Prosecutor Disbarment for Prejudicial Public Commentary and Baseless Judge Investigation; No Rule 5.1(b) Liability for Suboptimal Supervision of Seasoned Prosecutors

Introduction

Matter of Stanley no orals held, 2025 CO 51 (Colo. Sept. 8, 2025), is an attorney-discipline decision arising from Linda Stanley’s conduct while serving as the elected District Attorney for Colorado’s Eleventh Judicial District. The Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (“OARC”) pursued discipline based on (1) Stanley’s public and media statements in pending criminal cases and (2) her decision to direct an investigation into the sitting trial judge presiding over a high-profile prosecution.

The central issues were:

whether the Presiding Disciplinary Judge (“PDJ”) was required to recuse;
whether Stanley violated Colo. RPC 5.1(b) through inadequate supervision of subordinates in the “Morphew Case”;
whether Stanley violated Colo. RPC 8.4(a) and 8.4(d) by initiating an investigation into Judge Ramsey Lama based on unfounded rumors; and
whether disbarment was an appropriate sanction in light of the proven misconduct.

The Supreme Court affirmed disbarment, reversed only the Colo. RPC 5.1(b) violation, and rejected constitutional challenges grounded in separation of powers and vagueness.

Summary of the Opinion

The court (Hood, J.) held:

Disqualification: Although “a close call,” recusal from the entire proceeding was not required; the PDJ’s nonparticipation in weighing the prior discipline as an aggravator avoided a disqualifying conflict.
Rule 5.1(b): Reversed. Stanley’s supervisory decisions may have been imperfect, but recruiting and relying on highly experienced prosecutors constituted “reasonable efforts” to ensure ethical compliance.
Rules 8.4(a) and 8.4(d): Affirmed. Ordering a subordinate to investigate the presiding judge’s former spouse, without a reasonable basis and with the apparent purpose of disqualifying the judge, was conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice carried out “through the acts of another.”
Constitutionality: Rejecting separation-of-powers and vagueness challenges; regulating attorney conduct is within the Colorado Supreme Court’s exclusive domain.
Sanction: Disbarment affirmed as reasonable and proportionate, driven primarily by the seriousness of the 8.4(a)/(d) misconduct and extensive aggravation.

A dissent (Samour, J., joined by Chief Justice Márquez) would have reversed and remanded for a new hearing, concluding the PDJ was required to recuse in full and that “partial recusal” was not authorized.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standard of review and disciplinary authority

In re Abrams, 2021 CO 44: Cited for the standard that the court reviews conclusions of law de novo and factual findings for clear error in attorney discipline. Stanley reinforces that framework and signals the court’s willingness to correct overextensions (here, reversing the Rule 5.1(b) finding) while affirming sanction decisions supported by the record.
In re Att'y F., 2012 CO 57 and In re Roose, 69 P.3d 43: Cited to confirm that hearing boards have discretion in sanctioning, guided by the ABA Standards, and that the court will affirm unless the sanction is unreasonable or manifestly disproportionate. Stanley uses these cases to justify deference to the sanction analysis even after narrowing the rule-violation set.

2) Judicial disqualification: appearance, bias, and “material relationship”

People v. Julien, 47 P.3d 1194: Cited for de novo review of disqualification decisions. This framing matters because it underscores that recusal is not left to trial-level discretion in close cases; the Supreme Court independently evaluates impartiality.
Johnson v. Dist. Ct., 674 P.2d 952 (quoting People v. Botham, 629 P.2d 589): Sets the requirement that a recusal motion must allege facts allowing a reasonable inference of bias preventing fair treatment. Stanley relies on this threshold to reject recusal arguments grounded in general assertions about prior professional contact.
S.S. v. Wakefield, 764 P.2d 70: Cited for the principle that unsupported opinions or conclusions are insufficient to establish bias. The majority uses this to characterize Stanley’s theory of predisposition as speculative.
People v. Flockhart, 2013 CO 42: The key disqualification precedent. Flockhart rejects a per se rule requiring disqualification whenever a judge previously prosecuted a party, requiring “facts demonstrating some material relationship between the two proceedings, or facts showing that the past prosecution is relevant to the current case.” Stanley embraces the “material relationship” test, but then narrows its effect by holding that the PDJ’s abstention from the specific aggravator decision was sufficient to avoid disqualification from the entire proceeding.
Schupper v. People, 157 P.3d 516: Cited for the proposition that coworker relationships warrant disqualification only if “so close or unusual” that partiality might reasonably be questioned. Stanley uses Schupper to reject recusal based solely on professional overlap with OARC personnel.

