Proportionality and Unemployment Fraud Penalties:
Thigpen v. Best Home Care LLC and the Scope of the Excessive Fines Clause in Minnesota

Case: Christopher Thigpen v. Best Home Care LLC, Department of Employment and Economic Development (A23-1544)
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Date: December 24, 2025
Opinion by: Moore, III, J., for the Court; Hennesy, J., joined by Procaccini, J., dissenting

I. Introduction

This decision addresses whether Minnesota’s statutory scheme for punishing unemployment insurance “misrepresentation” violates the Excessive Fines Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. Specifically, the court considered the constitutionality of:

A 40% monetary penalty on the amount of unemployment benefits overpaid because of misrepresentation;
1% monthly interest on that overpayment and penalty; and
A statutory bar on future unemployment benefits for up to 10 years while any misrepresentation overpayment, penalty, or interest remains outstanding, after which the balance is cancelled.

Appellant Christopher Thigpen argued that this combined scheme is so harsh—especially given his low income—that it constitutes an unconstitutionally excessive fine. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that, as applied to Thigpen, the statutory penalties are not “grossly disproportional” to the gravity of his offense and thus do not violate either the federal or state Excessive Fines Clause.

In doing so, the court:

Reaffirmed and applied its existing three-factor proportionality test from State v. Rewitzer for excessive fines challenges;
Held that Minnesota’s unemployment fraud penalty structure is within constitutional bounds as applied to Thigpen;
Refused to expand the analysis formally to include “legislative intent” as a separate factor; and
Expressly left open—for a second time—whether a person’s ability to pay must be considered in Excessive Fines analysis.

The dissent would have gone further, holding that a person’s ability to pay must be considered under both the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions, and would have remanded for development of a record on Thigpen’s finances.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Factual Background

Thigpen, then 21 years old and living with his mother and four siblings, applied for Minnesota unemployment insurance benefits in March 2020, at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In his initial application, he:

Reported prior work at Home Depot and Target; and
Accurately disclosed that he was employed as a personal care assistant (PCA) for his mother through Best Home Care LLC at $13.25 per hour, approximately 40 hours per week.

After his application was approved, Thigpen continued receiving benefits for 104 consecutive weeks (March 2020–March 2022). Each week, he had to complete an online continued-claim questionnaire that explicitly asked:

Whether he had worked or received any pay during the reporting period; and
Whether he had received—or applied for—any other source of income not already reported.

Every week, Thigpen answered “No” to both questions, even though he continued to work as a PCA and earned between approximately $132.50 and $576 per week. During this period, he received:

Regular state unemployment benefits (“standard” benefits);
Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation (PEUC); and
Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC) supplements.

Eventually, DEED audited his account, provided him with a wage history from Best Home Care, and asked him to confirm its accuracy. He did so. DEED then determined that:

He had been overpaid $24,005 in regular and PEUC benefits; and
$15,600 in FPUC benefits.

DEED concluded these overpayments resulted from “misrepresentation” under Minn. Stat. § 268.18, subd. 2(a), and imposed:

A 40% penalty on the overpaid amount (approximately $15,842);
1% monthly interest on the state-benefit portion (overpayment + penalty); and
An ineligibility bar for future unemployment benefits while any part of the misrepresentation overpayment, penalty, or interest remained outstanding, up to ten years, after which any remaining balance would be cancelled.

B. Administrative Proceedings

Thigpen appealed DEED’s determination to an unemployment law judge (ULJ). At three evidentiary hearings in 2022–2023:

Thigpen and his mother testified that he lacked intent to defraud and misunderstood the forms;
His counsel argued that his initial disclosure of the Best Home Care job was inconsistent with fraudulent intent.

