Pro Se Noncompliance and In Forma Pauperis on Appeal:
Chan v. RE/MAX and the Tenth Circuit’s Reaffirmation of Compliance Requirements

1. Introduction

The Tenth Circuit’s unpublished order in Chan v. RE/MAX (Nos. 25‑1297 & 25‑2106, Dec. 2, 2025) offers a compact but important reaffirmation of three interlocking principles in federal civil practice:

Even pro se litigants must comply with court orders, including show‑cause orders; failure to do so can justify dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
A party seeking to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal must advance at least one reasoned, nonfrivolous argument addressing the district court’s actual grounds for dismissal.
Basic procedural concepts—subject‑matter jurisdiction, venue, and failure to state a claim—are distinct; confusing them does not save a defective pleading or create a nonfrivolous appellate issue.

Although the panel explicitly designates this as a nonprecedential “order and judgment,” it may be cited for its persuasive value (Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1). In doing so, the decision consolidates and restates several strands of Tenth Circuit doctrine on pro se litigation, dismissals for noncompliance, and IFP standards.

The case arises from two separate civil suits filed by Yu Hin Chan, proceeding without counsel, against RE/MAX and a host of public and private actors, alleging broad civil conspiracies involving defamation, contempt of court, and forgery of court records. Both district courts issued show‑cause orders identifying procedural and substantive defects; Chan did not respond. Both suits were dismissed without prejudice, and Chan appealed, seeking to proceed IFP.

This commentary examines the opinion’s structure, its use of precedent, and its broader implications for pro se litigants and for appellate IFP practice in the Tenth Circuit.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1 Procedural Posture

District of Colorado (No. 25‑1297): Chan sued a landlord, RE/MAX, its CEO, and various Colorado and New York officials and agencies, alleging a conspiracy to defame Chan and to hold Chan in contempt of court. The complaint invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983, sought $1 billion in damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief compelling some defendants to investigate others.
District of New Mexico (No. 25‑2106): Chan sued RE/MAX and five individuals, alleging they conspired to “forge” a court record to show that Chan filed an answer when Chan asserts no answer was filed. Chan again sought $1 billion, this time asserting jurisdiction under the RICO Act.
In each case, the district court issued an order to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed for defects including improper venue, failure to use court‑approved forms, and failure to state a claim. Chan did not respond.
Both district courts dismissed the complaints without prejudice and entered judgment for the defendants.
Chan appealed both decisions and moved to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

2.2 Holdings

The Tenth Circuit (Judges Matheson, Phillips, and McHugh) held:

No abuse of discretion in the dismissals. Both district courts acted within their authority under Rule 41(b) to dismiss the actions sua sponte after Chan failed to comply with show‑cause orders. (Part I)
In forma pauperis status properly denied. Chan failed to present a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument challenging the district courts’ actual grounds for dismissal and therefore did not satisfy the IFP standard. (Part II)

Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissals without prejudice and denied Chan’s motions to proceed in forma pauperis.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion provides only a skeletal description of the underlying facts, but enough to understand the nature of the disputes and the procedural rulings.

3.1.1 The Colorado Action (No. 25‑1297)

In June 2025, Chan sued:

A landlord;
RE/MAX, LLC (a real estate company);
RE/MAX’s CEO;
Multiple state officials and agencies in Colorado and New York, including regulatory and licensing authorities and election officials.

Chan alleged a conspiracy among these diverse defendants to:

Defame Chan, including through statements in court documents; and
Hold Chan in contempt of court.

Chan requested enormous damages ($1 billion) and sought:

A declaration that the defendants violated Chan’s constitutional rights; and
Injunctive relief ordering some defendants to investigate the others.

Chan asserted that the district court had jurisdiction “pursuant to” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District of Colorado issued a show‑cause order raising defects such as improper venue, failure to use court‑approved forms, and failure to state a claim. Chan did not respond or cure the defects. The court dismissed the case without prejudice.

3.1.2 The New Mexico Action (No. 25‑2106)

In August 2025, Chan filed a second action in the District of New Mexico, this time against RE/MAX and five individuals (their roles are not detailed). Chan alleged that the defendants:

“conspired together in forging the record that [Chan] filed an Answer to a Court case but truth being [Chan] never did.”

Again, Chan sought $1 billion in damages and asserted jurisdiction “under the RICO Act.” The New Mexico court likewise issued a show‑cause order highlighting filing defects. Again, Chan did not respond. The court dismissed the complaint without prejudice.

