Private-University Police as State Actors: A Commentary on Warman v. Mount St. Joseph University (6th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

In Matthew Warman v. Mount St. Joseph University, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed a constellation of constitutional and statutory claims arising from a private Catholic university’s COVID-19 vaccination policy and its campus police department’s alleged treatment of a graduate student who sought a religious exemption. The decision simultaneously narrows and expands §1983 liability: the panel dismissed most of the plaintiff’s claims but revived his Fourth Amendment unlawful-detention cause of action against two campus police officers, holding that those privately employed officers acted “under color of state law.” At the same time, the court confirmed that the campus police department itself is not a suable entity.

The opinion therefore clarifies three recurring issues:

When privately employed campus police officers qualify as state actors.
Whether a private university’s police department is sui juris.
How qualified-immunity principles apply, or may apply, to such officers.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The district court had dismissed all federal claims with prejudice and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit:

Reversed dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim against Officers Koo and Koopman, finding a plausible seizure without probable cause.
Held that the Mount St. Joseph Police Department (MSJPD) is not sui juris and affirmed its dismissal from the case.
Affirmed dismissal—with prejudice—of the plaintiff’s Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and Rehabilitation Act claims.
Vacated the district court’s refusal to hear state-law claims and remanded for reconsideration, because at least one federal claim survives.
Left open the unresolved doctrinal question whether privately employed campus police can ever claim qualified immunity, finding that even if they can, the defense fails at the pleading stage.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) – definition of a “seizure.”
Romanski v. Detroit Entertainment, 428 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2005) – private security guards endowed with plenary police powers may be state actors.
Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) & Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (2012) – framework for whether private actors receive qualified immunity.
State ex rel. Schiffbauer v. Banaszak, 33 N.E.3d 52 (Ohio 2015) – campus police constitute a “public office” under Ohio public-records law, but that status does not automatically make the department sui juris.
Multiple Sixth-Circuit cases on §1983 pleading standards (Inner City Contracting, Howell, Nugent, etc.).

The court synthesized these authorities to reach two pivotal holdings:

State-actor status: Because Ohio Rev. Code § 1713.50 cloaks campus police with “the same powers and authority” as municipal officers, the guards satisfy the public-function test of state action.
Non-sui-juris status of MSJPD: Analogizing to municipal police departments, the panel concluded that MSJPD is merely a subdivision of the University, lacks separate legal personality, and therefore cannot be sued.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Fourth Amendment Claim

The complaint alleged that Warman was taken into a back room, cursed at, and told he could not leave until another administrator arrived. Those allegations, taken as true on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, constitute a seizure. Because Warman was not suspected of wrongdoing, probable cause was absent, rendering the seizure potentially unreasonable.

3.2.2 State-Actor Analysis

Applying the public-function test, the court found that MSJPD officers’ powers are “traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state,” thus making them state actors when exercising those powers. The court buttressed this conclusion with:

The statutory delegation of “plenary police powers.”
Their ability to detain, arrest, and carry firearms.
The public-facing trappings of state authority (uniforms, marked vehicles, etc.).

3.2.3 Non-Sui-Juris Holding

Despite state-actor status for officers, the department itself cannot be sued because Ohio law treats a campus police department as an internal subdivision of the private university. Suing it would be akin to suing a city’s “Mayor’s Office” instead of the city itself.

3.2.4 Qualified Immunity

The panel identified a “serious, unresolved question” whether campus police can even assert qualified immunity. Because the defendants and the district court had not analyzed the historical/policy factors mandated by Richardson/Filarsky, the Sixth Circuit refused to decide the eligibility question but nonetheless denied immunity at the pleading stage: no reasonable officer could believe detaining a student for an hour without suspicion was lawful. Thus, the claim survives to discovery.

3.2.5 First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Rehabilitation Act Claims

The allegations, while troubling, did not show that Warman’s religious exercise was coerced or burdened. Nor did they identify similarly situated comparators or show discrimination “solely by reason of disability.” Consequently, those claims were properly dismissed.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

3.3.1 Immediate Litigation Consequences

Warman’s Fourth-Amendment claim and associated state claims are back in the district court; discovery into the officers’ detention practices and university oversight will proceed.
The decision offers plaintiffs a viable pathway to bring constitutional claims against private-university officers while cautioning that departments themselves are immune from suit absent statutory authorization.

3.3.2 Broader Doctrinal Significance

Clarification of State Action: The case cements within the Sixth Circuit that when a state statute grants private-university police “plenary” authority, those officers act under color of state law for §1983 purposes. This holding aligns the circuit with the Third Circuit’s approach (Henderson v. Fisher) and with district-court decisions in other circuits.
Split Emerging on Qualified Immunity: By refusing to decide whether campus police enjoy qualified immunity, the panel invites future litigants to brief the historical-immunity question thoroughly. Other circuits (e.g., the D.C. District in Wheeler) have flagged the same uncertainty. A circuit split could ripen and reach the Supreme Court.
Litigation Tactics for Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs must now name the university itself (under a Monell-style theory) or name individual officers, but not the campus police department, when pleading §1983 claims in Ohio (and likely throughout the circuit).
Policy Incentives for Universities: Universities may revisit hiring, training, and oversight structures for their police units, knowing that officer misconduct can expose them to federal liability if a policy/custom caused the alleged violation.
Free Exercise and Vaccine Litigation: The panel’s insistence on an actual burden to religious practice adds to a growing line of cases rejecting free-exercise challenges to COVID-19 policies absent concrete penalties.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

§1983: A federal statute that lets people sue state actors for violating constitutional rights.
State Actor: A private person or entity can be treated like the government when it performs duties traditionally reserved for the government (e.g., policing).
Sui Juris: Latin for “of its own right.” An entity that is sui juris can sue and be sued in its own name.
Qualified Immunity: A doctrine shielding governmental officials from damages unless they violated “clearly established” law. Private actors sometimes—but not always—benefit from it.
Monell Liability: A municipality (or a private entity acting in place of a municipality) is liable under §1983 only if a policy or custom caused the constitutional violation.
Public-Function Test: One of three analytic tools for deciding if private conduct counts as “state action.” If the activity is traditionally exclusive to government (like policing), the private actor is treated as the state.

5. Conclusion

Warman v. Mount St. Joseph University is less about COVID-19 and more about the constitutional status of private-university police. By holding that such officers are state actors yet denying sui juris status to their department, the Sixth Circuit strikes a careful balance: it enables civil-rights plaintiffs to pursue individual accountability while preventing artful pleading against non-legal entities. The court’s refusal to resolve the officers’ eligibility for qualified immunity leaves a doctrinal question that will undoubtedly resurface. Meanwhile, universities in the circuit should reassess policies, training, and oversight of their sworn officers, mindful that traditional police powers bring traditional constitutional constraints.