Proper Exhaustion and “Unavailable” Remedies under the PLRA in Florida’s Three‑Step Grievance System: Commentary on Moultrie v. James

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in Eddie James Moultrie v. Captain James & Officer Hansen, No. 24‑12561 (11th Cir. Dec. 9, 2025), affirming dismissal of a Florida prisoner’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive‑force action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

Although designated “Not for Publication” and therefore non‑precedential, the opinion provides a clear and detailed application of:

The PLRA’s mandatory exhaustion requirement;
Florida Department of Corrections (“FDOC”) three‑step grievance process (informal – formal – appeal); and
The Supreme Court’s “unavailability” doctrine under Ross v. Blake, as interpreted in Eleventh Circuit cases such as Turner v. Burnside, Maldonado v. Baker County Sheriff’s Office, Parzyck v. Prison Health Services, and Dimanche v. Brown.

The core dispute was not over the underlying Eighth Amendment excessive‑force claim, but over whether the plaintiff, Florida inmate Eddie James Moultrie, had satisfied the PLRA’s requirement to “properly exhaust” all “available” administrative remedies in the FDOC system before filing suit. The Eleventh Circuit held he did not.

The decision clarifies several important points for Florida prisoners and practitioners:

Excessive‑force claims must still proceed through FDOC’s ordinary three‑step grievance hierarchy; they are not among the narrow categories where inmates may bypass the informal step.
Sending grievances or complaints directly to the Secretary or the Office of the Inspector General, or obtaining an Inspector General review, does not substitute for proper exhaustion.
Allegations of delay or sporadic non‑processing at the institutional level do not themselves render remedies “unavailable” where FDOC rules provide mechanisms to move to the next level or seek extensions.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

On May 26, 2022, Moultrie was housed in administrative confinement at Columbia Correctional Institution (“Columbia”). He alleged that severe sleep deprivation made him paranoid and caused him to believe his cellmate intended to harm him. After staff initially told him “there was nothing they could do,” he declared a mental health emergency and was moved to a different cell.

Later, staff decided to move him back to his original cell. Moultrie asserted that he still believed he was in “imminent danger” and initially refused to submit to hand restraints. When the shift supervisor, Captain James, arrived, Moultrie explained his fear; James allegedly “was not concerned.” Moultrie then submitted to hand restraints, was taken to a shower area for a strip search, and—according to his account—threw himself against the shower door, screamed “staff assault,” lay on his stomach, and refused to stand.

Additional staff arrived, placed him in leg restraints, and forced him back to his original cell, allegedly contrary to Captain James’s instructions. He allowed staff to remove leg restraints but refused to remove hand restraints after the cell door was closed and the “use of force camera was de‑activated.” Moments later, Officer Hansen allegedly appeared at the cell door, watched Moultrie as he sat on the toilet, called over another officer, and sprayed him with chemical agents without warning.

After this incident, Moultrie was placed on heightened security status and referred to “close management,” a more restrictive form of confinement. The close‑management referral stated that he had been observed holding his roommate in a headlock, actively choking him, and that chemical agents were used to protect the roommate and that he kicked at staff. Moultrie asserted these facts were false and that staff had manipulated his referral.

B. Grievance Activity

The FDOC’s standard grievance procedure is a three‑step, sequential process:

Informal grievance to the staff member responsible for the area of the problem (Fla. Admin. Code R. 33‑103.005);
Formal grievance to the warden (R. 33‑103.006); and
Appeal to the Office of the Secretary of FDOC (R. 33‑103.007).

With limited exceptions not applicable here (e.g., certain emergency or sensitive issues), an inmate must start at the informal level.

After the May 26 incident, Moultrie filed numerous grievances, but not in the prescribed order. Among the key filings:

