Probable Cause Must Exist at the Moment of Seizure: Montana Supreme Court Clarifies the Line Between Extended Traffic Stops and Evidentiary Vehicle Seizures

Introduction

In State v. Carter-Brueggeman, 2025 MT 193, the Montana Supreme Court reversed a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence (methamphetamine and a pipe) found in a purse after a traffic stop. The decision draws a clear doctrinal boundary between (i) permissible extension of a traffic stop based on particularized suspicion and (ii) an evidentiary seizure of a vehicle and its contents, which requires probable cause based solely on facts known at the moment of seizure.

The case arose after an officer stopped Alison Beth Carter‑Brueggeman for expired registration, questioned her about suspected drug activity linked to a private residence she had just left, seized her truck and purse for evidentiary purposes, and later found contraband in the purse pursuant to a warrant. The core issue was whether the officer had probable cause to seize the vehicle (and effectively the purse) at the time he did so. The Supreme Court held he did not.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court issued a two-part holding:

• Extension of the stop: The officer had particularized suspicion to extend the traffic stop to ask about drug activity. This was based on (1) information that the defendant had just left a private residence associated with prior drug activity and (2) corroborating observations by an off-duty trooper and the defendant’s own admissions about her location and observations.
• Evidentiary seizure of the vehicle and purse: The officer lacked probable cause at the moment he seized the vehicle as evidence. The Court emphasized that probable cause for an evidentiary seizure cannot be bootstrapped by facts learned after the seizure, cannot be grounded on a decade-old dismissed charge, cannot be inferred from refusal to consent or guarded demeanor, and cannot rest merely on association with a location linked to drug activity. Because the evidentiary seizure was unsupported by probable cause, the motion to suppress should have been granted.

A concurring opinion further clarifies the limited weight of an anonymous tip under Montana’s Pratt framework and underscores the legal distinction between administrative (safety) impoundments and evidentiary seizures under Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution.

Detailed Background

On September 4, 2023, Ravalli County Deputy Sheriff Hsu stopped Carter‑Brueggeman’s pickup for expired registration after an off-duty trooper reported seeing her leave a Victor, Montana residence earlier flagged for drug activity; dispatch had also relayed a citizen tip about unusual traffic at that address. During the stop, Carter‑Brueggeman explained she had been cleaning a friend’s downstairs apartment (consistent with cleaning supplies observed in the truck), admitted being at the residence, and described multiple arrivals, consistent with the tip. She refused consent to a search. Deputy Hsu then announced he was seizing the truck as evidence and, after further confrontation, seized her purse as well. A search warrant for the vehicle and purse led to discovery of methamphetamine and paraphernalia in the purse.

