Prompt Remedial Action, RFRA, and Qualified Immunity: Commentary on Obie v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Docket No.: 24-2436-cv
Date: December 16, 2025
Disposition: Judgment of the Southern District of New York affirmed (summary order, non-precedential)

Important Note: This decision was issued as a summary order. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, it may be cited but has no precedential effect. Its legal reasoning is therefore persuasive rather than binding authority.

I. Introduction

Obie v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission sits at the intersection of three important areas of federal law:

the protection of religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),
the doctrine of qualified immunity for federal officials facing damages claims, and
Article III standing requirements for declaratory and injunctive relief, especially when a plaintiff has left government employment.

The dispute arose from a no-contact instruction (described by the court as a “gag order” or “no-contact clause”) imposed on the Inspector General of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) after he was placed on paid administrative leave. Although that directive formally bound only the Inspector General, plaintiff Stephen Jay Obie, then a CFTC attorney and close friend of the Inspector General, alleged that it substantially burdened his religious exercise by preventing them from engaging in group prayer.

After the CFTC quickly revised the no-contact clause to carve out prayer and the Inspector General retired, Obie shifted his lawsuit to seek:

RFRA damages against individual CFTC Commissioners (in their individual capacities), and
a declaratory judgment limiting the CFTC’s authority to restrict employees’ free speech rights.

The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal on two main grounds:

The Commissioners were entitled to qualified immunity on the RFRA damages claim because their response time in lifting the no-contact restriction was “objectively reasonable” under the circumstances.
Obie lacked standing to seek declaratory relief after his retirement because his prospect of future injury was too speculative.

Although non-precedential, the decision is analytically significant in three respects:

It underscores that RFRA damages actions against federal officials remain constrained by qualified immunity, even where religious burdens are quickly corrected.
It highlights how prompt remedial action by an agency can be decisive in the objective-reasonableness component of the qualified immunity analysis.
It reaffirms that retired employees generally lack standing to seek forward-looking declaratory or injunctive relief based on contingent plans to return to federal service.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The No-Contact Clause and the Alleged Religious Burden

In May 2023, the CFTC’s Inspector General, A. Roy Lavik, was placed on paid administrative leave after a unanimous vote by three CFTC Commissioners: Summer K. Mersinger, Kristin N. Johnson, and Christy Goldsmith Romero. As part of that leave, the Commissioners imposed a number of instructions, one of which was a no-contact clause providing that:

Lavik was “not to contact or communicate with any CFTC employee or contractor unless specifically instructed by the [CFTC] to do so.”

This directive, on its face, regulated only the Inspector General’s conduct, not that of any other CFTC employee. However, plaintiff Stephen Jay Obie, a CFTC attorney and close friend of Lavik, alleged that the no-contact clause directly impeded his own religious exercise. Once he learned of the restriction on May 23, he believed he was effectively precluded from joining with Lavik in collective prayer.

B. Initial Lawsuit and Request for Emergency Relief

On Sunday, May 28, 2023 (during Memorial Day weekend), Obie sued the CFTC alone, claiming that the no-contact clause:

violated his First Amendment rights, and
violated RFRA by substantially burdening his religious exercise.

On May 30, Obie sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction to allow him and Lavik to pray together. The district court (Clarke, J.) held a conference the next day.

At that May 31 conference, the district court observed:

The no-contact clause formally restricted only Lavik, not Obie.
Obie remained free to engage in “one-way communication” with Lavik (i.e., send messages, though Lavik could not reply without violating the clause).
There was, at that moment, no representation that Lavik himself wished to engage in prayer with Obie.

Despite these concerns, the court encouraged the CFTC to accommodate religious prayer if possible.