June 8, 2022 – Grievance Appeal No. 22‑6‑16843. Moultrie complained about the May incident and requested that an investigator review video footage. He indicated the grievance was to be sent to the Secretary’s Office, while also citing the rule on formal grievances to the warden. The Secretary’s Office returned it without action because it was not filed at the appropriate level and advised that any video retention requests must be initiated at the institutional level under FDOC Procedure 602.033. The office also forwarded the grievance to the warden.
June 16, 2022 – Two formal grievances. One complained of lack of response to a prior video‑footage request; the warden denied it, and Moultrie’s subsequent appeal (No. 22‑6‑19919) was denied by the Secretary. The second challenged his close‑management placement as based on a dishonest referral; the warden denied it, and the Secretary denied the appeal (No. 22‑6‑20035), finding his placement was based on his own behavior.
June 20, 2022 – Informal grievance No. 201‑2206‑0180. Moultrie sought information about why he had been in confinement in the month before May 26; it was returned without action for addressing more than one issue.
Subsequent formal grievance No. 2206‑201‑140. He repeated the May 26 narrative and requested an investigation into a staff member (CLO Minshew) for filing a false close‑management referral. The warden denied it, again citing his behavior and unsuitability for general population. On appeal (No. 22‑6‑21071), Moultrie clarified that he was not seeking reversal of close management but wanted to complain about false information in the referral. The Secretary returned this appeal without action for procedural non‑compliance, but forwarded it to the warden because it included allegations of excessive force against Hansen.
July–August 2022 Informal grievances. Several informal grievances (e.g., Nos. 201‑2207‑0125, 510‑2208‑0117) sought the “use of force incident” number and other information; they were returned without action. An appeal (No. 22‑6‑23941) again complaining of lack of responses was returned without action.
August 20, 2022 – Informal grievance No. 510‑2208‑0548 to the Inspector General. He asked for the incident report number for the May event. The Inspector General’s Office returned it, explaining that “asking questions or seeking information, guidance, or assistance is not considered a grievance.”

Overall, between the incident and the filing of this federal lawsuit, Moultrie filed:

91 informal grievances,
41 formal grievances, and
36 grievance appeals,

on matters related and unrelated to the May 26 incident.

C. District Court Proceedings

In April 2023, Moultrie filed a pro se § 1983 complaint in the Middle District of Florida, alleging that Captain James and Officer Hansen violated his Eighth Amendment rights by using excessive force on May 26, 2022.

The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA, submitting declarations from FDOC grievance officials and copies of relevant grievances. Moultrie responded that:

Columbia was not processing grievances properly, effectively making the process unavailable;
He “protected” himself by sending duplicate grievances directly to the Secretary’s Office;
At least one formal grievance (duplicating appeal No. 22‑6‑16843) “disappeared” when the institution failed to process it; and
He received all “available” relief once the Secretary forwarded his grievance to the warden and the Office of Inspector General became involved, rendering further exhaustion unnecessary.

The district court applied the Eleventh Circuit’s two‑step Turner v. Burnside test for exhaustion challenges and dismissed the complaint without prejudice, finding that adequate remedies were available and not properly exhausted.

D. Eleventh Circuit’s Holding

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit:

Reviewed de novo the district court’s application of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, and reviewed factual findings for clear error; and
Affirmed the dismissal.

The panel held that:

The FDOC grievance process was available to Moultrie; his extensive use of it undermined any claim of systemic unavailability or intimidation.
He failed to properly exhaust because:
- He never filed an informal grievance specifically about the alleged May 26 excessive force, as the rules require;
- Excessive‑force claims are not among the limited issues for which inmates may skip the informal level or proceed directly to the Secretary;
- Appeal No. 22‑6‑16843 was returned by the Secretary “without action” for procedural defects and therefore did not complete the final step; and
- Forwarding of his complaints to the warden and involvement of the Inspector General fell outside the prescribed grievance process and therefore did not satisfy PLRA exhaustion.

Because he did not follow FDOC’s rules and did not obtain a merits ruling from the Secretary on his excessive‑force complaint, the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement was not satisfied. The dismissal was affirmed.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Statutory Framework: 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

The PLRA states:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

Key points from Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent, all of which inform the panel’s analysis:

Exhaustion is mandatory when remedies are available.
“Proper exhaustion” requires the prisoner to comply with the prison’s own grievance rules and deadlines.
Where remedies are genuinely “unavailable,” prisoners are not required to exhaust them.

2. FDOC Grievance Rules

The opinion cites Florida Administrative Code Rules 33‑103.005 through 33‑103.007 and 33‑103.011, which provide:

A three‑step process: informal → formal → appeal to the Secretary.
Specified time limits for filing each type of grievance and appeal.
Limited situations where the inmate may bypass the informal step or proceed directly to the Secretary.
Mechanisms to deal with non‑responses or delays:
- If there is no timely response, the inmate may proceed to the next level and must clearly indicate that lack of response (R. 33‑103.011(4)); and
- The inmate may request an extension when it was not feasible to file in time but he made a good‑faith effort (R. 33‑103.011(2)).

The FDOC also has Procedure 602.033, which governs video retention requests. The panel emphasizes that this procedure does not modify or replace the standard grievance process for substantive claims like excessive force.

