Procedural Safeguards for “Consent” Orders of Protection under Family Ct Act § 154‑c(3):
Commentary on Matter of Casey Q. v. Jeffrey O., 2025 NY Slip Op 07049 (3d Dept)

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Appellate Division, Third Department’s decision in Matter of Casey Q. v. Jeffrey O., 2025 NY Slip Op 07049 (Dec. 18, 2025), a multifaceted family law appeal involving:

Competing family offense proceedings under Family Court Act article 8 (orders of protection);
A custody-related enforcement/modification proceeding under article 6; and
Multiple interlocutory orders regarding assigned counsel and sua sponte dismissals.

Although the decision formally addresses six separate appeals, its true doctrinal significance lies in a focused procedural holding: a Family Court may not enter an order of protection against a respondent on purported “consent” without either (i) a clear, on-the-record consent to the order or (ii) compliance with the procedural safeguards of Family Ct Act § 154‑c(3), including either factual findings or a proper admission to a family offense.

The Third Department:

Dismissed several appeals as nonappealable, moot, or taken by a non‑aggrieved party;
Exercised its discretion to treat a premature notice of appeal as valid where an order was later “corrected”; and
Reversed an order of protection entered against the father, finding that the Family Court failed to follow the statutory procedure for consent orders of protection and that the record did not support appellate fact‑finding.

This opinion thereby reinforces appellate jurisdictional limits, clarifies how corrected orders interact with premature notices of appeal, and—most importantly—tightens procedural protections around “consent” orders of protection in high‑conflict family cases.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Parties and Prior Litigation

The parties—Casey Q. (the mother) and Jeffrey O. (the father)—are the parents of a child born in 2017. Their litigation history is already well-known to the Third Department, which had recently reversed a November 2022 custody determination between these same parties and ordered a new fact‑finding hearing:

“The parties to this appeal are familiar to this Court, as we recently reversed a November 2022 custody determination and ordered a new fact-finding hearing (Matter of Casey Q. v Jeffrey O., 237 AD3d 1270 [3d Dept 2025]).”

The present decision concerns a later wave of litigation in 2023–2024, primarily revolving around cross‑allegations of harassment and requests for orders of protection, as well as a new custody‑related enforcement/modification petition.

B. The Four Family Court Proceedings

Proceeding No. 1 – Mother’s family offense petition (article 8)
In June 2023, the mother filed a family offense petition seeking an order of protection against the father, alleging harassment (first or second degree) and/or aggravated harassment in the second degree. She alleged that the father repeatedly accused her of neglect and repeatedly called the police for welfare checks during her parenting time. The father was assigned counsel in July 2023.
Proceeding No. 2 – Father’s “violation” petition (article 6 or 8 context)
Several months later, the father filed a 92‑page, pro se violation petition (Proceeding No. 2), requesting, among other relief, an order of protection in favor of himself and the child against the mother. He was then assigned the same counsel who represented him in Proceeding No. 1. On that same day, Family Court sua sponte dismissed the father’s petition without prejudice.
Proceeding No. 3 – Father’s family offense petition (article 8)
In November 2023, while counsel’s motion to withdraw (discussed below) was pending, the father filed another family offense petition (Proceeding No. 3), alleging that the mother was harassing, stalking, and threatening him. New counsel was assigned in December 2023.
Proceeding No. 4 – Mother’s custody enforcement/modification petition (article 6)
In July 2024, the mother filed a petition to enforce and modify a prior custody order. She sought:
- Sole legal custody;
- Primary physical custody; and
- A mental health evaluation of the father.
That same month, Family Court signed an order to show cause, directing the father to comply with the custody order then in place.

C. Assigned Counsel and Motions to Be Relieved

The father’s relationship with assigned counsel in Proceeding No. 1 deteriorated:

The father moved to relieve assigned counsel for alleged ineffective assistance.
On October 26, 2023, Family Court denied the father’s motion to remove counsel.
The next day, assigned counsel moved to be relieved, citing a breakdown in the attorney‑client relationship and a conflict of interest.
On November 16, 2023, Family Court granted counsel’s motion and relieved counsel.

The father appealed from both the October 26, 2023 and November 16, 2023 orders.

D. The June 2024 Fact‑Finding Hearing and “Mutual” Orders of Protection

A one‑day fact‑finding hearing was held in June 2024 on:

The mother’s article 8 petition (Proceeding No. 1) against the father; and
The father’s article 8 petition (Proceeding No. 3) against the mother.

During this hearing:

The mother requested mutual stay‑away orders of protection.
The father indicated that:
- He wished to continue with the fact‑finding hearing;
- He did, however, agree to an order of protection in his favor.

