Probable Cause and Consent: Upholding Warrantless In-Home Arrests for Counterfeit Currency Under the Fourth Amendment

Introduction

Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff’s Dept., decided April 10, 2025 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arose from Plaintiff-Appellant Kelly Glover’s § 1983 and state-law claims following her arrest for first-degree possession of a forged instrument. After Wegmans supermarket surveillance showed a woman using two counterfeit twenty-dollar bills, Deputy Albanese identified Glover via the store’s reward-card data, went to her home, obtained her consent to enter, and arrested her. Hours later, further ATM footage led to Glover’s “unarrest” and release without criminal charges. Glover then sued for false arrest/imprisonment, Fourth Amendment violations (unlawful entry and unreasonable seizure), denial of due process and equal protection, conspiracy, fraud and emotional distress, and municipal liability. The District Court granted summary judgment to Defendants, and Glover appealed.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed in full. It held that: (1) Magistrate Judge Baxter did not abuse his discretion in denying Glover’s belated discovery request, and District Judge Sharpe properly deemed the summary-judgment motion unopposed under Rule 56(d); (2) Deputy Albanese had probable cause to arrest—surveillance footage, inspection of the bills, and Glover’s admissions sufficed—and Glover had consented to his entry, so Payton’s warrant requirement did not apply; (3) no due process violation arose from her brief custody without a formal arraignment; and (4) her Monell claim failed because she suffered no actual injury from signing a release form.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court drew on a rich line of precedents:

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980): holding that warrantless in-home arrests violate the Fourth Amendment absent consent or exigent circumstances.
Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2006) & Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1996): defining probable cause as “knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information” supporting a belief that a crime occurred.
Grant v. City of New York, 500 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) & United States v. Everett, 719 F.2d 1119 (11th Cir. 1983): recognizing that passing counterfeit currency plus an identification of the passer furnishes probable cause.
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991): requiring prompt judicial determination of probable cause for warrantless arrests, generally within 48 hours.
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978): establishing municipal liability under § 1983 only when a policy or custom causes a constitutional violation.
Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132 (2d Cir. 1994) & Alphonse Hotel Corp. v. Tran, 828 F.3d 146 (2d Cir. 2016): setting standards for Rule 56(d) “extra-time” requests before opposing summary judgment.

These authorities collectively shaped the court’s conclusion that (i) consent cured any warrant defect under Payton, (ii) probable cause existed despite the arrestee’s innocent explanation, (iii) discovery and procedural rulings did not prejudice Glover’s ability to oppose summary judgment, and (iv) a brief, uncontested custody period without arraignment did not violate due process.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in two main threads:

Probable Cause & Consent. Under New York Penal Law § 170.30, first-degree possession of a forged instrument requires knowledge of forgery and intent to defraud. The court reaffirmed that in the probable-cause context, officers need not eliminate innocent explanations or prove every element for trial. Here, Deputy Albanese reviewed store video, examined the suspect bills (lacking proper watermarks), identified Glover through DMV photos, and obtained her admission of using the bills at Wegmans. Those facts sufficed to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe a crime occurred. Moreover, Glover invited him into her home before arresting her; she only asked him to leave after he announced the arrest. Thus, her Fourth Amendment challenge to warrantless entry failed.
Procedural & Due Process Claims. Glover attempted to compel additional discovery months after the close of a three-year period and after the summary-judgment motion was fully briefed. Both Magistrate Judge Baxter and District Judge Sharpe acted within their discretion in denying further discovery and deeming the motion unopposed, because Glover did not show the requested materials were both non-cumulative and material to her defense. On due process, the court relied on McLaughlin’s 48-hour benchmark: Glover spent roughly four hours in custody before being released without charge, so no prompt judicial determination violation occurred. Finally, her Monell claim collapsed because she suffered no cognizable injury from signing a release form.

Impact

Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff’s Dept. clarifies several important points in § 1983 litigation:

Law enforcement officers need not credit an arrestee’s innocent narrative when independent evidence supplies probable cause.
Consent to in-home questioning negates Payton’s warrant requirement for an ensuing arrest, provided the consent precedes any coercive police action.
Summary-judgment defenses based on lack of discovery must show that sought materials are both non-cumulative and directly germane; bare allegations of withheld evidence will not suffice.
Brief detention without arraignment—measured in hours rather than days—does not, by itself, violate the prompt‐presentment rule under the Fourth Amendment’s due process component.
To impose municipal liability under Monell, a plaintiff must show not just a policy or custom, but also a cognizable constitutional injury traceable to that policy.

Future litigants and courts in the Second Circuit will look to Glover for these clear guardrails on probable cause, consent, and procedural challenges to summary judgment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable Cause vs. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Probable cause is a lower threshold than the standard needed to convict at trial. It requires only a reasonable belief—supported by facts—that a person committed a crime.

Payton Rule: Generally prohibits warrantless arrests inside a home, but consent from the occupant or exigent circumstances allow officers to enter and arrest legally.

Rule 56(d): Lets a non-movant ask for more time to gather evidence before opposing summary judgment. The requesting party must show the evidence is material and that there is a good reason it was not obtained earlier.

Monell Liability: A municipality cannot be sued under § 1983 simply because its employee violated someone’s rights; the violation must flow from an official policy or custom, and the plaintiff must suffer actual harm.

Conclusion

Glover v. Onondaga County Sheriff’s Dept. reaffirms that officers may make warrantless in-home arrests when consent and probable cause coexist, and that they are not bound to credit a suspect’s self-serving explanations once independent evidence points to wrongdoing. The decision also underscores disciplined procedural practice: late discovery tactics and unsupported Rule 56(d) requests will not delay summary judgment, and brief custodial detentions without formal arraignment do not breach due process. Finally, it strengthens Monell’s demand for both a policy-level cause and an actual constitutional injury before holding a municipality liable under § 1983. This ruling provides courts, law enforcement, and civil-rights litigants with a concise framework for Fourth Amendment challenges and municipal liability claims in counterfeit-currency and similar cases.