Prima Facie Eligibility Based on Changed Country Conditions and the Non-Reviewable Nature of Sua Sponte Reopening: Mendoza-Jovel Precedent

Introduction

In Jose Juan Mendoza-Jovel v. Pamela Bondi, No. 24-3932 (6th Cir. Apr. 9, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the standards for reopening removal proceedings under the “changed country conditions” exception to the ninety-day deadline and the scope of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) sua sponte reopening authority. The petitioner, a Honduran national, sought to reopen his case after previously conceding removability and failing to secure cancellation of removal. He based his motion on two alleged changed conditions in Honduras—threats from a violent gang and fear of political persecution under the current ruling party. The BIA denied reopening for lack of prima facie eligibility and refused to reopen sua sponte. The Sixth Circuit denied review of the merits and dismissed the challenge to the sua sponte denial for lack of jurisdiction.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion, authored by Judge McKeague, contains two principal holdings:

The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mendoza-Jovel’s untimely motion to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). Even assuming “changed country conditions,” Mendoza-Jovel failed to establish a prima facie case for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) because his fears were speculative and lacked individualized evidence of prospective persecution.
The BIA’s decision not to reopen proceedings sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) is committed to agency discretion and is not subject to judicial review. The Sixth Circuit therefore dismissed that portion of the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314 (1992): Established that motions to reopen are disfavored and that the BIA has broad discretion.
Bi Feng Liu v. Holder, 560 F.3d 485 (6th Cir. 2009): Warned against “endless delay” by successive motions to reopen.
INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988): Clarified standards for reopening, including prima facie requirements.
Alizoti v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 2007): Held that the movant bears a “heavy burden” and articulated abuse-of-discretion review.
Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010): Confirmed abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing BIA denials of reopening.
Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2004): Recognized the BIA’s unfettered discretion to reopen sua sponte.
Additional circuit decisions (e.g., Lopez v. Garland, Rais v. Holder) reinforcing non-reviewability of sua sponte decisions.

Legal Reasoning

1. Timeliness and Changed Country Conditions Exception
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the final order. The petitioner moved to reopen over three years late. The exception for “changed country conditions” (id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)) requires: (a) material evidence of changed conditions that was not previously available; and (b) prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. The BIA assumed the first element but correctly found that Mendoza-Jovel’s evidence did not establish a reasonable likelihood of persecution on account of either gang threats or political opinion.

2. Prima Facie Eligibility for Asylum, Withholding, and CAT Relief
For asylum, the petitioner needed to show a well-founded fear of persecution based on one of five protected grounds. The BIA found his fears “unduly speculative” because the gang threat had not manifested since 2021 and no direct targeting of him was shown; and because his generalized opposition to the ruling party lacked any individualized risk of political persecution. Withholding of removal and CAT relief require the higher “more likely than not” standard and thus necessarily failed given the shaky asylum claim.

3. Sua Sponte Reopening
The regulation grants the BIA the authority to reopen cases at any time on its own motion for “exceptional circumstances.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Sixth Circuit precedent uniformly holds that such discretionary decisions are committed to the BIA and are not subject to judicial review absent a colorable constitutional or legal error, which Mendoza-Jovel did not allege.

Impact

This decision reinforces several important principles in immigration law:

Strict Application of the 90-Day Rule: Motions to reopen based on changed country conditions remain subject to a stringent timeliness rule and a heavy prima facie burden.
Speculative Fears Insufficient: Allegations of gang violence or political unrest must be tied to a real, individualized threat to satisfy reopening standards.
Finality of Sua Sponte Discretion: The BIA’s independent power to reopen on its own motion is firmly insulated from judicial review, preserving agency finality.
Circuit Consistency: Aligns the Sixth Circuit with broader federal jurisprudence that disfavors serial motions to reopen and protects agency discretion.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Prima Facie Eligibility: A preliminary showing that there is a reasonable likelihood the petitioner meets all legal requirements for relief, but not a final determination on the merits.
Changed Country Conditions Exception: An exception to the 90-day filing deadline allowing a late motion to reopen if significant new developments in the home country arise after the original removal order.
Sua Sponte Reopening: The BIA’s self-initiated authority to reopen any case for “exceptional circumstances,” independent of a party’s motion.
Well-Founded Fear (Asylum): A genuine and objectively reasonable fear of persecution based on protected grounds; requires both personal belief and reasonable likelihood.
Withholding vs. Asylum: Withholding requires proof that persecution is “more likely than not,” a higher standard than the “well-founded fear” for asylum.
Convention Against Torture (CAT) Relief: Relief from removal if it is more likely than not the individual would be tortured if returned, irrespective of motive-based persecution.

Conclusion

Mendoza-Jovel v. Bondi serves as a touchstone for the strict application of reopening standards in removal proceedings. It underscores that speculative or generalized fears—whether of gang violence or political persecution—fail to satisfy prima facie eligibility under the changed country conditions exception. The case also reaffirms the non-reviewable nature of the BIA’s sua sponte reopening discretion, preserving the finality and efficiency of the immigration adjudicatory process. Future petitioners and practitioners must, therefore, marshal concrete, individualized evidence of harm and meet exacting deadlines when seeking to reopen removal orders.