Despite this stated intention, Family Court ultimately issued two orders of protection on “consent”:

An order of protection in favor of the mother against the father (Proceeding No. 1); and
An order of protection in favor of the father against the mother (Proceeding No. 3).

The written orders recited that they were “entered on the consent of the parties.” The father appealed from both.

E. The Appeal from the July 2024 Order to Show Cause

The father also appealed from the July 2024 signed order to show cause in Proceeding No. 4, which had directed him to comply with the existing custody order. By the time of the appeal, that order to show cause had been superseded by an April 2025 temporary order.

III. Summary of the Appellate Division’s Decision

The Third Department’s disposition can be summarized as follows:

A. Appeals Dismissed

October 20, 2023 order (Proceeding No. 2 – father’s violation petition)
Holding: The order was issued sua sponte and is therefore not appealable as of right. Appeal dismissed.
October 26, 2023 order (Proceeding No. 1 – denial of father’s motion to remove assigned counsel)
Holding: A nondispositional, interlocutory order regarding assigned counsel is not appealable as of right. Appeal dismissed.
November 16, 2023 order (Proceeding No. 1 – order relieving assigned counsel)
Holding: Likewise a nondispositional order; no right to appeal. Appeal dismissed.
July 2024 signed order to show cause (Proceeding No. 4 – custody enforcement/modification)
Holding: The order to show cause was superseded by an April 2025 temporary order. The appeal is therefore no longer viable (moot). Appeal dismissed.
June 21, 2024 order of protection in Proceeding No. 3 (in favor of father)
Holding: The father, having prevailed in his own family offense petition, is not an “aggrieved” party under CPLR 5511. His appeal must be dismissed. The mother did not appeal that order, so no relief could be granted to her.

B. Appeal Reached on the Merits

The court did reach the merits of:

The father’s appeal from the June 21, 2024 order of protection in Proceeding No. 1 (the order entered against him on the mother’s petition), even though that order had been superseded by a “corrected” order. The court treated the premature notice of appeal as valid under CPLR 5520(c).

C. Substantive Holding: Reversal of the Order of Protection Against the Father

On the key issue, the court held:

The hearing transcript showed that the father only agreed to an order of protection in his favor and expressly indicated his desire to continue the hearing on the mother’s petition.
Family Court briefly asked both parties whether they would consent to an order “in their favor,” but:
- There were no findings of fact supporting the order against the father; and
- There was no admission by the father to any family offense.
As a result, Family Court failed to comply with Family Ct Act § 154‑c(3), which governs the procedures for entering orders of protection—especially those purportedly based on consent.
The record was insufficient for the Appellate Division to determine whether the proof established a family offense.

Accordingly, the Third Department:

Reversed the June 21, 2024 order of protection in Proceeding No. 1 (against the father); and
Remitted the matter to Family Court, Cortland County, for a new hearing and further proceedings consistent with its decision.

IV. Analysis

A. Appellate Jurisdiction and Nonappealable Orders

A large portion of the decision reaffirms fundamental jurisdictional principles about what orders may be appealed to the Appellate Division.

1. Sua sponte orders are not appealable as of right

The father’s appeal from the October 20, 2023 order in Proceeding No. 2 was dismissed because that order—dismissing his 92‑page violation petition—was issued sua sponte. Citing:

Matter of Donald QQ. v Stephanie RR., 198 AD3d 1155, 1156 n 1 (3d Dept 2021); and
Sholes v Meagher, 100 NY2d 333, 335 (2003),

the court reiterated that orders made on the court’s own motion, without an underlying motion by a party, are not appealable as of right. This rule serves several functions:

It limits piecemeal review of non-demanded rulings;
It encourages parties to first seek relief or clarification in the trial court (e.g., via motion to vacate or reargue); and
It respects the structure of appellate jurisdiction as defined by statute and court rules.

The father asked the Third Department to treat his notice of appeal as an application for permission to appeal. The court explicitly declined to exercise that discretionary power, referencing:

Matter of Walter Q. v Stephanie R., 237 AD3d 1297, 1298 (3d Dept 2025); and
Matter of Donald OO. v Tiffany OO., 212 AD3d 951, 952 (3d Dept 2023).

2. Nondispositional orders regarding assigned counsel are not appealable as of right

The October 26, 2023 and November 16, 2023 orders related to assigned counsel are described as nondispositional: they did not finally resolve any petition or terminate a proceeding. Thus, under longstanding Third Department precedent, they were not appealable as of right. The court again relied on:

Matter of Walter Q. v Stephanie R., 237 AD3d at 1297–1298;
Matter of Donald OO. v Tiffany OO., 212 AD3d at 952;
Matter of Melissa OO. v Rotisha PP., 209 AD3d 1193, 1194 (3d Dept 2022).

