Proposed Rule: Admit Showup Identifications Only in “True Exigencies” Where a Showup Is the Only Feasible Procedure

Case: State v. McLaurin (Dissent)

Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Date: 2025-07-22

Opinion: McDonald, J., joined by Ecker and Westbrook, Js., dissenting

Context note: This is a dissenting opinion. It does not itself change Connecticut law, but it offers a tightly reasoned blueprint for narrowing the “exigency” justification for showups and for applying Connecticut’s state-constitutional reliability framework (State v. Harris) more rigorously.

1. Introduction

The dissent addresses the admissibility of a showup identification in the prosecution of Gregory E. McLaurin for an armed robbery of a Milford restaurant. Two masked men robbed the restaurant; police soon detained two suspects in nearby woods and conducted one-on-one showups with an employee-witness, Jada Brinkley, who identified both suspects.

The central issues are:

Exigency / unnecessary suggestiveness: Whether the circumstances justified using a one-person showup rather than a less suggestive lineup or photographic array (including procedures contemplated by General Statutes § 54-1p).
Reliability: Even assuming unnecessary suggestiveness, whether Brinkley’s identification was reliable under the federal due process framework (Neil v. Biggers; Manson v. Brathwaite) and under Connecticut’s state-constitutional framework (State v. Harris, adopting estimator variables from State v. Guilbert and burden-shifting from State v. Henderson).
Harmlessness: If the identification was wrongly admitted, whether the state proved harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt (State v. Artis).

The dissent argues the showup was both unnecessarily suggestive (no true exigency) and unreliable (especially under State v. Harris), and that the error was not harmless.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Justice McDonald’s dissent makes two principal moves:

Narrowing “exigency”: It contends Connecticut precedent has expanded “exigent circumstances” too far beyond the original rationale of Stovall v. Denno (where a showup was “the only feasible procedure” due to a gravely injured witness). The dissent would limit admissible showups to situations where a showup is truly the only feasible identification option.
Rejecting reliability here: Applying the modern science-informed approach recognized in State v. Harris and State v. Guilbert, the dissent concludes Brinkley’s identification was not reliable given stress, weapon presence, masks, potential marijuana use, possible lack of eyeglasses, and her later total lack of memory of the event.

On remedy, the dissent would reverse and remand for a new trial because the identification was the only direct identification evidence, there was no physical evidence linking McLaurin to the crime, and DNA comparisons excluded him from tested items.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Federal due process framework for identifications

Neil v. Biggers and Manson v. Brathwaite: The dissent acknowledges these cases supply the traditional two-step federal test—(1) unnecessary suggestiveness, then (2) reliability under the “totality of the circumstances,” with the familiar Biggers factors. The dissent criticizes these factors as “malleable and outdated” and insufficiently aligned with modern science (echoing the concerns that motivated State v. Harris).
Stovall v. Denno: Treated as the “seminal exigency case.” The dissent reads Stovall narrowly: showups are justified when they are “the only feasible procedure” (e.g., witness may die; cannot travel; urgency is real and particularized).
In re Winship: Quoted for the foundational value judgment that convicting the innocent is worse than acquitting the guilty (Harlan, J., concurring). The dissent uses this to frame showups as a systemic risk to accuracy.

B. Connecticut identification jurisprudence and its evolution

State v. Ruiz: Cited for the articulation of the two-pronged federal due process inquiry and for the recognition that showups are “inherently and significantly suggestive,” while sometimes permitted if exigency exists.
State v. Revels: Cited for the commonsense proposition that one-to-one confrontations convey police belief in guilt and are therefore suggestive; also cited as part of the line of cases treating certain quick showups as justified.
State v. Wooten: Identified as a key Connecticut turning point expanding “exigency” beyond Stovall. The dissent critiques Wooten’s reasoning that “fresh memory” and “focus the investigation” can supply exigency, warning this collapses the distinction between necessity and convenience.
State v. Ledbetter (overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Harris): Cited as discussing Wooten’s rationale and the “fresh memory” justification. The dissent uses Ledbetter to show how exigency doctrine drifted.
State v. St. John: Cited as another example of Connecticut precedent allowing showups in similar circumstances; used to argue the “exigency” label has become overinclusive.
State v. Mitchell: Noted to emphasize how rarely Connecticut courts have suppressed showup identifications—used to argue current doctrine does not meaningfully constrain unreliable procedures.
State v. Guilbert: Foundational for Connecticut’s embrace of scientific consensus on eyewitness fallibility and for identifying “estimator variables” affecting reliability; also significant for allowing expert testimony on eyewitness identification.
State v. Harris: Central to the dissent. Harris modifies the Biggers framework under the Connecticut constitution by adopting Guilbert’s estimator variables and Henderson’s burden shifting, aiming to better screen unreliable identifications tainted by suggestive procedures.
State v. Dickson: Cited as a further due-process protection against inherently suggestive first-time in-court identifications when no reliable out-of-court identification occurred.
Tatum v. Commissioner of Correction: Cited to show the court’s continuing recognition that evolving eyewitness science affects legal doctrine; used to argue older showup-friendly cases should be reexamined through modern understanding and policy (including § 54-1p).
State v. White: Cited for the proposition that a large proportion of wrongful convictions involve mistaken eyewitness identification, reinforcing the systemic stakes.

