Primary Placement Requires Reviewable Best-Interest Findings; Counsel-Signed Child-Support Worksheets Bind the Client Absent Fraud

I. Introduction

In Richard Conway v. Amanda Orenberg (R.I. Jan. 28, 2026), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed three Family Court orders arising from a custody-and-support dispute between unmarried parents who share two minor children (born 2017 and 2020). Richard Conway (plaintiff/father) sought joint custody with “placement to father” and guideline child support; Amanda Orenberg (defendant/mother) sought sole custody/physical placement and child support. Over the course of more than a year, the Family Court entered multiple interim parenting and discovery orders, appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL), and required counseling and mediation.

The appeal focused on (1) a placement order that continued the mother’s “primary placement,” (2) a child-support guideline worksheet entered as an order, and (3) a handwritten “consent order” that also set support at the same monthly amount. The father argued the Family Court (a) took no testimony/evidence, (b) failed to analyze the children’s best interests, and (c) improperly entered “consent” orders over his objection.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Placement: The Court vacated the portion of the placement order granting the mother primary placement because the record lacked sufficient factual findings regarding the children’s best interests to permit appellate review.
Child support worksheet: The Court affirmed the child-support guideline worksheet entered as an order, holding that, absent fraud or special circumstances, a client is bound by counsel’s actions and signature.
Handwritten order: The Court found the father’s challenge moot because the worksheet—affirmed on appeal—already established the same monthly obligation, and a ruling on the handwritten order would have no practical effect.
Remand: The case was remanded for further proceedings on placement consistent with the opinion.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Appellate deference in custody and child support

Andrade v. Andrade (quoting DePrete v. DePrete): The Court reiterated that custody determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion and will be affirmed unless factual findings overlooked/misconceived material evidence or were clearly wrong. This deference, however, presupposes that findings exist to review.
Trojan v. Trojan (quoting Tamayo v. Arroyo): Child-support awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion, reinforcing the high bar for reversal—yet leaving room for correction where legal prerequisites (like valid consent or procedural regularity) are lacking.

2. Best interests and the Pettinato framework

Ayriyan v. Ayriyan (quoting Berard v. Berard): The “best interests of the child” are the “lode-star principle” in custody/placement decisions. This principle anchors the entire placement analysis.
Pettinato v. Pettinato: The Court restated the eight best-interest factors and emphasized that no single factor is determinative; the trial justice must consider the interaction among all relevant factors.
Waters v. Magee (quoting Africano v. Castelli): This line of cases was used to reaffirm both the Pettinato list and the “no one factor controls” principle.
Andreozzi v. Andreozzi and Chiappone v. Chiappone: These cases establish that a trial justice need not “refer to the Pettinato factors” expressly nor recite “best interests” as an incantation—but the decision must still clearly articulate a basis and reflect paramount consideration of best interests. The Court relied on these precedents to explain what was missing here: reviewable factual findings.

3. The necessity of findings for appellate review

Now Courier, LLC v. Better Carrier Corp. (quoting Chiaradio v. Falck): A hearing justice must make findings of fact sufficient for the Supreme Court to “pass upon the appropriateness of the order and the grounds upon which it rests.” This was the decisive authority supporting vacatur of the primary-placement ruling.

4. Attorney authority and binding effect on the client

DiLuglio v. Providence Auto Body, Inc. (quoting State v. Cline): The attorney-client relationship is “essentially one of principal and agent,” supplying the doctrinal foundation for treating counsel’s signature as the client’s act.
May v. Penn T.V. & Furniture Co., Inc. (quoting Cohen v. Goldman): The attorney’s implied authority includes taking steps deemed legal, proper, and necessary, and absent fraud such acts are regarded as the client’s acts.
Brindle v. Brindle: Absent special circumstances, the client is bound by the acts of the attorney of record. This sealed the outcome on the child-support worksheet.
Carpenter v. Carpenter: Cited to underscore waiver principles where a party explicitly agrees on the record and does not request an evidentiary hearing; here it reinforced the Court’s insistence that parties must timely contest procedures and preserve issues.

5. Mootness doctrine

Capital Video Corporation v. Bevilacqua (quoting Evoqua Water Technologies LLC v. Moriarty): If a judgment would not have a practical effect on the controversy, the issue is moot. The Court applied this to decline review of the handwritten order because the affirmed worksheet set the same support amount.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why the primary-placement ruling was vacated

The Court’s central custody/placement holding is procedural-but-substantive in effect: primary placement cannot stand on a record that lacks articulated, reviewable findings tied to the child’s best interests. Although the GAL orally recommended continuing primary placement with the mother and the hearing justice referenced recommendations and “best interest” in connection with a separate visitation order, the challenged placement order itself was entered “by agreement of the attorneys” and labeled “By Agreement” even though the father did not sign and his counsel lodged an on-the-record objection.

