Introduction

This appeal arises from a pro se challenge by George Dunbar Prewitt, Jr. to his 2019 speeding conviction in Yazoo County, Mississippi, and from motions to disqualify both the federal district judge and certain judges of the Fifth Circuit. After the Yazoo County Justice Court found him guilty, Prewitt appealed for a trial de novo in the County Court of Yazoo County, where—by administrative appointment of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s Chief Justice—Rankin County Judge James Kent McDaniel presided. On October 19, 2023, Judge McDaniel again found Prewitt guilty and imposed a $179.50 fine.

On the eve of that de novo proceeding, Prewitt filed a federal lawsuit against Judge McDaniel, alleging constitutional infirmities in the original justice court proceeding (no jury and wrong county) and broadly contesting the legitimacy of the 1890 Mississippi Constitution. He also sought to disqualify the assigned federal district judge, contending that the judge’s alma mater and presumed ancestry created bias. The district court dismissed for lack of Article III standing and denied recusal. On appeal, Prewitt challenged both rulings and additionally moved to disqualify Fifth Circuit judges.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal and denial of recusal, and it denied Prewitt’s motion to disqualify appellate judges. The court’s opinion clarifies two core points of recurring importance: first, petty traffic offenses do not trigger Sixth Amendment jury or vicinage/venue protections (and thus cannot ground an Article III injury-in-fact when those rights are invoked); second, recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455 requires objective, fact-based reasons—conjecture about ancestry, prior rulings, or broad sociopolitical criteria is inadequate.

Summary of the Opinion

• Standing and substantive rights: The panel held that Prewitt failed to allege any concrete, particularized injury. Because a speeding ticket is a petty offense (maximum six months), there is no Sixth Amendment or Article III right to a jury, and the Sixth Amendment’s vicinage/venue language does not apply. Allegations of a closed courtroom were conclusory and did not state a cognizable public-trial violation. Therefore, no injury-in-fact existed to support Article III standing, and the complaint was properly dismissed.
• Mississippi Constitution challenge: The court rejected Prewitt’s assertion that the 1890 Mississippi Constitution is “illegal,” noting repeated U.S. Supreme Court adjudications under that constitution, with no suggestion of illegitimacy.
• Recusal—district court: The denial of recusal under § 455 was within the district court’s discretion. Allegations premised on a judge’s alma mater, hypothesized ancestry, or dissatisfaction with rulings are speculative and insufficient.
• Recusal—Fifth Circuit: The court likewise denied Prewitt’s motion to disqualify appellate judges. His proposed categories (ancestral ties to slavery, perceived hostility in prior decisions, participation in certain activities, or membership in unspecified organizations) were not objective bases to question impartiality.
• Disposition: District court judgment affirmed; appellate disqualification motion denied.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Standing and case-or-controversy:
  • Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982): Federal courts do not exist to air generalized grievances; Article III requires an actual case or controversy.
  • Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992): The familiar three elements of standing—injury in fact, causation, and redressability.
  • City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983): “Abstract injury is not enough”; injury must be real and immediate, not hypothetical.
• Jury trial and petty offenses:
  • Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989): Offenses punishable by no more than six months are presumptively “petty” and do not carry a constitutional jury trial right absent unusually severe additional penalties.
  • Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1988): No distinction between Article III and Sixth Amendment jury provisions regarding when a jury right attaches; both turn on the petty/serious offense line.
• Public trial:
  • United States v. Lipscomb, 539 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1124 (2009): Bare, unsworn, and temporally vague claims of courtroom closure were insufficient to prove a Sixth Amendment public-trial violation.
• Mississippi Constitution legitimacy:
  • Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U.S. 1 (1901); Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910); Mississippi v. Arkansas, 415 U.S. 289 (1974): The Supreme Court has repeatedly adjudicated issues under the 1890 Mississippi Constitution, implicitly recognizing its validity.
• Recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455:
  • Chitimacha Tribe of La. v. Harry L. L. Co., 690 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1982): Objective “reasonable person” standard for questioning impartiality; recusal rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion.
  • Matter of Billedeaux, 972 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1992): Remote, contingent, or speculative interests do not reasonably call impartiality into question.
  • In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1102 (1989): Often cited for the principle that speculative interests are insufficient for recusal.
  • Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972): Judges have a duty to sit where not disqualified, as strong as the duty not to sit where disqualified.
  • Wiley v. Dep’t of Energy, 2021 WL 2853110 (E.D. La. July 8, 2021): Disagreement with prior rulings is not a basis for disqualification.
• Standards of review:
  • Ferguson v. Bank of New York Mellon Corp., 802 F.3d 777 (5th Cir. 2015), and Stokes v. Gann, 498 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2007): De novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals, with well-pleaded facts taken as true.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1) Standing and the “injury in fact” analysis. The district court dismissed for lack of standing, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Although the panel recited a Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review, the analysis centered on Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement:

• No jury right for petty offenses: Because a speeding infraction is a petty offense (maximum penalty six months), the Sixth Amendment and Article III jury guarantees do not attach. Without a cognizable right to a jury, alleging denial of a jury cannot constitute a concrete injury.
• Vicinage/venue clause inapplicable: The Sixth Amendment’s command that trials occur in the “State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed” is part and parcel of the jury-trial right. If there is no jury right for a petty offense, the vicinage/venue protection does not apply either. The Fifth Circuit also invoked Landry to confirm that Article III’s trial clause does not alter this outcome.
• Public trial claim conclusory: Prewitt alleged that others were told to wait in the lobby and the trial occurred “behind closed doors,” but he provided no specifics—no duration, justification, or prejudice. As Lipscomb illustrates, such threadbare assertions do not establish a public-trial violation. Consequently, there is no concrete constitutional harm on this theory either.
• Causation problem underscored: A footnote flags that the complaint named Judge McDaniel yet targeted alleged errors in the earlier justice court proceeding. This disconnect undermines traceability—the second element of standing—even apart from the lack of injury.