C. Out-of-state cases and comparative approaches

State v. Henderson (New Jersey): Cited (via Harris) for burden shifting: once a defendant shows evidence of unreliability from suggestive procedures, the state must justify reliability; then the defendant bears the ultimate burden of showing “very substantial likelihood of misidentification.”
State v. Hunt (Kansas): Cited for an enhanced reliability analysis that explicitly includes capacity to observe (physical/mental acuity) and whether the identification was a product of suggestion.
Commonwealth v. Johnson (Massachusetts) and People v. Adams (New York): Cited as examples of jurisdictions that, in some formulations, exclude identifications after undue suggestiveness without proceeding to a multi-factor reliability salvage inquiry—though the dissent notes exceptions can swallow the rule.
People v. Sammons (Michigan), Morales v. United States (D.C.), and State v. Lawson (Oregon): Cited for strong skepticism of showups and empirical recognition that showups increase mistaken identifications compared to lineups.
United States v. Concepcion and United States v. Hawkins: Cited for the proposition that permissible showups require “overriding necessity” or “extraordinary urgency,” aligning with the dissent’s “true exigency” conception.
United States v. Garcia-Alvarez: Cited for the proposition that a perpetrator wearing a mask weighs against reliability.

D. Connecticut evidentiary/constitutional and remedial authorities

State v. Marquez: Cited for standard of review and general reliability analysis.
State v. Clark: Cited regarding drug use affecting perception/recall and credibility.
State v. Artis: Cited for the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard when an unreliable identification is admitted and for the need for “strong, independent evidence” to deem the error harmless.

E. Statutory policy anchor

General Statutes § 54-1p (and P.A. 11-252): Used as evidence of legislative recognition that eyewitness identifications are “prone” to “stunning inaccuracy” and should be made more reliable through prescribed procedures (e.g., double-blind administration, fillers). The dissent argues broad “exigency” doctrine risks undermining the statute’s purpose by normalizing showups as routine.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Exigency: “only feasible procedure,” not convenience

The dissent’s core doctrinal critique is that Connecticut cases have diluted “exigency” to mean little more than “fast and convenient,” thereby allowing police to bypass more reliable procedures almost whenever a suspect is detained soon after a crime.

On the dissent’s reading, Stovall v. Denno supplies the proper model: exigency exists when circumstances make a showup the only feasible procedure. By contrast, the dissent contends State v. Wooten (and its progeny, including State v. Ledbetter, State v. Revels, and State v. St. John) expanded exigency to include rationales like “fresh memory” and “focus the investigation,” which are present in most investigations and therefore do not meaningfully limit showups.

Applying that principle to these facts, the dissent emphasizes record points the majority did not resolve:

Police already had two suspects in custody and had stopped searching.
Police conceded there was probable cause to arrest without the showup.
The gun used in the robbery was recovered at the scene.
The identifying witness was uninjured, and officers testified nothing prevented a lineup or photographic array.
A supervisor testified there was no emergency—only a request from the captain.

Thus, the dissent would hold the showup unnecessarily suggestive because the state could not show a true, particularized necessity.

B. Reliability: the dissent’s science-informed application of State v. Harris

Even assuming the federal Biggers factors could be satisfied, the dissent’s analysis is driven by Connecticut’s state-constitutional approach in State v. Harris, which incorporates the “estimator variables” recognized in State v. Guilbert. These variables shift attention away from surface indicia like witness confidence and toward empirically grounded risk factors.

