Pretext Requires More Than Stray Remarks and Dissimilar Comparators: Fourth Circuit Clarifies Title VII Summary Judgment Standards

Introduction

In Derek Chapman v. Maryland Department of State Police, Office of the State Fire Marshal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment against a long-serving law enforcement manager who alleged race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The case arises from the Maryland Office of the State Fire Marshal’s sustained efforts to eliminate a chronic backlog of fire investigation reports—documents critical to criminal prosecutions and insurance determinations—within the Northeast Regional Office overseen by Chapman, a Deputy Chief State Fire Marshal.

Chapman, who is Black, contended that after he reported racially offensive remarks by senior colleagues and filed a formal internal complaint, his employer stripped him of supervisory duties, transferred him to headquarters to complete delinquent reports, imposed reporting deadlines, and ultimately placed him on an emergency suspension with pay—actions he alleged were motivated by discriminatory animus or retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the Office, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion.

The key issues on appeal were: (1) whether the Office’s stated reason for the adverse actions—Chapman’s persistent failure to complete timely reports and to remediate a serious regional backlog—was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation; and (2) whether Chapman produced sufficient evidence of pretext to create a triable dispute that the real motive was discrimination or retaliation. The Fourth Circuit resolved the case on the pretext element of the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, assuming without deciding that Chapman had satisfied his prima facie burden on both discrimination and retaliation.

Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Office, holding that:

The Office met its burden to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for disciplining Chapman: his longstanding and quantitatively significant failure to complete required investigations and to remedy the largest backlog in the agency.
Chapman failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on pretext. Specifically:
- Comparator evidence failed because other deputy chiefs had far fewer overdue reports and promptly resolved them when directed, meaning they were not “similarly situated” in all relevant respects.
- The Office’s performance-based concerns and directives predated Chapman’s protected complaints, undermining any inference that discipline followed from retaliation.
- Racially offensive comments by some senior personnel lacked the requisite nexus to the challenged decisions—both because the speakers were not the ultimate decisionmakers and because the comments were generalized, remote in time, and unrelated to Chapman’s performance or the specific disciplinary actions at issue.

Because no reasonable jury could find that the Office’s explanation was a pretext for discrimination or retaliation, the court affirmed summary judgment without reaching in detail the prima facie stages of Chapman's claims.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): The court applied the three-step burden-shifting framework for Title VII claims lacking direct evidence. Significantly, the panel assumed the prima facie case and decided at the pretext stage—a permissible approach within the framework when the case can be resolved more efficiently by testing the employer’s explanation.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (2000): Reiterated that the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff to establish unlawful discrimination; pretext may be shown by discrediting the employer’s explanation or by circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus.
Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2019): Provided two critical strands the panel applied: (a) summary judgment standards, and (b) the “similarly situated” comparator requirement—same supervisor, same standards, same conduct without differentiating circumstances. Haynes also informs the kinds of inconsistencies that can evidence pretext.
Sempowich v. Tactile Systems Technology, Inc., 19 F.4th 643 (4th Cir. 2021): Cited for the proposition that pretext can be shown if the employer’s reasons are inconsistent, false, or based on factual mistakes.
Foster v. Univ. of Maryland–Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2015): Clarifies that to show pretext, a plaintiff must demonstrate both falsity and that discrimination or retaliation was a motivating reason.
Wannamaker-Amos v. Purem Novi, Inc., 126 F.4th 244 (4th Cir. 2025): Emphasizes how discriminatory comments by key decisionmakers can be circumstantial evidence of pretext, and highlights the need to assess the identity of the speaker, content, and temporal proximity to the challenged action. The panel adopted this analysis to discount generalized, remote remarks by nondecisionmakers.
Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289 (4th Cir. 2010): Provides the “stray remarks” principle—without a clear nexus to the decision, the probative value of offensive comments is substantially diminished. The court used this to find that remarks about race, untethered to Chapman's performance or the decisionmakers, were insufficient to show pretext.
Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317 (4th Cir. 2018), and Hannah P. v. Coats, 916 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2019): Recited to frame Title VII’s discrimination and retaliation prohibitions and to confirm McDonnell Douglas applies to retaliatory claims.
Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 690 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1982): Cited regarding the EEOC Right-to-Sue letter as a prerequisite to suit. Doctrinal note: Subsequent Supreme Court authority (Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U.S. 170 (2019)) clarifies that Title VII’s charge-filing requirements are nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules. The panel’s reference to Perdue did not affect the outcome here.

