Pretext, Preselection, and Comparative Qualifications in Title VII Promotion Cases:
Commentary on Hood‑Wilson v. Board of Trustees, Community College of Baltimore County

1. Introduction

This commentary examines the Fourth Circuit’s published decision in Melanie Hood‑Wilson v. Board of Trustees, Community College of Baltimore County, No. 24‑2263 (4th Cir. Dec. 12, 2025), a Title VII failure‑to‑promote case arising from a community college’s decision to select a male candidate for an assistant dean position over a long‑serving Black female director.

The case is important not because it breaks new doctrinal ground, but because it consolidates and sharpens several recurring themes in the Fourth Circuit’s Title VII jurisprudence:

How courts evaluate comparative qualifications at the pretext stage;
Why alleged preselection of a favored candidate, by itself, rarely proves discrimination;
How stray remarks and circumstantial evidence (e.g., internal discipline, alleged policy deviations) must be tied to the actual decisionmaker and decision to support an inference of discriminatory pretext; and
The continued insistence that courts not act as a super‑personnel department second‑guessing employers’ business judgments when the plaintiff cannot show her qualifications were demonstrably superior to the selectee’s.

The opinion thus serves as a detailed application of the McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting framework in the failure‑to‑promote context and clarifies the evidentiary expectations for plaintiffs at summary judgment in the Fourth Circuit.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Melanie Hood‑Wilson, a Black woman, had been employed by the Community College of Baltimore County (CCB) since 2001, rising to the role of Director of Special Populations, where she oversaw the Single Step program focused on workforce development for individuals with disabilities. In 2018, she applied for the position of Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions. The college instead selected Matthew Bernardy, a non‑Black male who had been serving as Director of Connections to Employment and Interim Director of the Center for Adult and Family Literacy.

Hood‑Wilson alleged race and gender discrimination under Title VII based on:

CCB’s failure to promote her to Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions; and
A Corrective Action Letter she received for approving inaccurate timecards.

After a prior appeal in which the Fourth Circuit revived her failure‑to‑promote claim at the pleading stage, the district court, on a full record, granted summary judgment to CCB. On this second appeal, the Fourth Circuit:

Assumed without deciding that Hood‑Wilson had established a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas;
Accepted CCB’s stated reason for its decision—that Bernardy was more qualified—as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification;
Held that Hood‑Wilson failed, at the pretext stage, to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that this justification was false and that discrimination was the real reason for the decision; and
Affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

Key holdings and emphases include:

A plaintiff challenging a qualifications‑based promotion decision must show that her qualifications are “demonstrably superior” to the selectee’s to support an inference of pretext, not merely that she was also qualified or that coworkers believed she was a better candidate.
Preselection of a candidate—without more—does not itself suggest discriminatory animus because it disadvantages all applicants, regardless of race or gender.
Stray remarks and disciplinary actions by a supervisor who was not the final decisionmaker require a concrete nexus—identity of speaker, content, and temporal proximity—to the challenged decision to be probative of discrimination.
Alleged comparators for disciplinary disparities must be similarly situated in all relevant respects, including their prior disciplinary and performance histories.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning is anchored in a well‑developed line of case law on Title VII burden‑shifting, summary judgment standards, and proof of pretext. The court uses these precedents not to announce new categorical rules, but to signal how rigorously it will examine evidence offered to show pretext in promotion disputes.

3.1.1 The Burden‑Shifting Framework: McDonnell Douglas and Burdine

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)
Provides the three‑step burden‑shifting framework for Title VII disparate treatment cases: prima facie case, employer’s nondiscriminatory reason, and plaintiff’s showing of pretext. The district court expressly applied this framework, and the Fourth Circuit followed suit.
Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)
Clarifies that after the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff’s burden of production merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. The Fourth Circuit invokes this to underscore that the key battleground here is the final, pretext stage: Hood‑Wilson must do more than raise doubt; she must offer evidence that allows a reasonable factfinder to infer discriminatory intent.