The ULJ rejected these arguments, finding that Thigpen did not have a good-faith belief in the correctness of his weekly answers and that his repeated “No” responses were not credible. The ULJ concluded:

Thigpen was overpaid $39,605 in unemployment benefits (state and federal combined);
A 40% penalty applied (approx. $15,842), pursuant to § 268.18, subd. 2;
Interest accrued at 1% per month on the state overpayment plus penalty (not on federal pandemic components);
Thigpen was barred from receiving further unemployment benefits while any balance remained, up to ten years, after which the remaining amount must be cancelled under § 268.18, subd. 4(b).

C. Court of Appeals

Thigpen petitioned the Minnesota Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari, raising four arguments:

The ULJ’s findings lacked substantial evidence;
The ULJ failed to apply a proper burden of proof;
He was denied due process; and
The penalty was an excessive fine under the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions.

The Court of Appeals:

Rejected all four arguments; and
Held that, under Minnesota’s established Excessive Fines test, the penalty was not unconstitutionally excessive.

Thigpen sought further review. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review only on the Excessive Fines Clause issue.

III. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding:

The 40% penalty and 1% monthly interest on unemployment misrepresentation overpayments are “fines” within the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause because they are monetary exactions imposed as punishment and deterrence, not purely remedial.
The separate statutory bar on future unemployment benefits for those with unpaid misrepresentation balances may be considered part of the punitive scheme for purposes of analysis, but the court expressly declined to decide definitively whether that bar itself is a “fine.” It assumed, without deciding, that it could be considered for purposes of the constitutional analysis.
Applying the three-factor proportionality test from State v. Rewitzer, the sanctions as applied to Thigpen are not “grossly disproportional” to the gravity of his misconduct.
Because the statute has at least one constitutional application (Thigpen’s own case), his facial challenge necessarily fails; only his as-applied challenge is analyzed.
The court again left open whether an individual’s “ability to pay” a fine must be considered under the Excessive Fines Clauses, finding that even if it were relevant, the sparse record of Thigpen’s finances would not change the outcome.
The court refused to adopt “legislative intent” as a standalone factor in the Excessive Fines analysis, despite some federal courts referencing it, noting that doing so risks circular self-validation by the legislature.

The dissent would have held that:

Ability to pay is a required component of the Excessive Fines analysis under both the federal and Minnesota constitutions; and
The case should be remanded so the ULJ can develop a factual record on Thigpen’s financial capacity to pay the penalty.

IV. Detailed Analysis

1. Legal Framework: The Excessive Fines Clause

Both the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions contain identical Excessive Fines Clauses:

U.S. Const. amend. VIII: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
Minn. Const. art. I, § 5: identical language.

The U.S. Supreme Court in Timbs v. Indiana (2019) held that the federal Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Minnesota has not previously interpreted its own Excessive Fines Clause to provide greater or lesser protection than the federal one, and Thigpen did not argue for a divergent interpretation on that point.

The modern doctrinal backbone is United States v. Bajakajian, which held:

A punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.

Bajakajian emphasized that proportionality—not exact parity—is the “touchstone”; fines may be harsh without being unconstitutional. Only “gross disproportionality” triggers constitutional invalidation.

Minnesota distilled federal doctrine into a three-part test in State v. Rewitzer (2000), later reaffirmed in Wilson and Wendell.

2. Issues Before the Court

The core legal questions were:

What aspects of Minnesota’s unemployment misrepresentation penalty scheme are “fines” subject to the Excessive Fines Clause?
Does the combined effect of the 40% penalty, 1% monthly interest, and up-to-10-year ineligibility bar violate the Excessive Fines Clauses as applied to Thigpen?
Must courts consider an individual’s ability to pay in determining whether a fine is unconstitutionally excessive?
If the scheme is constitutional as applied to Thigpen, does that necessarily defeat his facial challenge?

