under the APA within 30 days and obtained essentially the same relief.
His facial constitutional challenge to § 104.004 was not barred, because a judgment invalidating the statute on its face would “go beyond reversal” of the particular order.
His substantial‑evidence challenge to the cease‑and‑desist order was untimely under the APA and thus outside the court’s jurisdiction.

Gonzalez petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review. The Texas Medical Board did not file its own cross‑petition, so the court of appeals’ remand of the facial challenge was not at issue.

E. Issues Before the Supreme Court of Texas

The Supreme Court focused on two core questions:

Whether the redundant‑remedies doctrine barred Gonzalez’s ultra vires and as‑applied constitutional claims under the UDJA.
Whether the district court had jurisdiction over Gonzalez’s substantial‑evidence challenge to TMB’s cease‑and‑desist order, in light of his explicit refusal to rely on the APA and his reliance instead on an agency rule that purported to authorize judicial review.

III. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Sullivan, writing for the Court (Justice Hawkins not participating), held:

The court of appeals misapplied the redundant‑remedies doctrine. Gonzalez’s ultra vires and as‑applied constitutional claims seek relief that goes beyond mere reversal of the cease‑and‑desist order, including protection from future enforcement actions based on his campaign speech. Therefore, those claims are not barred and must be heard on remand.
The facial challenge to § 104.004 was correctly allowed to proceed, and in any event that ruling was insulated because TMB did not cross‑petition for review.
Gonzalez’s substantial‑evidence challenge was properly dismissed for want of jurisdiction—but for a different reason than the court of appeals gave. An agency rule cannot create judicial review jurisdiction; such jurisdiction must come from a statute (or a constitutional right). Because Gonzalez disclaimed reliance on the APA and identified no other statutory basis for review, the district court lacked jurisdiction over that claim.
The Court expressly declined to decide whether the cease‑and‑desist proceeding qualified as an APA “contested case,” and it did not reach the merits of the statutory and constitutional claims regarding political campaign speech.

The judgment: reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings on:

the facial constitutional challenge to § 104.004,
the as‑applied constitutional challenge, and
the ultra vires claim.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Patel v. Texas Department of Licensing & Regulation

In Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015), the Court recognized that plaintiffs could bring UDJA claims challenging the constitutionality of certain occupational‑licensing requirements, notwithstanding the availability of APA review. In Patel:

the plaintiffs had been cited by an agency, and
they could have appealed those citations under the APA, raising constitutional issues.

The Court nevertheless allowed a separate UDJA action because:

“The available remedies on appeal from an administrative finding are limited to reversal of the particular orders at issue.”
Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 79.

The plaintiffs in Patel sought more: prospective injunctive relief against future enforcement of the offending statutes and regulations. As a result, the APA remedy was not “redundant.”

Gonzalez relies heavily on that straightforward but important insight: what matters for the redundant‑remedies doctrine is not whether the claims could be raised in an APA appeal, but whether the scope of the relief available under the APA is co‑extensive with the relief sought under the UDJA.

2. Jones v. Turner

The Court cites Jones v. Turner, 646 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. 2022), for the proposition that courts consider whether plaintiffs “could be awarded relief that would render a declaratory judgment redundant and thus improper.” Id. at 328 (emphasis added).

Jones reinforces the remedy-centric approach: the UDJA is disfavored where it adds nothing meaningful to relief already obtainable via another cause of action, but it is appropriate where it provides additional, non‑duplicative relief—especially prospective relief that clarifies the parties’ rights and obligations going forward.

3. City of Corpus Christi v. Public Utility Commission

In City of Corpus Christi v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 51 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam), the Court reviewed a “contested‑case” order under the APA and entertained a facial constitutional challenge in that posture. This shows that constitutional claims—both facial and as‑applied—can be raised directly in APA proceedings.