On these facts, the dissent finds multiple reliability red flags:

High stress and weapon effects: Brinkley was “petrified” and screaming; a gun was present. Under Guilbert/Harris, weapon focus and high stress can impair memory accuracy.
Masked perpetrators: Both robbers wore ski masks; the dissent argues “proximity” is of limited value when faces are concealed (citing United States v. Garcia-Alvarez).
Possible intoxication: Brinkley testified she “most likely” smoked marijuana that day; under State v. Clark, drug use implicates capacity to perceive/recall.
Possible vision limitation: The trial court noted the possibility she was not wearing eyeglasses.
Memory collapse at trial: Brinkley testified she did not remember the incident or the identification events, even after body-camera clips.
Confidence is weakly correlated with accuracy: The dissent criticizes reliance on Brinkley’s “certainty,” because Guilbert/Harris treat confidence as a poor proxy for accuracy.
Procedure quality: A showup is not a double-blind, sequential procedure; Harris treats the absence of such safeguards as undermining reliability.

Accordingly, the dissent concludes the identification was unreliable under the Connecticut constitution and, on balance, not reliable even under the federal test.

C. Remedy: not harmless under State v. Artis

The dissent underscores that Brinkley’s identification was the only identification linking McLaurin to the robbery, and that DNA comparisons excluded him from multiple items. With no “strong, independent evidence” of guilt, the dissent would find the error not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under State v. Artis and would order a new trial.

3.3 Impact

Although not binding, the dissent has several potential impacts on Connecticut identification litigation and policing:

Reframing “exigency” arguments: Defense counsel may use the dissent to press a stricter, Stovall-like definition of exigency—requiring a concrete showing that a showup was the only feasible option, not merely faster or easier.
Strengthening state-constitutional challenges: The dissent models how to use State v. Harris and State v. Guilbert to argue unreliability grounded in estimator variables (stress, weapon focus, intoxication, disguises, memory decay, procedure quality).
Elevating § 54-1p as policy pressure: By framing frequent showups as undermining the legislature’s reliability mandate in General Statutes § 54-1p, the dissent invites courts to interpret “necessity” more narrowly to harmonize judge-made doctrine with statutory policy.
Trial-level practice changes: Prosecutors may respond by building richer records on necessity (why array/lineup wasn’t feasible) and by presenting reliability evidence more directly; police departments may anticipate more suppression risk and adjust practices.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Showup: Police present one detained suspect to a witness and ask, essentially, “Is this the person?” It is inherently suggestive because it signals police suspicion and provides no “filler” alternatives.
Lineup / photographic array: The witness chooses (or does not choose) from multiple people/photos, typically including “fillers.” This reduces pressure to pick the single suspect and allows police to detect mistaken selections.
Suggestive vs. unnecessarily suggestive: Many showups are suggestive by nature; the legal question is whether the suggestiveness was avoidable—i.e., whether police had feasible, less suggestive alternatives.
Exigency (in this context): A pressing, specific need that makes a showup the only feasible identification procedure (the dissent’s preferred standard), not merely a desire to act quickly.
Reliability “linchpin”: Even if the procedure was flawed, identification evidence can be admitted if, under the total circumstances, it is trustworthy enough. The dissent argues traditional federal factors overestimate trustworthiness.
Estimator variables (Guilbert/Harris): Scientifically grounded factors that affect memory accuracy (stress, weapon focus, disguise, cross-race effects, memory decay, post-event information, and procedure features like double-blind administration).
Double-blind, sequential procedure: The administrator does not know who the suspect is (double-blind), and images are shown one at a time (sequential), reducing subtle cues and comparison-driven mistakes.
Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: Even if evidence was wrongly admitted, the conviction stands only if the state proves the error could not have affected the verdict.

5. Conclusion

The dissent in State v. McLaurin is a forceful critique of routine reliance on showup identifications. It urges Connecticut to return “exigency” to its narrower roots in Stovall v. Denno—permitting showups only when they are the only feasible identification procedure—and it applies State v. Harris and State v. Guilbert to emphasize modern scientific insights that undermine confidence-based assessments of reliability.

Its broader significance lies in the dissent’s attempt to align constitutional doctrine with (1) contemporary cognitive science, (2) Connecticut’s evolving identification jurisprudence (Guilbert, Dickson, Harris, Tatum), and (3) legislative policy embodied in General Statutes § 54-1p—collectively pushing toward a regime where convenience no longer substitutes for necessity when the risk is wrongful conviction.