3.1.2 The Prima Facie Case and Its “Relatively Easy” Standard

Young v. Lehman, 748 F.2d 194 (4th Cir. 1984)
Describes the prima facie stage as a relatively easy test and notes that it is often at the pretext stage where cases fail. The Fourth Circuit uses Young to justify assuming, without deciding, that Hood‑Wilson met the prima facie standard and moving directly to pretext.
Evans v. Technologies Applications & Service Co., 80 F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 1996)
Confirms that the prima facie burden is not onerous and that relative qualifications are a valid, nondiscriminatory basis for an employment decision. The opinion cites Evans both on the prima facie burden and on the legitimacy of a qualifications‑based justification.
Sempowich v. Tactile Sys. Tech., Inc., 19 F.4th 643 (4th Cir. 2021)
Sets out the four‑part prima facie test as applied in the Fourth Circuit: membership in a protected class, adverse action, satisfactory performance, and circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. The court uses this to frame the elements but sidesteps a detailed prima facie analysis by assuming it is satisfied.

3.1.3 Pretext and Comparative Qualifications

Adams v. Trustees of the Univ. of N.C.–Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011)
Explains that in failure‑to‑promote cases, pretext can be shown either by demonstrating the plaintiff was better qualified or by assembling circumstantial evidence undermining the credibility of the employer’s reasons. This bifurcated path to pretext structures the court’s analysis: Section III.A addresses comparative qualifications; Sections III.B and III.C address circumstantial evidence.
Heiko v. Colombo Savings Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2006)
Establishes that courts assess relative qualifications using the employer’s own job‑related criteria and that a plaintiff must show her qualifications are “demonstrably superior” to the selected candidate’s to infer discrimination. The Fourth Circuit leans heavily on Heiko to reject the idea that modest differences or coworker preferences suffice; the decision emphasizes judicial reluctance to disturb promotion decisions absent stark disparities in qualifications.
Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 2005)
Provides two key propositions:
- Courts may compare the plaintiff’s and selectee’s qualifications and scrutinize the truthfulness of the employer’s explanation.
- The distinction between past performance evaluations and prospective assessments of suitability for a new position: the fact that someone was a good performer in a lower position does not compel a promotion decision.
The opinion uses Anderson to validate Netzer’s focus on how candidates would perform as assistant dean, not just how they had performed in prior roles.
DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 1998)
Emphasizes that it is the decisionmaker’s perception that matters, not the plaintiff’s or coworkers’ opinions, and warns against courts acting as a super‑personnel department. The opinion invokes this to discount coworker declarations praising Hood‑Wilson or disparaging Bernardy; such evidence does not undercut Netzer’s articulated assessment.

3.1.4 Pretext Through Circumstantial Evidence and Credibility

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)
Holds that proof that the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credence can support an inference of discrimination, especially combined with a prima facie case. The Fourth Circuit cites Reeves to articulate the standard but concludes that Hood‑Wilson has not shown sufficient falsity or inconsistency in CCB’s explanation.
Blue v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990)
Addresses preselection, stating that even if a supervisor unfairly preselects someone, that harms all applicants equally, black and white alike. The court relies on Blue to blunt Hood‑Wilson’s argument that alleged preselection of three White male candidates for assistant dean positions was inherently discriminatory.

3.1.5 Stray Remarks, Deviations from Policy, and Comparators

Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289 (4th Cir. 2010)
Holds that the intent of the decisionmaker is crucial and that stray remarks, untethered to the decision, have reduced probative value. The opinion applies Merritt to Slezak’s alleged comments, which were not made by the final decisionmaker, Netzer, and were temporally distant from the challenged decision.
Wannamaker‑Amos v. Purem Novi, Inc., 126 F.4th 244 (4th Cir. 2025)
(As described in the opinion) Identifies factors for assessing whether discriminatory comments are probative of discriminatory intent: speaker identity, nature of the remarks, and temporal proximity to the adverse action. Also signals that abrupt deviations from progressive discipline policies can evidence pretext. The Fourth Circuit distinguishes the facts here: Slezak’s comments were generalized, temporally remote, and not linked to Netzer’s promotion decision; and CCB followed, rather than ignored, its disciplinary policy with respect to the Corrective Action Letter.
Hollis v. Morgan State Univ., 153 F.4th 369 (4th Cir. 2025)
(As quoted) Acknowledges that deviations from internal policy are circumstantial evidence from which pretext and discriminatory intent may be inferred. The court juxtaposes this principle with the evidence here to conclude there was no deviation—Human Resources actually endorsed the lesser sanction given to Hood‑Wilson.
Laing v. Fed. Express Corp., 703 F.3d 713 (4th Cir. 2013)
Indicates that comments about an employee’s route change (or analogous employment conditions) are not necessarily discriminatory if they can be equally attributed to legitimate reasons. The court analogizes this to Slezak’s criticisms of Hood‑Wilson’s performance, concluding they sound in dissatisfaction with performance, not race or gender bias.
Cosby v. S.C. Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 93 F.4th 707 (4th Cir. 2024) and Mackey v. Shalala, 360 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2004)
These cases, referenced in a footnote, caution that purely self‑serving affidavits, unsupported by other evidence, carry limited weight in defeating summary judgment in Title VII cases. The court notes that while Hood‑Wilson has more than just her own affidavit, the principle warns against overreliance on subjective beliefs.