The significance for Gonzalez is twofold:

It confirms that Gonzalez could have raised his constitutional claims as part of an APA appeal.
It underscores why the Court stresses that the question under the redundant‑remedies doctrine is not whether the claims overlap but whether the remedies do.

4. King Street Patriots v. Texas Democratic Party and Board of Trustees v. Fox

The Court cites King Street Patriots v. Tex. Democratic Party, 521 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. 2017), quoting the U.S. Supreme Court’s observation in Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484–85 (1989), that the “usual judicial practice” is to consider as‑applied challenges before facial ones.

This point is doctrinally important because the court of appeals’ limited remand—sending back only the facial challenge while dismissing the as‑applied claim—would have forced the trial court to address the more sweeping facial issue without first deciding how the statute operates in the specific facts before it. The Supreme Court corrects that path by requiring that both the as‑applied and the facial challenges proceed.

5. City of El Paso v. Heinrich

City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009), is cited to clarify the proper defendants in an ultra vires action. Heinrich holds that:

“Ultra vires suits… must be brought against the state actors in their official capacity.”

The Court notes that on remand Gonzalez may amend his pleadings and “name other defendants as he thinks proper,” implicitly signaling that individual Board officials (in their official capacities) may be the correct defendants for his ultra vires and prospective constitutional claims, rather than the Board as an entity alone.

6. Continental Casualty Insurance Co. v. Functional Restoration Associates

In Continental Casualty Ins. Co. v. Functional Restoration Assocs., 19 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. 2000), the Court articulated a central principle of Texas administrative law:

“[T]here is no right to judicial review of an administrative order unless a statute provides a right or unless the order… violates a constitutional right.”
Id. at 397.

The Court added that:

“An agency’s rulemaking power cannot validly expand or create district court jurisdiction beyond that given in the Legislature’s own enactments.”
Id. at 397 n.5.

Gonzalez applies this rule directly. Gonzalez relied on a former TMB rule (22 Tex. Admin. Code § 187.83(f) (2017), since repealed) which purported to allow judicial review of cease‑and‑desist orders with no express deadline. The Court holds that such a rule cannot itself create jurisdiction. Because Gonzalez disclaimed reliance on the APA and could not identify an independent statutory vehicle for substantial‑evidence review, the district court lacked jurisdiction over that claim.

7. Serafine v. Branaman (Fifth Circuit)

The Supreme Court also notes Serafine v. Branaman, 810 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2016), in which the Fifth Circuit held that the Texas State Board of Examiners of Psychologists violated a political candidate’s First Amendment rights by prohibiting her from using the title “psychologist” when she was not licensed as such.

The Court invokes Serafine to underscore that:

there is scant precedent for professional licensing boards policing political campaign speech, and
federal courts have already been skeptical of such efforts.

Although Gonzalez stops short of deciding the constitutional question, this citation signals that any ultimate ruling on the merits must contend with strong First Amendment and Texas free‑speech protections in the campaign context.

8. Other References

The opinion also references:

Vazquez v. Health & Human Servs. Comm’n, No. 03‑20‑00075‑CV, 2021 WL 3176031 (Tex. App.—Austin July 28, 2021, pet. denied), and Heat Energy Advanced Tech., Inc. v. West Dallas Coalition for Env’t Justice, 962 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied), as examples of the Third Court’s expansive view that any agency proceeding with a hearing can be a “contested case” under the APA if the agency in fact provides an adjudicative hearing.
A law review article by Hamilton & Jewett suggesting that “contested case” likely refers to hearings the Legislature requires, not those an agency voluntarily convenes.
Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Falkner, 369 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1963), as a reference point for the notion of possible inherent constitutional rights to judicial review—though Gonzalez does not press such an argument here.