C. Rapid Developments: Declaration, Policy Revision, and Mootness

The situation then evolved quickly:

June 1, 2023: Obie filed a declaration from Lavik stating that he did indeed want to pray with Obie.
June 2, 2023: The CFTC informed the court by letter that Lavik was “free to pray” without fear that doing so would be treated as a violation of the no-contact clause.
June 7, 2023: The CFTC formally revised the no-contact clause to expressly allow Lavik to pray with any CFTC employee.
June 17, 2023: Lavik retired from his position at the CFTC.

With the revision of the policy and Lavik’s retirement, Obie’s motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction became moot: there was no longer an ongoing restriction to enjoin.

D. Amended Complaint, Retirement, and District Court Dismissal

On August 15, 2023, Obie filed an amended complaint that:

added the three CFTC Commissioners (Mersinger, Johnson, and Goldsmith Romero) as defendants in both their individual and official capacities,
sought money damages under RFRA against them, and
requested a declaratory judgment stating that the CFTC lacked authority to “restrict . . . free speech rights.”

On August 26, 2023—just eleven days after filing the amended complaint—Obie himself retired from the CFTC.

In September 2024, the district court dismissed the action. In relevant part it held:

The CFTC was protected by sovereign immunity (a ruling Obie did not challenge on appeal).
The individual Commissioners were entitled to qualified immunity on Obie’s RFRA damages claim.
Obie lacked standing to pursue declaratory relief, given his retirement and the speculative nature of his alleged future injuries.

Obie appealed only the rulings on qualified immunity, standing, and the denial of further leave to amend.

III. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Decision

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal in all respects relevant to the appeal, applying de novo review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

A. RFRA Claim: Qualified Immunity for the Commissioners

Obie argued that the Commissioners violated clearly established RFRA law by imposing a blanket no-contact clause that substantially burdened his religious exercise. The panel assumed, without definitively deciding, that Obie might be able to show a violation of a clearly established right. Nonetheless, it held that the Commissioners were entitled to qualified immunity because:

The no-contact clause was facially neutral and did not single out religious activity.
There was no evidence the Commissioners knew that Obie wished to pray with Lavik before the litigation began.
Once the Commissioners reasonably became aware of the issue, their response time—three working days after the first business day following the complaint—to revise the directive and permit prayer was “objectively reasonable under the circumstances.”

The court emphasized that, even when a right is clearly established, officials are shielded from damages if officers of reasonable competence could disagree about the legality of their conduct, or if their responsive conduct is within the bounds of objective reasonableness.

B. Declaratory Relief: Lack of Standing After Retirement

Obie also sought a declaratory judgment that the CFTC lacked authority to “restrict . . . free speech rights.” The panel held that he lacked Article III standing to seek such forward-looking relief.

The court reaffirmed that:

A past injury is not enough for standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief.
The plaintiff must show a “sufficient likelihood of future harm.”

Because Obie had retired from the CFTC, his only asserted basis for future injury was that he “will consider a return” if, in his view, the agency “cleans up its act.” The court characterized this as “conjectural or hypothetical speculation,” insufficient to support standing.

C. Denial of Further Leave to Amend

Finally, the Second Circuit upheld the denial of further leave to amend. Having already amended once, and having failed to identify additional facts that could:

overcome the Commissioners’ qualified immunity, or
establish standing for declaratory relief,

Obie could not show that any further amendment would be anything other than futile. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to replead.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Standards of Review and Pleading

Jaghory v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ., 131 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 1997) Cited for the proposition that dismissals under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) are reviewed de novo, and that courts must:
- accept all factual allegations as true, and
- draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) Cited for the plausibility pleading standard: a complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face,” not merely possible or speculative. This frames how the court evaluates the sufficiency of Obie’s allegations at the motion to dismiss stage.
Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2012) Cited on the standard for reviewing denial of leave to amend. Denial is reviewed for abuse of discretion, except where based on a legal determination of futility, which is reviewed de novo. This sets the lens through which the panel considers whether the district court properly denied further amendments.