3.1.6 Standard of Review and Summary Judgment

Belmora LLC v. Bayer Consumer Care AG, 987 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2021)
Cited for the de novo standard of review of summary judgment orders. The court also restates the familiar Rule 56 standard and, citing Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., confirms that all facts and reasonable inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Framing the Case at the Pretext Stage

The court follows a pattern increasingly common in appellate Title VII decisions:

It recites the McDonnell Douglas framework and prima facie elements;
It emphasizes the low bar for a prima facie case (relatively easy test);
It assumes the prima facie case is met without resolving disputes about whether Hood‑Wilson satisfied every element; and
It moves directly to the dispositive question of pretext—whether CCB’s stated reason (Bernardy’s superior qualifications) is a cover for discrimination.

This approach reflects a jurisprudential preference: rather than parsing whether a plaintiff barely clears the prima facie hurdle, the court evaluates whether, on a full record, there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to infer intentional discrimination.

3.2.2 Comparative Qualifications: “Demonstrably Superior” Standard

The core of CCB’s defense is that it hired Bernardy because he was more qualified for the Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions position. The job description emphasized:

Knowledge of federal, state, and county welfare‑to‑work and workforce development systems;
Ability to manage large staffs (25+ employees) and large operating and grant budgets;
Experience with performance‑based funding and WIOA (Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act) programs; and
A track record of effective grant writing.

Netzer, the Vice President and final decisionmaker, provided a detailed affidavit explaining why Bernardy matched these criteria more closely:

He managed larger, more complex programs with broader workforce development missions than the Single Step program;
He had significant experience with WIOA funding and workforce solutions programming;
He had written and managed substantial grants and performance‑based funding; and
He had preexisting relationships with key agencies in the workforce development ecosystem.

By contrast, Netzer perceived Hood‑Wilson’s background as narrower:

The Single Step program had a much smaller budget and staff and served a narrower population (people with disabilities);
Her interview performance suggested limited familiarity with WIOA, large‑scale grant management, and performance‑based funding; and
Her experience did not show the same breadth in general workforce development systems.

Hood‑Wilson attempted to rebut this by:

Offering her own testimony about her grant‑writing and WIOA experience;
Presenting a coworker’s declaration (Tenesha Riden) stating that Bernardy had poor leadership skills and mishandled a grant program, while praising Hood‑Wilson’s grant work.

The court, applying Heiko and DeJarnette, emphasizes two points:

Employer‑Defined Criteria Control: Courts must assess comparative qualifications against the job criteria the employer has established. Under those criteria, Netzer’s explanation that Bernardy better matched the workforce systems, WIOA, and large‑scale grant‑management requirements is facially coherent.
Decisionmaker’s Perception is Central: Coworker opinions about who is a better leader or whose program they preferred carry little weight compared to the decisionmaker’s documented reasoning. The court repeats that it is the perception of the decision maker which is relevant, not the plaintiff’s or her colleagues’ subjective views.

Because the record did not show that Hood‑Wilson was demonstrably (i.e., clearly, significantly) better qualified than Bernardy on the relevant criteria, the court declines to second‑guess the college’s judgment. To do otherwise would turn the court into the super‑personnel department warned against in DeJarnette.

3.2.3 Preselection: Why It Rarely Proves Discrimination

Hood‑Wilson claimed that:

Bernardy was effectively preselected for the Assistant Dean of Workforce Solutions role; and
Two other men (Bouis and Jurch) were similarly preselected for the other assistant dean roles.