Legal Reasoning

The court proceeded directly to the latter two stages of McDonnell Douglas—legitimate reason and pretext—assuming arguendo that Chapman had stated prima facie claims for discrimination and retaliation.

Legitimate, nondiscriminatory/nonretaliatory reason: The record “clearly” showed that despite repeated directives from leadership, Chapman failed over multiple years to eliminate his personal backlog and the Northeast region’s outsized backlog. This rationale is facially legitimate: timely investigative reporting is a nonnegotiable function central to the Office’s prosecutorial and public safety mandate.
Pretext analysis: The court addressed Chapman’s three main theories and found each insufficient:
- Comparators: Chapman pointed to two white deputy chiefs (Mowbray and Nelson) who also had late reports but were not disciplined similarly. The court stressed the need for comparators to be similarly situated in all relevant respects—same supervisor, same standards, and critically, “same conduct without differentiating or mitigating circumstances.” Quantitatively, Chapman’s situation was starkly different: in February 2021 he had roughly 50 overdue reports, versus 1 and 16 for the others, and he failed to clear the backlog when directed while they promptly eliminated theirs within weeks. Regionally, the Northeast had 239 overdue reports at the time of his transfer, compared with the next highest region’s 66. These disparities defeated an inference of differential treatment based on race.
- Timing/retaliation: Chapman argued that heightened discipline followed immediately after his discrimination complaints, suggesting retaliatory motive. The court found the record “unrefuted” that performance directives and escalating efforts to eliminate the backlog significantly predated his protected activity. Temporal proximity is not enough when decisive steps were underway already for nonretaliatory reasons.
- Discriminatory remarks: The court acknowledged that remarks attributed to Deputy Chiefs Svites and McMahon and Fire Marshal Geraci were offensive and inappropriate. But their probative value as pretext evidence was “substantially reduced” because they were (a) not tied to Chapman’s qualifications, performance, or the particular decisions at issue; (b) made by individuals who were not the ultimate decisionmakers for the transfer and suspension (especially Svites and McMahon); and (c) temporally remote (Geraci’s “black dogs” comment occurred more than a year before adverse actions). Absent a nexus—such as involvement in the decision or proximate timing—such “stray remarks” could not defeat summary judgment.

Accordingly, because no reasonable jury could conclude that the Office’s reasons were false and that discrimination or retaliation was a motivating factor, summary judgment was affirmed.

Impact and Implications

While unpublished and therefore nonbinding within the Fourth Circuit, the opinion crystallizes several practical and doctrinal points that are likely to influence Title VII litigation strategies:

