Prolonged Probate Neglect Violates SCR 20:1.3, but Mitigation May Support Public Reprimand (and Full Costs Absent “Exceptional Circumstances”)

1. Introduction

Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Bryant H. Klos (2026 WI 1) is a Wisconsin Supreme Court attorney-discipline decision arising from Attorney Bryant H. Klos’s extended failure to complete the work necessary to close a probate special administration. The Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) filed a one-count complaint alleging a lack of diligence in violation of SCR 20:1.3. The matter was tried on stipulations and a no-contest plea before a referee, who recommended a public reprimand and assessment of full costs. Neither party appealed, placing the case before the court for review under SCR 22.17(2).

The core issues were (1) whether the stipulated record established a violation of SCR 20:1.3 (reasonable diligence and promptness), (2) what level of discipline was appropriate given a probate administration that remained open for roughly fifteen years, and (3) whether costs should be reduced based on Attorney Klos’s asserted cooperation and early acceptance of responsibility.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court accepted the referee’s factual findings (derived from two stipulations) and agreed that clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence showed Attorney Klos violated SCR 20:1.3 by failing to diligently conclude the special administration, including failing to collect and distribute estate assets. Although the OLR sought a 60-day suspension, the court imposed a public reprimand, emphasizing mitigation (no prior discipline; no dishonest or selfish motive) and consistency with comparable cases.

The court also ordered Attorney Klos to pay full costs ($8,378.50), finding no “exceptional circumstances” to depart from the general rule in SCR 22.24.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Scanlan, 2006 WI 38, ¶72, 290 Wis. 2d 30, 712 N.W.2d 877

The referee relied on Scanlan for sanction factors used to calibrate discipline. While the opinion does not restate the full Scanlan list, its role here is methodological: it frames how the referee weighed the nature of the misconduct, the lawyer’s circumstances, and aggravating/mitigating factors when selecting reprimand rather than suspension. The Supreme Court’s acceptance of the recommendation reflects deference to that structured, factor-based approach when supported by the stipulated record.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125

Inglimo supplies the standard of review for referee findings: the court will affirm findings of fact unless “clearly erroneous,” while legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. This case demonstrates the practical operation of that rule when the facts are stipulated and no appeal is filed—there is rarely a basis to find factual findings clearly erroneous, so the court’s analysis centers on sanction selection and cost assessment.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686

Widule is cited for the proposition that the Supreme Court determines sanction independently, though it benefits from the referee’s recommendation. Here, the court explicitly exercised that independent judgment by acknowledging the OLR’s requested suspension was “not unreasonable,” yet choosing the lesser sanction due to mitigation and comparability.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Charlton, 174 Wis.2d 844, 875-76, 498 N.W.2d 380 (1993)

Charlton provides the standard disciplinary objectives: assessing seriousness, protecting the public/courts/legal system, impressing upon the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct, and deterring similar misconduct by others. The court used this framework to justify a public sanction even without suspension—emphasizing that extended non-completion of probate work is a “professional failure” warranting public discipline to promote deterrence and accountability.

In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gonzalez, 2018 WI 104, 384 Wis. 2d 300, 919 N.W.2d 559

The court treated Gonzalez as “analogous and persuasive” for the proposition that lack of diligence, even when it affects critical procedural steps (e.g., preparing orders, entering pleas), can appropriately result in a public reprimand. By invoking Gonzalez, the court reinforced that reprimand remains within the mainstream of Wisconsin discipline for diligence failures where aggravation does not compel suspension.

Public Reprimand of Sarah Clemment, No. 2011-6

The court also relied on this public reprimand as a comparator: failing to appear at a final immigration hearing and failing to timely advance a client’s interests. That citation served as an additional anchor for sanction proportionality—i.e., public reprimand is an established outcome for significant diligence lapses when the broader circumstances and discipline history support a non-suspension sanction.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in a disciplined sequence typical for Wisconsin attorney discipline:

1. Procedural posture and record: Because no appeal was filed, review proceeded under SCR 22.17(2). The court adopted the stipulated facts as true.
2. Misconduct finding: On the stipulations and no-contest plea, the court found clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence of a violation of SCR 20:1.3, emphasizing the prolonged failure to complete necessary probate work, including collecting and distributing estate assets.
3. Sanction selection: Applying the protective/deterrent objectives from In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Charlton and weighing mitigation and aggravation, the court concluded a public reprimand best fit. The court accepted the referee’s contextual observations (complexity, third-party errors, unclaimed property mishandling, personal setbacks, COVID-19) not as a defense, but as relevant to proportionality. Critically, the court highlighted progressive sanctioning and the respondent’s lack of prior discipline as reasons to avoid suspension.
4. Costs: The court affirmed full costs, agreeing there were no “exceptional circumstances” justifying deviation from SCR 22.24. The referee’s rejection of arguments about OLR’s unwillingness to offer a consensual reprimand under SCR 22.09 effectively clarified that such negotiation posture, standing alone, is not an extraordinary reason to reduce costs.

3.3 Impact

Although fact-bound, the decision carries several practical signals for Wisconsin disciplinary practice and probate representation:

• Diligence in “slow” matters is still diligence: Probate administrations can be complex and drawn out, but this opinion underscores that long-running status does not excuse years of inactivity—especially when necessary steps (e.g., ordering death certificates, pursuing unclaimed-property assets, disbursing recovered funds) are not completed.
• Mitigation can meaningfully affect sanction even for extreme delay: The case illustrates that a very long period of non-completion may still result in a reprimand where (a) there is no prior discipline, (b) no dishonest/selfish motive, and (c) contextual complications help explain—but not justify—the delay.
• Comparator discipline matters: The court expressly grounded its outcome in consistency with In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Gonzalez and Public Reprimand of Sarah Clemment, reinforcing the importance of proportionality to prior discipline in sanction arguments.
• Costs remain the rule, not the exception: The decision reinforces a strong presumption of full costs under SCR 22.24, and suggests that partial cooperation or early stipulation may not suffice absent truly “exceptional circumstances.”

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• SCR 20:1.3 (diligence): Requires a lawyer to pursue a client’s matter with reasonable promptness and persistence. Prolonged inactivity—especially where concrete steps are known and available—can violate the rule.
• No contest plea (in discipline): The lawyer does not contest the charge; the court may treat the allegations as established for discipline purposes, typically supported by stipulated facts.
• Stipulation: An agreement between the parties about facts (and sometimes aggravating/mitigating factors) that becomes the evidentiary foundation for the referee and the court.
• Clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence: The level of proof required in Wisconsin lawyer discipline—more than “more likely than not,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
• Public reprimand vs. suspension: A public reprimand is formal public discipline but does not remove the attorney’s ability to practice; a suspension temporarily revokes that ability.
• Progressive sanctioning: Discipline generally escalates for repeat misconduct; a clean disciplinary history can weigh heavily against suspension even for serious lapses.
• Costs under SCR 22.24: The default is that the respondent pays the full costs of the disciplinary proceeding unless exceptional circumstances justify reduction.

5. Conclusion

Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Bryant H. Klos reaffirms that prolonged failure to complete probate administration work can constitute lack of diligence under SCR 20:1.3, warranting public discipline even where complications and personal setbacks exist. At the same time, the decision underscores that mitigating factors—particularly a long career without prior discipline and the absence of dishonest motive—can support a public reprimand rather than suspension, consistent with comparative Wisconsin discipline. Finally, the opinion reinforces the presumption of full cost assessment under SCR 22.24 absent truly exceptional circumstances.