Probable Cause via Manneristic Identification and Indictment Presumption: The Heredia Precedent

Introduction

This commentary examines the Second Circuit’s summary order in Heredia v. City of New York, 24-1185-cv (2d Cir. Mar. 31, 2025). Diego Heredia, a former art gallery manager, challenged his arrest and prosecution for burglary under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the police lacked probable cause and later maliciously pursued charges against him. The City of New York, the NYPD and individual officers moved for summary judgment in the Eastern District of New York, which the court granted. On appeal, Heredia asserted that neither his arrest nor his prosecution met constitutional or state-law standards for probable cause. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals held:

“False Arrest” claim: Probable cause existed as a matter of law, based on identification by mannerisms, clothing recognition, gallery alarm‐code knowledge, possession of keys, and incriminating texts.
“Malicious Prosecution” claim: A grand jury indictment creates a rebuttable presumption of probable cause under New York law (Colon v. City of New York), and Heredia presented no evidence of fraud, perjury, suppression of evidence or bad-faith police conduct to overcome that presumption.
The district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants was affirmed in full.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Sotomayor v. City of New York, 713 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2013) – standard of review on summary judgment in § 1983 claims.
Nick’s Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2017) – movant’s burden on summary judgment.
Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 2012) and Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344 (2d Cir. 2007) – definition of probable cause: “reasonably trustworthy information.”
Burgess v. DeJoseph, 725 F. App’x 36 (2d Cir. 2018) – a single eyewitness identification can establish probable cause.
Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388 (2d Cir. 2006) – once probable cause is established, an officer has no duty to pursue additional investigation to satisfy beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150 (2d Cir. 2021) – elements of malicious prosecution under § 1983 and New York law.
McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2006) and Colon v. City of New York, 455 N.E.2d 1248 (N.Y. 1983) – grand jury indictment creates a rebuttable presumption of probable cause in malicious prosecution claims.

Legal Reasoning

1. False Arrest (42 U.S.C. § 1983):

Probable cause is a mixed legal‐and‐factual question, but when the underlying facts are undisputed, it becomes a pure question of law (Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 157 (2d Cir. 2007)).
Here, no factfinder dispute existed: Detective Donegan had (a) internal and external video of a black‐clad burglar, (b) Jimenez’s identification by mannerisms, (c) Acosta’s confirmation of similar clothing, (d) Heredia’s prior text about holiday closures and (e) access to codes/keys. These cumulatively provided “reasonably trustworthy information” establishing probable cause (Ackerson, 702 F.3d at 19).
The Court emphasized that identification by mannerisms is sufficient (see Burgess, 725 F. App’x at 39) and an officer need not pursue further investigation once probable cause exists (Panetta, 460 F.3d at 398).

2. Malicious Prosecution (42 U.S.C. § 1983):

Under New York law, a malicious prosecution plaintiff must show lack of probable cause (Kee, 12 F.4th at 161–62).
A grand jury indictment creates a rebuttable presumption of probable cause (McClellan, 439 F.3d at 145).
To rebut, a plaintiff must produce evidence of police fraud, perjury, suppression of evidence or bad faith (Colon, 455 N.E.2d at 1251). Heredia offered nothing in the record—no grand jury minutes, no affidavits of impropriety—so the presumption stood.
Thus, probable cause was a complete defense, and summary judgment was appropriate.

Impact

This decision clarifies two key points for § 1983 practitioners:

Manneristic or behavioral identifications, when supported by corroborating circumstances, can alone satisfy the probable cause standard for arrest.
In malicious prosecution claims, the indictment‐presumption framework demands tangible evidence of prosecutorial or investigative misconduct to proceed; mere allegations of misinformation without supporting proof will not overcome summary judgment.

Going forward, lower courts in the Second Circuit will likely apply Heredia to uphold arrests based on non‐physical identifications and to require concrete proof of bad faith before allowing malicious prosecution cases to survive.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable Cause: A reasonable belief, based on facts and circumstances known to the officer, that a suspect committed a crime. It is a lower threshold than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Summary Judgment: A court decision without a full trial, granted when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
False Arrest Claim (42 U.S.C. § 1983): A civil rights claim alleging that a person was unlawfully arrested without probable cause.
Malicious Prosecution Claim (42 U.S.C. § 1983): A civil rights claim alleging that a person was wrongfully subjected to criminal proceedings without probable cause and with malice, causing damage.
Grand Jury Indictment Presumption: Under New York law, returning an indictment means there was probable cause, unless the plaintiff shows the indictment resulted from misconduct (e.g., perjury, suppression of exculpatory evidence).

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s decision in Heredia v. City of New York reinforces the robustness of the probable cause standard and the high bar for malicious prosecution claims under New York law. By affirming that manneristic identification, clothing corroboration, prior access and behavior can establish probable cause, and by highlighting the formidable rebuttable presumption afforded by grand jury indictments, this precedent will guide law enforcement practices, defense strategies, and judicial assessments of § 1983 claims. The clarity and thoroughness of the court’s reasoning make Heredia a touchstone for future disputes over arrest and prosecution legality in the Second Circuit.