3. Precedents and Authorities Cited

a. U.S. Supreme Court Precedents

Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) – Held that civil forfeitures are covered by the Excessive Fines Clause when at least partly punitive. This case undergirds the notion that civil monetary sanctions, like unemployment penalties, can be “fines.”
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) – Established the “gross disproportionality” standard and identified proportionality as the “touchstone.” Minnesota’s Rewitzer test is built on Bajakajian.
Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. 146 (2019) – Incorporated the Excessive Fines Clause against the states and highlighted historical concerns with punitive economic sanctions that destroy livelihoods or are used as predatory revenue tools. The majority and dissent both rely on Timbs’s historical narrative, but draw different implications.
Department of Housing & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) – Though not an Excessive Fines case on the merits, the Court (approving the Ninth Circuit’s analysis) noted that eviction from public housing is not a “fine” because it is neither a cash nor in-kind payment payable to the government. The majority here uses Rucker to support the argument that non-monetary sanctions like loss of benefits are not, on their own, “fines.”
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) – Cited for the demanding standard for facial challenges: the challenger must show there is no set of circumstances in which the law could be constitutionally applied.

b. Minnesota Supreme Court Precedents

State v. Rewitzer, 617 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 2000) – Adopted a three-factor test for Excessive Fines challenges:
1. Gravity of the offense vs. harshness of the penalty;
2. Comparison with penalties for other offenses in the same jurisdiction;
3. Comparison with penalties for the same offense in other jurisdictions.
Wilson v. Commissioner of Revenue, 656 N.W.2d 547 (Minn. 2003) – Held that imposing the full amount of another person’s tax liability (plus interest) on a corporate officer for failing to comply with a levy was excessive, in part because the officer did not create the underlying liability. It is used here to contrast a relatively minor culpability with a severe penalty.
Miller v. One 2001 Pontiac Aztek, 669 N.W.2d 893 (Minn. 2003) – A vehicle forfeiture case. The court there assumed without deciding that a defendant’s financial situation might be relevant to harshness, but found the forfeiture constitutional anyway. The present majority repeats this move, again declining to decide the ability-to-pay question.
Wilson, Wendell v. Commissioner of Revenue, 7 N.W.3d 405 (Minn. 2024) – In Wendell, the court upheld a 25% “frivolous tax return” penalty, emphasizing the harm to tax administration and government resources. It serves as an important analogue for the unemployment misrepresentation penalty, both in amount (percent-based) and in rationale (deterring dishonest filings).
Minnesota Voters Alliance v. City of Minneapolis, 766 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 2009); McCaughtry v. City of Red Wing, 831 N.W.2d 518 (Minn. 2013) – Cited on the law of facial challenges.
Wendell and In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. 1989) – Reiterate that statutes are presumed constitutional and courts should declare them unconstitutional only when “absolutely necessary.”

c. Other Federal and State Authorities

Grashoff v. Adams, 65 F.4th 910 (7th Cir. 2023) – Indiana unemployment fraud case upholding a 25% penalty against an Excessive Fines challenge. The Seventh Circuit emphasized the systemic harm caused by unemployment insurance fraud (financial, administrative, and trust-related). The majority here leans on Grashoff to characterize the gravity of unemployment misrepresentation.
Federal Courts of Appeals dicta on ability to pay – Some circuits, including the Eighth, have acknowledged that ability to pay can be relevant when the sanction is a monetary fine (e.g., United States v. Lippert, United States v. Aleff, United States v. Viloski, United States v. Levesque). The dissent cites these to argue that considering ability to pay is doctrinally supported.
Out-of-state decisions on ability to pay – The dissent references decisions from Colorado, Indiana, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington that incorporate ability to pay into Excessive Fines analysis (especially in forfeiture contexts), arguing Minnesota should join this trend.
U.S. ex rel. Fesenmaier v. Cameron-Ehlen Group, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (D. Minn. 2024) – District of Minnesota decision criticizing “legislative intent” as a meaningful factor in Excessive Fines analysis because it effectively allows the lawmaker to certify its own constitutionality. The Minnesota Supreme Court here agrees with that critique.

4. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. What Counts as a “Fine”? Monetary Penalties, Interest, and Benefit Ineligibility

For the Excessive Fines Clause to apply, a sanction must:

Be at least partly punitive (not purely remedial or compensatory), and
Constitute a “fine”, i.e., a cash or in-kind payment to the government.

