Pro Se Pleading Standards Under §1915(e)(2): Finality of Dismissals and the Threshold for ADA, NYCRL §50, and Defamation Claims

Introduction

Lewis v. R.L. Vallee, Inc. (2d Cir. Apr. 10, 2025) arises from a pro se employment‐law suit filed by Scott Phillip Lewis against his former employer, R.L. Vallee, Inc. (“RLV”), doing business as Maplefield's. Lewis asserted claims under:

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
New York Civil Rights Law (NYCRL) § 50 (right of publicity)
New York common-law defamation

The district court dismissed Lewis’s complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim, granted leave to amend, and entered judgment when Lewis did not replead. On appeal, the Second Circuit addressed two threshold issues: (1) whether the court had jurisdiction over a dismissal that originally granted leave to amend but became final when the amendment period lapsed; and (2) whether Lewis’s pleadings met the governing standards for his ADA, NYCRL § 50, and defamation claims.

Summary of the Judgment

Jurisdiction: The court held that a district court’s sua sponte dismissal with leave to amend ripens into a final judgment when the plaintiff fails to replead within the allotted time, thereby vesting appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (citing Slayton v. Am. Express Co. and Berlin v. Renaissance Rental Partners, LLC).
Merits Review: Reviewing de novo under § 1915(e)(2), the court concluded that Lewis’s pro se complaint failed to state plausible claims:
- ADA: Lewis did not allege how his diagnosed impairments substantially limited major life activities, nor did he identify any requested reasonable accommodation or its denial.
- NYCRL § 50: There were no nonconclusory facts showing use of Lewis’s name or likeness for advertising or trade purposes without consent.
- Defamation: The complaint did not specify the allegedly false statements, their publication to third parties, or any resulting harm.
Disposition: The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and denied Lewis’s motion to file a supplemental brief.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

28 U.S.C. § 1291 & Slayton v. American Express Co. Clarify that an order dismissing a complaint with leave to amend is not appealable until the amendment period lapses or the plaintiff disclaims further amendment. (460 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Berlin v. Renaissance Rental Partners, LLC Holds that a premature appeal from a nonfinal order ripens into a valid appeal if a final judgment is entered by the time the appeal is heard and the appellee suffers no prejudice. (723 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2013)).
Pino v. Ryan and Hughes v. City of Albany Establish that district courts may dismiss in forma pauperis complaints under § 1915(e)(2) before service of process and that a pro se plaintiff’s complaint is deemed “filed” for Rule 4 purposes only after fee payment or IFP status is granted. (49 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1995); 76 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996)).
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal Set the “plausibility” standard for surviving a motion to dismiss: factual allegations must allow a court to draw a reasonable inference that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. (550 U.S. 544 (2007); 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).
Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co. and Noll v. IBM Define the elements of an ADA disability discrimination claim and the contours of a “reasonable accommodation.” (457 F.3d 181, 183–84 (2d Cir. 2006); 787 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2015)).
Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., Lerman v. Flynt Distribution Co., and Kane v. Orange County Publications Outline the elements of a NYCRL § 50 claim and define “advertising” vs. “trade” uses of a person’s likeness. (31 N.Y.3d 111 (2018); 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984); 649 N.Y.S.2d 23 (2d Dep’t 1996)).
Palin v. New York Times Co. and Tannerite Sports, LLC v. NBCUniversal News Group Set forth the five elements of defamation under New York law and require specificity as to the allegedly false statements and their publication. (940 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 2019); 864 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 2017)).

Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdictional Finality: The court examined 28 U.S.C. § 1291’s “final decision” requirement. A dismissal with leave to amend is normally nonfinal, but when a plaintiff neither amends nor disclaims further amendment within the deadline, the order ripens into a final judgment. This mechanism prevents gamesmanship by appellants and preserves judicial economy.

2. Standards for Dismissal: Under § 1915(e)(2), pro se filings are held to “plausibility” standards per Twombly and Iqbal. Conclusory or formulaic recitals of claim elements do not suffice; factual allegations must be concrete enough to allow the court to infer entitlement to relief.

3. ADA Claim: Lewis’s allegations of PTSD, ADHD, and alcohol abuse, unaccompanied by facts showing substantial limitation of major life activities or a specific accommodation request and denial, failed to state a plausible ADA claim.

4. NYCRL § 50 Claim: Mere sharing of surveillance footage, without nonconclusory allegations that it was used in or as an advertisement or to attract trade, does not constitute a § 50 violation.

5. Defamation Claim: To withstand dismissal, a plaintiff must identify the precise statements alleged to be false, to whom they were published, and the defamatory nature of those statements. Lewis’s bare allegations did not provide sufficient notice to RLV to prepare a defense.

Impact of the Decision

This summary order reinforces critical lessons for pro se litigants and district courts:

Finality of § 1915(e)(2) Dismissals: Failure to amend a dismissed complaint within the allotted period converts a nonfinal order into a final judgment, enabling immediate appeal.
Pleading Discipline: Even pro se complaints must include specific factual allegations—mere labels or conclusions will not survive screening.
Clarity in ADA Claims: Plaintiffs must tie their impairments to recognized legal definitions of “disability” and articulate concrete accommodation requests.
Specificity in Privacy and Defamation Actions: Claims under NYCRL § 50 and defamation law demand detailed accounts of how and where a plaintiff’s likeness or reputation was used or harmed.

Lower courts will cite Lewis v. R.L. Vallee, Inc. when dismissing pro se in forma pauperis actions for lack of factual specificity and when addressing jurisdiction over premature appeals from § 1915(e)(2) dismissals.

Complex Concepts Simplified

In Forma Pauperis Screening (§ 1915(e)(2)): Courts can dismiss indigent plaintiffs’ suits at the outset if the claims are legally frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim.
Ripening of Appeals: An order that initially allows amendment becomes final—and thus appealable—if no amendment is filed within the deadline.
Plausibility Standard: A complaint must include enough factual detail for the court to reasonably infer the elements of each claim are met.
ADA “Disability” & “Reasonable Accommodation”: Disability must be a substantial limitation on a major life activity (e.g., working, concentrating). A reasonable accommodation is any change that enables the employee to perform essential job functions.
NYCRL § 50 “Trade or Advertising” Use: The use of a person’s likeness must be part of a commercial promotion (“advertising”) or used to draw customers to the business (“trade”).
Defamation Elements: A plaintiff must show a false statement of fact, published to someone else, that harms their reputation, plus fault (negligence or actual malice).

Conclusion

Lewis v. R.L. Vallee, Inc. stands as a concise but instructive summary order on two fronts: first, it affirms that a district court’s screening dismissal under § 1915(e)(2) becomes final if a pro se plaintiff does not amend; second, it emphasizes that even pro se ADA, NYCRL § 50, and defamation complaints must meet the federal pleading standards of factual specificity and plausibility. The decision underscores the importance of detailed factual allegations and timely repleading, shaping future practice for indigent litigants and screening courts alike.