The Court ultimately leaves the “contested case” question unresolved as unnecessary to its holding, a point that preserves flexibility for future litigation over the scope of APA judicial review.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Reading Gonzalez’s Petition Broadly, Not Narrowly

A key move in the Court’s analysis is rejecting the court of appeals’ narrow reading of Gonzalez’s pleadings. The lower court had treated everything but the facial constitutional claim as merely an attack on a single agency order:

“[A]ll of Gonzalez's claims besides his facial constitutional claim ‘challenge only the cease‑and‑desist order.’”
716 S.W.3d at 681 (court of appeals characterization, quoted and rejected by the Supreme Court).

The Supreme Court disagreed:

Gonzalez’s ultra vires claim alleges that TMB has no statutory authority to regulate him—a non‑licensee—for the challenged campaign speech.
His as‑applied constitutional claim contends that even if the statutes empower TMB to act, enforcing them against his campaign statements violates his free‑speech rights.

The “plain thrust” of these claims, the Court explains, is that TMB may not take any adverse action against Gonzalez based on his self‑description as a doctor and physician on the campaign trail. A declaration to that effect would:

protect Gonzalez from future enforcement actions,
not just negate the existing cease‑and‑desist order.

Therefore, the Court holds that both the ultra vires and as‑applied claims, like the facial challenge, reach far beyond the single agency order at issue.

2. Reframing the Redundant-Remedies Doctrine

The court of appeals emphasized that Gonzalez could have raised his ultra vires and as‑applied constitutional claims in an APA appeal. The Supreme Court responds bluntly: “True but irrelevant.”

The Court’s central clarification is encapsulated in this passage:

“But it doesn’t matter whether Gonzalez could’ve brought the same claims. What matters is whether the APA would've afforded him the same remedy—that’s why we call it the redundant‑remedies doctrine, not the redundant‑claims doctrine.”

Applying Patel, the Court emphasizes:

The APA’s judicial review remedy is limited to reversal, affirmation, or other modification of the particular order under review.
By contrast, Gonzalez’s UDJA and ultra vires claims seek prospective declarations and injunctions that would govern TMB’s conduct in the future.
Those prospective remedies are not available merely by winning APA review of the existing order.

Accordingly, the redundant‑remedies doctrine does not bar:

Gonzalez’s ultra vires claim (challenging TMB’s statutory authority to regulate him at all), or
his as‑applied constitutional challenge (arguing that enforcement against his speech is unconstitutional).

This reasoning implicitly confirms an important practical consequence: even if APA review of a specific order is time‑barred, litigants may still pursue UDJA‑based constitutional and ultra vires claims so long as they seek meaningful prospective relief that the APA could not have supplied.

3. Treatment of Facial vs. As-Applied Challenges

The court of appeals had already remanded the facial constitutional challenge, recognizing that a ruling that § 104.004 is facially invalid would go “beyond reversal” of the order. The Supreme Court agrees with that premise and extends it to Gonzalez’s as‑applied and ultra vires theories.

The Court also invokes the usual practice of deciding as‑applied challenges first. If only the facial challenge were remanded, the trial court would be forced to address, in the abstract, whether § 104.004 is valid in all its applications, without first determining whether the statute is invalid as applied to Gonzalez’s particular facts. That inversion of the usual order of analysis would be doctrinally awkward and potentially distort the record.

The Court’s remedy—remanding both the as‑applied and facial challenges—restores a more coherent and familiar sequence of adjudication.

4. Ultra Vires Claims and Prospective Relief

Ultra vires claims occupy a special niche in Texas separation‑of‑powers doctrine: they allow litigants to:

sue state officials in their official capacities to prevent them from acting outside their statutory authority,
without being barred by sovereign immunity, because an official has no lawful authority to commit ultra vires acts.

In Gonzalez, the ultra vires theory is:

TMB’s organic statutes and the Medical Practice Act empower it to regulate licensed practitioners and prevent unlicensed practice of medicine.
Gonzalez is not licensed and has not attempted to practice medicine.
Therefore, the Board has no authority to sanction him for political campaign speech in which he describes himself as “Dr.” or as a “physician.”