3) Due process and the objective “probability of bias” line

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 and In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133: Cited for the constitutional baseline—“a fair trial in a fair tribunal.” Stanley treats these as the outer boundary: due process recusal is reserved for extreme cases.
Sanders v. People, 2024 CO 33 and Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1: Used to emphasize the “objective standard” and the requirement that allegations be more than “merely theoretical.” The majority applies this to hold that prior employment and earlier prosecution activity, without more, did not create an unconstitutional potential for bias.

4) Prosecutor ethics, “administration of justice,” and reliance on professional standards

In re Att'y C, 47 P.3d 1167 and Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043: Cited for the proposition that courts may consult the American Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice when interpreting prosecutor obligations. Stanley relies on this to validate consultation of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecutorial Investigations in assessing the judge-investigation conduct.
People v. Chambers, 154 P.3d 419, People v. Trogani, 203 P.3d 643, and People v. Raines, 510 P.3d 1089: Cited to rebut the “first impression” claim by showing Rule 8.4(d) has been applied to varied interferences with judicial processes (civil interference by a DA; “judge shopping” by defense counsel; sabotage of plea processes by an assistant DA). Stanley uses these not as direct analogies but as confirmation that “prejudicial to the administration of justice” is a flexible, fact-driven standard.

5) Separation of powers and the court’s exclusive power to regulate lawyers

People v. Dist. Ct., 527 P.2d 50, People in Int. of J.A.L., 761 P.2d 1137, People v. Dist. Ct., 632 P.2d 1022, and People v. Lovato, 2014 COA 113: These cases are used to describe prosecutorial discretion and limits on judicial interference with charging decisions. Stanley distinguishes those limits from attorney regulation, concluding ethics enforcement is not an impermissible judicial intrusion into executive authority.
Coffman v. Williamson, 2015 CO 35 and Unauthorized Prac. of Law Comm'n v. Grimes, 654 P.2d 822: Cited for the principle that regulation of attorneys is within the Supreme Court’s exclusive domain under article VI. These cases provide the backbone for rejecting Stanley’s separation-of-powers defense.
In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175 and People v. Reichman, 819 P.2d 1035: These cases reinforce that prosecutors’ authority to enforce laws does not license violations of professional responsibility; prosecutorial discretion remains “circumscribed” by ethics rules. Stanley employs them to hold that ethics rules can constrain even “discretionary” prosecutorial actions if those actions undermine justice.

6) Vagueness in professional discipline

In re Estate of Rabin, 2020 CO 77: Cited for de novo constitutional review.
In re Kleinsmith, 2017 CO 101 (quoting People v. Morley, 725 P.2d 510) and Bd. of Educ. v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695: These cases supply the test: whether the proscribed conduct is “readily understandable to a licensed lawyer,” and if the rule clearly applies to the conduct, the vagueness challenge fails. Stanley applies this to hold that a DA would understand that investigating the presiding judge in a pending case without a reasonable belief of criminal conduct—and for the purpose of removal—falls within Rule 8.4(d).

7) Sanction framework and prosecutor identity

People v. Rolfe, 962 P.2d 981 and People v. Groland, 908 P.2d 75: Cited in applying aggravation based on experience and public-official status. Stanley uses them to justify heightened responsibility for prosecutors.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78: Quoted for the classic principle that a prosecutor’s interest is “not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” This provides normative force for disbarment where the prosecutor’s conduct undermines fairness and public confidence.
In re Sather, 3 P.3d 403: Cited (along with In re Att'y C, 47 P.3d 1167) to explain when “first impression/unclear rule” concerns may reduce sanctions. Stanley distinguishes those situations from Rule 8.4(d), which the court deemed clear as applied.