2. RFRA and Substantial Burden

Tanvir v. Tanzin, 120 F.4th 1049 (2d Cir. 2024) Cited for the basic RFRA principle that the federal government may not “substantially burden an individual’s exercise of religion” unless it satisfies RFRA’s strict scrutiny test. The panel quotes Tanvir’s formulation of RFRA’s core prohibition.
RFRA (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1) provides that:
- If the government substantially burdens a person’s religious exercise,
- the government must show that the burden:
  - furthers a compelling governmental interest, and
  - is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Tanzin v. Tanvir (2020) (not cited in this order but foundational) held that RFRA authorizes money damages against federal officers in their individual capacities. The Second Circuit’s 2024 decision in Tanvir v. Tanzin elaborates RFRA doctrine within the circuit and is used here to frame the RFRA claim.

3. Qualified Immunity Doctrine

Clark v. Valletta, 157 F.4th 201 (2d Cir. 2025) Cited for the standard RFRA/constitutional qualified immunity test: officials are shielded from damages unless a plaintiff shows:
1. a violation of a statutory or constitutional right, and
2. the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.
The court quotes Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011), underscoring that clearly established law must give officials fair warning that their conduct is unlawful.
Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 1995) A key Second Circuit qualified immunity case. It supplies:
- the “objectively reasonable” standard—officials are immune if it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their conduct lawful; and
- the “officers of reasonable competence could disagree” formulation, drawn from Malley v. Briggs.
The panel uses Lennon to justify giving substantial leeway to officials making time-sensitive judgments, especially where they respond promptly once alerted to a potential legal issue.
Outlaw v. City of Hartford, 884 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 2018) Cited for the proposition that even if a plaintiff demonstrates a violation of a clearly established right, officials may still be entitled to qualified immunity if their actions were objectively reasonable—that is, if reasonable officers could disagree about lawfulness.
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) Cited (via Lennon) for the classic formulation that qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” and that immunity applies where “officers of reasonable competence could disagree” about legality.

4. Standing and Prospective Relief

Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82 (2d Cir. 2021) Cited for the principle that a past injury, by itself, cannot confer standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief. The plaintiff must show a “sufficient likelihood of future harm” from the same challenged policy or conduct.
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85 (2013) A Supreme Court case cited for its articulation that standing cannot rest on “conjectural or hypothetical” future injuries. The Court there held that a broad covenant not to sue mooted a trademark dispute and underscored that speculative concerns about hypothetical future enforcement were insufficient to preserve a case or controversy.

5. Leave to Amend

Murphy Med. Assocs., LLC v. Yale Univ., 120 F.4th 1107 (2d Cir. 2024) (per curiam) Cited for the proposition that once a court has correctly concluded that claims fail as a matter of law, it does not err in denying further leave to amend—especially where the plaintiff has already amended once and cannot identify additional facts that would cure the legal defects.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. RFRA, Qualified Immunity, and “Objectively Reasonable” Response Time

Obie’s central claim on appeal was that the Commissioners violated clearly established RFRA law by substantially burdening his religious practice—group prayer with the Inspector General—through a blanket no-contact clause. He argued that existing RFRA jurisprudence clearly protects group prayer and that the Commissioners should have known their directive burdened that religious exercise.

The Second Circuit, however, structured its analysis around qualified immunity, and more specifically, around the Commissioners’ response time once they became aware of Obie’s religious objection.

a. Structure of the qualified immunity analysis

The panel restated the familiar two-step framework:

Has the plaintiff pleaded facts showing a violation of a statutory or constitutional right?
Was that right clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct?

But the court then emphasized—as reflected in Clark, Lennon, and Outlaw—that even if those two steps are satisfied, officials are entitled to immunity if it was objectively reasonable for them to believe their conduct was lawful.

The panel did not conclusively decide whether Obie had shown:

a substantial burden under RFRA, or
a violation of clearly established law.

