Primacy of Standing Determinations Over Exhaustion in §2241 Habeas Proceedings

Introduction

This commentary examines the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Christopher Cobb v. Warden, No. 23-12416, rendered January 30, 2025. At its core, the case concerned a pro se prisoner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition challenging both the calculation of his sentence under the First Step Act (18 U.S.C. § 3632 et seq.) and the constitutionality of certain statutory provisions. The Warden moved to dismiss on two fronts: (1) that Cobb lacked Article III standing to mount a facial challenge to the First Step Act, and (2) that he had not exhausted administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court, following a magistrate judge’s report, dismissed the petition on exhaustion grounds and tacked on a cursory standing analysis. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that a court must resolve jurisdictional standing before addressing non-jurisdictional exhaustion requirements.

Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, identified a fundamental error in the district court’s sequencing of issues. It reminded the lower court that Article III standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite which cannot be waived or forfeited, whereas administrative exhaustion under § 2241 is a non-jurisdictional precondition that may be forfeited or excused. Because the district court dismissed Cobb’s petition for failure to exhaust without first resolving whether Cobb had standing, it exercised “hypothetical jurisdiction,” something federal courts cannot do. The appellate court therefore vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to address standing in the first instance. The Eleventh Circuit expressly declined to rule on the exhaustion question, leaving it for the district court’s renewed consideration if standing is found.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Holston Invs., Inc. v. LanLogistics Corp. (677 F.3d 1068): Confirmed that jurisdictional issues are reviewed de novo.
Skinner v. Wiley (355 F.3d 1293): Held that a § 2241 petition’s exhaustion dismissal is reviewed de novo.
Santiago-Lugo v. Warden (785 F.3d 467): Clarified that exhaustion under § 2241 is a non-jurisdictional requirement.
AT&T Mobility, LLC v. NASCAR, Inc. (494 F.3d 1356): Emphasized that standing is a threshold jurisdictional question.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t (523 U.S. 83): Prohibited courts from exercising “hypothetical jurisdiction.”
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp. (549 U.S. 422): Recognized limited judicial discretion in choosing threshold grounds, but cautioned on unbounded leeway.
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. (526 U.S. 574): Discussed the balance of threshold rulings.
Fla. Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (859 F.3d 1306): Highlighted the expectation to resolve jurisdictional grounds first.
Singleton v. Wulff (428 U.S. 106): Established the principle that appellate courts generally do not consider issues not passed on below.

Legal Reasoning

The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning rests on two core distinctions:

Jurisdictional vs. Non-Jurisdictional Requirements: Article III standing “is perhaps the most important, or alternatively the most central, of Article III’s jurisdictional prerequisites” (Gardner v. Mutz, 962 F.3d 1329, 1337). A jurisdictional requirement cannot be waived or forfeited. Conversely, exhaustion is a judicially imposed precondition that may be forfeited or excused (Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368; Santiago-Lugo).
Order of Analysis: A federal court cannot dismiss a case for failure to satisfy a non-jurisdictional condition before confirming it has subject-matter jurisdiction (Friends of the Everglades v. EPA, 699 F.3d 1280; Steel Co.). Although Sinochem allows some discretion in choosing threshold issues, Florida Wildlife Federation instructs that district courts are “generally expected” to resolve jurisdiction first.

Because the district court dismissed Cobb’s petition on exhaustion grounds without first definitively resolving standing, it purported to exercise hypothetical jurisdiction. The Eleventh Circuit therefore remanded for the district court to address standing in the first instance, consistent with the principle that appellate courts are “courts of review, not courts of first view” (Callahan v. Azar, 939 F.3d 1251).

Impact

This decision clarifies the procedural sequence in habeas corpus litigation and beyond:

Lower courts must address Article III standing prior to non-jurisdictional preconditions such as exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Habeas petitioners and their counsel should craft pleadings and responses that robustly address standing at the outset, even when non-jurisdictional defenses are also asserted.
The ruling may affect future habeas and civil rights litigation under the PLRA by reinforcing the non-jurisdictional nature of exhaustion and by elevating the procedural priority of standing.
Judicial economy will be served by avoiding needless adjudication of merits-adjacent requirements in cases where subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Article III Standing: A plaintiff must show an actual injury caused by the defendant that a court can redress. If there is no standing, the federal court has no power to hear the case.
Jurisdictional Requirement: A rule that defines whether a court has the authority to decide a case. Jurisdictional rules cannot be ignored, waived, or forfeited.
Non-Jurisdictional Requirement (Exhaustion): A procedural rule that may bar relief if a party fails to meet it, but does not deprive the court of authority to hear the case. Such rules may be waived or excused.
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) Exhaustion: Requires prisoners to exhaust certain administrative grievance procedures before filing suit in federal court. Under Santiago-Lugo, this exhaustion is mandatory but not jurisdictional in habeas proceedings.
Hypothetical Jurisdiction: When a court addresses the merits or non-jurisdictional defenses before confirming it has authority to decide the dispute—a practice prohibited by Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment.

Conclusion

Christopher Cobb v. Warden establishes a clear procedural rule: in federal habeas corpus proceedings under § 2241, courts must determine Article III standing before reaching exhaustion of administrative remedies. By reaffirming the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional requirements and instructing district courts to address standing first, the Eleventh Circuit has reinforced the structural safeguards of the judicial power. This decision will guide lower courts, litigants, and pro se petitioners in sequencing threshold issues, ensuring that only properly adjudicated claims proceed to the merits.