Pretext focus at summary judgment: Courts may assume a prima facie case and decide on pretext where the employer’s performance-based rationale is robust and unrebutted. Plaintiffs should be prepared to marshal concrete evidence of inconsistency, falsity, or discriminatory animus beyond generalized assertions.
Quantitative disparities and comparators: When comparator evidence is invoked, meaningful equivalence matters. Large differences in the severity and persistence of performance deficiencies are “differentiating circumstances” that defeat similarity. Plaintiffs should select comparators with closely aligned metrics, timelines, supervisors, and disciplinary histories.
Stray remarks without nexus: Offensive comments by nondecisionmakers, or remarks remote in time and unrelated to performance concerns, will rarely suffice to show pretext. Plaintiffs should develop “nexus” evidence—decisionmaker involvement, temporal proximity, or a causal chain such as a “cat’s paw” theory showing that a biased subordinate influenced the decision.
Temporal proximity and ongoing performance issues: Temporal proximity loses force where the employer’s nonretaliatory concerns substantially predate protected activity and discipline flows from a documented, ongoing remediation process.
Public safety and mission-critical functions: For agencies whose core functions rely on timely reporting (law enforcement, fire marshal, corrections, healthcare), measured, escalating discipline to compel compliance is a strong legitimate rationale when well documented and consistently applied.
Internal investigations and documentation: The court gave weight to the Internal Affairs findings that confirmed policy violations and to objective documentation of backlog levels and missed deadlines. Employers should contemporaneously document directives, deadlines, follow-ups, and comparisons across units to sustain legitimate reasons.
Scope of adverse action: Although the court did not need to resolve whether transfer and paid suspension are adverse actions in this case (because it decided on pretext), the decision illustrates that even potentially adverse measures will not proceed to trial absent evidence undermining the employer’s explanation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Title VII: A federal law that prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and prohibits retaliation against employees who oppose unlawful practices or participate in related proceedings.
McDonnell Douglas framework: A three-step method courts use when there is no direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation.
- Step 1: The employee makes a prima facie case (basic showing) of discrimination or retaliation.
- Step 2: The employer states a legitimate, nondiscriminatory/nonretaliatory reason for the action.
- Step 3: The employee must show this reason is a pretext—i.e., false or not the real reason—and that discrimination/retaliation was a motive.
Pretext: Proof that the employer’s stated reason is not the true reason. This can be shown by inconsistencies, factual errors, shifting explanations, or evidence of bias (e.g., discriminatory remarks by decisionmakers closely tied to the decision).
Comparator evidence: Showing that similarly situated employees outside the plaintiff’s protected class were treated more favorably. “Similarly situated” usually means same supervisor, same standards, same misconduct, and no meaningful differences in context.
Stray remarks doctrine: Offensive or biased comments that are remote in time, made by nondecisionmakers, or unrelated to the employment decision have limited value in proving discrimination without a clear link to the adverse action.
Summary judgment: A procedural device to resolve a case without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Appeals are reviewed de novo, viewing evidence in the nonmovant’s favor.
EEOC Right-to-Sue letter: A document allowing the employee to file a lawsuit after the EEOC has processed the charge. The panel cites older circuit law describing it as “jurisdictional,” though the Supreme Court has since clarified that charge-filing rules are claim-processing, not jurisdictional. This distinction typically does not affect case outcomes unless timeliness or exhaustion is contested.
“Open” vs. “late” reports: In this case, the record used these terms interchangeably to refer to delinquent fire investigation reports; any distinction was immaterial to the court’s analysis.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Chapman underscores a disciplined application of the McDonnell Douglas framework at the summary judgment stage. The Office’s objectively documented, mission-critical performance rationale—anchored in persistent and severe backlog metrics, repeated directives, and an internal investigation—constituted a legitimate reason for discipline. Chapman’s evidence did not create a triable issue on pretext: his proposed comparators were materially dissimilar in scope and responsiveness; the Office’s corrective actions began well before his protected activity; and racially offensive comments in the workplace, while unacceptable, were neither tied to the decisional process nor temporally proximate.

The opinion reinforces several practical lessons: successful comparator evidence requires tight factual alignment; “stray remarks” without a nexus to the decision carry limited weight; and temporal proximity cannot overcome a documented history of performance-based interventions. For employers, consistent documentation and measured escalation in response to critical performance failures remain key. For employees, building a pretext record requires targeted evidence tying discriminatory animus to the specific decisionmakers and decisions at issue. Although unpublished, this case offers a clear roadmap for evaluating pretext in Title VII cases where quantitative performance deficiencies dominate the record.