Instead, it assumed for argument’s sake that Obie could satisfy those requirements and then held that the Commissioners’ conduct remained objectively reasonable, thereby entitling them to qualified immunity.

b. Focus on timing and neutrality of the policy

The key elements of the court’s reasoning were:

The no-contact clause was facially neutral: it applied to all communications by the Inspector General with CFTC employees, not specifically to religious activity or to Obie.
There was no record evidence that the Commissioners knew about Obie’s desire to pray with Lavik before the lawsuit was filed.
Once sued, the Commissioners needed time to:
- familiarize themselves with the claims,
- consult with CFTC and Department of Justice counsel,
- deliberate internally,
- vote to alter their prior instruction, and
- communicate the updated directive to the Inspector General.

The order emphasizes that Obie filed suit on a Sunday during Memorial Day weekend. Measuring from the first working day, Tuesday, May 30, 2023, the Commissioners took three working days to complete the steps above and allow prayer.

c. Objective reasonableness in context

Drawing on Lennon, the court concluded that a factfinder could reasonably view this timeline as objectively reasonable under the circumstances:

“Under these circumstances—where the gag order at issue was facially neutral, and there was no evidence in the record that the Commissioner Defendants were aware of Obie’s desire to pray with Lavik prior to the start of the litigation—a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the Commissioner Defendants’ response time was objectively reasonable.”

The court cites Lennon’s observation that qualified immunity protects officials making “on-the-spot judgments in tense circumstances.” Though the administrative-leave scenario is not identical to a tense law enforcement encounter, the panel analogizes the need for quick, high-stakes decisions, followed by rapid course correction once legal concerns are raised.

d. Practical effect: damages barred despite a short-lived burden

A notable implication of this reasoning is that:

Even if one assumes Obie’s religious exercise was substantially burdened for a brief period (roughly from his discovery of the clause on May 23 until the policy was revised to permit prayer),
the Commissioners nonetheless avoid personal liability for damages because they acted in a manner a reasonable official could view as lawful and adjusted promptly upon notice of the religious concern.

From a doctrinal standpoint, this illustrates how qualified immunity can insulate federal officials from RFRA damages claims where:

the burden arises from a facially neutral, generally applicable directive (here, an administrative no-contact order), and
the officials promptly modify the directive once they become aware of a specific religious conflict.

2. Standing to Seek Declaratory Relief After Retirement

Obie also sought prospective relief: a declaration that the CFTC lacked authority to restrict employees’ free speech rights in the manner he alleged. The panel treated this as a request for forward-looking declaratory relief, functionally equivalent (for standing purposes) to a request for an injunction.

Relying on Dorce and Already, the court reiterated that:

A plaintiff who has suffered a past injury does not automatically have standing to obtain prospective relief.
Article III requires a “real and immediate threat” or “sufficient likelihood of future harm,” not mere speculation.

Here, the obstacle for Obie was twofold:

He had retired from the CFTC.
His alleged future injury consisted solely of his statement that he “will consider a return” to the agency if, in his view, it “cleans up its act, ends its culture of retaliation, and stops trying to ban prayer.”

The panel characterized this as exactly the kind of “conjectural or hypothetical speculation” that Already condemned as inadequate. In practical terms:

Obie had no concrete plan or commitment to seek re-employment with the CFTC.
Even if he did, whether the same or a similar policy would ever be applied to him again was entirely uncertain.

The court therefore held that Obie lacked standing to pursue declaratory relief. This is consistent with a broader body of law holding that:

Former employees generally lack standing to seek prospective relief concerning workplace policies unless they show a credible, non-speculative likelihood of future exposure to those policies.

3. Denial of Leave to Amend as Futile

Lastly, the Second Circuit agreed that the district court properly denied Obie further leave to amend his complaint.

Key points:

Obie had already filed an amended complaint once, adding the Commissioners and altering his requested relief.
On appeal, he did not proffer any new facts that might:
- negate qualified immunity (for example, facts suggesting the Commissioners knew about his prayer practice earlier or deliberately disregarded it), or
- establish standing (such as concrete steps toward returning to the CFTC or an ongoing relationship with the agency affected by a still-operative policy).

