Pro Se § 1983 Claims Against Private Media: Persistent Shotgun Pleading Warrants Dismissal With Prejudice Absent Plausible State Action

1. Introduction

In Stephen Lynch Murray v. Janelle Irwin Taylor, Peter D. Schorsch, Extensive Enterprises Media, LLC, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Middle District of Florida’s dismissal with prejudice of a pro se plaintiff’s amended complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Murray sued a journalist (Taylor), a publisher/editor (Schorsch), and a private media company (Extensive Enterprises Media, LLC), alleging violations of free speech and due process (and referencing multiple constitutional amendments).

The dispute arose from a February 2021 article reporting on Murray’s arrest for alleged cyberstalking and sending threatening emails. After Murray sought (and was refused) a retraction, he pursued a state defamation suit that was dismissed on the merits. He then reframed the dispute as a federal civil-rights action, asserting that the private media defendants were “state actors.”

The core issues on appeal were procedural and structural: whether the district court adequately explained the pleading defects, whether Murray received a meaningful opportunity to amend, and whether dismissal with prejudice was permissible after the amended complaint allegedly repeated the same “shotgun pleading” deficiencies and failed to plausibly allege state action.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Murray’s amended complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading. The court emphasized that:

Even liberally construed, the amended complaint did not identify claims with sufficient clarity for defendants to respond.
The pleading remained “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts,” presented as a sprawling narrative.
Murray failed to plausibly allege that the private journalist and media entities were state actors for § 1983 purposes.
Because Murray received notice of the defects and one opportunity to amend—but did not cure them—dismissal with prejudice was permissible.

The judgment was therefore AFFIRMED.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is largely an application of established Eleventh Circuit doctrine on pleading standards, shotgun pleadings, pro se practice, and state action.

Shotgun pleadings and the court’s discretion to dismiss

Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets (878 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2018)) anchors the framework: district courts may dismiss on shotgun-pleading grounds, but generally must give the litigant one chance to replead after explaining defects. The panel used Vibe Micro both to justify dismissal authority and to measure whether Murray received adequate notice and opportunity to cure.
Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Office (792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015)) supplies the taxonomy: four “rough types” of shotgun pleadings and the ultimate touchstone—whether defendants have fair notice of claims and supporting facts. The panel relied on Weiland to characterize Murray’s narrative as the type “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts” and to emphasize that the real problem is lack of intelligible notice, not mere technical noncompliance.
Jackson v. Bank of America, N.A. (898 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2018)) provides the “with prejudice” endpoint: once a plaintiff has been given the required opportunity to replead and fails to fix the shotgun defects, dismissal with prejudice is within the court’s discretion. The panel invoked Jackson to reject Murray’s argument that he deserved additional instructions or further amendment opportunities.
Sledge v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires N. Am., Ltd. (275 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001)) is cited for the proposition that pleadings must identify claims with enough clarity for a defendant to frame a responsive pleading—precisely what the court found lacking here.

Pro se pleadings: liberal construction, but not exemption from rules

Tannenbaum v. United States (148 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 1998)) is cited for liberal construction of pro se pleadings. The panel acknowledged this baseline but treated it as a principle of interpretation, not a license for incoherent pleading.
Albra v. Advan, Inc. (490 F.3d 826 (11th Cir. 2007)) reinforces the limit: pro se litigants must still conform to procedural rules. The panel used Albra to justify applying Rules 8 and 10 rigorously despite pro se status.

State action and conclusory allegations

Harvey v. Harvey (949 F.2d 1127 (11th Cir. 1992)) is central to the § 1983 viability issue: “Only in rare circumstances” can a private party be treated as a state actor. The panel used Harvey to underscore that pleading “collusion” labels is not enough—especially when the defendant is a private media outlet.
Snow v. DirecTV, Inc. (450 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006)) supports the refusal to credit “vague and conclusory allegations.” This helped the court dispose of Murray’s generalized assertions of coordinated wrongdoing without concrete factual content.