Legal Reasoning

1) Disqualification: “material relationship” acknowledged, but cabined

The majority accepts Stanley’s strongest disqualification point: because her prior public censure was considered as an aggravating factor, it created a “material relationship” between the earlier discipline matter and the present one (invoking People v. Flockhart, 2013 CO 42). Nevertheless, it holds that full recusal was not required because the PDJ “abstained” from the prior-discipline aggravation decision, leaving the two other board members to weigh it.

Critically, the majority frames the disqualification inquiry as proceeding-specific rather than person-specific: if the allegedly disqualifying overlap is quarantined from decision-making, the remainder of the adjudication can proceed. The dissent challenges that premise as unauthorized “partial recusal” and as structurally inconsistent with the three-member-board regime.

2) Rule 5.1(b): Reasonableness is not excellence

The court’s reversal of the Colo. RPC 5.1(b) finding draws a sharp line between: (a) poor leadership or imperfect management of a complex prosecution and (b) a failure to make “reasonable efforts” to ensure ethical compliance.

The majority’s key move is to treat Stanley’s staffing decisions—assembling highly experienced prosecutors and adding discovery-support personnel—as substantial evidence of “reasonable efforts.” In doing so, the opinion implicitly rejects an outcome-based metric (e.g., discovery sanctions or excluded experts) as a substitute for proving an ethical supervisory breach by clear and convincing evidence.

3) Rules 8.4(a) and 8.4(d): Prosecutorial “judge-investigation” as prejudicial to justice

The court affirms that launching a baseless investigation into a sitting judge presiding over an active case—especially where motivated by adverse rulings— constitutes “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice” under Colo. RPC 8.4(d). It further holds Stanley responsible under Colo. RPC 8.4(a) because she acted “through the acts of another” by ordering her investigator to interview the judge’s former spouse.

The analysis is anchored in three findings:

No reasonable predicate: A change.org petition and rumors did not supply a reasonable belief of criminality or disqualifying conflict.
Appearance of intimidation: Using the DA’s own investigator created an appearance of influence or intimidation, which Stanley herself acknowledged could look “malicious or devious.”
Warning signs ignored: Refusals from CCSO leadership and the CBI placed Stanley on notice of merit and impropriety concerns.

The court’s consultation of the Prosecutor Standards (§ 26-3.2) reinforces a “reasonableness/independence” norm: investigations touching the judiciary must be predicated on reasonable belief and structured to protect independence.

4) Separation of powers and vagueness: ethics regulation prevails

On separation of powers, the court draws a doctrinal boundary: prosecutorial discretion over charging decisions is executive authority, but it does not immunize prosecutors from attorney regulation. Citing Coffman v. Williamson, 2015 CO 35, In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, and People v. Reichman, 819 P.2d 1035, the court treats this discipline matter as regulation of the lawyer, not judicial control of prosecutions.

On vagueness, the court holds that a licensed attorney would readily understand Rule 8.4(d) to prohibit an unfounded, strategically timed probe of the presiding judge’s personal history aimed at disqualification. Under In re Kleinsmith, 2017 CO 101 and Bd. of Educ. v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, clarity “as applied” defeats the challenge.

5) Sanction: disbarment driven by institutional injury and aggravation

Even after reversing Rule 5.1(b), the court affirms disbarment because the sanction must be consistent with the most serious misconduct, and here the Rule 8.4 violations (misuse of office affecting a sitting judge and judicial process) supported the ABA Standards’ disbarment track (§ 5.21).

The opinion treats the harms as systemic: reputational harm to defendants, dismissals of prosecutions, venue disruption, and erosion of public confidence. It also highlights Stanley’s mental state findings (negligent, knowing, reckless, intentional across categories) and heavy aggravation—particularly refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing.

