Prior Prostitution Does Not Defeat Enticement or Undue-Influence Findings: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Broad Aiding-and-Abetting Liability in Minor Sex-Trafficking Cases

Prior Prostitution Does Not Defeat Enticement or Undue-Influence Findings: Eleventh Circuit Affirms Broad Aiding-and-Abetting Liability in Minor Sex-Trafficking Cases

Introduction

This non-argument, unpublished per curiam decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirms the convictions and sentences of Jayla Denice Welch and Xavier Latrell Smith for federal sex-trafficking offenses involving a minor. The panel (Judges Newsom, Grant, and Anderson) addressed a range of issues: a motion by Smith’s counsel to withdraw; Welch’s bid for a continuance to review discovery; the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Welch’s convictions on conspiracy, sex trafficking of a minor, transporting a minor for sexual activity, and enticement; and several sentencing disputes, including the Guidelines enhancements for undue influence and for custody/care/supervisory control, as well as Welch’s request for a minor-role reduction.

At bottom, the opinion applies and reinforces several important principles: (1) defendants who are themselves trafficking victims or “top girls” (co-participants who assist a pimp) can still be held criminally liable when they recruit or facilitate trafficking of minors; (2) a minor’s prior history of prostitution does not negate enticement under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) or the U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) undue-influence enhancement; (3) requests to withdraw counsel or to continue trial require a concrete showing of good cause and prejudice; (4) “custody, care, or supervisory control” is assessed functionally, not formally; and (5) even potentially arguable Guidelines errors may be harmless where the advisory range is unchanged.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board:

  • Smith’s motion to withdraw counsel: No abuse of discretion; no good cause or prejudice shown.
  • Welch’s motion for continuance: No abuse of discretion; she identified no exculpatory material that additional time would have yielded or how it would have changed the outcome.
  • Sufficiency of evidence (Welch): The record supported convictions for conspiracy to commit sex trafficking (18 U.S.C. § 1594(c)), sex trafficking of a minor (18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)), transporting a minor to engage in prostitution (18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)), and enticement (18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)).
  • Sentencing:
    • Undue influence enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B)) properly applied to both Smith and Welch.
    • Custody/care/supervisory control enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(1)(B)) properly applied to Smith; in any event, any error would be harmless because his Guidelines range would be unchanged.
    • Welch was not entitled to a minor-role reduction (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b)).

The court also rejected Welch’s late-raised “duplicity” challenge (citing United States v. Pulido) to her § 2422(b) count, both on preservation grounds and on the merits under plain-error review given the narrow timeframe and evidence of a discrete enticement episode.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

1) Counsel withdrawal and defendant-counsel conflict

  • United States v. Jimenez-Antunez (11th Cir. 2016): Denial of a motion to withdraw counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The panel followed this standard.
  • United States v. Garey (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc): A defendant has no unqualified right to appointed counsel of choice; “good cause” is required (conflict of interest, total breakdown in communication, irreconcilable conflict).
  • United States v. Joyner (11th Cir. 2018): Counsel’s refusal to pursue frivolous or meritless positions does not amount to “good cause.”
  • United States v. Calderon (11th Cir. 1997): Three-factor test for evaluating denial of motions for new counsel (timeliness, adequacy of the court’s inquiry, and whether the conflict prevented an adequate defense). Defendant must also show prejudice; i.e., counsel’s performance fell outside the range of competence and that the outcome would have differed.
  • United States v. Montenegro (11th Cir. 2021): Issues not substantively argued are abandoned on appeal (cited for general abandonment principle).

2) Continuances to review discovery

  • United States v. Chalker (11th Cir. 2020): Continuance denials reviewed for abuse of discretion.
  • United States v. Perez (11th Cir. 2006): When the continuance is to review discovery, the focus is prejudice—would more time have affected the outcome?
  • United States v. Pendergrass (11th Cir. 2021): The defendant must identify the specific evidence they would have presented if a continuance had been granted.