In short, the panel concluded that the pleaded constitutional deprivations either do not exist as a matter of law in petty-offense cases or were not plausibly alleged as factual violations. Without a nonconclusory deprivation of a legally protected interest, Article III injury-in-fact fails—and with it, standing.

2) Challenge to the 1890 Mississippi Constitution. Prewitt’s broad attack on the legitimacy of Mississippi’s constitution was dispatched succinctly. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed issues arising under that constitution without questioning its validity. The Fifth Circuit cited early-twentieth-century decisions and a 1974 boundary case to demonstrate that federal courts have long treated the constitution as operative. With no authority to the contrary, the claim failed.

3) Recusal and the duty to sit. The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of recusal and denied appellate recusal:

• Objective standard: Under § 455, the question is whether a reasonable person, apprised of the facts, would question impartiality. It is not enough to show subjective discomfort or policy disagreement.
• Speculation is insufficient: Allegations based on a judge’s alma mater, conjectured ancestry, or general disagreement with judicial outcomes are “remote, contingent, or speculative” and do not meet § 455’s threshold.
• No judge-shopping: Litigants may not dictate the personal characteristics or background of the judge assigned to their case. The panel emphasized the countervailing “duty to sit” where there is no true disqualification.

C. Impact and Practical Significance

• Petty offenses and constitutional trial rights: The decision reinforces that routine traffic violations—punishable by at most six months—do not trigger jury or vicinage/venue rights. Litigants cannot manufacture federal standing by asserting deprivation of a jury in such cases.
• Pleading a public-trial violation: To plausibly allege a Sixth Amendment public-trial violation, a litigant must provide concrete facts (e.g., scope and duration of closure, lack of necessity, prejudice). Bare assertions of a locked door or temporary exclusion are insufficient.
• Recusal grounded in facts, not identity: The opinion cautions against recusal requests premised on identity, ancestry, or generalized ideological disagreements. § 455 demands objective, case-specific facts indicating a reasonable question about impartiality. The court’s reaffirmation of the “duty to sit” will likely be cited to deter judge-shopping.
• Standing and merits interplay: The panel’s approach illustrates that when the alleged “injury” consists of the denial of a right that does not legally attach (e.g., jury in a petty case), a court may find no injury-in-fact without fully engaging merits discovery or trial.
• Limits of federal forum for state ticket disputes: The opinion reiterates that federal courts are not venues for generalized grievances about state criminal processes, especially where state appellate mechanisms exist and alleged federal rights are inapplicable.
• Unpublished but instructive: While nonprecedential, the decision offers a practical template for district courts facing similar pro se challenges to traffic convictions and for evaluating speculative recusal motions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article III standing: To sue in federal court, a plaintiff must show a concrete injury caused by the defendant and likely to be fixed by a court decision. A mere belief that government acted wrongly, without a personal, concrete harm, does not suffice.
• “Petty offense” and jury rights: The Constitution does not guarantee a jury trial for offenses punishable by six months or less, unless other penalties are so severe they resemble serious crimes. Most traffic tickets fall into the petty category.
• Vicinage/venue in the Sixth Amendment: The requirement that a jury be drawn from the state and district of the crime is part of the jury-trial right. If there is no jury right at all (as in petty offenses), the vicinage/venue clause does not apply.
• Public trial right: Criminal trials are generally open to the public, but limited, justified closures can occur (e.g., safety, sensitive testimony). To claim a violation, one must show meaningful closure without adequate reason and resulting harm—not just a brief, unexplained delay or entry restriction.
• Recusal under § 455: A judge steps aside only if a reasonable observer, knowing the facts, would question impartiality. Speculative theories, a judge’s educational background, or disagreement with past decisions do not meet this standard.

Observations on Procedure and Framing

• Standard of review: The panel recited the Rule 12(b)(6) de novo standard while affirming a standing dismissal (commonly analyzed under Rule 12(b)(1)). Either way, de novo review applies, and the outcome does not turn on the label: the complaint’s allegations failed to show a concrete, legally protected injury.
• Causation gap identified: As the opinion notes in a footnote, suing the county-court judge for alleged errors in the earlier justice-court proceeding underscores a traceability problem separate from injury-in-fact.
• Other defenses not reached: The panel did not rely on other potential defenses that often arise when suing judges (e.g., judicial immunity), resolving the case on standing and the insufficiency of the constitutional claims as pleaded.

Conclusion

Prewitt v. McDaniel underscores two firm propositions in federal adjudication. First, routine traffic infractions are petty offenses that do not carry jury or vicinage/venue protections; invoking those rights cannot, without more, establish Article III injury. Conclusory allegations of a closed courtroom likewise do not state a public-trial violation. Second, recusal under § 455 hinges on objective, fact-based reasons; conjecture about ancestry, institutional affiliations, or policy disagreements cannot disqualify a judge, and courts retain a “duty to sit” absent true disqualification.

While unpublished, the decision is practically significant. It offers clear guidance for dismissing federal challenges to minor state convictions that rest on inapplicable constitutional guarantees and for policing the boundaries of recusal to protect both impartiality and the orderly administration of justice.