The majority holds:

The 40% penalty is clearly punitive and monetary; it is a fine.
The 1% monthly interest on that penalty and overpayment is also part of the punitive financial obligation; DEED does not dispute that both the penalty and interest are subject to Excessive Fines review.
The 10-year bar on future unemployment benefits is trickier. It is arguably punitive, but it is not a direct payment “to” the government. Citing Rucker, the State argued that such a sanction is not a “fine.”

Instead of resolving that question definitively, the court takes a pragmatic path:

It acknowledges Timbs’s history suggesting that rules which effectively trap a person in unpaid fines and poverty are within the core concern of the Excessive Fines Clause.
The court assumes, for purposes of analysis, that the benefits ineligibility may be considered part of the punitive “fine” structure—but holds the scheme constitutional even under that more demanding, generous-to-the-defendant framing.

Thus, the constitutionality of the ineligibility bar as a separate “fine” remains open in Minnesota law. But lower courts are now instructed that, at least in the unemployment context, including that bar in the proportionality analysis does not alter the outcome in this case.

b. Facial vs. As-Applied Challenge

Thigpen brought both:

a facial challenge, arguing the statutory scheme is unconstitutional in all or virtually all of its applications; and
an as-applied challenge, focusing on his particular circumstances.

Under federal and Minnesota doctrine, a facial challenge fails if there is any constitutional application of the statute. Because the court concludes the scheme is constitutional as applied to Thigpen himself, it declares that this alone defeats the facial challenge and thus analyzes only the as-applied claim.

c. Application of the Rewitzer Three-Factor Test

(1) Gravity of the Offense vs. Harshness of the Penalty

The first factor requires courts to evaluate:

“The harm caused or threatened to the victim or society”; and
The “culpability of the offender.” (Borrowed from Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)).

On gravity of the offense, the court notes:

Thigpen falsely reported that he had no work or income for 104 consecutive weeks, even though he worked nearly full time as a PCA and earned wages every week.
Unemployment misrepresentation causes direct financial harm to the unemployment insurance fund and undermines:
- The State’s ability to assist legitimately unemployed workers;
- The administrative integrity of the system (time and resources spent detecting and rectifying fraud); and
- Public confidence in the fairness and effectiveness of the program.

The court explicitly cites and adopts the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Grashoff, which emphasized the systemic harms of unemployment fraud—threatening the viability of the fund, complicating administration, and eroding public trust.

On harshness, the court acknowledges:

The penalty is substantial: 40% of the overpayment plus ongoing interest;
The ineligibility bar prevents Thigpen from drawing new unemployment benefits while he still owes anything on the misrepresentation balance;
However, the entire balance must be cancelled after 10 years if not repaid—meaning the debt is not perpetual, and the ineligibility is time-limited.

The court weighs these points against the seriousness and persistence of Thigpen’s misrepresentation. It also distinguishes this case from Wilson, where the corporate officer had not created the underlying tax liability and yet was saddled with the full amount as a penalty—a mismatch between culpability and financial burden. In contrast, Thigpen’s own actions directly created the overpayment.

The majority also rejects Thigpen’s attempt to downgrade the gravity of his conduct by highlighting:

His youth;
Pandemic-related hardships; and
His alleged confusion about the forms.

Because the ULJ found his testimony not credible and expressly found misrepresentation, and because that finding is not under review, the Supreme Court treats his conduct as actionable misrepresentation, not mere misunderstanding.

Conclusion on factor one: While the penalties are “harsh,” they are not grossly disproportional to the offense, especially given the scale and duration of the misrepresentation and the 10-year cap with mandatory cancellation.

(2) Comparison with Penalties for Similar Offenses in Minnesota

The second factor looks at whether penalties for more or less serious conduct in the same jurisdiction are lower or higher, which can reveal whether a particular penalty is an outlier.