The Court does not decide the merits of this claim but holds that it is justiciable, not barred by redundant‑remedies, and properly the subject of declaratory and injunctive relief. Its forward‑looking nature—aimed at preventing future unauthorized enforcement—underscores why the APA’s limited remedial scheme does not suffice.

5. Dismissing the Substantial-Evidence Claim for Lack of Jurisdiction

By contrast, Gonzalez’s substantial‑evidence challenge to the cease‑and‑desist order meets a different fate.

The court of appeals had assumed that the APA applies to TMB cease‑and‑desist orders and held that Gonzalez filed too late, missing the 30‑day deadline in Texas Government Code § 2001.176(a).

The Supreme Court takes “an easier way”:

Gonzalez expressly disclaimed reliance on the APA. Instead, he argued that an old TMB rule—22 Tex. Admin. Code § 187.83(f) (2017)—created a right to judicial review without a deadline.
Under Continental Casualty, however, only a statute can confer a right to judicial review (absent some constitutional guarantee). An agency rule cannot expand district‑court jurisdiction.

Therefore, because Gonzalez:

did not rely on the APA as his jurisdictional hook, and
identified no other statutory vehicle for substantial‑evidence review,

the district court had no subject‑matter jurisdiction over his substantial‑evidence claim. The Supreme Court affirms the dismissal on that narrower, more fundamental ground and expressly avoids resolving whether the cease‑and‑desist proceeding was a “contested case” under the APA.

6. No Present Ruling on the Merits of Free-Speech or Statutory-Authority Disputes

Finally, it is critical to note what the Court does not decide:

It does not determine whether § 104.004 or the Medical Practice Act are constitutional—either on their face or as applied to political campaign speech.
It does not hold that TMB definitively lacks authority to regulate Gonzalez’s use of “Dr.” or “physician” in the electoral context.
It does not resolve whether the proceedings below qualify as an APA “contested case.”

Instead, the Court’s opinion is a gateway ruling that ensures those substantive questions can be litigated in the proper forum, with a full record, and without being prematurely extinguished by procedural doctrines such as redundant remedies or jurisdictional defects.

C. Impact on the Role of Agencies in Policing Political Speech

The Court opens and closes with a notable observation: there is “considerably less precedent” for the Texas Medical Board to police political campaigns, and TMB itself acknowledged that this was the first time it had disciplined someone for campaign‑trail statements.

By emphasizing this novelty and citing Serafine v. Branaman, the Court implicitly signals skepticism about expansive administrative regulation of political candidate speech—especially where:

the candidate holds the credential in question (here, an M.D.), but
is not licensed to practice the profession in Texas.

The opinion ends with a pointed statement:

“If the Texas Medical Board thinks it has the power to police campaign speech, it will have to defend that position on the merits.”

That closing line makes clear that, on remand, TMB bears a substantial burden to justify its authority and its restrictions under both statutory and constitutional norms.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. The Redundant-Remedies Doctrine

The redundant‑remedies doctrine in Texas asks whether a party is seeking declaratory relief under the UDJA that is no different in substance from relief the party could obtain via another, more specific avenue (such as APA review).

Key points:

The doctrine focuses on remedies, not on whether the claims or legal theories are similar.
If a plaintiff wants only to reverse or void an agency order, then an APA appeal (if available) is usually the exclusive path, and UDJA relief is redundant.
If a plaintiff also seeks prospective relief—for example, a declaration that an ongoing policy is unconstitutional or that an agency lacks authority to regulate a certain class of conduct—then the UDJA claim may not be redundant, even if related claims could have been raised in an APA appeal.

Gonzalez clarifies this doctrine by stressing that:

“We call it the redundant‑remedies doctrine, not the redundant‑claims doctrine.”

B. Facial vs. As-Applied Constitutional Challenges

A facial challenge asserts that a statute is invalid in all or virtually all of its applications. Success on a facial challenge often invalidates the statute in its entirety or substantially limits its enforcement.