The principle is straightforward: interlocutory orders about representation—such as the denial of a motion to remove counsel or the granting of counsel’s motion to withdraw—do not themselves provide a basis for an immediate appeal. Any challenge to the effect of such orders must ordinarily await an appeal from a final order or be raised by motion practice in the trial court.

3. Superseded orders are not viable subjects of appeal

The July 2024 order to show cause in Proceeding No. 4 was superseded by an April 2025 temporary order. Citing:

Matter of Christopher N. v Karoline O., 196 AD3d 774, 776 (3d Dept 2021); and
Matter of Jordan SS. [Kevin SS.], 180 AD3d 1159, 1160 (3d Dept 2020),

the court held that once a temporary order has been replaced by a later temporary or final order, an appeal from the earlier order is no longer viable. The controversy is effectively mooted and appellate review would be academic unless a recognized exception to mootness applied (none is suggested here).

Again, the father requested that his notice of appeal be treated as an application for leave to appeal; again, the court declined in its discretion.

4. The “aggrieved party” requirement: CPLR 5511

The father also appealed from the June 21, 2024 order of protection in Proceeding No. 3. That order granted his own petition and provided an order of protection in his favor. Under CPLR 5511, only an “aggrieved” party may appeal—meaning a party who has suffered a direct, adverse effect from the order. The father, having obtained the relief he requested, was not aggrieved.

Relying on:

Matter of Daniel A. v Jessica B., 176 AD3d 1408, 1408 (3d Dept 2019), and
CPLR 5511,

the court dismissed the appeal. Moreover, because the mother did not appeal from the order that ran against her, the court lacked authority to grant her any relief:

Matter of Dibble v Valachovic, 141 AD3d 774, 775 n (3d Dept 2016);
Matter of Sharyn PP. v Richard QQ., 83 AD3d 1140, 1143–1144 (3d Dept 2011).

In other words, an order cannot be modified to favor a non‑appealing party.

B. Premature Appeals and Corrected Orders: Application of CPLR 5520(c)

The June 2024 order of protection in Proceeding No. 1 was later “corrected,” but the father’s notice of appeal referenced the initial June 2024 order. Technically, that notice was premature as to the corrected order.

The Third Department exercised its discretion under CPLR 5520(c) to treat the premature notice of appeal as valid, citing:

Matter of Evelyn EE. v Jody CC., 222 AD3d 1294, 1296 n 3 (3d Dept 2023), lvs denied 41 NY3d 907 (2024);
Matter of Linda D. v Renee D., 40 AD3d 1201, 1202 n 2 (3d Dept 2007).

This reflects a pragmatic approach: if the intention to appeal the substance of an order is clear, and a later corrected order does not fundamentally change the rights at issue, the appellate court may cure technical defects in the notice to reach the merits.

C. Procedural Requirements for “Consent” Orders of Protection: Family Ct Act § 154‑c(3)

The most consequential portion of the opinion involves the Third Department’s analysis of the order of protection entered against the father in Proceeding No. 1.

1. What Family Ct Act § 154‑c(3) requires

While the opinion does not quote the statute, its application is clear. In general terms, Family Ct Act § 154‑c(3) regulates the circumstances in which a Family Court may issue an order of protection, including situations where:

The court makes findings, after a fact‑finding hearing, that a family offense has been committed; or
The respondent admits (on the record) to having committed a family offense; or
The respondent consents to the entry of an order of protection, often without admitting wrongdoing, provided the court complies with procedural safeguards (e.g., explanation of the order’s terms and consequences).

The Appellate Division has previously made clear that orders of protection cannot be entered casually or by implication; the statutory procedures must be observed. Here, the court cited:

Matter of Daniel W. v Kimberly W., 135 AD3d 1000, 1002 (3d Dept 2016); and
Matter of Anthony T. v Melissa U., 211 AD3d 1406, 1408 (3d Dept 2022).

Both cases emphasize that where there is no admission and no findings, an order of protection cannot stand.

2. What happened at the June 2024 hearing

The transcript showed the following sequence:

The father was called to testify and began doing so regarding the mother’s petition.
The proceedings were then interrupted by a break.
Upon returning, the parties discussed a potential agreement.
After conferring with counsel, the father:
- Consented to an order of protection in his favor; and
- Expressed a desire to continue the fact‑finding hearing on the mother’s petition against him.
Despite that stated intent, Family Court:
- “Briefly asked both the mother and the father respectively if they would consent to an order in their favor”; and
- Entered mutual orders of protection, each reciting consent of the parties.