Thigpen highlighted that Minnesota’s new paid family and medical leave law (effective 2026) imposes:

A 15% penalty on misrepresentation-related overpayments;
Interest of 6% per year (significantly lower than 1% per month); and
No eligibility bar; instead, repayment can occur through offset of up to 20% of future benefits.

He argued this shows unemployment misrepresentation penalties are unduly harsh by comparison.

DEED countered by pointing to Minnesota tax law:

50% penalty for fraudulent or false tax returns or fraudulent refunds (Minn. Stat. § 289A.60, subd. 6);
Additional penalties for abusive tax shelters and fraud-related refunds;
These civil penalties can stack on top of criminal tax penalties.

The court concluded, much like in Wendell, that:

Some penalties for analogous or related conduct are lower (e.g., paid leave misrepresentation);
Some are higher (e.g., tax fraud penalties, False Claims Act-type statutes).

Because the unemployment misrepresentation scheme is not clearly more severe than penalties imposed for comparable or worse financial dishonesty in Minnesota—and is within the same general range—the court holds that it is not an outlier in the state’s own statutory landscape.

(3) Comparison with Penalties for the Same Offense in Other Jurisdictions

The third factor compares Minnesota’s penalty with unemployment fraud penalties in other states. Under federal law, all states must impose at least a 15% penalty for unemployment fraud-related overpayments. Minnesota’s 40% is higher than the federal floor, but:

Several states impose 40%–50% penalties; some go to 100% (e.g., Michigan, Utah);
Some states charge interest equal to or greater than Minnesota’s 1% per month;
Multiple states also impose benefit ineligibility provisions that bar claimants from collecting future benefits until misrepresentation penalties are repaid in full.

The court therefore finds that Minnesota’s scheme, though “onerous,” is not out of step with national practice. It falls within the mainstream range of state responses to unemployment benefit fraud and thus does not suggest gross disproportionality under comparative analysis.

d. Ability to Pay: Assumed but Not Decided

Thigpen and the dissent argued that:

A person’s financial circumstances must be considered in assessing the “harshness” of a fine; and
In Thigpen’s case, his low weekly earnings (~$288) make even the interest payments “an insurmountable challenge.”

The majority acknowledges that both it and the U.S. Supreme Court have previously left open the role of ability to pay in Excessive Fines analysis (Miller; Bajakajian fn. 15). It does so again here, and takes a two-step approach:

Legal question: The court expressly declines to decide whether the Excessive Fines Clauses (federal or state) require consideration of an individual’s ability to pay.
Factual question: It assumes for argument’s sake that ability to pay is a relevant factor, but finds that the record is too thin to demonstrate inability to pay in a way that would affect the proportionality analysis. Thigpen offered only high-level assertions, without a developed factual record on his current income, expenses, assets, or long-term earning capacity.

Thus, the court avoids making new constitutional law on ability to pay, while signaling that litigants who want to press such arguments must develop a robust factual record.

e. Legislative Intent as a Factor: Rejected

DEED suggested that the court consider “legislative intent” as an additional factor in the Excessive Fines analysis, following some federal cases that have treated legislative judgments as weighty evidence of proportionality.

The court rejects this proposal, agreeing with the critique in Fesenmaier and Yates (11th Cir., Newsom, J., concurring) that:

Every statutory penalty necessarily reflects the legislature’s intent;
If legislative intent were treated as a substantive factor, the government’s choice to impose a given penalty would, in effect, be its own justification for constitutionality (“letting the driver set the speed limit”).

The court therefore keeps the Rewitzer test limited to:

Gravity vs. harshness;
Intrajurisdictional comparison (within Minnesota);
Interjurisdictional comparison (other states).

5. The Dissents’ Arguments

a. Justice Hennesy’s Dissent

Justice Hennesy’s dissent is significant because it proposes a doctrinal shift: ability to pay must be a required part of Excessive Fines analysis under both federal and Minnesota constitutions.