She relied on:

A non‑selected candidate’s impression that the interview questions were tailored to those three candidates’ strengths; and
Testimony suggesting that Netzer had told the college president these positions were being created to keep those three from leaving CCB.

Citing Blue and Anderson, the court holds:

Preselection, by itself, is not evidence of discriminatory animus. If Netzer favored these three male candidates, that prejudice is against all other applicants—Black and White, male and female—equally.
The plaintiff must connect preselection to protected‑class status (race or gender), not simply to favoritism, patronage, or perceived better fit. Favoritism might be unfair, but it is not necessarily illegal under Title VII.

Crucially, the court notes that Hood‑Wilson did not point to any specific interview question or evaluation criterion that was biased because of race or gender, as opposed to being tailored to the favored candidates’ experiences. Thus, preselection remains, at most, a sign of ordinary unfairness, not actionable discrimination.

3.2.4 Circumstantial Evidence: Remarks, Discipline, and Climate

Hood‑Wilson also argued that circumstantial evidence—Slezak’s remarks and disciplinary actions—showed a discriminatory climate against Black women, including herself.

(a) Alleged Discriminatory Remarks by Slezak

She pointed to three types of statements Slezak allegedly made:

A comment dismissing Martha’s Vineyard because There are a lot of Black people there.
A remark about people in Baltimore jumping rent, followed by, Melanie, I know you know all about that.
Repeated statements questioning Hood‑Wilson’s competence, including calling her incompetent and saying she did not know the ins and outs of everything.

The court assumes, for summary judgment purposes, that these remarks were indeed made, but finds them insufficient for several reasons:

Speaker Identity and Role: Slezak was not the final decisionmaker; Netzer was. While she sat on the search committee, there is no evidence she dominated it or that the committee’s deliberations were tainted by her alleged bias. In fact, Netzer and Slezak gave Hood‑Wilson her highest interview scores.
Lack of Nexus to the Decision: There is no evidence that Slezak’s comments about race or competence influenced Netzer’s decision, that she manipulated the process against Hood‑Wilson, or that the committee deviated from its scoring procedures in a way tied to those remarks.
Temporal Distance: At least one remark (the Martha’s Vineyard comment) occurred nearly a year before the promotion process. Under Wannamaker‑Amos, temporal proximity is not strictly required but is a factor; here it weighs against probative value.
Nature of the Remarks: Some comments are generalized remarks about Black people or the city, not directly about Hood‑Wilson’s qualifications or character. Under Wannamaker‑Amos, individualized, job‑related disparagement linked to protected status is more probative than generalized bias.

Applying the Merritt and Wannamaker‑Amos factors, the court treats these as stray or isolated remarks insufficiently tied to the promotion decision to establish pretext.

(b) The Corrective Action Letter and Alleged Disparate Discipline

After Hood‑Wilson announced her resignation (effective February 2019), she received a Corrective Action Letter from Slezak in December 2018 citing her for approving overlapping timecards (double‑dipping) by two of her Black female subordinates. The letter stated she had repeatedly been warned about fiscal management issues and had caused approximately $5,000 in overpayments.

Hood‑Wilson argued:

The double‑dipping issues arose from a new payroll system and were procedural rather than fraudulent;
White male employees, including Jurch, allegedly made similar timekeeping mistakes but were not disciplined; and
The discipline thus showed both discriminatory animus and disparate treatment.

The court again rejects this as proof of pretext, emphasizing:

Policy Compliance, Not Deviation: Unlike the situations in Hollis or Wannamaker‑Amos, where abrupt deviations from progressive discipline policies suggested a discriminatory motive, here Slezak followed the college’s policy and Human Resources’ recommendation. Hood‑Wilson had prior documented issues with fiscal management; the written warning was a moderated response, not an escalation beyond policy.
Comparator Requirements: For a disparate discipline theory, comparators must be similarly situated in all relevant respects, including disciplinary history. Hood‑Wilson failed to show that the White male employees she named had the same history of fiscal issues or that they engaged in identical misconduct. Under Cosby, this failure is fatal to the comparator theory.
Disconnect from the Promotion Decision: The Corrective Action Letter was issued after the promotion decision and after she had already tendered her resignation. Its connection to Netzer’s earlier decision is attenuated; it cannot easily be read back into the rationale for the promotion choice.