Critically:

There were no findings of fact that the father had committed any family offense; and
The father never made an admission to any such offense.

3. The Third Department’s conclusion

Given that record, the court concluded:

“Accordingly, Family Court failed to observe the procedural requirements of Family Ct Act § 154-c (3) (see Matter of Daniel W. v Kimberly W., 135 AD3d 1000, 1002 [3d Dept 2016]).”

Furthermore:

“As the record is insufficient for us to determine whether the proof established a family offense, we must vacate the order and remit the matter for a new hearing (see Matter of Anthony T. v Melissa U., 211 AD3d 1406, 1408 [3d Dept 2022]).”

This reflects two crucial points:

Strict compliance with § 154‑c(3)
A Family Court judge cannot infer consent to an order of protection against a litigant from:
- General discussions about “mutual” orders; or
- A brief confirmatory question framed only as an order “in their favor.”
There must be an unequivocal, on‑the‑record consent, or else the court must complete the hearing, make factual findings, and determine whether a family offense was proved.
Limits on appellate fact‑finding
Where no proper fact‑finding was conducted below, the Appellate Division will not attempt to supply it. Instead, it will:
- Vacate the defective order; and
- Remit the matter for a new hearing, protecting the respondent’s due process rights.

D. Consent, Mutual Orders, and Challenges to Consented Orders

The decision also addresses, in a footnote, how a party who consents to an order of protection may later challenge it.

Here, the mother consented to the mutual order of protection that was entered against her in Proceeding No. 3, “with the understanding that mutual orders of protection would be granted.” The court clarifies that such a party is:

“not precluded from bringing a challenge to such order[ ], but instead must do so in the first instance by filing a motion to vacate the order, thus providing Family Court with an opportunity to consider and correct any deficiencies” (quoting Matter of Vicktoriya DD. [Daniel EE.], 172 AD3d 1473, 1474 [3d Dept 2019]; see also Matter of Dimitry E. [Clarissa E.], 177 AD3d 1223, 1224 [3d Dept 2019]).

Two points emerge:

Consent does not forever bar challenge
A party who consents to an order of protection is not permanently barred from contesting its validity (for example, challenging whether the required statutory procedures were followed).
Proper procedural path: motion to vacate
Such a challenge must be made first in Family Court by moving to vacate the order. The trial court is given the initial opportunity to correct procedural or substantive errors before appellate review is sought.

This reinforces a consistent Third Department theme: trial-level correction is preferred over immediate appeals, especially where factual development or clarification may resolve the issue.

E. Impact and Practical Implications

1. For Family Court judges

The decision sends a clear message to Family Court judges:

Do not shortcut fact‑finding simply because the parties express an interest in “mutual” orders of protection, especially in high‑conflict custody cases.
Before entering an order of protection against a respondent:
- Ensure there is either a clear, on‑the‑record consent (with the respondent’s full understanding of rights and consequences); or
- Complete the fact‑finding hearing and make explicit findings regarding the alleged family offense.
Maintain a clear record distinguishing:
- What each party is requesting;
- Which orders each party is consenting to; and
- Which issues remain contested.

2. For practitioners

Attorneys representing parties in article 8 proceedings should be alert to:

The risk that ambiguous colloquies can be misconstrued as global consent;
The necessity of clarifying on the record whether:
- A client is admitting to a family offense;
- A client is merely consenting to an order of protection without admission; or
- The client wishes to proceed to full hearing.
Advising clients of the downstream consequences of orders of protection (including on custody and visitation).

3. For litigants

The decision protects litigants—particularly respondents in family offense proceedings—by reaffirming that:

They cannot be saddled with an order of protection without either their clear consent or a proper evidentiary determination that they committed a family offense.
If an order was entered on supposed “consent” but without actual understanding or agreement, the proper remedy is to:
1. Move in Family Court to vacate the order; and
2. Pursue appellate review only if necessary after Family Court rules.

4. Doctrinally: strengthening procedural rigor in article 8 practice

Substantively, the opinion does not announce a brand‑new rule, but it sharpens and reaffirms existing law in several ways:

It underlines that Family Ct Act § 154‑c(3) is not a formality. The court will vacate orders that do not comply, even where written orders recite “consent.”
It confirms the Third Department’s reluctance to conduct de novo fact‑finding in the absence of a proper record; the remedy is remittal for a new hearing.
It situates article 8 practice firmly within broader due process principles—parties are entitled to clear notice, a meaningful hearing, and transparent, reviewable findings.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

Several legal terms and concepts in the opinion may be unfamiliar to non‑lawyers. The following brief explanations may help.