3. Supreme Court Precedents

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). The Court held that:
- Exhaustion is an affirmative defense; inmates are not required to plead it in the complaint.
- “Compliance with prison grievance procedures ... is all that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” (quoted by the panel at 549 U.S. at 218.)
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006). The Court coined the term “proper exhaustion,” requiring compliance with an agency’s deadlines and procedural rules; untimely or procedurally defective grievances do not satisfy § 1997e(a).
Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016). The Court clarified that “availability” is a statutory limit: if administrative remedies are “unavailable,” they need not be exhausted. Ross identified three general scenarios where remedies may be unavailable:
1. The process is a “dead end” (officers are unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief);
2. The scheme is so opaque that it is practically incapable of use; or
3. Prison officials thwart inmates from using the process through “machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.”
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion draws on this framework (explicitly through Maldonado and implicitly in distinguishing Turner).

4. Eleventh Circuit Precedents

Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2008). Turner established the two‑step framework for resolving exhaustion disputes:
1. Step 1: Accept the plaintiff’s version of the facts as true and determine whether, under that version, dismissal is warranted.
2. Step 2: If dismissal is not warranted at step one, the court resolves factual disputes about exhaustion and makes specific findings.
Turner also involved a warden who allegedly ripped up an inmate’s grievance and threatened him with transfer if he pursued it—conduct that could render remedies unavailable via intimidation. The panel carefully distinguishes Turner from Moultrie’s situation.
Maldonado v. Baker County Sheriff’s Office, 23 F.4th 1299 (11th Cir. 2022). Maldonado restated Turner’s two‑step test and emphasized the “availability” limitation from Ross. The panel cites Maldonado for the Turner framework and to support the requirement that district courts make specific findings adequate for appellate review.
Parzyck v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 627 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2010). Parzyck describes FDOC’s three‑step process and underscores that prisoners must follow the steps and levels in sequence, absent an applicable exception.
Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2015). Dimanche holds that efforts outside the formal grievance procedure (such as informal requests and letters) generally do not satisfy PLRA exhaustion; “proper exhaustion” must occur within the official grievance channels.
Geter v. Baldwin State Prison, 974 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2020). Geter provides the standard of review: de novo review of the PLRA exhaustion ruling and clear‑error review of underlying factual findings.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Application of the Turner Two‑Step Test

The district court applied Turner’s two‑step approach, and the Eleventh Circuit confirmed that it did so adequately.

Step One – Plaintiff’s version of the facts.
The court considered Moultrie’s assertions: that Columbia was not processing grievances, that a formal grievance about the May 26 incident disappeared, and that the grievance process essentially broke down. Even under his version, the question was whether he had properly exhausted “available” remedies.
Step Two – Judicial fact‑finding on availability and compliance.
The court agreed with the district court’s factual findings that:
- FDOC’s grievance process was functioning and available to him; and
- He did not comply with its procedural requirements as to his May 26 excessive‑force claim.
These findings were “specific enough” to permit meaningful appellate review, satisfying Maldonado.

2. Availability of Remedies under Ross

Moultrie argued that the grievance process was unavailable because the institution was not timely processing his grievances and because at least one grievance disappeared. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument for several reasons:

Extensive use of the grievance system. The panel emphasized that he filed 91 informal grievances, 41 formal grievances, and 36 appeals between the incident and filing suit. This record, the court held, “clearly reflect[s] that [Moultrie] knew how to use the grievance process” and that the process was functioning, undermining any claim of systemic breakdown or unavailability.
No threats, intimidation, or obstruction akin to Turner. Unlike in Turner, Moultrie did not allege that officials ripped up grievances, threatened him, or otherwise used intimidation or machination to prevent filing. Thus, the third Ross category—officials thwarting inmates through intimidation or deception—was not satisfied.
Rules provided a remedy for non‑response or delay. The FDOC rules explicitly allow prisoners to:
- Proceed to the next grievance level if there is no timely response, provided the inmate clearly states the lack of response (R. 33‑103.011(4)); and
- Request extensions if it was not feasible to file within time limits despite a good‑faith effort (R. 33‑103.011(2)).
Because such mechanisms existed and were not used, the grievance system was not a “dead end,” and it was not too opaque to navigate. Remedies therefore remained legally “available” under Ross.

In short, sporadic delays or isolated failures to process or log specific grievances, without more, do not render the entire grievance scheme “unavailable,” particularly where rules provide explicit workarounds that the inmate did not invoke.

3. Failure to “Properly Exhaust” FDOC’s Three‑Step Process

Having held that remedies were available, the panel turned to the core question: whether Moultrie properly exhausted them as to his May 26 excessive‑force claim.

