Proportional Attorney Fee Awards under the Rhode Island Open Meetings Act: Discretion and Proportionality Affirmed

Introduction

John Cullen v. Albion Fire District et al. (No. 2024-195-Appeal, decided April 23, 2025) arises from a dispute over whether the livestreamed annual meeting of the Albion Fire District during the COVID-19 pandemic complied with Rhode Island’s Open Meetings Act (OMA), G.L. 1956 chapter 46 of title 42. Plaintiff John Cullen sued, seeking declaratory relief and attorneys’ fees under § 42-46-8(d), alleging the livestream failed to provide “active, real-time participation” as required by Executive Order No. 20-46 and OMA guidance. After the Superior Court granted summary judgment for Cullen on liability and later awarded him $2,500 in attorneys’ fees, the defendants appealed only the fee award. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed, holding that the OMA plainly authorizes fee awards for prevailing plaintiffs and that the amount—though significantly less than requested—fell within the trial justice’s broad discretion and was proportionate to the breach.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court, in an order without full briefing or argument, affirmed the Superior Court’s award of $2,500 in attorneys’ fees to John Cullen. It held:

Section 42-46-8(d) of the OMA mandates that a prevailing private plaintiff be awarded “reasonable attorney fees and costs,” absent special circumstances.
Whether a legal basis exists for fees is reviewed de novo; the quantum of fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
The trial justice considered the Colonial Plumbing & Heating factors (aligned with Rule 1.5 of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct), pandemic context, remedial steps taken in subsequent meetings, and absence of willfulness.
Despite a lack of detailed factor-by-factor explanation, the award was proportional to the OMA breach and fell within the discretion afforded.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Tanner v. Town Council of Town of East Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784 (R.I. 2005): Emphasizes proportionality between fee award and the breach’s impact under the OMA.
Colonial Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v. Contemporary Construction Co., 464 A.2d 741 (R.I. 1983): Enumerates factors for reasonableness of fees (time and labor, novelty, skill, custom rates, results obtained, etc.), mirrored in Rule 1.5 of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct.
Danforth v. More, 129 A.3d 63 (R.I. 2016) and Shine v. Moreau, 119 A.3d 1 (R.I. 2015): Clarify standard of review—de novo for legal basis, abuse of discretion for amount.

Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Basis: § 42-46-8(d) unambiguously authorizes fee awards to prevailing private plaintiffs. The Court first confirmed the existence of this legal basis de novo.

2. Standard of Review: Because the statutory basis exists, the Court reviewed the fee amount for an abuse of discretion. Trial justices must fashion a fee award that is “proportional to the breach and the effect thereof” (Tanner).

3. Application of Fee Factors: The hearing justice noted the Colonial factors/Rule 1.5 criteria, considered pandemic timing (early adjustment to remote operations), remedial conduct in subsequent Zoom meetings, and the absence of willfulness. Although the justice did not detail the precise weight of each factor, the Supreme Court concluded that awarding $2,500—some fraction of the $10,278.50 requested—was well within the broad discretion allowed.

Impact

This decision clarifies several points for future OMA cases:

Court-awarded attorney fees are mandatory for prevailing private plaintiffs absent special circumstances.
Fee awards must be proportional to both the violation and its repercussions—most notably, courts may look to when the violation occurred (e.g., pandemic adjustments) and whether subsequent compliance remedied the public’s access concerns.
Trial justices enjoy significant leeway in determining the amount, even if the detailed breakdown of factor weightings is not fully articulated on the record.

Administrative bodies and their counsel should therefore anticipate not only liability under the OMA but also a potentially significant—but proportionate—fee exposure if they fail to provide adequate public participation mechanisms.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Open Meetings Act (OMA): Rhode Island law requiring public bodies to hold open, accessible meetings and providing remedies for violations, including attorneys’ fees.
Executive Order No. 20-46: A COVID-19 emergency order mandating that remote public meetings allow “active, real-time participation” when required by law.
Summary Judgment: A court ruling that decides certain claims as a matter of law before trial, when no material facts are disputed.
De Novo Review: The appellate court’s fresh, independent review of a lower court’s legal conclusions.
Abuse of Discretion: A standard of review under which an appellate court defers to a trial court’s decision unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or exceeds legal bounds.
Rule 1.5 Factors: Professional Conduct criteria for reasonable attorney fees, including time spent, complexity, and results obtained.

Conclusion

John Cullen v. Albion Fire District et al. reaffirms that prevailing plaintiffs under Rhode Island’s OMA are entitled to a reasonable fee-shifting remedy. It underscores the necessity for public bodies to adopt robust public participation mechanisms—especially during emergency circumstances—and shows that courts will calibrate fee awards to the nature, timing, and remediation of any breach. By upholding a modest yet proportional fee award, the Supreme Court has provided clearer guidance on how trial justices should exercise their discretion under § 42-46-8(d), balancing statutory mandates against practical realities.