Thus, even if the letter were unfair in a colloquial sense, it does not, on this record, support a finding that the promotion decision was motivated by race or gender discrimination.

3.2.5 The Court’s Overall Evaluation of the Evidence

Bringing these strands together, the Fourth Circuit concludes that:

CCB articulated a clear, consistent, and job‑related explanation for choosing Bernardy;
Hood‑Wilson’s relative qualifications, viewed through CCB’s own job criteria, were not demonstrably superior to Bernardy’s;
Alleged preselection affects all candidates equally and, without additional proof of class‑based animus, does not show discrimination;
Stray remarks and later disciplinary actions, disconnected from the actual decisionmaker and the promotion process, cannot reasonably carry the plaintiff’s burden of showing pretext; and
No reasonable factfinder could conclude, on this record, that CCB’s reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason for the failure to promote.

Accordingly, summary judgment for CCB is affirmed.

3.3 Impact and Implications

3.3.1 For Title VII Failure‑to‑Promote Plaintiffs

The decision underscores the Fourth Circuit’s high evidentiary bar at the pretext stage in promotion cases:

Comparative Qualifications: It is not enough to show that the plaintiff was qualified or even arguably better. The plaintiff must marshal evidence that her qualifications were so plainly superior that a reasonable jury could infer that any rational employer would have chosen her absent discrimination.
Subjective Opinions Are Weak Evidence: Self‑assessments and coworker opinions about who was the better candidate carry limited weight, especially when the employer can point to job‑related criteria and documented experience of the selected candidate.
Preselection as a Limited Tool: Evidence of favoritism or preselection may support a general argument of unfairness but will rarely, by itself, prove discrimination. Plaintiffs must connect preselection to protected traits, not just to personal preferences or network ties.
Stray Remarks Must Be Tied to Decisions: Allegedly biased remarks matter only if there is a clear nexus between the speaker, the content and timing of the remarks, and the challenged employment decision. Comments by non‑decisionmakers or remote in time will typically be discounted.
Comparators Must Be Carefully Matched: For disparate discipline or treatment theories, plaintiffs must show that comparators are similarly situated in all material respects—similar positions, supervisors, performance histories, and misconduct.

3.3.2 For Employers and Decisionmakers

The opinion also provides a practical roadmap for employers defending promotion decisions:

Define Clear, Job‑Related Criteria: CCB’s detailed job description, emphasizing WIOA, workforce systems, and large‑scale management, allowed the court to assess qualifications in a structured way.
Document the Decision Process: Use of a multi‑member search committee, standardized questions, numeric scoring, and a reasoned affidavit from the decisionmaker all bolstered the credibility of CCB’s explanation.
Keep Discipline Consistent with Policy: The fact that HR recommended the written warning and that it aligned with CCB’s progressive discipline structure insulated the Corrective Action Letter from being viewed as discriminatory pretext.
Be Aware of Supervisors’ Remarks: While the court discounted Slezak’s statements here, repeated or more proximate remarks by someone with greater control over the decision could tip the balance in another case. Training and oversight remain important.

3.3.3 Doctrinally: Consolidation, Not Transformation

Doctrinally, Hood‑Wilson does not create a new rule but:

Reaffirms the “demonstrably superior” standard for using comparative qualifications to show pretext in the Fourth Circuit;
Clarifies that preselection, without a link to protected traits, is insufficient evidence of discrimination;
Aligns with recent cases (Wannamaker‑Amos, Hollis, Cosby) that sharpen the requirements for using stray remarks, policy deviations, and comparator evidence at summary judgment; and
Signals continued judicial reluctance to overrule employer business judgments where those judgments are documented, consistent, and grounded in articulable job‑related criteria.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

For readers less familiar with employment discrimination law, this section explains key concepts referenced in the opinion.

4.1 Prima Facie Case

A prima facie case is the initial showing a plaintiff must make to raise an inference of unlawful discrimination. In a Title VII failure‑to‑promote case in the Fourth Circuit, this generally means showing:

You are in a protected class (e.g., race, sex);
You suffered an adverse action (e.g., were passed over for promotion);
You were meeting your employer’s legitimate expectations; and
The circumstances of the decision suggest possible discrimination (e.g., the job went to someone outside your protected class with similar qualifications).