3) Sufficiency of the evidence and elements of the offenses

  • Standard of review: De novo. A verdict stands if any reasonable construction of the evidence supports guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (United States v. Dixon; United States v. Herrera). The court assumes all credibility determinations in favor of the verdict (United States v. Jiminez).
  • Sex trafficking of a minor (18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)): Elements reinforced by United States v. Gatlin (11th Cir. 2024): recruiting/transport/harboring; knowledge or reckless disregard of minority; and knowledge or reckless disregard that the victim would engage in a commercial sex act. The panel applied Gatlin directly.
  • Conspiracy to commit sex trafficking (18 U.S.C. § 1594(c)): Elements set out in United States v. Brown (11th Cir. 2025): agreement to violate § 1591, knowledge of goal, and voluntary assistance. Agreements can be inferred from conduct, with circumstantial evidence sufficient.
  • Aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2): Not a separate crime but a liability theory; evidence must show association with the venture and action taken to make it succeed (United States v. Walser; United States v. Howard).
  • Liability of sex-trafficking victims who recruit others: United States v. Walker (11th Cir. 2023) holds that a trafficking victim can still be criminally liable for recruiting other women and posting their ads.
  • Transporting a minor (18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)): Government must show knowing interstate transport of a minor with intent that the minor engage in prostitution or criminal sexual activity. The panel relied on trial testimony and credibility deference.
  • Enticement (18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)): United States v. Rutgerson (11th Cir. 2016) requires specific intent to persuade/induce/entice/coerce and a substantial step. Terms are given their ordinary meaning. United States v. Kincherlow (11th Cir. 2023) clarifies prior prostitution does not foreclose enticement—indeed, prior participation may show that the defendant’s efforts were effective.
  • Duplicitous counts and preservation: United States v. Pulido (11th Cir. 2025) addresses when a single § 2422(b) count spanning a long period risks juror non-unanimity if there were many episodes that could constitute discrete enticements. United States v. Levy (11th Cir. 2004) limits raising new issues in Rule 28(j) letters; United States v. Durham (11th Cir. 2018) provides a narrow exception for intervening Supreme Court decisions. United States v. Cenephat (11th Cir. 2024) articulates plain-error parameters.

4) Sentencing standards and specific Guidelines provisions

  • Standards of review: Guidelines applications are reviewed de novo; factual findings for clear error (United States v. Trujillo).
  • Undue influence (U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B)): Clear-error review (United States v. Whyte). A rebuttable presumption applies if the defendant is 10+ years older than the minor. Courts assess whether a participant’s influence compromised voluntariness—advertising services, transportation, and money control show abuse of superior knowledge/resources.
  • Custody, care, or supervisory control (U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(1)(B)): The commentary calls for a broad, functional analysis of the relationship, not formal legal status. Temporary caretakers qualify. United States v. Gatlin (2024) confirms no long-term relationship is required; it suffices that the defendant assumed responsibility for the child’s wellbeing.
  • Harmless Guidelines error: Under United States v. Riley (11th Cir. 1998), a Guidelines error that does not alter the range does not require resentencing.
  • Minor-role reduction (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b)): Clear-error review (United States v. Cruickshank). The defendant bears the burden (United States v. De Varon (en banc)). Courts assess totality of circumstances and compare the defendant’s role both to the conduct for which she is held accountable and to other participants.

Legal Reasoning Applied to This Record

A. Smith’s motions to withdraw counsel

The panel found no “good cause” under Garey: there was no conflict of interest, irreconcilable conflict, or total breakdown preventing an adequate defense, and any friction appeared to stem from counsel not adopting meritless positions—explicitly not good cause under Joyner. Applying Calderon, the court noted no prejudice. In light of “overwhelming” trial evidence regarding Smith’s knowing recruitment of a minor, interstate transport, ad dictation with his phone number, and control of the victim’s earnings, Smith failed to show the outcome would have been different with new counsel.

B. Welch’s motion for a continuance

Reviewing prejudice under Perez and Pendergrass, the court held Welch identified no exculpatory evidence that additional preparation would have unearthed. The district court had already delayed trial a week, modified the protective order so counsel could mail her the discovery, and she received it a week before trial. Without a concrete showing of what additional time would have changed, there was no abuse of discretion.

C. Welch’s sufficiency challenges

Counts One and Two (conspiracy to commit sex trafficking; sex trafficking of a minor):

  • Welch, a “top girl” working for Smith, initiated contact with the minor and solicited her to “choose up” with Smith, vouching for him as a “good pimp.”
  • Both Welch and Smith knew the victim was a minor and that she had no current pimp.
  • Welch moved the victim into the apartment she shared with Smith, introduced her to cocaine, and, along with Smith, took the victim on a multi-state trip to facilitate prostitution.
  • Welch posted and “bumped” the ads; she coached the victim, sometimes booked hotels, and provided a CashApp conduit for customer payments; Smith dictated ad content, listed his phone number, paid expenses, and controlled proceeds.

These facts permitted the jury to find Welch knowingly recruited, harbored, and transported the minor for commercial sex (Gatlin), and that she conspired with Smith to do so (Brown). They also supported aiding-and-abetting liability (Howard; Walser). Welch’s defense that she too was a trafficking victim did not immunize her from liability for recruiting others and posting ads (Walker). Nor did the government need to prove financial benefit or force as elements of the charged offenses.