Key points:

History and purpose of the Clause: Drawing on Timbs and Browning-Ferris, the dissent emphasizes that from Magna Carta onward, “economic sanctions” were not to be “so large as to deprive [an offender] of his livelihood.” Excessive fines historically functioned as tools of oppression—either political or economic—and the Clause is meant to prevent penalties that destroy a person’s ability to survive lawfully.
Modern context: The dissent notes the contemporary problem of “legal financial obligations” trapping low-income people in cycles of debt, license suspensions, and further penalties, citing scholarly work suggesting such fines entrench poverty and erode trust in the justice system.
Doctrinal foundation: Several federal circuits (including the Eighth) already treat ability to pay as a relevant factor for monetary fines; numerous state high courts (Colorado, Indiana, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Washington) have expressly adopted ability-to-pay as central to Excessive Fines analysis.
Logical necessity: The dissent argues that one cannot legitimately assess the “harshness” of a monetary sanction without reference to the offender’s economic circumstances. A $10,000 fine is vastly different for a minimum-wage worker supporting a family than for a wealthy professional.
State constitutional independence: Even if the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet mandated consideration of ability to pay, Minnesota has the interpretive freedom—and, in the dissent’s view, the duty—to construe Article I, § 5 of its own Constitution more protectively. The dissent invokes the court’s traditional self-understanding as the “first line of defense for individual liberties” in Minnesota (Kahn v. Griffin).
Remedy: Because the current record is underdeveloped on Thigpen’s actual ability to pay, the dissent would reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals with instructions to send the case back to the ULJ to collect and assess detailed financial evidence under a newly clarified Excessive Fines standard that includes ability to pay.

b. Justice Procaccini’s Separate Dissent

Justice Procaccini writes separately but joins Parts B and C of Justice Hennesy’s dissent. He agrees that:

The Minnesota Constitution’s Excessive Fines Clause should be interpreted to require an analysis of an individual’s ability to pay; and
Remand is appropriate for development of a factual record.

While he also believes the federal Constitution should be read similarly, he notes that the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet decided the issue and suggests Minnesota need not resolve the federal question now if it can rest its holding on the state constitution—mirroring the court’s approach in Deegan v. State.

6. Likely Impact and Future Litigation

a. Unemployment Insurance Enforcement and DEED Practices

This decision strongly reinforces DEED’s existing enforcement regime:

DEED can continue imposing the 40% fraud-related penalty, 1% monthly interest (on state components), and the misrepresentation-related ineligibility bar with substantial constitutional security—at least in cases comparable to Thigpen’s.
The decision signals that long-term, repeated misrepresentation (104 weeks) is viewed as particularly serious and justifies robust penalties.
The 10-year cancellation provision is now judicially recognized as a meaningful mitigating feature; DEED may point to it in future litigation to show penalties are not perpetual or ruinous.

b. Excessive Fines Jurisprudence in Minnesota

On the one hand, the case consolidates and clarifies Minnesota’s approach:

Rewitzer remains the controlling framework for Excessive Fines analysis;
Courts must use a gross disproportionality standard, highly deferential to legislative judgments;
Comparative analysis (within Minnesota and across states) is central to judicial review of economic penalties.

On the other hand, the case also:

Leaves two important questions open:
- Whether non-monetary deprivations (like benefit ineligibility) are “fines” when imposed alongside monetary sanctions; and
- Whether ability to pay must be considered in assessing “harshness.”
Signals that if a litigant wants to press an ability-to-pay argument, they must build a strong evidentiary record (income, assets, debts, dependents, earning capacity, etc.).
Creates a roadmap for future state-constitutional litigation: two justices have already endorsed an ability-to-pay requirement under Article I, § 5, framing it as a question of proportionality and historical fidelity.

If a future case presents an egregiously high fine imposed on a demonstrably indigent litigant with a robust financial record in the record, the court could be asked again—possibly successfully—to adopt the dissent’s view.

c. Implications for Low-Income Litigants and Administrative Penalties

For low-income Minnesotans, the immediate practical message is:

Unemployment misrepresentation carries serious and constitutionally sustainable financial consequences.
Courts will not lightly intervene to reduce or invalidate statutory civil penalties absent strong evidence of gross disproportionality.