Impact

1) A clarified ceiling on Rule 5.1(b) in public-law offices

The reversal of the Rule 5.1(b) finding signals that, in complex prosecutions, supervision duties will not be converted into strict liability for litigation failures when the supervisor reasonably staffs and delegates to seasoned attorneys. Future discipline cases will likely need evidence tying the supervisor’s acts/omissions to ethical noncompliance (not merely adverse trial-court rulings, sanctions, or mismanagement).

2) A strong warning against “judge-targeting” conduct by prosecutors

The Rule 8.4(d) holding supplies a concrete application: investigating the presiding judge (or the judge’s family) on rumor, in the midst of a case, with an apparent litigation advantage motive, is prejudicial to the administration of justice—especially when done using the prosecutor’s own office resources. This will likely influence how prosecutors structure any credible allegations implicating judicial misconduct: independence, reasonable belief, and procedural safeguards become essential.

3) Disqualification doctrine: unresolved tension over “partial recusal”

Although the majority allows the PDJ to remain after abstaining from the aggravator connected to the prior proceeding, the dissent asserts this is legally unsupported and undermines public confidence. Practitioners should expect future litigation over whether, and how, “partial recusal” can operate in Colorado discipline proceedings consistent with C.R.C.P. 242’s hearing-board structure.

4) Prosecutor speech: discipline consequences for case-prejudicing commentary

While not appealed, the affirmed Rule 3.6(a) and Rule 3.8(f) violations show the court’s readiness to treat media appearances and even “off the record” interactions as ethically perilous when dissemination is foreseeable and statements heighten condemnation or prejudice proceedings. The dismissals under the outrageous governmental conduct doctrine in the Jacobs and Crawford matters underscore that professional discipline risk may track real case outcomes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Colo. RPC 3.6(a) (trial publicity): Limits what lawyers can say publicly about a pending case when the statement is likely to reach the public and likely to materially prejudice the proceeding (e.g., affecting jurors or fairness).
Colo. RPC 3.8(f) (special limits on prosecutors): Adds a prosecutor-specific restriction: statements that are likely to heighten public condemnation of the accused are prohibited unless needed to inform the public and serve a legitimate law-enforcement purpose.
Colo. RPC 5.1(b) (supervising lawyers): Requires supervisors to make “reasonable efforts” to ensure subordinates follow ethical rules. In Stanley, “reasonable efforts” can be satisfied by staffing a case with experienced attorneys and supporting them—poor outcomes or management missteps alone do not prove an ethical breach.
Colo. RPC 8.4(d) (prejudicial to the administration of justice): A broad misconduct rule aimed at protecting the fairness and integrity of courts and legal processes. Here, using prosecutorial power to probe the presiding judge on rumor—apparently to force recusal—was deemed inherently damaging to that integrity.
Colo. RPC 8.4(a) (misconduct through another): You cannot evade ethical responsibility by ordering or using someone else to do the improper act. Stanley applied this because the DA directed her office investigator to conduct the judge-related interview.
“Outrageous governmental conduct”: A rare doctrine under which a court may dismiss charges if government conduct is so unfair that it violates fundamental due process principles. In this record, the Jacobs and Crawford cases were dismissed after the DA’s public statements.
Separation of powers: Prevents one branch of government from controlling core functions of another. The court held that disciplining a prosecutor for ethics violations is not judicial control of charging decisions; it is regulation of lawyers, which is within the judiciary’s constitutional authority.

Conclusion

Matter of Stanley no orals held, 2025 CO 51, establishes two practical guideposts in Colorado attorney discipline: (1) Rule 5.1(b) demands reasonable supervisory efforts, not exemplary leadership or error-free case administration, particularly where experienced attorneys are recruited and relied upon; and (2) a prosecutor’s baseless, office-directed investigation into the presiding judge, apparently motivated by adverse rulings, is squarely sanctionable under Colo. RPC 8.4(a) and 8.4(d).

The decision’s broader significance lies in its institutional focus: when prosecutorial speech and actions undermine fairness, threaten judicial independence, and erode public confidence, the court is willing to impose the profession’s most severe sanction—disbarment. At the same time, the dissent highlights an important unresolved fault line about disqualification mechanics in discipline cases, suggesting future clarification may be necessary.