Critically, the Court did not hold that a trial justice must perform a mechanical Pettinato factor-by-factor recitation. Instead, consistent with Andreozzi and Chiappone, it held that the decision must contain enough factual grounding to permit meaningful appellate review. Here, the Supreme Court found the record “devoid of sufficient factual findings,” noting that the “sole evidence” considered on primary placement appeared to be the GAL’s brief oral recommendation. Under Now Courier, LLC v. Better Carrier Corp. and Chiaradio v. Falck, that absence required vacatur and remand.

2. Why the child-support guideline worksheet was affirmed

The father argued that the worksheet was not truly “consented to,” pointing to counsel’s later statement that he disagreed with the numbers and to the pressures of discovery disputes. The Court acknowledged the context—ongoing discovery issues and the hearing justice’s strong admonitions—but treated the dispositive fact as the worksheet’s execution by both attorneys and its entry as an order.

Applying agency principles from DiLuglio, May, Cohen, and Brindle, the Court held that absent fraud or special circumstances, counsel’s signing of the guideline worksheet bound the client. The Court also emphasized a practical safety valve: its affirmance did not preclude later modification of support “upon appropriate motion in the Family Court,” recognizing that support can be revisited under proper procedures if financial inputs were incorrect or circumstances change.

3. Why the handwritten order challenge was moot

Because both the worksheet and the handwritten order set support at $1,254 per month, and because the arrearage appeared to be computed from that same monthly figure retroactive to February 28, 2023, striking the handwritten order would not change the operative obligation while the worksheet stood affirmed. Under Capital Video Corporation v. Bevilacqua and Evoqua Water Technologies LLC v. Moriarty, there was no live controversy with a remedy that would have practical effect, so the Court declined review.

C. Impact

Placement orders must be reviewable: The clearest doctrinal effect is a reinforced requirement that Family Court placement decisions—especially “primary placement”—must be supported by findings sufficient for appellate review. Reliance on a GAL recommendation, without articulated findings, risks vacatur even under deferential review standards.
“Consent” labeling will not cure lack of consent or lack of findings: Where a party objects on the record and does not sign, courts should be cautious about characterizing contested placement provisions as agreed. This case signals that the Supreme Court will look past labels to the substance of what was actually agreed and what was actually found.
Child-support worksheets signed by counsel carry strong finality on appeal: The opinion confirms that an attorney’s signature on a guideline worksheet is generally treated as the client’s act, shifting disputes about income inputs away from appellate invalidation and toward post-judgment modification mechanisms in Family Court.
Strategic consequences for litigants: Parties who disagree with support numbers should press for timely evidentiary development or formal objection before entry—because once counsel signs, appellate relief is unlikely absent fraud/special circumstances. Conversely, parties challenging placement should ensure the record contains best-interest findings, not merely recommendations.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Primary placement” vs. “joint legal custody”: Joint legal custody concerns shared decision-making (education, healthcare, etc.). Primary placement concerns where the child primarily lives and the baseline parenting-time structure.
Pettinato factors: A set of eight considerations (parent wishes; child preference when appropriate; parent-child relationships; adjustment to home/school/community; mental/physical health; stability; moral fitness; willingness to support the other parent’s relationship) used to evaluate best interests.
Findings of fact: The judge’s stated determinations about what happened and why it matters. Appellate courts need these to review whether discretion was properly exercised.
Guardian ad litem (GAL): A court-appointed representative who investigates and makes recommendations about children’s interests; their recommendation can be influential but does not replace the court’s duty to make findings.
Consent order: An order reflecting the parties’ agreement. A label alone does not guarantee true consent; signatures and on-the-record assent matter.
Agency principle (attorney as agent): Because the lawyer acts for the client, the client is usually bound by the lawyer’s authorized acts (like signing a filed worksheet), absent fraud or unusual circumstances.
Mootness: Courts do not decide issues where their ruling would not change anything in the real world; once the worksheet was affirmed, attacking a duplicative handwritten order could not provide effective relief.
Retroactive child support and arrearage: Support can be ordered effective from an earlier date; unpaid amounts accrued over time become an arrearage, often with interest.

V. Conclusion

Conway v. Orenberg delivers two practical rules. First, a Family Court award of primary placement must rest on articulated findings that demonstrate best-interest reasoning and permit appellate review; a GAL’s recommendation alone, without sufficient findings, is not enough. Second, a child-support guideline worksheet signed by counsel and entered as an order will generally bind the client on appeal absent fraud or special circumstances, with disputes about inputs more appropriately addressed through Family Court modification procedures. The decision thus strengthens procedural rigor in placement adjudications while reinforcing finality principles for counsel-executed support orders.