3.1.3 The Appeals and Chan’s Arguments

On appeal:

In the Colorado appeal, Chan argued the district court erred in dismissing for improper venue because “several defendants” resided in Denver. Chan repeated that the court had “obtained its jurisdiction pursuant to § 1983.”
In the New Mexico appeal, Chan argued that § 1983 “does not bar a federal court from intervention” and that the lower court erred in dismissing—essentially repeating that reference to § 1983 multiple times.

Critically, the appellate briefs did not address the core basis for dismissal: failure to respond to the show‑cause orders.

3.2 Standards of Review and Pro Se Leniency

The court begins by emphasizing the special treatment afforded to pro se litigants while also carefully delineating its limits.

3.2.1 Liberal Construction of Pro Se Pleadings

Citing Greer v. Moon, 83 F.4th 1283 (10th Cir. 2023), the court reiterates that pro se filings are:

“construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

The panel notes that it will attempt to read a pro se filing to state a valid claim if possible, even where the litigant:

Fails to cite proper legal authority;
Confuses legal theories; or
Is unfamiliar with pleading requirements.

However, the opinion also underscores a traditional limitation: the court does not act as the pro se litigant’s advocate. The appellate panel will not rewrite or invent arguments that have not been made; it will only construe what is actually presented as generously as reasonably possible.

3.2.2 Abuse of Discretion Review

Dismissals for failure to follow court orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Citing Conkle v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1333 (10th Cir. 2003), the panel applies that standard here.

The opinion then references United States v. Clay, 148 F.4th 1181 (10th Cir. 2025), to define abuse of discretion as occurring when:

The ruling is based on an error of law;
The ruling reflects a clearly erroneous finding of fact; or
The ruling manifests a clear error in judgment.

Applying these standards, the panel sees no such defect in the district courts’ conduct.

3.3 Dismissal for Failure to Comply with Show‑Cause Orders

The heart of Part I of the opinion is the reaffirmation of district courts’ authority to dismiss actions sua sponte under Rule 41(b) where a plaintiff fails to comply with an order, even where the plaintiff is pro se.

3.3.1 Legal Basis: Rule 41(b) and Precedent

The panel cites:

Davis v. Miller, 571 F.3d 1058, 1060 (10th Cir. 2009), for the rule that a court may dismiss an action sua sponte when a party fails to comply with a court order.
Olson v. Mapes, 333 F.3d 1199, 1204 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which permits dismissal for failure to comply with rules or court orders.

Rule 41(b) itself contemplates involuntary dismissal “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order.” Although the rule mentions dismissal “on motion,” Tenth Circuit precedent recognizes the power of the court to act on its own initiative in appropriate circumstances, including where a plaintiff ignores a show‑cause order.

3.3.2 Application to Chan’s Cases

Both district courts:

Identified defects (venue, forms, sufficiency of the complaint), and
Gave Chan an opportunity to respond and cure those defects through a show‑cause order.

Chan:

Did not respond to either show‑cause order;
Did not amend the complaints; and
Did not otherwise address the courts’ concerns.

The panel succinctly concludes that dismissal “was within the courts’ authority and appropriate under the circumstances” and thus not an abuse of discretion. The opinion does not delve into the usual multi‑factor analysis (such as degree of prejudice, interference with judicial process, culpability, prior warnings, and lesser sanctions) sometimes used in Rule 41(b) contexts, likely because:

The dismissals were without prejudice, mitigating concerns about harshness; and
Chan was clearly on notice through the show‑cause orders and simply failed to act.

The net effect is a reiteration of a straightforward but often misunderstood proposition: a show‑cause order is not optional, even for pro se litigants. Ignoring such an order can and will lead to dismissal.

3.4 In Forma Pauperis on Appeal and the Requirement of a Nonfrivolous Argument

Part II of the opinion addresses Chan’s motions to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, focusing on the requirement of a nonfrivolous legal and factual basis for the appeal.

3.4.1 The Watkins Framework

The panel relies on Watkins v. Leyba, 543 F.3d 624, 627 (10th Cir. 2008), to articulate the IFP standard. Under Watkins, a litigant seeking IFP must:

Comply with filing requirements (procedural compliance);
Show financial inability to pay the filing fees; and
Present a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument based in law and fact supporting the issues raised on appeal.

The opinion focuses on the third requirement—nonfrivolousness.