However, the dissents—and the majority’s recognition that ability to pay may be relevant—also indicate:

There is growing judicial awareness of how fines and administrative penalties can trap poor people in cycles of debt;
An Excessive Fines argument based on ability to pay remains viable in future cases, especially under the state constitution, if accompanied by detailed financial proof.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Excessive Fines Clause

This constitutional rule limits how large financial penalties (including certain civil penalties and forfeitures) can be. A fine is unconstitutional if it is:

Punitive in nature (meant to punish or deter, not just to reimburse the government); and
“Grossly disproportional” to the seriousness of the offense.

2. “Misrepresentation” in Unemployment Law

Under Minn. Stat. § 268.18, subd. 2(a), a person commits “misrepresentation” if they receive an overpayment of unemployment benefits by making a false statement or representation without a good-faith belief in its correctness. It is not necessary that they intend to commit criminal fraud; dishonesty or reckless disregard can suffice.

3. Facial vs. As-Applied Constitutional Challenges

Facial challenge: Argues a statute is unconstitutional in all (or virtually all) applications. If any constitutional application exists, the facial challenge normally fails.
As-applied challenge: Argues the statute is unconstitutional as used in one specific person’s case, given their particular facts.

4. “Gross Disproportionality”

This is a demanding standard. A penalty can be:

Severe or harsh; yet still constitutional;
Unconstitutional only if the punishment is way out of proportion to the offense—so extreme that it offends the Clause’s basic principle of proportionality.

5. Ability to Pay

“Ability to pay” means how capable a person is of paying a fine, considering:

Income;
Assets and debts;
Dependents and basic living expenses;
Realistic future earning prospects.

Whether courts must consider this when evaluating fines under the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions remains formally undecided by the majority—but is strongly urged by the dissent.

VI. Conclusion and Key Takeaways

Thigpen v. Best Home Care LLC marks an important application—and partial clarification—of Minnesota’s Excessive Fines jurisprudence in the context of unemployment insurance fraud.

Key takeaways:

The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of:
- The 40% civil penalty for misrepresentation-related unemployment overpayments;
- 1% monthly interest on those overpayments and penalties (for state benefits); and
- An up-to-10-year bar on further unemployment benefits while any misrepresentation-related balance remains—subject to mandatory cancellation after 10 years.
The court reaffirmed the three-factor Rewitzer proportionality test and the “gross disproportionality” standard, emphasizing legislative deference and comparative analysis within Minnesota and across states.
The court held that, as applied to a claimant who misrepresented his work and income for 104 consecutive weeks, the penalty scheme is not grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense, especially given the 10-year cancellation provision.
The decision does not resolve two important questions:
- Whether benefit ineligibility provisions are “fines” under the Excessive Fines Clause; and
- Whether an individual’s ability to pay must be considered under the Eighth Amendment or under Minnesota’s Article I, § 5.
Instead, it assumes for argument’s sake that these can be considered and still finds no violation in Thigpen’s case.
The dissent would have taken a more protective approach, holding that ability to pay is an essential component of Excessive Fines analysis—especially under the Minnesota Constitution—and remanding for a developed record on Thigpen’s financial situation.

Going forward, Thigpen solidifies Minnesota’s authority to impose substantial civil penalties for unemployment misrepresentation and signals that such penalties will generally survive Excessive Fines challenges, particularly in the absence of a detailed showing of financial hardship. At the same time, the decision keeps the door open for future litigants—and potentially a future majority—to recognize an explicit, constitutionally mandated role for ability-to-pay analysis, especially under the Minnesota Constitution’s Excessive Fines Clause.

This commentary is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Proportionality and Unemployment Fraud Penalties: Thigpen v. Best Home Care LLC and the Scope of the Excessive Fines Clause in Minnesota