Count Three (transporting a minor, § 2423(a)):

The victim’s testimony that Welch drove her from Louisiana to Florida, while posting ads during the trip, was sufficient. Challenges premised on Welch’s lack of a driver’s license or on silence about who drove through intervening states failed because the court defers to the jury’s credibility findings and any reasonable construction of the evidence supports the verdict.

Count Four (enticement, § 2422(b)):

The government charged enticement in conjunction with Florida’s child-trafficking statute (Fla. Stat. § 787.06(3)(g)) and Louisiana’s prohibition on commercial sex with minors (La. Rev. Stat. § 14:82.1(A)(1)). The court applied Rutgerson’s plain-meaning definitions and substantial-step requirement and Kincherlow’s teaching that prior prostitution by a minor does not defeat proof of enticement. The evidence showed Welch:

  • Targeted a minor who had left an abusive pimp and was living with non–sex workers;
  • Approached her to “choose up” with Smith; vouched for Smith as a “good pimp;”
  • Gave her drugs; moved her into Welch and Smith’s apartment; and coached her on how to deal with customers;
  • Had ads posted by the very next day and repeatedly “bumped” them, resulting in immediate commercial sex work.

That sequence was enough for a rational jury to find Welch intended to persuade/induce/entice a minor and took substantial steps to effectuate that intent. The court also rejected Welch’s late-breaking duplicity argument under Pulido: she could not raise it for the first time via a Rule 28(j) letter (Levy; Durham), and even under plain-error review (Cenephat), Pulido’s concern about long, amorphous timeframes did not apply because the indictment period was short (Dec. 23–Jan. 6) and the evidence showed a discrete enticement moment almost immediately (Dec. 23–24).

D. Sentencing rulings

Undue influence enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B)) applied to Smith and to Welch:

  • Smith: A rebuttable presumption of undue influence applied due to a 10+ year age difference. The evidence showed he abused superior knowledge/resources—dictating ads, listing his phone number, transporting the minor across state lines for commercial sex, and controlling proceeds. This matched the paradigm in Whyte.
  • Welch: The commentary applies the enhancement if any participant unduly influenced the minor. Welch targeted a former minor sex worker who lacked a pimp, recruited her to Smith, introduced her to drugs, posted/bumped ads, and drove her interstate. The court held this conduct helped compromise the victim’s voluntariness, satisfying the enhancement’s purpose.

Both defendants’ reliance on the victim’s prior prostitution failed; Whyte makes clear that prior acts do not foreclose a finding of undue influence.

Custody, care, or supervisory control enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(1)(B)) applied to Smith:

The panel endorsed a functional analysis: Smith, age 33, moved the 17-year-old victim into his apartment, purchased clothes and a phone, paid expenses, managed her sex work, and controlled her earnings. That is responsibility for the minor’s wellbeing and supervision within the meaning of the enhancement’s commentary and Gatlin’s functional approach. In any event, even if there were error, the advisory range would remain 360 months to life (offense level 38, CHC VI), rendering any error harmless under Riley.

Denial of Welch’s minor-role reduction (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b)):

Applying De Varon and Cruickshank, the district court found Welch’s role too substantial to merit a minor-role reduction. She recruited the minor, posted and boosted ads, sometimes booked rooms, and drove interstate to facilitate the enterprise. Even if less culpable than Smith, her role was not minor relative to the conduct for which she was held accountable and in comparison to the scheme’s participants. No clear error.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

