Probable Cause Does Not Automatically Trigger Miranda Custody; Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms § 922(g)(1)’s Constitutionality After Bruen and Rahimi

Probable Cause Does Not Automatically Trigger Miranda Custody; Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms § 922(g)(1)’s Constitutionality After Bruen and Rahimi

Introduction

In United States v. Ernell Shaw, No. 24-10266 (11th Cir. Sept. 24, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a felon-in-possession conviction and a 300-month sentence arising from a traffic stop that led to the discovery of marijuana and a firearm. The appeal presented three issues:

  • Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon-in-possession) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment after the Supreme Court’s decisions in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi;
  • Whether statements about a gun, elicited during a Terry stop without Miranda warnings, should have been suppressed because the stop had ripened into “custody” for Miranda purposes; and
  • Whether a 300-month upward-variance sentence was substantively unreasonable in light of the advisory Guidelines and mitigating evidence.

The panel affirmed across the board, holding that binding circuit precedent forecloses Second Amendment attacks on § 922(g)(1) post-Bruen and post-Rahimi; that the defendant was not in Miranda custody during the investigatory stop when he admitted the presence of a gun; and that the district court acted within its broad discretion in imposing an upward variance based on the defendant’s extensive criminal history.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Second Amendment: The court held that United States v. Rozier (11th Cir. 2010)—upholding § 922(g)(1) against Second Amendment challenge—remains binding after Bruen and Rahimi, as reaffirmed by United States v. Dubois (“Dubois II”) (11th Cir. 2025). The district court correctly denied the motion to dismiss the indictment.
  • Miranda/Suppression: The court concluded that, considering the totality of circumstances, the traffic stop remained an investigatory Terry stop at the time Shaw made incriminating statements about a gun. Handcuffing and the existence of probable cause did not, by themselves, convert the stop into Miranda custody. No warnings were required; suppression was properly denied.
  • Sentencing: The 300-month sentence—after an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a) and an additional upward variance—was substantively reasonable given Shaw’s serious and persistent criminal history and the § 3553(a) factors. The district court permissibly attached great weight to deterrence and recidivism risk.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Second Amendment thread

  • United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010): Binding circuit precedent upholding § 922(g)(1). Shaw argued Rozier was abrogated by later Supreme Court cases; the panel disagreed.
  • N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Reframed Second Amendment analysis around text and historical tradition, but did not itself address § 922(g)(1). Post-Bruen, many circuits revisited firearm restrictions under the historical analogue test.
  • United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024): The Supreme Court upheld § 922(g)(8), confirming that disarmament of individuals shown to be dangerous fits within the Nation’s historical tradition. The Eleventh Circuit recognized Rahimi as consistent with Rozier’s continuing validity.
  • United States v. Dubois (Dubois I), 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024), vacated, 145 S. Ct. 1041 (2025), and on remand Dubois (Dubois II), 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025): The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that Rozier was not abrogated by Bruen or Rahimi; accordingly, § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under the prior panel precedent rule.
  • United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 2019): Restates the Eleventh Circuit’s prior panel precedent rule—binding until overruled by the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc.

Miranda/custody and Terry stop thread

  • Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966): Requires warnings prior to custodial interrogation.
  • California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983): Defines “custody” as formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.
  • Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984): Ordinary traffic stops are generally noncustodial; crucially, footnote 22 rejects the idea that the moment probable cause exists, Miranda custody necessarily attaches.
  • Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968): Investigatory stops with reasonable suspicion are permitted; such stops do not automatically trigger Miranda.
  • United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141 (11th Cir. 2004): Provides a four-factor framework to assess when a Terry stop becomes an arrest: purpose, diligence, intrusiveness, and duration; also recognizes that a “highly intrusive coercive atmosphere” can trigger Miranda even absent formal arrest.
  • United States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Roper, 702 F.2d 984 (11th Cir. 1983): Handcuffing or directing a suspect out of a vehicle does not automatically transform a Terry stop into an arrest.
  • Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499 (2012); Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010): Reaffirm the objective, contextual inquiry for Miranda custody; temporary, relatively nonthreatening detentions do not inherently constitute custody.
  • United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2010): Custody is evaluated under an objective test; subjective beliefs are irrelevant.