An as‑applied challenge concedes that a statute might be valid in general but argues it is unconstitutional as applied to the particular facts of the plaintiff’s case.

Courts generally prefer to:

First decide as‑applied challenges, grounded in a concrete factual context.
Then, if necessary, address facial challenges.

In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court’s insistence that both as‑applied and facial challenges proceed on remand preserves this conventional order and avoids forcing the trial court into abstract constitutional rulings untethered to concrete facts.

C. Ultra Vires Actions

An ultra vires claim alleges that a government official is acting beyond his or her legal authority. In Texas:

Such suits must be brought against the official in his or her official capacity, not necessarily against the agency as an entity.
Sovereign immunity does not bar ultra vires suits because an official has no authority to commit illegal acts; seeking to prevent such acts does not intrude on sovereign immunity.
The remedy is typically prospective declaratory or injunctive relief, not damages.

Gonzalez’s ultra vires theory—if successful—would result in a declaration and injunction that TMB officials may not regulate his campaign speech about being an M.D. and “physician” because that conduct is not within the scope of TMB’s statutory jurisdiction.

D. Substantial-Evidence Review and the APA

Under the Texas APA, many agency orders are subject to substantial‑evidence review in district court. In that posture:

The court does not retry the case or weigh evidence anew.
It asks whether reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as the agency, based on the evidence in the administrative record.
Judicial review is ordinarily available only if undertaken within the APA’s specific procedural framework—for example, the 30‑day deadline to file suit set out in Government Code § 2001.176(a).

In Gonzalez, the plaintiff tried to obtain substantial‑evidence review of the cease‑and‑desist order without relying on the APA, instead invoking a Board rule that gave him a path to district court. The Supreme Court holds that this attempt fails because only statutes—not agency rules—can open the courthouse door for judicial review of agency action.

E. Agency Rules vs. Statutory Grants of Jurisdiction

Texas law draws a firm line between:

the Legislature’s power to define the jurisdiction of the courts by statute, and
agencies’ power to adopt rules within the scope of their statutory authority.

Agencies cannot, by rule, enlarge the jurisdiction of the courts. Thus:

A rule that purports to create a right of judicial review where no statute does is invalid to that extent.
Litigants must anchor their requests for judicial review in an enabling statute (such as the APA), or in an independent constitutional right to review, not merely in an agency rule or procedural guideline.

Gonzalez reinforces this structural constraint and is a useful reminder that jurisdictional defects cannot be cured by clever pleading or reliance on administrative rules alone.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Expanded Space for Prospective UDJA and Ultra Vires Claims

By clarifying that the redundant‑remedies doctrine focuses on the scope of relief, the Court opens (or confirms) an important pathway for litigants who face or anticipate ongoing agency enforcement:

Even if APA review of a specific order is time‑barred or incomplete, plaintiffs may still bring UDJA and ultra vires suits that seek broader prospective declarations and injunctions concerning:
- the constitutionality of the governing statute or rules, and
- the extent of the agency’s statutory authority.
This is especially salient in recurring or ongoing regulatory disputes where a single order is just one episode in a longer pattern of enforcement.

Regulated parties, particularly professionals and businesses subject to licensing boards, can now point to Gonzalez as a strong authority that:

UDJA/ultra vires suits are not automatically barred simply because similar issues could have been raised in an APA appeal;
what matters is whether the UDJA suit genuinely seeks more than reversal of an isolated order.

B. Stronger Judicial Oversight of Agency Forays into Free-Speech Regulation

In substantive terms, Gonzalez has not yet resolved whether TMB may constitutionally restrict political candidates from describing themselves using professional titles that reflect their education but not current licensure. However, the Court’s willingness to ensure that Gonzalez’s constitutional and ultra vires claims proceed to the merits carries practical implications:

Licensing boards contemplating enforcement actions that touch on political speech should anticipate robust judicial scrutiny, not just of the factual basis for an order but also of their underlying statutory authority and compliance with constitutional free‑speech protections.
The citation to Serafine suggests that Texas courts will be attentive to federal precedents that guard against overbroad licensing‑based restrictions on truthful speech, particularly in campaigns.

