Proration Compelled: Third Circuit Holds First Step Act’s “for each year” Requires Pro-Rated Good-Conduct Time for Partial-Year Sentences

Introduction

In a precedential opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) method for calculating federal good-conduct time (GCT) under the First Step Act of 2018. The petitioner, Christopher Thieme, serving a 210-month sentence for federal offenses, argued that the First Step Act’s revision to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) entitled him to a full 54 days of GCT for the last six months of his sentence—rather than a prorated amount. The BOP, by contrast, applied a daily accrual rate (0.148 days per day) to partial-year terms, yielding 26 days of GCT for the last six months.

The core issue: Does the First Step Act’s change from “at the end of each year” to “for each year” of the prisoner’s sentence, and deletion of the word “prorated,” entitle inmates to a full 54 days of GCT in the last partial year, or does it still require proration?

The Third Circuit held that the statute, properly read, sets a rate of 54 days per year, which necessarily compels proration for partial-year terms. The court also rejected Thieme’s due process and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) challenges and, in the post–Loper Bright world, resolved the case through the statute’s single best meaning rather than agency deference.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit (Judge Phipps) affirmed the district court’s denial of Thieme’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. On de novo review, the court concluded:

Textual interpretation of § 3624(b)(1), as amended by the First Step Act, compels proration of GCT for partial years. The phrase “up to 54 days for each year of the prisoner’s sentence” sets a per-year rate; thus partial years accrue proportionally.
Deleting the word “prorated” does not eliminate proration because Congress simultaneously inserted “for each year,” which functions as a rate-setting phrase (“per year”).
Due process challenges fail because they target rulemaking, not adjudication; procedural due process does not attach to legislative rulemaking.
APA challenges to the BOP’s 2022 final rule were premature when Thieme filed (2020), and APA review of the BOP’s individualized release-date determination is barred by 18 U.S.C. § 3625.
Chevron deference is no longer applicable (Loper Bright abrogated Chevron). The outcome rests on the statute’s single best meaning.
The rule of lenity does not apply because there is no “grievous ambiguity.”
Issues raised for the first time (e.g., rounding-down convention, major questions doctrine) were not preserved.

Result: Thieme is not entitled to an extra 28 days; the BOP’s calculation of 26 days of GCT for his final six months stands.

Background and Statutory Context

Federal GCT has existed in various forms since the 19th century. The modern regime began with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which awarded “54 days at the end of each year” and authorized proration for the last year or portion thereof, with credits posted in the final six weeks. The 1994 amendments added “up to” before “54 days” and further refined standards for awarding credit.

In Barber v. Thomas (2010), the Supreme Court interpreted the pre–First Step Act statute to tie GCT to time actually served—not the sentence imposed—emphasizing the statute’s retrospective design (“at the end of each year,” based on conduct “during that year”).

The First Step Act of 2018 amended § 3624(b)(1) in several ways:

Changed “term of imprisonment” to “sentence imposed by the court.”
Changed “at the end of each year” to “for each year,” removing the explicit “prorated” and “last six weeks” language.
Overall effect: made GCT less purely retrospective and gave it some prospective attributes, still subject to BOP determination based on institutional conduct.

The BOP issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (Dec. 31, 2019) and, after comments, a final rule (effective Mar. 14, 2022) that:

Calculates GCT against the sentence imposed (post–First Step Act), not time served (pre–First Step Act / Barber regime).
Prorates partial years at a daily rate of 54/365 ≈ 0.148 credits per day.

Factual and Procedural Posture

Thieme began serving his 210-month sentence in December 2016. Under pre–First Step Act rules, his maximum GCT was 823 days. After the First Step Act and the BOP’s recalculation (April 25, 2020), his potential GCT increased to 944 days, which included 26 days for the last six months (daily proration with rounding down). If the last six months yielded a full 54 days, his total would be 972 days—a 28-day difference.