The district court denied suppression, concluding the officer had particularized suspicion to extend the stop and probable cause to seize the vehicle (and thus the purse). The Supreme Court reversed, holding the seizure lacked probable cause at the time it occurred.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Investigatory stops and extensions
  • State v. Hunt, 2025 MT 122: Particularized suspicion requires specific, articulable facts assessed under the totality of circumstances; permissible to extend a stop when additional indicia of drug activity exist. The Court analogized this case to Hunt insofar as the suspect was tied to a private location of known drug activity (as opposed to a public venue), supporting limited inquiry beyond the traffic infraction.
  • State v. Loberg, 2024 MT 188, and State v. Fisher, 2002 MT 335: Presence in a high-crime area or at a public business known for drug trade is insufficient, standing alone, to justify an investigatory extension. The Court distinguished this case from Loberg and Fisher because the location was a private residence with a much narrower universe of visitors—making the suspicion more particularized for purposes of extending the stop, but not enough for probable cause to seize.
  • State v. McMaster, 2008 MT 294: Officers may rely on collective knowledge and corroborated observations to form particularized suspicion. The Court recognized that some third-party information plus officer observations can justify investigative inquiry but emphasized here that the facts never ripened into probable cause to seize.
  • State v. Noli, 2023 MT 84: Officers may verify information during a stop so long as the additional inquiry is reasonably related in scope and duration to the basis for the stop. The Court found the deputy’s questions stayed within that lane.
  • State v. Harning, 2022 MT 61: Nervous or hesitant behavior is common during stops and alone does not justify escalation. This supports the Court’s rejection of “hostility” as a factor establishing probable cause.
• Evidentiary seizures and probable cause
  • State v. Pierce, 2005 MT 182; State v. Broell, 249 Mont. 117 (1991): An automobile can be seized pending a warrant if probable cause exists to believe its contents offend the law. The Court reaffirmed this standard but found it unmet here.
  • State v. Stoumbaugh, 2007 MT 105; State v. Saxton, 2003 MT 105; State v. Van Dort, 2003 MT 104; Indreland v. MVD, 2019 MT 141: Probable cause is assessed based on what the officer knew at the time; suspicion can ripen into probable cause but had not done so in this case.
  • State v. Panasuk, 2024 MT 113: Prior criminal involvement, especially arrests without convictions, is insufficient by itself to generate reasonable suspicion—let alone probable cause. The Court relied on this principle to discount a decade-old dismissed charge.
  • State v. Valley, 252 Mont. 489 (1992), and State v. Tackitt, 2003 MT 81: Stale or uncorroborated historical information carries little weight in establishing current probable cause. The Court used this reasoning to reject reliance on decade-old, dismissed allegations.
  • State v. Zeimer, 2022 MT 96: Totality of circumstances controls. Even so, the aggregate of innocent or equivocal facts did not cross the probable-cause threshold here.
• Informant tips and reliability
  • State v. Pratt, 286 Mont. 156 (1997), and State v. Foster, 2017 MT 118: Three-factor reliability test (identity, personal observation, corroboration). The concurrence stressed the caller’s anonymity and limited corroboration as reasons the tip had minimal weight for probable cause.
  • State v. Brander, 2004 MT 150: Anonymous tips can contribute to particularized suspicion when officers corroborate with their own observations; still not enough here to establish probable cause.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning turns on three interlocking principles:

1. Two different thresholds—do not collapse them.
   • Particularized suspicion justified extending the traffic stop to inquire about drug activity because the defendant had just come from a private residence linked to drug activity, the off-duty trooper corroborated vehicle and location details, and the defendant admitted being there and described unusual traffic consistent with the tip.
   • Probable cause to seize the vehicle (and, by operation, its contents) was lacking because the officer did not have facts sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that contraband would be found in the vehicle at the moment of seizure.
2. Probable cause is measured at the moment of seizure and cannot be retroactively justified.
   • Items first observed or emphasized after the seizure (e.g., a butane torch, alcohol swabs, and the defendant’s “hyper focus” on her purse) cannot be used to backfill probable cause. The “time-of-knowledge” rule is decisive.
   • Similarly, guarded demeanor, refusal to consent, or skepticism about the stop are not probative of criminality. Asserting one’s rights is not hostility.
3. Association and old allegations are not enough.
   • Mere association with a location known for drug activity, even a private residence, plus the presence of multiple cars, creates grounds for inquiry but not for seizure without further specific facts tying the occupant or the vehicle to contraband.
   • A decade-old, dismissed drug charge cannot be used to bootstrap probable cause for present-day seizure.
   • Omissions such as failing to initially mention a brief stop at a motorcycle shop are not material inconsistencies and cannot establish probable cause; brief, innocent stops (casino, gas station, shop) fall within the realm of ordinary behavior.

Impact and Forward-Looking Significance

The decision has immediate operational consequences across Montana:

