Pretrial Home Incarceration as a Condition of Bond Constitutes “Custody” Under West Virginia’s Escape Statute

Introduction

In State of West Virginia v. Corbett Maurice Carter (No. 23-277), the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia confronted a recurring but previously under-clarified question: Is a defendant placed on home incarceration with electronic monitoring as a condition of pretrial bond in “custody” for purposes of the state’s escape statute, West Virginia Code § 61-5-10? Writing for the Court, Justice Walker answered yes and affirmed Carter’s felony escape conviction after he cut his GPS bracelet, left his residence, and discarded the device.

The decision resolves a contested point of statutory interpretation and fixes it as binding law in a new syllabus point: when home incarceration is imposed as a condition of pretrial bond or bail, the defendant is in “custody” within the meaning of § 61-5-10. While a memorandum decision in State v. McGann had previously pointed the same way, Carter elevates the rule to precedential status and provides full reasoning. Acting Chief Justice Bunn dissented and reserved the right to write separately. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County (Hon. Andrew G. Dimlich) is affirmed.

The ruling has immediate consequences for pretrial supervision, prosecutorial charging, and defense counseling: violating home incarceration conditions by absconding and tampering with monitoring equipment can now unambiguously support felony escape charges where the underlying case is a felony.

Summary of the Opinion

Carter was charged in late 2021 with first-degree robbery. As a bond condition, he was placed on home incarceration with 24/7 GPS monitoring by the Home Incarceration Division of the Raleigh County Sheriff’s Office. He signed both the court’s bond order and the Home Incarceration Office’s rules acknowledging that he was confined to his residence except for preapproved schedules or emergencies and that leaving without permission could be charged as “escape.”

Shortly after placement, Carter cut his bracelet, left his home, and threw the device in a dumpster. The supervising corporal received an alert, tracked, and recovered the cut device. A jury convicted Carter of felony escape under § 61-5-10. On appeal, Carter argued that because he was on bond, he was not in “custody” and therefore could not “escape.”

The Court rejected this argument. Applying the plain-meaning canon, it held that “custody” in § 61-5-10 encompasses the charge-and-control exercised by a county sheriff (or authorized representative) over a defendant on pretrial home incarceration. The Court emphasized the breadth of statutory coverage—escape may be “from the custody” of enumerated officials or “from any institution, facility, or any alternative sentence confinement”—and the statute’s application when custody or confinement is “by virtue of a charge or conviction for a felony.” The Court expressly adopts a new syllabus point: pretrial home incarceration as a condition of bond or bail constitutes “custody” for purposes of the escape statute. The conviction and three-year determinate sentence are affirmed.

Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Cited

State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995): Sets the familiar sufficiency standard—reviewing whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Carter did not contest the facts; he contested whether those facts could constitute “custody” as a matter of law. Thus, Guthrie frames the background but is not outcome-determinative.
State v. Cottrill, 204 W. Va. 77, 511 S.E.2d 488 (1998) and Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995): Establish de novo review for pure questions of law and statutory interpretation. The definition of “custody” in § 61-5-10 is such a question.
State v. Elder, 152 W. Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968): Anchors the plain-meaning rule: when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, courts apply it without resorting to interpretive canons. Elder is central—“custody” is undefined in § 61-5-10, so the Court supplies the term’s ordinary meaning.
State v. Sulick, 232 W. Va. 717, 753 S.E.2d 875 (2012); Miners in General Group v. Hix, 123 W. Va. 637, 17 S.E.2d 810 (1941); State ex rel. Cohen v. Manchin, 175 W. Va. 525, 336 S.E.2d 171 (1984): Support using common, ordinary meanings for undefined statutory words. The Court resorts to general and legal dictionaries to define “custody” and “constructive custody.”
State v. McGann, No. 20-0329, 2021 WL 4936282 (W. Va. Sept. 27, 2021) (memorandum decision): Previously resolved the same issue against a defendant in a nonprecedential format. Carter expressly approves McGann’s conclusion and now elevates it to binding law via syllabus point 5.
State v. Hughes, 197 W. Va. 518, 476 S.E.2d 189 (1996): Addressed credit for time served on home incarceration and distinguished pretrial home incarceration (a bail condition) from postconviction home incarceration under the Home Incarceration Act. Hughes characterized the postconviction regime as “penal.” Carter explains why this “credit” line of cases does not control the meaning of “custody” in the escape statute and notes later legislative changes on credit (as recognized in State v. Jedediah C., 240 W. Va. 534, 814 S.E.2d 197 (2018)).
State v. McGuire, 207 W. Va. 459, 533 S.E.2d 685 (2000) and State v. Jedediah C., 240 W. Va. 534, 814 S.E.2d 197 (2018): Trace the evolution of credit-for-home-incarceration doctrine; relevant to show the different legal questions and subsequent legislative responses.
State v. Allman, 240 W. Va. 383, 813 S.E.2d 36 (2018): Articulates the policy rationale for escape statutes—to deter breaches of lawful custody and protect those charged with custody pretrial and postconviction. Carter relies on Allman to underscore that pretrial custodians deserve the same statutory protection.
Statutes:
- W. Va. Code § 61-5-10 (2000): The escape statute. Post-1995, it broadly covers escape “from the custody” of enumerated officers (including a county sheriff and authorized representatives) and “from any institution, facility, or any alternative sentence confinement,” applicable when custody or confinement is “by virtue of a charge or conviction.”
- W. Va. Code § 62-1C-1a(a)(2)(C) (2021): Authorizes courts to impose, as a condition of pretrial release, “[p]articipat[ion] in home incarceration pursuant to § 62-11B-1 et seq.”
- W. Va. Code § 62-11B-1 et seq. (Home Incarceration Act): Governs the home incarceration system, principally in the postconviction context, but expressly incorporated by reference into permissible pretrial bond conditions.
- W. Va. Code §§ 62-11A-1, -1a: Provide sentencing alternatives, underscoring the Legislature’s expansion of custodial and confinement regimes beyond traditional jail.
Dictionaries: Merriam–Webster (custody as “immediate charge and control”), Black’s Law Dictionary (custody as “care and control … for … security” and “constructive custody” as control by legal authority without direct physical restraint).