  • No “victim shield” for co-participants: Following Walker and this case’s application, the Eleventh Circuit confirms that a co-participant who is herself a trafficking victim can still be liable for recruiting and facilitating the trafficking of minors. “Top girl” conduct—recruiting, coaching, posting and promoting ads, booking travel/lodging—readily supports principal or aiding-and-abetting liability.
  • Prior prostitution does not defeat enticement or undue-influence findings: Kincherlow and Whyte, as applied here, foreclose reliance on a minor’s prior prostitution history to negate intent, substantial steps, or compromised voluntariness. Prosecutors can confidently charge § 2422(b) and seek § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) where record evidence shows manipulation and facilitation, even if the minor previously engaged in commercial sex.
  • Indictment drafting after Pulido: The court underscores Pulido’s limited reach. To minimize duplicity risk and plain-error arguments, indictments should allege reasonably discrete enticement episodes or narrow timeframes and trial proofs should identify the moment of enticement where feasible. Here, a short charge window and immediate action neutralized Pulido concerns.
  • Functional approach to “custody/care/supervision”: Pimps and organizers who house minors, fund essentials, manage sex work, and control proceeds face § 2G1.3(b)(1)(B). Formal legal relationships are unnecessary; temporary and de facto caretaking suffices.
  • Continuances and discovery management: Defense requests must identify specific exculpatory or material items and articulate how additional time would change the outcome. Courts may mitigate prejudice with modest continuances and protective-order adjustments; absent a concrete showing of prejudice, denials will stand.
  • Motions to withdraw counsel: Without evidence of a total communication breakdown or conflict that impairs defense, and without outcome-determinative prejudice, denials will be affirmed—particularly where trial evidence is strong.
  • Guidelines harmlessness: Appellants should assess whether any challenged enhancement changes the advisory range. Where it does not, relief will often be denied under Riley’s harmless-error principle.
  • Minor-role reductions remain fact-intensive but narrow: Where a defendant recruits, transports, posts/boosts ads, and facilitates the enterprise, a minor-role reduction is unlikely—even if another co-defendant is more culpable.
  • Preservation and Rule 28(j): The panel’s reminder that new arguments cannot be smuggled in via 28(j) letters is a cautionary tale. Preserve duplicity and similar objections in the district court; failing that, make a robust plain-error showing tethered to the case’s specific facts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Non-argument calendar: The case was decided on the briefs without oral argument, typically indicating the panel viewed the issues as governed by settled law.
  • Good cause to replace appointed counsel: Requires more than disagreement; the defendant must show a serious breakdown—like conflict of interest or communication collapse—that harms the defense.
  • Prejudice in continuance requests: It’s not enough to say “I needed more time.” The defendant must identify what additional evidence or strategy the extra time would have enabled and how it would have changed the verdict.
  • Sufficiency of the evidence on appeal: The appellate court asks whether any reasonable juror could have found guilt. It accepts credibility determinations in favor of the verdict.
  • Aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2): A theory of liability that treats helpers as principals if they associate with the criminal venture and act to make it succeed.
  • Enticement (18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)): Requires intent to persuade/induce/entice/coerce a minor into criminal sexual activity, plus a substantial step. Prior willingness by the minor does not negate enticement.
  • Duplicitous indictment: Improperly charges more than one offense in a single count, risking a non-unanimous jury verdict about which offense occurred. Preservation is key; plain error is hard to show.
  • Undue influence enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B)): Adds two offense levels where a defendant’s influence compromises a minor’s voluntariness; presumed where the age gap is 10+ years. Actions like advertising, transporting, and controlling money are hallmarks.
  • Custody, care, or supervisory control (U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(1)(B)): Broadly covers those who assume responsibility for a minor’s wellbeing, even temporarily and without formal legal status.
  • Minor-role reduction (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2): Reserved for defendants substantially less culpable than most participants, assessed against their own conduct and compared to others’ roles.
  • Harmless Guidelines error: If removing an enhancement does not change the advisory range, resentencing is typically unnecessary.
  • Subculture terms:
    • “Top girl”: a higher-ranking sex worker who assists a pimp by recruiting and managing others.
    • “Choose up”: slang for switching or committing to a particular pimp.
    • “Bumping ads”: repeatedly reposting an online ad to keep it at the top of listings and increase visibility.

Conclusion

Although unpublished, United States v. Welch and Smith is a robust reaffirmation of Eleventh Circuit law in minor sex-trafficking prosecutions. The decision underscores several durable propositions:

  • Co-participants, including those who are themselves victimized by pimps, can still bear criminal liability if they recruit or facilitate other victims’ commercial sex acts.
  • A minor’s prior prostitution does not undercut enticement or the undue-influence enhancement; courts look to the defendant’s intent, actions, and exploitation of superior resources to compromise voluntariness.
  • Requests to withdraw appointed counsel or to continue trial must be grounded in concrete showings of good cause and prejudice.
  • Sentencing enhancements for custody/care/supervisory control are determined functionally and applied broadly, and alleged Guidelines errors that do not affect the range are commonly deemed harmless.
  • Pulido’s duplicity concerns are context-specific; narrow charging windows and clear proof of a discrete enticement episode neutralize the risk of juror non-unanimity.

For prosecutors, the opinion validates charging and sentencing strategies centered on recruitment and facilitation by “top girls” and emphasizes the probative force of ad creation, “bumping,” travel logistics, and control of proceeds. For defense counsel, it highlights the importance of preserving indictment and trial-structure objections, making detailed prejudice showings for pretrial motions, and carefully assessing whether sentencing claims will affect the advisory range. In the broader landscape, the ruling fortifies a practical, evidence-driven approach to combating minor sex trafficking while clarifying the reach of aiding-and-abetting and the sex-offense Guidelines within the Eleventh Circuit.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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