• For law enforcement
  • Officers may extend a stop to ask about drug activity when there are specific, articulable links to a private location with known drug activity, but an evidentiary seizure requires more: concrete facts that the vehicle contains contraband.
  • Do not rely on refusal to consent, skeptical demeanor, or post-seizure observations to create probable cause.
  • Distinguish clearly between a statutory, safety-based impound (e.g., unregistered/uninsured vehicle) and an evidentiary seizure. If the purpose is evidence preservation, probable cause is mandatory.
  • Anonymous or minimally detailed tips contribute little unless corroborated by facts indicating criminality—not merely by matching innocent details like vehicle description or route.
  • Video evidence will be scrutinized; courts will not credit characterizations of “hostility” where the record shows assertion of rights without more.
• For prosecutors
  • When defending evidentiary seizures, confine the probable-cause showing to pre-seizure facts and avoid reliance on stale history or mere association.
  • Demonstrate a nexus to contraband with specific, timely, and articulable facts; articulate why innocent explanations are not plausible based on contemporaneous evidence.
• For defense counsel
  • Press the temporal boundary: challenge any reliance on post-seizure observations to justify a preexisting seizure.
  • Highlight the weak weight of anonymous tips under Pratt absent corroboration of criminal facts, and emphasize the legal irrelevance of refusal to consent or prior arrests without convictions.
• For courts
  • This decision emphasizes careful parsing of the moment-of-seizure record and fidelity to the distinction between suspicion and cause, and between administrative impounds and evidentiary seizures.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Particularized suspicion vs. probable cause
  • Particularized suspicion (akin to “reasonable suspicion”) allows an officer to stop someone briefly or to extend a stop to ask questions. It requires specific, articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.
  • Probable cause is a higher standard requiring facts sufficient to make a reasonable person believe that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched or that the person/thing to be seized is involved in a crime. It is needed for evidentiary seizures and warrants.
• Pratt test (informant reliability)
  • Courts evaluate tips by asking: Did the informant identify themselves? Did they speak from personal observation? Was their information corroborated? Anonymous tips tied only to innocent details carry low weight unless corroborated by criminal indicia.
• Collective knowledge doctrine
  • Officers can rely on information from other officers (e.g., an off-duty trooper) to form suspicion or probable cause; however, the shared information must collectively add up to the required standard and tie to criminal activity, not merely to innocent facts.
• Administrative impound vs. evidentiary seizure
  • Administrative impound (e.g., for unsafe, unregistered, or uninsured vehicles) is a safety measure authorized by statute and does not require probable cause of contraband.
  • Evidentiary seizure (to preserve evidence of a crime) requires probable cause under Article II, Section 11, and the Fourth Amendment. The officer’s stated purpose and subsequent actions will be examined to determine which regime applies.
• Time-of-knowledge rule
  • Probable cause must be established with facts known at the moment the seizure occurs. Later-discovered facts cannot retroactively validate an earlier seizure.

Why the Probable Cause Showing Failed

• The defendant’s admitted presence at a private residence linked to drug activity justified questions but did not create probable cause that contraband was in the vehicle.
• Cleaning supplies corroborated her stated reason for being there; no contradictory evidence undermined her explanation.
• Refusal to consent, skepticism, or “guarded cooperation” is constitutionally neutral behavior.
• A decade-old, dismissed drug charge is too stale and too weak to support probable cause for a current seizure.
• Post-seizure observations (torch, swabs, focus on purse) cannot backfill probable cause.
• Omitting a brief stop at a motorcycle shop is not a material inconsistency; brief, innocent stops are ordinary.

Key Takeaways

• Leaving a private residence associated with drug activity may justify extending a stop to ask questions; it does not, by itself, permit an evidentiary seizure of a vehicle or personal effects.
• Probable cause for seizure must be anchored in facts known before the seizure. Refusal to consent, cautious demeanor, stale allegations, and post-seizure discoveries are legally insufficient.
• Anonymous tips carry limited weight unless corroborated with facts indicating criminality, not just innocent details.
• Courts must carefully evaluate bodycam/video and avoid equating assertion of rights with hostility.
• Officers must distinguish between statutory, safety-based impoundments and constitutional, evidentiary seizures. The latter demands probable cause.

Conclusion

State v. Carter‑Brueggeman is a meaningful refinement of Montana search-and-seizure law under Article II, Section 11, and the Fourth Amendment. It clarifies that:

• Particularized suspicion is enough to extend a traffic stop for drug-related questioning when tied to a private residence with known drug activity.
• But an evidentiary seizure of a vehicle and personal effects requires probable cause based solely on facts known at the moment of seizure, not on general associations, stale allegations, refusal to consent, or observations made afterward.
• Anonymous tips must be carefully weighed under the Pratt factors; corroboration of innocent details is not a substitute for corroboration of criminal activity.
• Administrative impounds for safety or compliance reasons are distinct from evidentiary seizures—conflating them risks eroding constitutional protections.

By reversing the denial of suppression, the Court reinforces a crucial temporal and doctrinal boundary: suspicion—even well-founded suspicion—does not automatically mature into probable cause. That bright-line preserves both effective policing and the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.