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in four principal steps.

Plain meaning of “custody” governs. Section 61-5-10 does not define “custody.” The Court applies Elder’s plain-meaning directive to supply the term’s ordinary and accepted meaning using general and legal dictionaries. “Custody” includes the exercise of charge and control by a public authority. It need not entail physical restraint; “constructive custody,” like that of parolees and probationers, suffices.
Pretrial home incarceration fits within “custody of a county sheriff … [or] authorized representative.” The record established that the Raleigh County Sheriff’s Home Incarceration Division and its officer (Corporal Vance) exercised pervasive control over Carter’s movement and daily life: confinement to the residence, electronic monitoring, unannounced inspections, drug testing, prohibitions on firearms and alcohol, and the obligation to follow directives. Carter explicitly agreed to these conditions in writing. This degree of state-imposed control is “custody,” even if it is not within a jail’s walls.
The escape statute is broadly framed and applies “by virtue of a charge.” The 1995 amendments greatly expanded § 61-5-10. Post-amendment, a person can escape “from the custody of” various officials and entities or from “any institution, facility, or any alternative sentence confinement.” The inclusion of “alternative sentence confinement” is additive, not limiting. Crucially, the statute applies when the custody or confinement is “by virtue of a charge or conviction.” Thus, the statute encompasses pretrial custody regimes designed to secure appearance and public safety. Carter’s attempt to infer a carve-out from the 1995 inclusion of “alternative sentence confinement” fails; the Legislature meant to broaden—not narrow—the reach of the escape statute.
Credit cases do not control “custody” for escape. Carter invoked cases (e.g., Hughes) distinguishing pretrial home incarceration from postconviction home incarceration in credit-for-time-served contexts, noting the latter’s “penal” character. The Court explained that the escape statute does not turn on whether custody is punitive; it expressly covers custody “by virtue of a charge.” Moreover, pretrial home incarceration is expressly “pursuant to” the Home Incarceration Act by statutory cross-reference in § 62-1C-1a(a)(2)(C), further undermining Carter’s effort to erect a categorical divide. In any event, even if one overlooked that cross-reference, the control exercised here independently constitutes “custody.”

Rejecting Carter’s appeals to Rule 46 (“Release from custody”) and the bail bond definition in Black’s Law Dictionary, the Court emphasized that procedural rules and generalized bail concepts do not displace the Legislature’s chosen term in § 61-5-10. The statutory question is whether the defendant was in “custody” in the ordinary sense; because he was, cutting the monitor and leaving the residence constituted escape “by any means.”

Synthesizing its analysis and policy guidance from Allman, the Court articulates a new binding rule: “When an individual charged with a felony or a misdemeanor is placed on home incarceration as a condition of pretrial bond or bail, that individual is in ‘custody’ for purposes of the escape statute, West Virginia Code § 61-5-10 (2000).”

3) Addressing the Defendant’s Three Arguments

“Bond means release from custody.” Even if bond is colloquially described as “release,” that does not answer what “custody” means in § 61-5-10. The statute’s text governs; the ordinary meaning of “custody” comfortably covers home incarceration with continuous supervision by the sheriff’s office. “Constructive custody” is still custody.
“Alternative sentence confinement” limits scope to postconviction settings. The 1995 amendments expanded, not restricted, the statute. “Alternative sentence confinement” added an additional category; it does not subtract already-covered escapes from “the custody of” enumerated officers, including sheriffs and their representatives, irrespective of pretrial or postconviction posture.
“Credit-for-time” cases prove pretrial home incarceration is not custody. Credit determinations answer a different legal question and turned on the penal nature of the postconviction Home Incarceration Act. Section 61-5-10 expressly applies to custody “by virtue of a charge,” so punishment’s presence or absence is immaterial for escape. Additionally, the bail statute explicitly authorizes pretrial home incarceration “pursuant to” the Home Incarceration Act, blunting the attempted dichotomy.