Sentencing thread

  • 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): Governing sentencing factors.
  • U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a): Authorizes upward departure where the criminal history category substantially underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or likelihood of recidivism.
  • United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc); United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022): Substantive reasonableness review is highly deferential; the appellate court will not substitute its judgment for the district court’s so long as the sentence is within the “ballpark of permissible outcomes.”
  • United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2009) (unrelated to the present defendant): A district court may attach great weight to one factor (such as criminal history) over others.
  • United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2021): District courts have broad leeway in weighing criminal history and deterrence; emphasis on prior crimes frequently justifies upward variances.

Legal Reasoning

1) Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1)

Applying the Eleventh Circuit’s prior panel precedent rule, the court held that Rozier remains binding. The panel relied on Dubois II, where the Eleventh Circuit, after a Supreme Court GVR in light of Rahimi, concluded that neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated Rozier. Because one Eleventh Circuit panel cannot overrule another absent en banc action or an on-point Supreme Court decision, the panel was bound to reject Shaw’s Second Amendment attack. The district court therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds.

The upshot: in this circuit, felon-in-possession prosecutions under § 922(g)(1) remain constitutional after Bruen and Rahimi, unless and until the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc or the Supreme Court holds otherwise.

2) Miranda and the investigatory stop

The court applied the Acosta framework and the objective “custody” test. Although officers handcuffed Shaw and had probable cause to arrest him after finding marijuana, the panel emphasized that:

  • The officers acted diligently and briefly in pursuing a “quick and non-intrusive” investigation arising from a traffic stop with additional indicia of criminal activity (odor of marijuana, observed concealment gesture, known violent firearm history).
  • Handcuffing, by itself, does not automatically convert a Terry stop into an arrest—particularly where officer safety concerns are present. The officers here reasonably perceived risk based on Shaw’s history and observed behavior.
  • The duration was short—only a few minutes from initiation to the incriminating statement about the gun.
  • There is no rule that probable cause instantaneously creates Miranda custody. The Supreme Court has expressly rejected such a formulaic trigger (Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 435 n.22). The custody analysis remains objective, focusing on whether a reasonable person would perceive restraints associated with a formal arrest.

On these facts, the stop did not mature into an arrest at the time Shaw admitted the presence of a gun, nor did it otherwise create a “highly intrusive coercive atmosphere” tantamount to custody. As a result, no Miranda warnings were required before the officers asked about items in the car. The district court correctly denied suppression.

3) Sentencing and the upward variance

After granting the Government’s motion for an upward departure under § 4A1.3(a), the district court imposed a sentence above the resulting advisory range based on the § 3553(a) factors, emphasizing Shaw’s extensive criminal history and the need for deterrence. On appeal, the panel stressed:

  • Substantive reasonableness is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with heavy deference to the sentencing court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors.
  • District courts may attach “great weight” to a defendant’s criminal history and risk of recidivism, even when the Guidelines already account for prior conduct.
  • The court need not select the single “most appropriate” sentence; it must impose a reasonable one within the range of permissible outcomes. The 300-month sentence fit within that range given Shaw’s record and the court’s articulated rationale.

Impact

Second Amendment challenges in the Eleventh Circuit

  • The decision confirms—again—that § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional in the Eleventh Circuit after Bruen and Rahimi. Defendants mounting facial or as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) in this circuit face a steep climb under the prior panel precedent rule unless en banc or Supreme Court intervention occurs.
  • Rahimi (upholding § 922(g)(8)) bolsters restrictions aimed at dangerous individuals, dovetailing with Rozier’s acceptance of felon-disarmament as consistent with historical tradition.
  • Although this opinion is unpublished and non-precedential, it reflects the circuit’s ongoing fidelity to Rozier and Dubois II.

