Procedural Nature of Wells-Yates Proportionality Rules Precludes Retroactive Application

Introduction

Rodney Dewayne McDonald v. The People of the State of Colorado (2024 CO 75) addresses whether the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision in Wells-Yates v. People (2019 CO 90M, 454 P.3d 191) announced new, substantive constitutional rules that must be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. McDonald, whose habitual-criminal sentence was imposed in 1996 and became final in 1999, sought a second proportionality review under the revised Wells-Yates framework. The People of the State of Colorado resisted, arguing that Wells-Yates announced only procedural clarifications, not substantive rules, and thus does not apply retroactively to his long-finalized sentence.

Key issues:

• Did Wells-Yates announce new rules of constitutional law?
• If so, are those rules substantive or procedural?
• Does Teague v. Lane’s retroactivity framework permit relief on collateral review?

Parties:

• Petitioner: Rodney Dewayne McDonald
• Respondent: The People of the State of Colorado

Summary of the Judgment

The Colorado Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Hood joined by a full en banc court, affirmed the court of appeals. It held that:

1. McDonald’s conviction became final in 1999, well before Wells-Yates in 2019.
2. Several Wells-Yates holdings—most notably that not all narcotics offenses are per se grave or serious and that post-offense legislative amendments may inform gravity assessments—did announce new rules.
3. Those new rules are procedural, not substantive, because they regulate the manner of reviewing a habitual-criminal sentence rather than removing conduct from the scope of punishable offenses.
4. Under Teague v. Lane, only new substantive rules apply retroactively on collateral review. Because Wells-Yates announced no new substantive rule, its holdings do not apply to McDonald’s case.

Consequently, McDonald is not entitled to a second proportionality review under Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI)(b), and the court of appeals’ judgment denying relief is affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Wells-Yates v. People (2019 CO 90M): Clarified Colorado’s two-stage proportionality review under the habitual-criminal statute, admonishing courts to consider all triggering and predicate offenses together and to re-examine the “per se grave or serious” designation for narcotics offenses, and to account for post-offense legislative amendments.
• Solem v. Helm (463 U.S. 277): Established the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality test—first an abbreviated review of gravity versus sentence severity, and, if necessary, an extended inter- and intra-jurisdictional comparison.
• Rutter v. People (2015 CO 71): Explained Colorado’s abbreviated review factors for habitual-criminal sentences and confirmed per se gravity presumptions for certain offenses.
• Gaskins (825 P.2d 30): Originated the “per se grave or serious” default list for habitual-criminal proportionality analyses, later trimmed by Wells-Yates.
• Teague v. Lane (1989): Set the framework for retroactivity of new constitutional rules—direct review versus collateral review, and substantive versus procedural rules.
• Montgomery v. Louisiana (577 U.S. 190): Confirmed that substantive rules altering the permissible scope of punishment apply retroactively on collateral review.
• Summerlin (542 U.S. 348) and Bousley (523 U.S. 614): Defined the difference between substantive and procedural constitutional rules.

Legal Reasoning

1. Finality: McDonald’s convictions became final in 1999. Teague’s default non-retroactivity rule governs subsequent collateral attacks.

2. Newness: A rule is “new” if it was not dictated by binding precedent at the time the conviction became final. The Court found that two Wells-Yates holdings (narrowing the per se list for narcotics offenses and allowing post-offense legislative amendments in the gravity analysis) were new. Other Wells-Yates clarifications merely reiterated existing practice.

3. Substantive vs. Procedural: Under Teague and its progeny, only new substantive rules apply retroactively. A substantive rule “alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.” Procedural rules, by contrast, regulate how sentencing or conviction reviews are conducted but leave the underlying punishable conduct intact.

4. Application to Wells-Yates:

• Wells-Yates did not eliminate any category of offenders or crimes from Colorado’s habitual-criminal reach. It preserved the possibility that narcotics offenses still trigger enhanced sentences; it only refined the proportionality methodology.
• Post-offense legislative amendments do not change which offenders may be sentenced; they merely inform the gravity assessment.

Thus, the Court classified these rules as procedural. Because they do not impose new substantive restraints on Colorado’s power to punish, they do not apply retroactively to McDonald’s case.

Impact

This decision clarifies the limits of Wells-Yates retroactivity:

• Counsel must seek Wells-Yates–based proportionality review only in cases still on direct appeal, not long-finalized convictions.
• Defendants serving habitual-criminal sentences finalized before 2019 cannot obtain a second review unless a substantive constitutional rule is at issue.
• The ruling underscores the narrowness of Eighth Amendment proportionality challenges and reaffirms Teague’s distinction between substantive and procedural developments.

Future litigants will focus on identifying truly substantive shifts—those that remove conduct from the permissible sentencing range—if they hope to secure retroactive relief.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Habitual Criminal Statute: Colorado law that imposes enhanced, mandatory sentences (up to life) when a defendant has certain prior felony convictions (predicate offenses) in addition to a new crime (triggering offense).
• Proportionality Review: A two-stage Eighth Amendment check on whether a sentence is “grossly disproportionate” to the crime:
  1. Abbreviated review: Compare the seriousness of the crime(s) to the harshness of the sentence.
  2. Extended review: If needed, compare sentences for similar and different crimes within and across jurisdictions.
• Per Se Grave or Serious: A presumption that certain offenses are inherently serious enough to justify harsh habitual-criminal sentences without individualized gravity analysis. Wells-Yates narrowed this presumption for narcotics offenses.
• Retroactivity Doctrine (Teague Framework): When a court announces a new constitutional rule:
  • Direct Review: All defendants whose cases are pending can benefit.
  • Collateral Review: Only new substantive rules (changing who or what may be punished) apply retroactively; procedural rules do not.

Conclusion

In McDonald v. State, the Colorado Supreme Court reaffirmed that Wells-Yates’s refinements to Colorado’s habitual-criminal proportionality review are procedural clarifications rather than substantive limitations on the state’s power to punish. Under Teague v. Lane, procedural rules do not apply retroactively on collateral review. Because McDonald’s conviction became final two decades ago, he is not entitled to a second proportionality assessment under Wells-Yates. The decision underscores the strict boundaries of retroactivity and the enduring deference to legislative sentencing schemas, so long as they do not transgress substantive constitutional limits.