3.4.2 What Makes an Appeal Nonfrivolous?

The panel further relies on Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), which defined a frivolous claim, in the IFP context, as one that:

“lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

A nonfrivolous appeal, therefore, must at least:

Address the actual legal ruling being challenged; and
Offer some plausible legal or factual reasoning why that ruling was incorrect.

3.4.3 Chan’s Briefing: A Failure to Engage the Actual Grounds

The Tenth Circuit faults Chan’s briefs for two related deficiencies:

Minimal reasoning

The Colorado brief contains only “two sentences of reasoning.”
The New Mexico brief contains “just one, repeated three times.”

Failure to address the real basis of dismissal

Most importantly, neither brief addresses the key point: both district courts dismissed because Chan failed to respond to show‑cause orders. Instead, Chan:

Relied on the assertion that several defendants resided in Denver (conflating residency with proper venue), and
Repeatedly invoked § 1983 and “federal intervention,” confusing subject‑matter jurisdiction with procedural and pleading requirements.

The panel cites Nixon v. City & County of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015), to emphasize that an appellant’s “first task is to explain why the district court’s decision was wrong.” Chan’s briefs do not perform that task.

3.4.4 Why Chan’s Arguments Are Frivolous

The panel then explains, in substance, why Chan’s arguments “on their own terms” lack an arguable legal basis:

Venue: Chan argued that because some defendants “reside in Denver,” venue must be proper in the District of Colorado. The panel points to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), which allows venue in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located” (emphasis added). The opinion notes that “some” Denver defendants do not necessarily satisfy this requirement. Thus, the argument misunderstands the statute and offers no serious basis to reverse a dismissal (especially given that the dismissal was based on noncompliance, not solely on venue).
Subject‑matter jurisdiction vs. venue vs. stating a claim: Chan insisted that § 1983 “does not bar” federal court intervention and that federal courts have jurisdiction under § 1983. The panel agrees that federal courts generally have subject‑matter jurisdiction over § 1983 claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, but underscores that:
- Subject‑matter jurisdiction is not the same as venue (citing Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006), and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (3)); and
- Subject‑matter jurisdiction is not the same as validly stating a claim under Rule 8(a)(2) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), (6), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–87 (2009)).
Merely asserting that the court had jurisdiction says nothing about whether the complaint complies with pleading requirements, venue statutes, or court orders.

Because Chan’s appellate arguments:

Ignored the actual procedural ground for dismissal (noncompliance with show‑cause orders), and
Rested on basic misunderstandings of venue and jurisdiction,

the panel held that Chan had not presented a nonfrivolous basis for appeal and therefore denied in forma pauperis status.

3.5 Venue, Subject‑Matter Jurisdiction, and Failure to State a Claim

An important—but often confused—set of distinctions is clarified in the opinion: the difference between:

Subject‑matter jurisdiction (Does this court have power over this type of case at all?);
Venue (Is this the right geographic location among the available federal courts?); and
Failure to state a claim (Has the complaint properly alleged a legally cognizable claim with enough factual detail to be plausible?).

3.5.1 Subject‑Matter Jurisdiction

Chan was correct at a high level: federal courts have subject‑matter jurisdiction over questions “arising under” federal law, such as:

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights);
Claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).

This is grounded in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which confers jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under federal law. However, subject‑matter jurisdiction alone does not address:

Where the suit should be filed (venue);
Whether the complaint meets basic pleading standards; or
Whether the plaintiff has complied with procedural orders from the court.

3.5.2 Venue Under § 1391(b)(1)

Chan focused on the presence of “several” Denver defendants. But 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) requires that:

“A civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located” (emphasis added).

If some defendants are in Colorado and others are in New York, the requirement that “all defendants” be residents of the same state is not satisfied. There are other bases for venue under § 1391(b), such as where a substantial part of the events occurred, but Chan’s venue argument did not engage with those provisions or with the specifics of his multi‑state defendant list.

Moreover, even if venue were proper, that would not cure Chan’s failure to respond to a show‑cause order or to adequately plead a plausible claim.

3.5.3 Failure to State a Claim: Rule 8(a)(2) and Iqbal

The panel reminds us that subject‑matter jurisdiction is distinct from the obligation to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), a complaint must include sufficient factual content to render the claim “plausible” rather than merely conceivable or speculative. Pure conclusions, bare accusations of “conspiracy,” or requests for massive damages untethered to well‑pleaded facts will not satisfy this standard.

Chan’s reliance on jurisdictional labels (e.g., “§ 1983,” “RICO”) does not address whether the complaints:

Contained factual allegations making any conspiracy plausible; or
Identified specific unconstitutional acts by particular state actors (for § 1983); or
Pleaded the elements of a RICO claim (pattern of racketeering activity, enterprise, etc.).

