Prosecutorial Disclosure and Witness Coaching Under Brady & Napue: Carter v. State (2025 UT 13)

Introduction

In Carter v. State (2025 UT 13), the Utah Supreme Court confronted decades-old allegations of prosecutorial and police misconduct in the 1985 capital murder trial of Douglas Stewart Carter. Carter had been convicted and sentenced to death for the stabbing and shooting of Eva Olesen, despite the absence of physical evidence linking him to the crime scene. His conviction rested entirely on a verbal confession introduced through the lead investigator, Lieutenant George Pierpont, and on corroborating testimony by two friends, Epifanio and Lucia Tovar. Decades later, the Tovars recanted, swearing under penalty of perjury that police threats, financial benefits, and active coaching induced them to lie at trial. Carter’s postconviction petition alleged violations of Brady v. Maryland (suppression of favorable impeachment evidence) and Napue v. Illinois (failure to correct known perjured testimony). The State appeals a district court order vacating Carter’s conviction and death sentence and remanding for a new trial.

Summary of the Judgment

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the postconviction court’s grant of relief. It held that:

• The State violated Brady by suppressing evidence that the Tovars had received over $4,000 in living assistance, and that police threatened them with deportation, arrest, and loss of their child;
• The State violated Napue by knowingly allowing defense-inconsistent testimony—coached by investigators—that the Tovars had received no benefits;
• These violations were material to both guilt and sentencing under the Utah PCRA’s prejudice standards, mirroring the federal “reasonable probability” test for Brady and the “any reasonable likelihood” test for Napue;
• Carter’s conviction and death sentence were vacated, and a new trial was ordered.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83, 1963): Prosecutors must disclose evidence favorable to the accused, material to guilt or punishment.
• Napue v. Illinois (360 U.S. 264, 1959): Due process forbids use of perjured testimony or failure to correct known false testimony.
• United States v. Bagley (473 U.S. 667, 1985): Unified “reasonable probability” standard for Brady materiality; characterized Napue errors as requiring harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.
• United States v. Agurs (427 U.S. 97, 1976): Differentiated materiality when undisclosed evidence involves perjured testimony (Napue) versus other undisclosed evidence (Brady requests).

Legal Reasoning

1. Identification of Violations: Lieutenant Pierpont and Officer Mack threatened the Tovars, paid their living expenses, and coached them to lie on two critical points: that they received no benefits, and that Carter said he intended to “rape, break, and drive” on the night of the murder. Prosecutor Watson, present at pretrial strategy meetings and trial, knew of the benefits yet allowed perjured testimony to stand uncorrected.
2. Materiality & Prejudice Standards:
   • Under Brady/Bagley, suppressed evidence is material if there is a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome.
   • Under Napue, failure to correct false testimony is material unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (“any reasonable likelihood” test).
   • Utah’s PCRA § 78B-9-104(2) adopts parallel standards:
     • Subsection (2)(a): “reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome” (Brady test).
     • Subsection (2)(b): for known false testimony, “in any reasonable likelihood [it] could have affected the judgment” (Napue test).
3. Cumulative Impact on Guilt & Sentencing: With no physical evidence, the State’s case turned on Carter’s unrecorded confession (introduced solely through Pierpont’s testimony) and the Tovars’ corroboration. Disclosure of the threats, payments, and coaching would have severely undercut the credibility of both investigator and witnesses, undermining confidence in the confession. At sentencing, the fabricated “rape” intent was a linchpin for establishing extreme depravity, tipping the balance toward death.

Impact

Carter v. State clarifies that due process requires full disclosure of all forms of witness inducements—including threats, benefits, and active coaching to lie—and imposes a duty on prosecutors to correct any known perjury, even when generated by investigators. It provides a roadmap for analyzing combined Brady and Napue errors under Utah’s PCRA and underscores that cumulative misconduct by police and prosecution can undermine confidence in both conviction and capital sentencing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Brady Violation: Prosecutors must turn over any evidence that could help the defense or impeach a key witness. Failing to do so violates due process.
• Napue Violation: If prosecutors know—or should know—a witness is lying in court and fail to correct it, the trial is unfair, even if the lie only affects credibility.
• Materiality Tests:
  • Brady: Would full disclosure create a “reasonable probability” of a different verdict?
  • Napue: Could the false testimony “in any reasonable likelihood” have swayed the jury?
• PCRA Standards: Utah’s postconviction law mirrors the federal tests to determine whether undisclosed or false evidence prejudiced the trial or sentencing.

Conclusion

Carter v. State reaffirms that a fair criminal trial depends on the unvarnished truth. Investigators may not threaten or financially bind witnesses, nor coach them to lie, and prosecutors cannot stand by as perjury goes unchallenged. By integrating Brady and Napue principles into Utah’s PCRA framework, the decision ensures that cumulative misconduct—however senior the officers or how long ago the trial—can be remedied, preserving the integrity of our justice system.