In future cases, we can expect litigants to use Gonzalez to argue that:

agencies cannot “bootstrap” regulation of core political speech under the guise of professional‑title restrictions, and
courts should not allow procedural doctrines to bar full consideration of such constitutional objections.

C. Consequences for Agency Drafting of Rules That Purport to Authorize Judicial Review

The Court’s reaffirmation that agencies cannot expand court jurisdiction via rulemaking will likely influence how agencies draft their procedural rules:

Agencies may need to review and, where necessary, revise rules that appear to “grant” a right of judicial review that is not clearly supported by statute.
Regulated parties should be cautious about relying on such rules; if a statute does not expressly or by necessary implication provide for judicial review, a rule cannot fill that gap.

The decision may also prompt legislative action, if the Legislature believes that certain agency orders (such as cease‑and‑desist orders) should be reviewable even when not clearly covered by the APA. For now, the message is clear: jurisdiction flows from statutes, not from agency self‑help.

D. Litigation Strategy Considerations for Regulated Parties

From a strategic perspective, Gonzalez suggests several lessons for lawyers challenging agency action:

Preserve APA review when appropriate. If a client wants to overturn a specific agency order on substantial‑evidence or record‑based grounds, counsel should carefully observe the APA’s timing and procedural requirements.
Consider parallel UDJA and ultra vires claims. Where broader prospective relief is needed—especially on constitutional or statutory‑authority issues—counsel should plead UDJA and ultra vires claims expressly seeking relief beyond reversal of a particular order.
Plead deliberately, but flexibly. As Gonzalez illustrates, a plaintiff can suffer if he disclaims reliance on a clear statutory basis (the APA) while simultaneously relying on weak or invalid alternative theories (an agency rule).
Name the proper defendants. Following Heinrich, lawyers should ensure they sue the appropriate officials in their official capacities for ultra vires and prospective constitutional claims.

E. Doctrinal Clarification, but Substantive Questions Remain

Finally, the case sets the stage for future substantive developments:

On remand, the district court (and potentially later appellate courts) must decide whether § 104.004 and TMB’s order:
- violate the First Amendment or Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution, and/or
- exceed TMB’s statutory mission under the Medical Practice Act.
The decision hints at a friction between:
- the State’s interest in preventing deception about professional credentials, and
- the candidate’s right to engage in truthful, meaningful political self‑description based on his education and experience.

The final contours of that balance will be drawn later, but Gonzalez ensures those questions cannot be avoided on jurisdictional or procedural grounds alone.

VII. Conclusion

Gonzalez v. Texas Medical Board is an important administrative‑law decision with significant free‑speech overtones. Without resolving the ultimate constitutional and statutory‑authority disputes, the Supreme Court of Texas:

clarifies that the redundant‑remedies doctrine is a remedy‑based doctrine, not a claims‑based one;
confirms that UDJA and ultra vires suits seeking prospective relief against future enforcement are not barred merely because similar arguments could have been raised in an APA appeal of a past order;
reinforces that agency rules cannot create judicial review jurisdiction in the absence of a statutory grant; and
preserves an avenue for courts to scrutinize administrative attempts to regulate political campaign speech.

For Texas practitioners, the decision is now a central reference point in:

structuring challenges to agency action,
drafting UDJA and ultra vires claims for prospective relief, and
defending or contesting the extent of agency authority in areas touching on constitutional rights.

As the remanded proceedings unfold, and perhaps return on appeal, Gonzalez is likely to become a leading case at the intersection of Texas administrative procedure, sovereign immunity, and the constitutional limits on occupational‑licensing agencies’ reach into the political arena.