The Tenth Circuit thus underscores that an assertion of federal jurisdiction is not a substitute for a properly pleaded claim or compliance with court orders.

3.6 The Role of § 1983 and RICO in the Case

Although the opinion does not deeply analyze § 1983 or RICO on the merits, their invocation by Chan highlights common pro se misunderstandings.

3.6.1 Section 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a vehicle for suing:

Persons acting under color of state law,
For violations of federal constitutional or statutory rights.

To state a viable § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead:

A deprivation of a federal right;
By a defendant acting under color of state law; and
Personal participation or a causal connection between the defendant and the alleged violation.

Chan’s complaints alleged “conspiracies” among public and private actors, but the opinion provides no indication that Chan pleaded these elements with the factual specificity required by Iqbal, especially given the district courts’ reference to “failure to state a claim” and Chan’s failure to cure that defect when invited to do so.

3.6.2 RICO

The New Mexico complaint invoked the “RICO Act.” A civil RICO claim typically requires:

A pattern of racketeering activity;
Involvement in an enterprise affecting interstate commerce;
Conduct of the enterprise’s affairs through racketeering acts; and
Injury to the plaintiff’s business or property by reason of that conduct.

Allegations that defendants “forged” a court record, standing alone, rarely satisfy this demanding structure, especially in the absence of detailed factual allegations tying multiple predicate acts into a pattern and enterprise. Again, Chan did not respond to the district court’s invitation to explain or amend.

The Tenth Circuit’s opinion does not need to reach these substantive questions because the cases were resolved on procedural grounds (noncompliance with show‑cause orders). But the case serves as a reminder that invoking § 1983 or RICO in name only does not establish either jurisdiction or a viable claim.

3.7 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion is, in effect, a short synthesis of several strands of Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent. Each cited case plays a specific role:

Greer v. Moon, 83 F.4th 1283 (10th Cir. 2023): Reaffirms liberal construction of pro se pleadings while declining to act as the litigant’s advocate.
Conkle v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1333 (10th Cir. 2003): Confirms that dismissals for failure to comply with court orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Clay, 148 F.4th 1181 (10th Cir. 2025): Provides the modern Tenth Circuit articulation of what constitutes an abuse of discretion (error of law, clearly erroneous factfinding, clear error in judgment).
Davis v. Miller, 571 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir. 2009): Recognizes that a district court may dismiss an action sua sponte for a party’s failure to comply with a court order, the core proposition sustaining the dismissals here.
Olson v. Mapes, 333 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2003): Supports the use of Rule 41(b) as authority for involuntary dismissals based on noncompliance.
Watkins v. Leyba, 543 F.3d 624 (10th Cir. 2008): Sets out the three‑part test for IFP status, emphasizing the requirement of a nonfrivolous argument.
Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364 (10th Cir. 2015): Emphasizes that an appellant must explain why the district court was wrong—highlighting why Chan’s failure to engage the show‑cause issue is fatal.
Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303 (2006): Clarifies that subject‑matter jurisdiction and venue are distinct concepts, crucial to addressing Chan’s confusion over § 1983 jurisdiction and venue.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Supplies the modern plausibility standard for assessing whether a complaint states a claim under Rule 8.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989): Provides the definition of “frivolous” in the IFP context (no arguable legal or factual basis), used here to evaluate Chan’s appellate arguments.

The Tenth Circuit does not innovate doctrinally; it carefully applies these established authorities to a straightforward procedural scenario. The significance of Chan v. RE/MAX is less in creating new law and more in crystallizing existing principles in a setting that frequently arises in pro se litigation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

This section translates key legal concepts from the opinion into more accessible terms.