4) Element-by-Element Fit Under § 61-5-10

Custody or confinement by virtue of a charge for a felony: Carter was on home incarceration because he was charged with first-degree robbery (a felony). His supervision was by the county sheriff’s Home Incarceration Division and its authorized representative.
Escape or attempt to escape “by any means”: Cutting the electronic bracelet, leaving the residence without authorization, and discarding the device constitute escape “by any means.” The evidence included his signed conditions, GPS movement map, alert, and the recovered cut device.
From “the custody of” a listed official or representative: The sheriff’s office had immediate charge and control over his movements and compliance; the supervising corporal was an “authorized representative.”

5) Likely Impact and Practical Implications

Prosecutorial charging and leverage: Prosecutors can confidently charge felony escape when a defendant absconds from pretrial home incarceration in felony cases (and misdemeanor escape for misdemeanor charges). This increases the stakes for violations and may affect plea dynamics.
Pretrial release practice: Judges, magistrates, and supervising agencies will likely emphasize explicit, written advisements (as occurred here) that absconding from home incarceration can constitute felony escape, not merely a bond violation.
Defense counseling: Defense attorneys should advise clients that home incarceration on bond is “custody” and that tampering with equipment, deviating from schedules, or leaving without authorization can trigger a new felony.
Supervision and documentation: Home incarceration divisions should continue rigorous documentation of monitoring, alerts, geolocation data, retrieval of devices, and chain-of-custody for equipment and records to meet evidentiary needs at trial.
Legislative and policy alignment: Carter harmonizes pretrial and postconviction custody concepts under § 61-5-10, aligning the statute’s deterrent purpose with modern supervision modalities (GPS, electronic monitoring, residential confinement).
Boundary of the holding: The decision is anchored in facts showing direct sheriff’s office supervision and signed, explicit conditions. Disputes in future cases may turn on proof that the supervising entity is an “authorized representative” of a listed official and that the defendant was “lawfully confined” to those conditions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Custody vs. confinement: “Custody” is about control—who exercises charge over a person’s freedom of movement and conduct. “Confinement” often implies physical restraint or placement in a facility. The escape statute covers escapes from both “custody” of enumerated officials and from places of confinement.
Constructive custody: A person can be in custody without being behind bars. If legal authorities substantially control a person’s liberty (e.g., parole, probation, home incarceration), that person is in “constructive custody.”
Escape “by any means”: The statute’s breadth captures conduct as varied as walking away, violating geographic boundaries, tampering with monitoring devices, or failing to return from authorized leave. It is not limited to breaking out of a locked facility.
Pretrial home incarceration vs. Home Incarceration Act: While the Home Incarceration Act principally governs postconviction supervision, West Virginia’s bail statute allows courts to impose pretrial home incarceration “pursuant to” that Act. For escape purposes, either context can constitute custody.
Standards of review: Sufficiency challenges ask whether any rational jury could convict given the evidence (Guthrie). Legal interpretation of statutes is reviewed fresh, with no deference to the lower court (de novo) (Cottrill/Chrystal R.M.).
West Virginia “syllabus points”: In West Virginia appellate practice, new binding rules are often announced in syllabus points at the beginning of opinions. Carter’s syllabus point 5 is now the controlling articulation that pretrial home incarceration on bond is “custody” for escape.

Conclusion

State v. Carter makes explicit what the structure of § 61-5-10 and modern supervision practices already implied: a defendant on pretrial home incarceration is in the sheriff’s custody for purposes of the escape statute. By adopting a plain-meaning approach to “custody,” recognizing constructive custody, and situating the 1995 and 2020 amendments within a pattern of statutory expansion, the Court rejects a narrow, facility-centric view of escape. The opinion situates pretrial and postconviction regimes on the same deterrent continuum emphasized in State v. Allman, safeguarding both public safety and the integrity of court-ordered supervision.

The takeaway is clear and consequential. Absconding from pretrial home incarceration—particularly by cutting or evading monitoring and leaving one’s residence—is not merely a bond violation; it is felony escape when the underlying charge is a felony. Carter thus provides definitive guidance to courts, prosecutors, defense counsel, and supervising agencies and will shape West Virginia’s pretrial release practices going forward.

Case Details

Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Term/Date: January 2025 Term; Filed March 25, 2025
Case No.: 23-277
Judge Below: Hon. Andrew G. Dimlich (Raleigh County)
Opinion: Justice Walker
Disposition: Affirmed
Notable: Acting Chief Justice Bunn dissents (opinion reserved); Justices Wooton and Trump disqualified; Judges Sorsaia and Akers sitting by temporary assignment.