Prohibition Against Delegation of Device Restrictions to Probation: United States v. Mayhew

Introduction

In United States v. Mayhew, 22-1704-cr (2d Cir. May 16, 2025), Michael Mayhew pled guilty to receipt and possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A), 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(b)(2). The District Court sentenced him to 16 years and 8 months’ imprisonment, followed by 30 years of supervised release. In addition to standard conditions, the court imposed five special conditions, two of which Mayhew challenged on appeal, as well as a $17,000 special assessment under 18 U.S.C. § 2259A.

Key issues on appeal:

Whether Special Condition 5’s language permitting the Probation Department to limit Mayhew to one internet-capable device impermissibly delegated judicial authority;
Whether the imposition of a $17,000 special assessment was procedurally reasonable under §§ 3553(a) and 3572.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit vacated the portion of Special Condition 5 delegating to Probation the decision to limit Mayhew to one device.
All other aspects of the sentence—including Special Condition 3 (psychosexual evaluation/treatment) and the $17,000 special assessment—were affirmed.
The case was remanded for the District Court to either omit or reimpose device-restriction language consistent with precedent.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2015): Prohibits delegation of judicial decisions to third parties in supervised-release conditions.
United States v. Degroate, 940 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2019): Clarifies that “shall” language tied to contingencies does not necessarily delegate authority.
United States v. Kunz, 68 F.4th 748 (2d Cir. 2023): Holds that permitting Probation to “may” limit device usage is an improper delegation requiring particularized findings.

Legal Reasoning

Standard of Review: Mayhew failed to object below, so the court applied plain-error review: error must be obvious, affect substantial rights, and undermine judicial integrity.
Special Condition 3 (Psychosexual Evaluation): The court found no improper delegation because the condition used mandatory language (“shall participate”) upon a future contingency (evaluator’s recommendation), consistent with Degroate.
Special Condition 5 (Device Restriction): The phrase “you may be limited to possessing one personal internet capable device” unlawfully delegated judicial power to Probation. Citing Kunz, the court vacated that clause and remanded for particularized findings or omission.
Unannounced Examinations: The remaining search and monitoring provisions were upheld. The court found adequate justification based on Mayhew’s expertise in computer science and his decades-long evasion of detection.
Special Assessment: The court held no plain procedural error in imposing the $17,000 assessment under § 2259A, noting the District Court expressly considered the statutory factors and adopted the Presentence Investigation Report’s findings regarding Mayhew’s ability to pay.

Impact

This decision reaffirms key principles in supervised-release sentencing:

No Delegation of Core Judicial Power: Conditions cannot give Probation the final say on liberty restrictions.
Precision in Drafting: Mandatory language (“shall”) tied to court-defined contingencies is permissible; permissive “may” risks invalidation.
Particularized Findings Required: For severe restrictions (e.g., limiting devices), the sentencing court must explain on the record why they are necessary for the individual defendant.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Delegation of Judicial Authority: A court cannot outsource core sentencing decisions—any condition that lets Probation set the terms of release is invalid.
Plain-Error Review: When a defendant doesn’t object at sentencing, an appellate court will only correct errors that are clear, affect substantial rights, and harm courtroom integrity.
Particularized Findings: Judges must record individualized reasons when imposing unusually harsh supervised-release restrictions.
Special Assessment vs. Fine: Special assessments under § 2259A are distinct from fines and require consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay and statutory sentencing factors.

Conclusion

United States v. Mayhew underscores the judiciary’s exclusive authority to impose and define supervised-release conditions. By vacating the improper delegation to Probation regarding device limits and affirming the need for clear judicial findings, the Second Circuit has provided a roadmap for crafting technology-related release conditions that respect both judicial prerogatives and defendants’ rights.