Pro se litigant: A person who goes to court without a lawyer, representing themselves. Courts give them some leeway in interpreting their filings but still require them to follow basic rules and orders.
Show‑cause order: A written order from the court telling a party: “Explain—by a certain date—why I should not take a particular action (such as dismissing your case).” It is a warning and an opportunity to fix problems. Ignoring it can lead to dismissal.
Sua sponte: Latin for “on its own motion.” When a court acts without a request from either party—for example, dismissing a case because the plaintiff ignored a show‑cause order.
Rule 41(b) dismissal: A dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which allows the court to end a case if the plaintiff fails to prosecute it or fails to follow court rules or orders.
In forma pauperis (IFP): Latin for “in the manner of a pauper.” It allows someone who cannot afford court fees to file or appeal a case without paying those fees, if they show both financial need and at least one nonfrivolous legal argument.
Frivolous appeal: An appeal that has no real legal or factual basis. It does not seriously attempt to show that the lower court made a legal or factual error. Courts can deny IFP status for frivolous appeals.
Subject‑matter jurisdiction: The court’s legal authority to hear a particular type of case. For example, federal courts can usually hear cases involving federal laws (like § 1983 or RICO). Without subject‑matter jurisdiction, the court cannot decide the case at all.
Venue: The specific geographic location where a case should be heard. Venue rules (like 28 U.S.C. § 1391) decide which federal district is the proper place for a case, based on where parties live or where the events occurred.
Failure to state a claim: Even if the court has jurisdiction and venue is proper, a complaint can still be dismissed if it does not allege enough facts to show a plausible legal claim. Simply saying “my rights were violated” or “they conspired against me” is not enough without specific facts.
42 U.S.C. § 1983: A federal law that lets people sue state and local officials (and sometimes others acting with them) for violating their federal constitutional or statutory rights.
RICO: The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. It allows criminal and civil actions against those who engage in a pattern of racketeering activity connected to an “enterprise” (often used against organized crime, but also in some business or fraud cases).

5. Impact and Significance

5.1 Implications for Pro Se Civil Litigants

For pro se litigants in the Tenth Circuit (and, by persuasive analogy, elsewhere), Chan v. RE/MAX sends several clear messages:

Show‑cause orders must be taken seriously. Silence in the face of an order warning of potential dismissal is almost certain to result in dismissal, and appellate courts will generally uphold that outcome.
Labeling a case as “§ 1983” or “RICO” is not enough. Invoking federal statutes does not automatically cure venue problems, deficient pleadings, or procedural noncompliance.
Appeals require specific, reasoned arguments. Simply asserting “the lower court erred” or repeating a single sentence about “federal intervention” will not satisfy the requirement of a nonfrivolous basis for appeal—and will justify denial of IFP status.

5.2 Guidance for District Courts in the Tenth Circuit

For district judges, the opinion:

Reaffirms the legitimacy of Rule 41(b) dismissals for noncompliance with show‑cause orders, even where the plaintiff is pro se, so long as the plaintiff was given a fair opportunity to respond.
Supports the practice of issuing detailed show‑cause orders that identify defects (venue, forms, sufficiency) and invite correction, thereby both protecting litigants’ rights and creating a clear record for appellate review.
Encourages careful documentation of the grounds for dismissal (e.g., failure to respond to orders) so that appellate courts can readily affirm without needing to reach more complex substantive issues.

5.3 Persuasive Authority Beyond the Tenth Circuit

Although the order is nonprecedential, it can be cited for its persuasive value. Outside the Tenth Circuit, the decision has two main uses:

As a concise illustration of how federal courts can handle duplicative or procedurally defective pro se suits that span multiple jurisdictions and theories.
As a practical application of the Neitzke and Watkins standards in the appellate IFP context, especially in cases where appellants fail to engage with the true basis of the lower court’s decision.

The opinion aligns with broader national doctrine: courts are sympathetic to the difficulties of self‑representation but insist on minimum procedural compliance to preserve judicial efficiency and fairness.

6. Conclusion

Chan v. RE/MAX does not break new doctrinal ground, but it powerfully consolidates several core themes of modern federal civil procedure in a pro se setting:

A district court may dismiss an action sua sponte under Rule 41(b) when a plaintiff—pro se or represented—fails to comply with a show‑cause order, and such dismissals will generally be upheld absent clear abuse of discretion.
A litigant seeking to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal must do more than assert general dissatisfaction; they must present at least one reasoned, nonfrivolous argument that addresses the actual grounds of the district court’s ruling.
Confusing or conflating subject‑matter jurisdiction, venue, and pleading sufficiency does not create a viable argument on appeal and can render the appeal frivolous under Neitzke.

In a legal system that increasingly confronts complex pro se litigation, Chan v. RE/MAX offers a concise, practical blueprint for balancing leniency toward self‑represented parties with the need for procedural order and meaningful appellate review. It stands as a reminder that, even for those without counsel, court orders demand a response, and legal labels cannot substitute for compliance, clarity, and plausibility.

Pro Se Noncompliance and In Forma Pauperis on Appeal: Chan v. RE/MAX and the Tenth Circuit’s Reaffirmation of Compliance Requirements