Miranda and investigatory stops

  • The opinion highlights a key practical rule: probable cause arising during a Terry stop does not automatically create Miranda custody. The inquiry remains objective and circumstance-driven.
  • Officer safety measures (e.g., handcuffing, repositioning a suspect) will not necessarily convert a stop into an arrest when reasonably tailored to the situation and when the detention remains brief and investigative.
  • Defense suppression arguments will likely need to emphasize coercive features beyond handcuffs and multiple officers, such as prolonged detention, transport to a different location, isolation, or other indicia of restraint equivalent to formal arrest.

Sentencing discretion

  • The case underscores the Eleventh Circuit’s considerable deference to district courts’ weighing of criminal history and deterrence. Upward departures under § 4A1.3(a) can be followed by upward variances where the court reasonably concludes that Guidelines understate the risk or the gravity of the history.
  • Arguments premised on partial declines in certain offense categories over time may not carry the day when the court perceives continued danger or recidivism risk, especially in firearm contexts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Prior panel precedent rule (11th Cir.): Once a published Eleventh Circuit panel has decided a legal question, later panels must follow it unless the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc overrules it. Here, Rozier controls § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality, reaffirmed by Dubois II.
  • Terry stop vs. arrest: A Terry stop is a brief detention based on reasonable suspicion to investigate possible criminal activity. An arrest requires probable cause and imposes restraints akin to formal arrest. Handcuffs or officer safety measures do not automatically transform a stop into an arrest.
  • Miranda custody: Miranda warnings are required only if a person is in “custody” and subject to interrogation. “Custody” means a formal arrest or equivalent restraint. Ordinary traffic/Terry stops are generally not custodial unless they become highly coercive or prolonged.
  • Probable cause vs. Miranda custody: Even if officers have probable cause to arrest, Miranda custody does not automatically attach. The key is whether, objectively, the suspect’s freedom of movement is limited to the degree associated with formal arrest.
  • Upward departure vs. upward variance: A departure modifies the advisory Guidelines range under specified policy statements (e.g., § 4A1.3(a)). A variance is a sentence outside the advisory range based on the statutory sentencing factors in § 3553(a). Courts may do both, as here.
  • Standards of review:
    • Constitutionality of a statute: De novo.
    • Suppression rulings: Factual findings for clear error; legal conclusions de novo.
    • Substantive reasonableness of sentence: Abuse of discretion, with substantial deference to the district court.
  • “Not for publication”: This opinion is unpublished and not binding precedent. Its significance lies in its application of already binding authorities, especially Rozier and Dubois II.

Conclusion

United States v. Ernell Shaw reinforces three important propositions in Eleventh Circuit practice. First, § 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under binding circuit law despite Bruen’s text-and-history framework and the Supreme Court’s subsequent guidance in Rahimi. Second, the existence of probable cause during a Terry stop does not automatically trigger Miranda custody; the custody inquiry remains objective and contextual, and brief, safety-conscious investigative measures—such as handcuffing—do not, without more, convert a stop into an arrest. Third, the Eleventh Circuit continues to afford wide latitude to district courts to impose substantial upward variances where a defendant’s criminal history and recidivism risk warrant heightened punishment under § 3553(a).

Although unpublished, the decision is a clear signal of the Eleventh Circuit’s current posture: (1) Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed by circuit precedent; (2) suppression claims hinging solely on handcuffing or the mere existence of probable cause during a brief Terry stop are unlikely to succeed absent additional coercive features; and (3) upward sentences grounded in serious criminal histories will receive substantial appellate deference. Together, these holdings offer practical guidance for litigants and district courts navigating post-Bruen Second Amendment claims, Miranda-custody questions during street encounters, and the scope of sentencing discretion in firearm cases.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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