1. Family offense petition (Family Court Act article 8)

A family offense petition is a proceeding in Family Court where one family member (or intimate partner) alleges that another family member committed an offense such as harassment, assault, stalking, or similar conduct. The primary remedy is an order of protection, which can:

Direct the respondent to stay away from the petitioner;
Prohibit communication or contact;
Impose other conditions (e.g., no harassment, no threats).

2. Order of protection

An order of protection is a court order designed to safeguard a person from violence, threats, harassment, or intimidation. In Family Court, they can be:

Temporary (issued at the beginning of a case); or
Final (after a hearing, admission, or consent).

3. Family Court Act article 6 (custody and visitation)

Article 6 covers custody and visitation proceedings, including:

Who has legal and physical custody of a child;
Visitation schedules;
Requests to modify or enforce existing custody orders.

4. Sua sponte

“Sua sponte” (Latin: “of its own accord”) describes when a judge acts on their own initiative, without a request (motion) from either party. For example, the Family Court’s dismissal of the father’s 92‑page violation petition was done sua sponte. Such orders are generally not appealable as of right.

5. Nondispositional order

A nondispositional order is an order that does not finally decide a case or a petition. For example:

An order granting or denying a change of counsel;
An order scheduling a hearing.

Such orders are typically not directly appealable. Instead, they may be reviewed on appeal from the final order.

6. Superseded order

An order is superseded when a later order replaces it. For instance, a temporary custody arrangement might be superseded by a new temporary order or by a final custody order. Appeals from superseded orders are generally considered moot because the earlier order is no longer in effect.

7. “Aggrieved” party (CPLR 5511)

Under CPLR 5511, only a party who is “aggrieved”—meaning harmed or adversely affected by an order—may appeal it. A party who wins completely in the lower court (e.g., whose petition is granted) is not aggrieved and may not appeal simply to seek a different rationale or additional relief.

8. CPLR 5520(c) – Curing defects in notices of appeal

CPLR 5520(c) allows the appellate court to cure certain technical defects in a notice of appeal (for instance, where the wrong date or order is referenced), especially if:

The intention to appeal is clear; and
No party will be prejudiced by treating the notice as valid.

In this case, it was used to treat a premature appeal from the original June 2024 order as a valid appeal from a later “corrected” order.

9. Motion to vacate an order

A motion to vacate asks the court that issued an order to cancel or set aside that order (for example, for procedural defects, lack of consent, or new evidence). In this context, a party who consented to an order of protection but later believes that consent was defective or uninformed must first file such a motion in Family Court.

VI. Conclusion: Significance of Matter of Casey Q. v. Jeffrey O.

Matter of Casey Q. v. Jeffrey O. is an important reaffirmation of procedural safeguards in Family Court, particularly in the sensitive context of orders of protection intertwined with custody disputes.

The decision:

Reiterates jurisdictional limitations on appeals from:
- Sua sponte orders;
- Nondispositional orders about assigned counsel; and
- Superseded temporary orders.
Clarifies that only an aggrieved party may appeal under CPLR 5511.
Confirms the court’s discretion under CPLR 5520(c) to treat premature notices of appeal as valid where a later corrected order issues.
Most significantly, holds that:
- Family Court cannot enter an order of protection against a respondent based on ambiguous or assumed “consent”; and
- Absent a clear, on‑the‑record consent or an admission to a family offense, the court must hold a proper hearing and make findings, as required by Family Ct Act § 154‑c(3).
Provides guidance on how parties who have consented to orders of protection may later challenge them—by motion to vacate in Family Court before any appeal.

From a broader perspective, the decision underscores that orders of protection carry significant legal and practical consequences, especially when they arise in highly contentious custody contexts. The Third Department’s insistence on strict compliance with statutory procedures and due process protects both petitioners and respondents: petitioners receive enforceable orders grounded in proper process; respondents are not deprived of rights without unequivocal consent or a fair evidentiary determination.

In this sense, Matter of Casey Q. v. Jeffrey O. is best understood as a precedent that fortifies procedural integrity in family offense proceedings and clarifies the boundaries of appellate review, thereby contributing to a more orderly and rights‑respecting family law system in New York.

Procedural Safeguards for “Consent” Orders of Protection under Family Ct Act § 154‑c(3): Commentary on Matter of Casey Q. v. Jeffrey O., 2025 NY Slip Op 07049 (3d Dept)