Citing Murphy Medical, the panel concluded that where claims fail as a matter of law—because qualified immunity and standing are legal barriers—further amendment would be futile. Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny additional repleading.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

A. RFRA, Neutral Workplace Directives, and Quick Remediation

While non-precedential, Obie provides a useful illustration of how RFRA and qualified immunity operate in the context of federal workplace management, particularly:

disciplinary or administrative measures (like placing an Inspector General on leave), and
collateral effects on third parties’ religious exercise (here, a co-worker’s desire to pray).

Key takeaways for future RFRA disputes in similar settings:

Facially neutral, broad administrative orders (such as no-contact directives) can incidentally burden religious exercise. RFRA applies, but officials may still be protected from damages if they:
- lack specific knowledge of the religious conflict at the time of issuance, and
- promptly adjust the policy once a concrete conflict is brought to their attention.
Courts may treat the duration of the burden and the speed of governmental correction as central to the “objective reasonableness” inquiry in qualified immunity analysis.
RFRA plaintiffs should anticipate that defendants will invoke qualified immunity and that courts will scrutinize:
- whether officials had fair notice that the directive burdened religious practice, and
- how rapidly officials acted once notified of the conflict.

B. Qualified Immunity’s Protective Reach in RFRA Damages Claims

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Tanzin v. Tanvir, it is clear that RFRA supports individual-capacity damages actions against federal officers. Obie shows, however, that:

Such damages claims remain constrained by qualified immunity to much the same extent as constitutional tort claims.
Courts may be especially sympathetic where the challenged action:
- serves a non-religious, operational purpose (e.g., managing an official on leave), and
- is quickly modified to eliminate or mitigate religious burdens once flagged.

This has practical implications:

Federal officials may take some comfort that swift corrective action can materially reduce their exposure to RFRA damages.
At the same time, RFRA plaintiffs seeking money damages will face an uphill battle unless they can show:
- prolonged or deliberate indifference to the religious burden, or
- targeted or obviously discriminatory restraints on religious activity.

C. Standing Limitations for Former Federal Employees

The decision also reinforces a recurring theme in constitutional litigation: plaintiffs who are no longer subject to a challenged policy often lose standing to seek forward-looking relief.

For former federal employees, Obie underscores that:

Retirement or voluntary separation will typically break the chain of ongoing injury needed to seek declaratory or injunctive relief.
Generalized statements that one might return to federal employment—or to a particular agency—if certain conditions change are usually too speculative to satisfy Article III.

For agencies and employees alike, this suggests that:

Once an employee has left the agency and no ongoing policy applies to them, litigation over systemic declaratory relief may be vulnerable to dismissal on standing grounds.
Employees hoping to obtain structural or declaratory relief should be aware that retirement or resignation can undermine their ability to do so, unless another plaintiff with ongoing injury joins the case.

D. Persuasive Weight of Summary Orders

Because this decision is a summary order, it carries no precedential effect in the Second Circuit. However:

It may still be cited in briefs (with a “SUMMARY ORDER” notation, per Local Rule 32.1.1) and can provide persuasive guidance on how the Second Circuit is currently applying:
- RFRA’s substantial-burden framework,
- qualified immunity in religious-freedom contexts, and
- standing doctrine for declaratory relief.

As such, Obie offers a practical reading of how a contemporary Second Circuit panel views the reasonableness of rapid remedial actions by federal officials facing RFRA-based objections.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)

RFRA is a federal statute designed to restore strong protections for religious exercise. Under RFRA:

The federal government may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion unless:
- it has a compelling governmental interest, and
- it uses the least restrictive means to achieve that interest.
A substantial burden usually means serious pressure to violate religious beliefs or to stop practicing one’s religion.
After Tanzin v. Tanvir, RFRA allows people to sue federal officials for money damages in their individual capacities when their actions violate this standard.

2. Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity is a doctrine that protects government officials from being personally liable for money damages in many civil-rights lawsuits. It applies when:

The official’s conduct did not violate a statutory or constitutional right, or
Even if there was such a violation, the right was not “clearly established” at the time, or it was objectively reasonable for the official to believe their conduct was lawful.

“Clearly established” means that existing law (from Supreme Court or relevant appellate decisions) would have made it clear to a reasonable official that the conduct was unlawful in that specific situation.

“Objectively reasonable” means that officers of reasonable competence could disagree about whether the conduct was legal; if so, the official is protected.

3. Sovereign Immunity vs. Qualified Immunity

Sovereign immunity protects the government itself (and its agencies, like the CFTC) from being sued for money damages unless Congress has explicitly waived that immunity.
Qualified immunity protects individual government officials from personal liability for damages, even when a cause of action exists (for example, under RFRA against individual-capacity defendants).

In Obie, the CFTC successfully invoked sovereign immunity, and the Commissioners successfully invoked qualified immunity.

4. No-Contact Clause / Gag Order

A no-contact clause (sometimes colloquially called a “gag order” in employment contexts) is an instruction that a person:

may not communicate with certain individuals,
except under specified conditions or with prior authorization.

Agencies often impose such clauses on employees under investigation or on administrative leave, to:

preserve the integrity of investigations,
prevent interference or intimidation, or
avoid disruption in the workplace.

In Obie, the no-contact clause bound only the Inspector General, but its practical effect, according to Obie, was to block his joint religious practice (prayer) with the Inspector General.

5. Standing for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

To bring a lawsuit in federal court, a plaintiff must have standing under Article III of the Constitution. For declaratory or injunctive relief, this requires:

a concrete and particularized injury,
that is actual or imminent (not hypothetical or speculative),
caused by the defendant, and
likely to be redressed by the requested relief.

For prospective relief, the plaintiff must show a realistic likelihood of being subjected again to the challenged conduct. Prior injury alone is not enough. In Obie, retirement from the CFTC effectively severed any ongoing or imminent relationship to CFTC workplace policies.

6. Summary Orders and Precedential Effect

The Second Circuit issues some decisions as summary orders. Under Local Rule 32.1.1:

Summary orders do not have precedential effect.
They may be cited (if filed on or after January 1, 2007), but counsel must:
- cite an electronic database or the Federal Appendix and
- note that it is a “SUMMARY ORDER.”

In other words, they can be used as persuasive guidance, but courts are not bound to follow them as they would a published opinion.

VII. Conclusion

Obie v. CFTC illustrates the modern contours of federal religious-freedom litigation against federal officials:

Even when a government directive arguably burdens religious exercise, officials may be shielded from RFRA damages if they:
- acted under a facially neutral policy, and
- promptly corrected the policy once informed of the religious conflict.
Qualified immunity remains a powerful defense in RFRA damages actions, especially when officials’ conduct is arguably reasonable and quickly remedied.
Former employees seeking declaratory or injunctive relief face formidable standing hurdles when their alleged future injuries depend on speculative possibilities of return to federal service or contingent changes in agency culture.

Although the Second Circuit’s decision in Obie is non-precedential, its reasoning offers a clear, contemporary snapshot of how courts in this circuit are likely to:

evaluate RFRA claims arising from workplace management decisions,
apply the “objective reasonableness” branch of qualified immunity when agencies move quickly to accommodate religious practice, and
enforce rigorous standing requirements for plaintiffs seeking structural or declaratory relief after leaving federal employment.

For practitioners and scholars, Obie underscores the critical importance of timing, knowledge, and remedial action in RFRA litigation, and it reinforces that qualified immunity and standing doctrine together sharply delimit the scope of viable federal religious-freedom suits against individual officials and agencies.

Prompt Remedial Action, RFRA, and Qualified Immunity: Commentary on Obie v. CFTC