The court identified multiple defects:

No informal grievance specifically on the excessive‑force claim.
The single filing that directly raised excessive force—appeal No. 22‑6‑16843—was an appeal sent to the Secretary, not an informal grievance. The record contained no informal grievance about the alleged use of chemical agents by Officer Hansen. Under FDOC rules and Parzyck, the inmate must begin at the informal level unless a specific exception applies.
Excessive‑force claims are not exempt from the informal step.
The FDOC lists limited issues where an inmate may proceed directly to the Secretary or skip the informal step (for example, certain medical, protective, or sensitive complaints). Excessive force is not one of those categories. Moultrie could not lawfully treat his use‑of‑force claim as an exception.
Misuse of FDOC Procedure 602.033 (video retention).
Moultrie argued that because he was seeking video evidence under Procedure 602.033, he could bypass the informal step and go straight to the warden or Secretary. The court rejected this, clarifying that Procedure 602.033 governs video retention requests only; it does not modify the substantive grievance path for an excessive‑force complaint.
Improper appeal to the Secretary (No. 22‑6‑16843).
Even assuming he had somehow satisfied the informal and formal steps (or that one vanished due to non‑processing), appeal No. 22‑6‑16843 was returned by the Secretary “without action” for procedural defects, not resolved on the merits.
- Under Woodford, a grievance that is rejected for procedural non‑compliance is not “properly exhausted.”
- “Forwarding” the grievance to the warden merely initiated off‑channel review; it did not constitute a merits decision by the Secretary.

Thus, even allowing for Moultrie’s disputed factual narrative, his case never successfully completed the third step of Florida’s grievance ladder in the manner required by Jones and Woodford.

4. Inspector General Involvement and Off‑Channel Review

A significant aspect of Moultrie’s argument was that, once:

The Secretary’s Office forwarded his filing to the warden; and
The warden in turn involved the Office of Inspector General (as reflected in a June 2022 letter),

he had obtained all “available” administrative relief, thereby satisfying exhaustion.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected this line of reasoning, relying on Dimanche and general PLRA principles:

Inspector General review is not part of the grievance procedure. The FDOC grievance rules (R. 33‑103.005-.007) do not list a step involving the Office of Inspector General. Whatever investigative or disciplinary actions the Inspector General might take are parallel to, not a component of, the grievance process.
“Off‑channel” avenues do not satisfy exhaustion. As Dimanche emphasizes, letters, informal complaints, and alternative channels outside the designated grievance mechanism do not meet the PLRA’s “proper exhaustion” standard.
Actual notice is not enough. The fact that prison officials, including the warden and Inspector General, may have actually reviewed his allegations does not overcome failure to follow the formal grievance steps. Under Woodford and Jones, it is compliance with the rules—not merely authorities’ awareness—that matters.

Consequently, Inspector General involvement did not relieve Moultrie of the obligation to exhaust the FDOC’s three‑step process correctly.

5. Distinguishing Turner and the Role of Intimidation or Interference

Moultrie invoked Turner v. Burnside, where the court held that an inmate’s failure to exhaust could be excused if prison officials made the process functionally unavailable by threatening and obstructing him. The panel distinguished Turner on factual grounds:

In Turner, the warden allegedly ripped up a filed grievance and threatened to transfer the inmate far from his family if he continued to pursue it.
Those facts, if true, fell squarely within Ross’s “thwarting by intimidation” category.
By contrast, Moultrie alleged no such threats, destruction of grievances, or intimidation. His complaints centered on non‑processing, delay, and procedural confusion.

Therefore, while Turner remains an important precedent on when intimidation and direct obstruction can excuse non‑exhaustion, the Eleventh Circuit made clear that Moultrie’s factual allegations, even taken at face value, did not rise to that level.

IV. Impact and Future Implications

A. For Florida Prisoners and Pro Se Litigants

Even though this opinion is unpublished, it offers strong guidance—likely persuasive in future Eleventh Circuit and district court cases—on how Florida inmates must approach PLRA exhaustion:

File an informal grievance specifically on the incident and legal theory at issue.
General complaints about classification, discipline, or alleged “false reports” will not preserve an underlying excessive‑force claim if they do not clearly grieve the force incident itself.
Follow the three steps in order unless a recognized exception applies.
Excessive‑force allegations are not among the exceptions allowing inmates to bypass the informal step or go directly to the Secretary.
Use the FDOC’s own tools to deal with non‑responses.
If there is no timely response:
- File at the next level, explicitly noting the absence of response (R. 33‑103.011(4)); and
- If necessary, seek a deadline extension, explaining why it was not feasible to file in time (R. 33‑103.011(2)).
Merely complaining in federal court that the institution did not respond is insufficient if these internal options were available and unused.
Do not rely on letters, Inspector General requests, or “information‑only” filings.
Requests for incident numbers, video retention, or advice are not “grievances” unless filed in the prescribed form and route. External oversight or investigations do not cure failure to complete the grievance ladder.