The bar is intentionally low; the real test comes at the pretext stage.

4.2 Burden‑Shifting under McDonnell Douglas

In cases without direct evidence of discrimination, courts use the McDonnell Douglas three‑step framework:

Plaintiff’s Prima Facie Case – raises an initial inference of discrimination.
Employer’s Legitimate Reason – the employer must articulate a non‑discriminatory reason (e.g., the other candidate was more qualified).
Plaintiff’s Proof of Pretext – the plaintiff must show the employer’s reason is false or not the real reason, and that the real reason is discriminatory.

4.3 Pretext

Pretext means that the stated reason for an employment decision is not the true reason, but a cover for unlawful discrimination. Plaintiffs can show pretext by, for example:

Exposing inconsistencies in the employer’s explanation;
Showing comparators outside the protected class were treated better in similar circumstances;
Demonstrating that the plaintiff was much more qualified than the selected candidate; or
Pointing to discriminatory remarks or conduct closely tied to the decision.

4.4 Comparative Qualifications and “Demonstrably Superior”

In promotion cases, plaintiffs often argue, I was more qualified. Courts will not re‑run the hiring process from scratch. Instead, they ask:

Did the employer use reasonable, job‑related criteria?
Are there clear, objective reasons to believe the plaintiff was overwhelmingly better qualified under those criteria?

If the answer is no—if both candidates were reasonably qualified and the differences are debatable—courts typically will not second‑guess the employer. The plaintiff must show her qualifications were “demonstrably superior”—obviously and materially better—to infer discrimination from the choice.

4.5 Preselection

Preselection occurs when a decisionmaker informally decides who will get a job before a formal process (like posting and interviews) is completed. Preselection is often unfair and may violate internal policies, but:

It is not automatically illegal under Title VII; and
It shows discrimination only if the favored candidate was chosen because of race, sex, or another protected trait.

If preselection simply reflects favoritism or a desire to retain particular employees, it may be bad practice but not unlawful discrimination.

4.6 Stray Remarks

Stray remarks are comments that may be biased but are:

Made by someone who is not the decisionmaker, or
Unrelated in time or subject matter to the actual decision, or
Too general or ambiguous to link to the specific employment action.

Such remarks may show a problematic environment, but courts require a clear link between the remark and the adverse action to use it as evidence of pretext.

4.7 Comparators

A comparator is another employee used to show unequal treatment. To be valid, a comparator must be similarly situated in all material respects to the plaintiff:

Same or similar job duties;
Same decisionmakers or chain of command;
Similar performance and disciplinary histories; and
Similar misconduct or performance issues.

If the alleged comparator has a different history (e.g., no prior warnings when the plaintiff had several), courts will not treat that person as a proper comparator.

5. Conclusion

Hood‑Wilson v. Board of Trustees, Community College of Baltimore County is best understood as a clarifying and consolidating decision rather than a revolutionary one. The Fourth Circuit:

Affirms that, in promotion cases, plaintiffs must do more than show they were qualified or even arguably as qualified; they must present evidence that their qualifications were demonstrably superior to those of the selectee;
Reiterates that courts defer to the employer’s reasonably defined job criteria and the decisionmaker’s documented assessment of those criteria;
Confirms that alleged preselection and favoritism, while potentially unfair, do not by themselves constitute actionable discrimination without a demonstrated link to protected‑class status;
Applies a strict nexus requirement to stray remarks and disciplinary evidence, insisting on a close connection between such evidence, the decisionmaker, and the challenged action before it can show pretext; and
Reinforces the broader principle that federal courts will not sit as super‑personnel departments re‑weighing hiring and promotion decisions absent strong, class‑based evidence of discriminatory intent.

For plaintiffs, the opinion is a cautionary reminder that success at the motion‑to‑dismiss stage—where allegations are taken as true—is only the beginning. On a full evidentiary record, a Title VII failure‑to‑promote claim in the Fourth Circuit must present solid, specific, and decision‑focused proof of pretext to survive summary judgment.

Pretext, Preselection, and Comparative Qualifications in Title VII Promotion Cases: Commentary on Hood‑Wilson v. Board of Trustees, Community College of Baltimore County