Principles Governing Dismissal for Want of Prosecution and Rule 60(b) Relief

Introduction

In Terri Griffiths v. Lorin Eggemeyer, 23-3253 & 24-1098 (7th Cir. May 29, 2025), the Seventh Circuit confronted two interrelated procedural questions: when a district court may dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for want of prosecution, and to what extent a litigant may obtain post-judgment relief under Rule 60(b) on grounds of “excusable neglect.” The appellant, Terri Griffiths—a licensed attorney representing herself—brought a breach of contract action against Lorin and Sandra Eggemeyer and their construction company after building a house went awry. Over nearly two years of litigation in the Southern District of Illinois, Griffiths repeatedly failed to respond to discovery, ignored court-ordered deadlines, and did not appear at multiple hearings. After the district court dismissed her case and then denied her Rule 60(b) motion for relief, Griffiths appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed both rulings, emphasizing the proper application of Rule 41(b) factors and the stringent standard for excusable neglect under Rule 60(b).

Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit held, by unanimous per curiam order, that:

• The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendants’ Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss for want of prosecution. Griffiths had repeatedly ignored deposition scheduling, failed to respond to discovery requests for nearly a year, and missed two court hearings.
• The district court also did not abuse its discretion in denying Griffiths’s Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. Her assertion of a debilitating horse-trampling injury failed to explain earlier delays, she produced no medical records when repeatedly asked, and—having consented to email service—she could not credibly claim lack of notice of the October 2023 hearings.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The court invoked a series of binding precedents to structure its assessment:

• Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)—empowering dismissal for “failure to prosecute or to comply with … a court order.”
• McMahan v. Deutsche Bank AG, 892 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2018)—describing the “abuse of discretion” standard on Rule 41(b) appeals and calling for a fact-specific inquiry.
• Ball v. City of Chicago, 2 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 1993)—outlining factors district courts must weigh, including frequency and magnitude of noncompliance, responsibility for delays, prejudice to defendant, and docket disruptions.
• Fischer v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 446 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2006)—clarifying that a defendant’s motion to dismiss can serve as adequate notice that dismissal is imminent.
• Robb v. Norfolk & W. R.R. Co., 122 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997), and Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380 (1993)—establishing the equitable “excusable neglect” standard under Rule 60(b)(1).
• Brandon v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 1998)—confirming abuse-of-discretion review of Rule 60(b) denials.
• Snyder v. Barry Realty Inc., 60 F. App’x 613 (7th Cir. 2003), and Easley v. Kirmsee, 382 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2004)—imposing a duty on litigants to monitor their dockets and rejecting inattentiveness as excusable.
• In re Canopy Financial Inc., 708 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2013)—highlighting the moving party’s burden of production and persuasion to obtain Rule 60(b) relief.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in two steps:

1. Rule 41(b) Dismissal. Applying Ball’s multi-factor balancing test, the court found: Griffiths’s dilatory conduct was repeated (months of non-response and missed depositions); she bore full responsibility (pro se status); the Eggemeyers suffered prejudice (wasted discovery efforts); and the district court’s calendar was disrupted. Although courts often warn before dismissal, Fischer made clear that the defendants’ motion sufficed to alert Griffiths to the risk.
2. Rule 60(b) Relief. The court considered Pioneer’s equitable factors and found that Griffiths’s horse-trampling injury did not excuse (a) the long pre-injury period of neglect, (b) missed hearings she had requested, or (c) her failure to furnish any medical documentation despite court orders. Her consent to electronic service, combined with a year-old docket entry for the pretrial conferences, undercut any claim of lack of notice. In sum, she failed her burden under In re Canopy.

Impact on Future Cases

This decision underscores several binding principles:

• District courts will rigorously enforce discovery and scheduling orders, particularly against pro se litigants who cannot shift blame to counsel.
• Failure to engage in basic case management—responding to discovery, communicating scheduling dates, monitoring dockets—can justify dismissal without an explicit pre-dismissal warning if a dismissal motion is pending.
• Rule 60(b) relief demands concrete, timely evidence; lay declarations alone will not satisfy the “excusable neglect” test, especially where the alleged excuse predates and fails to account for earlier lapses.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Dismissal for Want of Prosecution (Rule 41(b))—A sanction allowing a court to end a lawsuit when a plaintiff repeatedly fails to move their case forward or comply with orders.

Excusable Neglect (Rule 60(b)(1))—An equitable standard for undoing judgments when a party misses deadlines for reasons outside ordinary care, evaluated by factors such as length of delay, reasons for omission, and potential prejudice.

Abuse of Discretion—A highly deferential appellate standard; reversal occurs only if the lower court’s decision lacks any reasonable justification or omits essential factors.

Pro Se Status—When a litigant represents themself; courts often grant some procedural leeway but hold pro se litigants to the same substantive obligations as attorneys.

Conclusion

Griffiths v. Eggemeyer reaffirms the Seventh Circuit’s commitment to procedural rigor in federal litigation. It clarifies that pro se litigants are not exempt from responding to discovery, adhering to scheduling orders, or monitoring the court docket. It further cements that Rule 60(b) relief for excusable neglect requires credible, timely evidence—and that self-inflicted delays or strategic nonparticipation will not suffice. Going forward, this opinion will guide district courts and practitioners in evaluating both the propriety of Rule 41(b) dismissals and the narrow pathway to post-judgment relief under Rule 60(b).