Prior litigation as context

Murray v. Archer (No. 22- 13155, 2023 WL 6381523 (11th Cir. Oct. 2, 2023)) is referenced as a prior example of Murray’s pleadings being dismissed as shotgun pleadings and affirmed on appeal. While not treated as formal preclusion in the court’s holding, it contextualizes the court’s patience with repeated pleading deficiencies.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The opinion’s logic proceeds in three steps.

Identify the governing standard and the defect. The court reiterates that Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b) require a “short and plain statement” and organized, numbered paragraphs. Shotgun pleadings violate these rules by obscuring which facts support which claims, depriving defendants of fair notice.
Apply the shotgun-pleading framework to the amended complaint. Even after being reduced from 258 pages to 121 pages, Murray’s amended complaint remained a sprawling narrative intermixing political commentary, accusations, and tangential matters (including alleged misconduct by non-defendants such as a state attorney and a state legislator). The panel agreed with the lower court that the pleading did not clearly specify: (a) the distinct causes of action being asserted, (b) the elements for each, (c) which facts supported each, and (d) which defendant committed which act. This is the functional heart of the shotgun-pleading doctrine: defendants cannot reasonably respond to an amorphous narrative.
Confirm that the plaintiff received the required opportunity to fix the problem—and failed. Under Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, the plaintiff must generally receive one chance to replead after the court explains the deficiencies. Murray received that chance after the magistrate judge detailed what was wrong with the first complaint and provided guidance about § 1983 pleading. When the amended complaint repeated the core defects, Jackson v. Bank of America, N.A. permitted dismissal with prejudice.

Notably, while the panel’s formal ground is shotgun pleading, the opinion also signals a substantive barrier: even if the complaint were better organized, Murray’s allegations did not plausibly establish “state action” by private media defendants. The state-action observations reinforce why further amendment was not warranted: the case looked like a repackaged defamation dispute, not a viable § 1983 claim.

3.3. Impact

Although designated “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the decision fits cleanly into a consistent Eleventh Circuit pattern and has practical consequences:

Reinforces the one-chance rule and the with-prejudice consequence. Litigants—pro se included—should expect that once a court explains shotgun defects and allows amendment, repeating the problem can end the case.
Signals skepticism toward § 1983 reframing of defamation disputes against private media. The opinion underscores the “rare circumstances” requirement for treating private parties as state actors, making conclusory “collusion” allegations an especially weak pathway to federal civil-rights liability.
Encourages early docket control. By affirming dismissal with prejudice after a failed repleader, the court strengthens district courts’ ability to prevent sprawling, unclear cases from consuming discovery and judicial resources.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Shotgun pleading”: A complaint so disorganized or overstuffed that no one can tell which facts support which legal claims, or which defendant did what. The problem is lack of fair notice, not merely length.
Rule 8 “short and plain statement”: The complaint must state the claim clearly and concisely enough that the defendant can answer it. A long narrative can violate Rule 8 if it obscures the actual claim.
Rule 10(b) numbered paragraphs: Claims should be presented in an organized way—separate circumstances and, typically, separate claims, so the court and defendants can track what is being alleged.
§ 1983 “state actor” requirement: You can sue under § 1983 only for violations committed “under color of” state law. Private parties (like journalists and media companies) are usually not state actors unless exceptional facts show they were effectively acting for the state.
Dismissal “with prejudice”: The case is over and cannot be refiled based on the same claims in that court. Here, it followed an initial dismissal without prejudice plus an opportunity to amend.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s affirmance rests on a clear procedural principle: when a plaintiff—even proceeding pro se—files a shotgun pleading, receives a detailed explanation and one opportunity to replead, and still fails to present coherent, claim-specific allegations tied to particular defendants, dismissal with prejudice is within the district court’s discretion. The decision also highlights a substantive caution: § 1983 claims against private media defendants require plausible, nonconclusory allegations of state action, which the court found absent here.