Propensity-Free Chain Reasoning for Intent Under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) Affirmed in United States v. Johnson

Introduction

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Artez L. Johnson, No. 24-2027 (7th Cir. May 30, 2025), addresses the admissibility of prior “other-acts” evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prove intent in a drug-distribution prosecution. The defendant, Artez Johnson, was stopped for erratic driving in Rantoul, Illinois, and arrested after officers discovered a total of 331.2 grams of methamphetamine in his car. At trial, Johnson defended on the basis of personal use. The government sought to introduce testimony from Dagan Traylor about Johnson’s prior meth sales to show intent to distribute. The district court admitted the evidence under the Fourth Circuit’s pre-2014 four-factor framework; on appeal, Johnson challenged that admission. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the evidence was relevant to intent through a “propensity-free chain of reasoning” and survived Rule 403 balancing. This commentary examines the decision’s background, holdings, and wider implications.

Summary of the Judgment

After a two-day trial, a jury convicted Johnson of possessing 50 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). On appeal, Johnson argued that the district court erred by admitting prior-acts testimony under Rule 404(b) and that even if relevant, the evidence was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. The Seventh Circuit held:

The district court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 404(b) despite relying on the pre-Gomez four-factor test, because its reasoning aligned with the en banc framework requiring a propensity-free chain of reasoning.
Johnson forfeited rather than waived his Rule 403 argument and, under plain-error review, the admission of Traylor’s testimony was not clearly erroneous or unfairly prejudicial.
The limiting instruction given to the jury adequately reduced any risk of improper propensity inference.

The conviction was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Ross, 510 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2007) – Set forth the four-factor test for Rule 404(b) prior-acts admissibility prior to Gomez.
United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2014, en banc) – Abolished the four-factor test in favor of a rules-based approach requiring (1) relevance to a non-propensity purpose through a propensity-free chain of reasoning, and (2) Rule 403 balancing.
United States v. Chapman, 765 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2014) – Excluded remote heroin-trafficking conviction where only improper propensity inference could be drawn.
United States v. Morgan, 929 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2019) – Approved admission of recent drug sales to show intent to distribute.
Other authorities on appellate review standards (abuse of discretion, plain error, waiver vs. forfeiture): Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948 (7th Cir. 2024); Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021).

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeded in two parts:

Rule 404(b) Analysis. Though the district court applied Ross’s four-factor test, the Seventh Circuit found no abuse of discretion because the court effectively identified a non-propensity purpose (intent to distribute) and established a propensity-free chain of reasoning. The similarity and timing factors demonstrated that Johnson’s multi-month prior sales to Traylor, ending only at Traylor’s arrest shortly before Johnson’s own arrest, made it more likely Johnson intended to distribute the meth seized on the traffic stop.
Rule 403 Balancing. Johnson argued secondarily that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial because he did not contest intent at trial. The court held he forfeited that precise argument by failing to raise it below, and under plain-error review, the trial court’s determination that probative value outweighed prejudice was not “clear and obvious” error. The district court also mitigated prejudice by giving a limiting instruction at the appropriate junctures.

Impact

United States v. Johnson reinforces and clarifies several important points under Seventh Circuit law:

District courts may still consider similarity and timing of prior acts when they bear directly on a non-propensity inference (intent), so long as the chain of reasoning does not depend on propensity.
Application of the pre-2014 four-factor test is not per se reversible error if the ultimate reasoning tracks Gomez’s propensity-free approach.
Limiting instructions remain an effective tool to guard against improper use of 404(b) evidence.
Defendants should explicitly preserve all Rule 403 arguments in the trial court; failure to do so typically leads to plain-error review.

In future drug-distribution cases, practitioners will cite Johnson to support the admission of recent, directly analogous prior-acts testimony to prove intent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

404(b) Evidence: Allows “other-acts” evidence not to prove character or propensity, but for purposes such as intent, motive, or knowledge.
Propensity-Free Chain of Reasoning: A logical path from evidence to a permitted purpose (e.g., intent) that does not rely on the jury inferring a defendant’s bad character.
Rule 403 Balancing: Courts weigh the evidence’s legitimate importance against the risk it will unfairly sway the jury for an illegitimate reason.
Waiver vs. Forfeiture: Waiver is intentional abandonment of a right (no appellate review). Forfeiture is unintentional neglect to raise a right (appellate review possible under plain-error standard).
Plain-Error Review: Appellate courts correct only clear or obvious mistakes that affect substantial rights when a party forfeited an objection.

Conclusion

United States v. Johnson reaffirms the Seventh Circuit’s commitment to a principled, “propensity-free” application of Rule 404(b) for non-propensity purposes—in this case, intent to distribute controlled substances. By upholding the admission of regularly timed prior sales evidence and validating the district court’s Rule 403 balancing and limiting instructions, the decision provides clear guidance for both prosecutors seeking to prove intent and defense counsel aiming to challenge such evidence. The case underscores the importance of precise preservation of evidentiary objections and demonstrates that admitting well-tailored prior-acts testimony remains a powerful tool in narcotics prosecutions.