B. For Prison Officials and FDOC Administrators

The opinion confirms that:

Courts will enforce the FDOC’s procedural rules strictly, as long as the process remains, in fact, available.
Grievance logs and records are critical evidence in PLRA litigation; here, the large number of grievances filed by Moultrie undercut his claim that the process was functionally unavailable.
When grievances are returned “without action” for procedural reasons, those defects can form a valid basis for non‑exhaustion, provided inmates were reasonably capable of complying with the rules.

C. For Federal Courts and Practitioners

Moultrie underscores several practice points:

Importance of precise issue matching.
Courts examine whether the inmate’s grievance fairly alerts prison officials to the specific problem (e.g., excessive force by a particular officer) rather than merely related downstream effects (like classification changes or allegedly false reports).
Record‑based fact‑finding under Turner.
District courts should:
- Apply Turner’s two steps;
- Make explicit findings on availability and compliance; and
- Discuss documentary evidence (such as logs) countering claims of unavailability or obstruction.
Limited legal effect of off‑channel investigations.
Practitioners should recognize that Inspector General or internal affairs investigations—even when triggered by grievances—do not necessarily equate to exhaustion, unless they are part of the formal grievance track set out in prison rules.

While non‑precedential, this decision fits within and reinforces an existing, strict PLRA exhaustion framework in the Eleventh Circuit, and will likely be cited informally by litigants and judges dealing with Florida prison cases.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is a federal statute that allows individuals to sue state and local officials (including prison staff) in federal court for violating their constitutional rights, such as the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.

2. Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) Exhaustion

The PLRA requires prisoners to use the prison’s internal complaint (grievance) system before they can file a federal lawsuit about prison conditions. They must:

Use every step of the process (e.g., informal, formal, appeal), and
Follow the prison’s rules about deadlines and formats.

If they do not, the federal case can be dismissed, even if their underlying claim might have merit.

3. “Available” Remedies

Remedies are “available” if they are actually open and usable in practice. They may be “unavailable” if:

Officials never give relief through the system (a “dead end”);
The rules are so confusing that a reasonable prisoner cannot use them; or
Officials stop prisoners from using the system by threats, lies, or other interference.

If remedies are genuinely unavailable, the prisoner is not required to exhaust them under the PLRA.

4. “Proper Exhaustion”

“Proper exhaustion” means:

Filing complaints in the right place,
At the right time,
In the right order, and
Using the correct forms and procedures.

If a grievance is rejected as too late or procedurally defective and the prisoner could have complied with the rules, the PLRA treats it as not exhausted.

5. FDOC Grievance Levels

Informal grievance – The first step, typically filed with staff at the institution level.
Formal grievance – The second step, filed with the warden.
Appeal to the Secretary – The final step, filed with the FDOC Secretary’s Office.

Skipping steps, except in very specific circumstances defined by rule, generally means the claim has not been exhausted.

6. Per Curiam, Non‑Argument Calendar, and Unpublished Opinions

Per curiam – An opinion issued “by the court” collectively, without a single judge’s name attached as the author.
Non‑argument calendar – The appeal was decided without oral argument, based solely on the written briefs and record.
Not for publication – The opinion is not published in the official reporters and is generally not binding precedent, though it can have persuasive value, especially on similar facts.

VI. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Moultrie v. James reinforces a strict interpretation of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement in the context of Florida’s three‑step FDOC grievance system. The court held that:

Administrative remedies were “available” because the FDOC grievance system was functioning and because rules provided methods to cope with non‑responses or delays.
Moultrie did not “properly exhaust” because he failed to:
- File an informal grievance specifically addressing the alleged May 26 excessive force,
- Observe the required sequence of informal → formal → appeal, and
- Obtain a merits ruling from the Secretary on his excessive‑force claim (his key appeal was returned without action).
Forwarding of grievances to the warden and involvement of the Office of Inspector General did not substitute for compliance with the formal grievance process.

The case illustrates how, under Jones, Woodford, and Ross, the question is not whether prison officials had notice of the complaint or even investigated, but whether the inmate completed the prescribed grievance steps in a procedurally proper manner, unless those steps were truly unavailable. By affirming the dismissal, the Eleventh Circuit underscores that Florida prisoners must carefully adhere to the FDOC grievance rules, including timeliness, sequence, and level‑of‑filing requirements, before seeking relief in federal court.