Thieme filed a pro se § 2241 petition (Oct. 22, 2020), arguing that proration for the last partial year was unlawful; he also raised due process, APA, and separation-of-powers challenges. The district court denied relief, holding the statute permits proration and, alternatively, deferring to BOP under Chevron. On appeal, the Third Circuit appointed amicus to brief statutory and related issues. While the appeal was pending, new criminal charges were filed against Thieme in another district; those did not moot the case.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Sources Cited

Barber v. Thomas (2010): Clarified that, pre–First Step Act, GCT was awarded for time actually served and prorated for partial years, reflecting a retrospective award system.
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024): Abrogated Chevron deference; courts must identify the single best meaning of statutes.
Textual canons and interpretive cases:
- Rule against superfluity: Hayes v. Harvey; Ross v. Blake; United States v. Weiss; National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense; Pierce County v. Guillen; Stone v. INS.
- Ordinary meaning and context: Perrin v. United States; City & County of San Francisco v. EPA.
- Use of dictionaries and proximity: Merriam-Webster; Oxford English Dictionary; United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp.
- Meaning of “year”: United States v. Brown (common usage of a year as 12 months/365 days).
Habeas and APA interface:
- Preiser v. Rodriguez; Munaf v. Geren (habeas scope for duration of custody).
- APA finality: Bennett v. Spear; Corner Post v. Board of Governors (final agency action requirement under § 704).
- Definition of “order” and “agency action”: 5 U.S.C. § 551; Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp.
- Third Circuit APA-in-habeas guidance: Gardner v. Grandolsky.
- Statutory bar to APA review for BOP determinations: 18 U.S.C. § 3625; Murray v. Bledsoe; Reeb v. Thomas; Richmond v. Scibana; Standifer v. Ledezma.
Due process and rulemaking vs adjudication: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC; Londoner v. Denver; Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization.
Rule of lenity: Barber; Muscarello v. United States; Bifulco v. United States; Sash v. Zenk (Second Circuit’s view that § 3624(b) is non-penal).
Exhaustion: Vasquez v. Strada (no need to exhaust when only statutory construction is at issue).

Legal Reasoning

The central interpretive question was whether Congress, by deleting the word “prorated” from § 3624(b)(1), eliminated proration for partial years. The court concluded it did not, because Congress simultaneously replaced “at the end of each year” with “for each year,” which—given its ordinary meaning—functions as a rate-setter. “For each” is synonymous with “per,” and “per year” denotes a rate or proportion. In a rate-setting context, the presence of a constant denominator (a year) implies proportional calculation when the period is less than that unit.

Applying the rule against superfluity, the court reasoned that the deletion of “prorated” does not imply the abolition of proration when Congress also inserted a rate-bearing phrase that accomplishes the same work more directly and in closer proximity to “54 days.” In other words, Congress changed the mechanism of expression—from an explicit proration clause to a per-year accrual statement—without changing the underlying concept.

The court rejected the argument that “year” should be read to mean “full year” when advantageous to the inmate but “partial year” at the end of the sentence. Post–Loper Bright, a statute must be given its single best meaning. In the context of setting a rate (“54 days for each year”), “year” is the constant denominator, not a flexible unit that morphs between full and partial periods. The court also found no grievous ambiguity to trigger the rule of lenity; the text, structure, and purpose point to proration.

On the administrative law issues, the court held:

The APA allows challenges to agency action in habeas only if tied to the lawfulness or duration of custody; that nexus existed here. But Thieme’s challenge to the 2022 final rule was premature when he filed (2020), failing APA finality.
While the BOP’s April 2020 individualized recalculation qualifies as an “order,” judicial review of such determinations is expressly barred by 18 U.S.C. § 3625 (which excludes APA review under §§ 701–706 for determinations under §§ 3621–3626, including § 3624(b)).
Thus, the court reached the statutory question de novo, unassisted by Chevron (now abrogated). The BOP’s interpretation prevailed not by deference but because it is the best reading of the statute.

The court also disposed of collateral arguments:

Procedural due process: Not implicated by legislative rulemaking; the cited cases involved adjudicative deprivations of existing credits, not general rules.
Exhaustion: Not required for pure questions of statutory construction under § 2241.
Unpreserved issues: The challenge to the BOP’s rounding-down convention and the major questions doctrine argument were not preserved and thus were not considered.

Impact and Significance

This decision settles a nationally relevant question within the Third Circuit: the First Step Act’s “for each year” language is a rate that compels proration for partial-year segments of a sentence. Because the BOP’s daily accrual methodology (0.148 days per day) rests on that conclusion, the decision validates the BOP’s uniform approach and forecloses claims for a windfall 54-day credit in a final partial year.

Key practical effects:

Inmates serving partial-year tails cannot claim a full 54-day credit for that fraction; they accrue credits proportionally. Across a large custodial population, this preserves consistent release-date computations and curbs litigation premised on the textual deletion of “prorated.”
Post–Loper Bright, the decision illustrates how courts will resolve agency–statute disputes through rigorous textual analysis rather than deference. Agencies seeking to defend rules must align their interpretations with the statute’s single best meaning.
On the APA front, the opinion underscores two limits: (1) the finality requirement (Bennett/Corner Post) for challenging rules, and (2) § 3625’s categorical exclusion of APA review for individualized BOP determinations under §§ 3621–3626. This channels federal prisoners’ challenges primarily into statutory construction arguments under § 2241.
Due process claims premised on the BOP’s rulemaking processes are non-starters unless tied to adjudicative deprivations of existing credits. Rulemaking is not subject to constitutional procedural requisites beyond the APA (and here, § 3625 limits APA review for determinations).

Finally, while the court did not reach the rounding-down issue, the opinion signals that such challenges must be properly preserved. Future litigation may test the legality of rounding conventions if timely raised and adequately briefed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Good-Conduct Time (GCT) vs. Earned Time Credits: GCT under § 3624(b)(1) reduces a sentence based on institutional conduct; it accrues at a maximum of 54 days per year of the sentence. Separate from this are First Step Act “earned time credits” under § 3632(d)(4), which relate to program participation and have different rules and limits.
Proration: When a benefit is expressed as an annual rate (here, “54 days for each year”), the benefit for less than a full year is calculated proportionally. For six months, the BOP calculates roughly 26 days (0.148 × 182–183 days, rounded down).
APA Finality: To challenge a regulation under the APA, the rule must be final. A proposal during notice-and-comment is not final; challenges to it are premature.
§ 3625 APA Bar: Even where an inmate can pursue a habeas petition, the APA provides no cause of action to review BOP “determinations” under §§ 3621–3626 (including release-date calculations under § 3624). Courts will instead decide pure legal questions (e.g., statutory interpretation) de novo under § 2241.
Chevron Deference Abrogated: Loper Bright eliminated Chevron, so courts now identify a statute’s single best meaning. Agency rules survive only if they match that meaning—not because they are “reasonable.”
Rule of Lenity: A tie-breaking rule favoring defendants when a penal statute remains grievously ambiguous after using all interpretive tools. It did not apply here because the statute, read in context, is not grievously ambiguous.
Due Process and Rulemaking: Constitutional procedural due process generally attaches to adjudications that determine specific individuals’ rights. Legislative rulemaking does not trigger those individualized procedural requirements.

Conclusion

Thieme v. Warden Fort Dix FCI establishes an important precedential rule in the Third Circuit: the First Step Act’s revision to § 3624(b)(1) sets a per-year rate—“up to 54 days for each year”—that compels pro-rated good-conduct time for partial-year segments. The court’s opinion, anchored in textual canons, ordinary meaning, and statutory context, rejects the argument that deleting the word “prorated” created an entitlement to a full 54 days in the final partial year. Post–Loper Bright, the decision exemplifies judicial insistence on the statute’s single best meaning, independent of Chevron deference.

On the procedural front, the court clarifies that:

APA challenges to proposed rules are premature; and
APA review of individualized BOP determinations under § 3624 is barred by § 3625.

For practitioners and incarcerated individuals alike, the takeaway is clear: under the First Step Act, GCT accrues at a fixed annual rate, and partial years are necessarily prorated. This decision harmonizes the statute’s plain language with the BOP’s daily accrual method and brings welcome clarity to release-date calculations under federal law.