Presumptive Validity of Firearms‑Training Requirements After Bruen: The Second Circuit’s Application in Corbett v. Hochul

I. Introduction

In Corbett v. Hochul, No. 22‑3210‑cv (2d Cir. Nov. 21, 2025) (summary order), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction sought by plaintiff Jonathan Corbett against enforcement of New York’s firearms‑training requirement for concealed‑carry licenses under the Concealed Carry Improvement Act (“CCIA”).

The decision comes against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s landmark Second Amendment decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and the Second Circuit’s own recent precedential opinion in Giambalvo v. Suffolk County, 155 F.4th 163 (2d Cir. 2025). While Corbett is a non‑precedential summary order, it is significant because it:

Reaffirms that, in light of Giambalvo, New York’s 18‑hour firearms‑training requirement is likely constitutional under the Bruen text‑and‑history framework;
Clarifies the heightened burden on plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctions against governmental licensing schemes enacted in the public interest;
Applies the Supreme Court’s articulation of the standard for facial constitutional challenges in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024); and
Confirms that, in this context, standing exists against certain City officials but not against the identified State officials.

This commentary unpacks the court’s reasoning, the influence of earlier precedents, and the implications for Second Amendment litigation concerning training or competency requirements.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. New York’s CCIA and the Firearms‑Training Requirement

After Bruen struck down New York’s prior “may‑issue” regime that conditioned public carry licenses on a showing of “proper cause,” New York enacted the Concealed Carry Improvement Act (“CCIA”) in 2022. Among its provisions is a detailed firearms‑training requirement codified in N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(19).

Under that provision, as quoted by the panel:

“[A]s a prerequisite to obtaining a license, ‘an applicant shall complete an in-person live firearms safety course conducted by a duly authorized instructor,’ including ‘a minimum of sixteen hours of in-person live curriculum’ and ‘a minimum of two hours of a live-fire range training course.’” (citing N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(19)).

This totals 18 hours of training: 16 hours classroom‑style, and 2 hours live‑fire.

B. Corbett’s Application and Lawsuit

Jonathan Corbett applied to the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) Licensing Division for a permit to own and carry a concealed handgun. While his application was pending, New York enacted the CCIA and, with it, the training requirement.

Corbett then filed suit in the Southern District of New York against a set of State officials (including the Governor and Attorney General) and City officials (including the Mayor, the Police Commissioner, and the head of the NYPD Licensing Division). He alleged, in substance, that the CCIA firearms‑training requirement:

“unnecessarily, intentionally, and unreasonably restricts his ability” to “keep and bear arms” in violation of the Second Amendment. (Joint App’x at 11).

He sought a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of the training requirement during the pendency of the litigation.

Corbett had initially challenged additional CCIA requirements as well, but the district court held he lacked standing to contest those. On appeal, he did not challenge that aspect of the judgment, and the Second Circuit treated those claims as abandoned, citing Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 119 (2d Cir. 2004) (arguments not raised on appeal are deemed abandoned).

C. District Court’s Initial Ruling on the Preliminary Injunction

On November 29, 2022, Judge Lorna G. Schofield of the Southern District of New York denied Corbett’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court:

Assumed without deciding that Corbett had standing to challenge the training requirement;
Focused instead on the likelihood of success on the merits; and
Concluded that Corbett had not carried his burden to show that New York’s training requirement was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.

Corbett appealed this denial to the Second Circuit.

D. First Second Circuit Remand for Standing (Jacobson Remand)

In an earlier phase of the appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case under the procedure set out in United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 21‑22 (2d Cir. 1994). Under Jacobson, the appellate court can remand for additional fact‑finding or clarification (here, on the threshold issue of standing) while retaining jurisdiction over the appeal.

On remand, the district court issued a detailed opinion:

Holding that Corbett has standing to challenge the CCIA firearms‑training requirement as against the City defendants; but
Holding that he lacks standing to challenge that requirement as against the State defendants.

See Corbett v. Hochul, No. 1:22‑cv‑05867 (LGS), 2024 WL 3553132, at *1–4 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2024).

Crucially, the district court made clear that its prior denial of the preliminary injunction remained substantively unchanged by its standing analysis. The earlier denial was premised on Corbett’s failure to establish a likelihood of success on the merits, and that merits analysis was unaffected by narrowing the set of defendants.

While the case was on remand, the NYPD Licensing Division denied Corbett’s concealed‑carry application on May 14, 2024. The district court nonetheless concluded that he still had standing against the City defendants.

E. Intervening Decisions in Giambalvo and Rahimi

After the district court’s standing decision, the Second Circuit:

Reinstated Corbett’s appeal on the merits of the preliminary‑injunction denial; but
Held the appeal in abeyance pending its decision in Giambalvo v. Suffolk County, a case presenting broader challenges to CCIA licensing requirements, including the very same firearms‑training provision.

On September 12, 2025, the Second Circuit issued its precedential opinion in Giambalvo, 155 F.4th 163 (2d Cir. 2025). Given the direct overlap, the Corbett panel requested supplemental briefing on the effect of Giambalvo and also on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024).

III. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Decision

The Second Circuit’s November 21, 2025 summary order in Corbett does three main things:

Standing: It adopts the district court’s standing analysis and holds that Corbett has standing to challenge the training requirement only as against the City defendants, not the State defendants. Corbett did not appeal the adverse standing ruling as to the State defendants, and the court deems any challenge to that issue abandoned.
Standard of Review & Preliminary Injunction Framework: It applies abuse‑of‑discretion review to the denial of a preliminary injunction and emphasizes the heightened “clear or substantial likelihood of success” standard applicable when the injunction would affect government action taken in the public interest under a statutory scheme.
Merits (Second Amendment): Relying heavily on Giambalvo, it holds that Corbett has not shown a clear or substantial likelihood of success on his facial Second Amendment challenge to the CCIA training requirement. This is because:

Giambalvo already held that the CCIA’s 18‑hour training requirement is “likely constitutional” and that such training is presumptively valid under Heller and Bruen as part of a “shall‑issue” regime;
Under Bruen, the Supreme Court expressly indicated that nothing in its analysis casts doubt on the constitutionality of such shall‑issue regimes with objective licensing criteria, including training; and
Under Rahimi, a facial challenge requires proof that no set of circumstances exists under which the provision would be valid, a demanding standard Corbett does not meet.

Having found that Corbett failed to meet his burden on likelihood of success, the Second Circuit affirms the denial of a preliminary injunction. The court notes that it has considered Corbett’s remaining arguments and finds them without merit.

Because this is a summary order, the panel opens by repeating the Second Circuit’s standard disclaimer: such orders “do not have precedential effect,” though they may be cited under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Standing: City Versus State Defendants

The panel begins by addressing the threshold question of standing. It expressly endorses the district court’s “thorough and well‑reasoned analysis” and agrees that:

Corbett has Article III standing to challenge the training requirement as against the City defendants (e.g., the NYPD officials who administer the licensing process); but
He lacks standing to pursue that challenge against the State defendants (e.g., the Governor, Attorney General, and Superintendent of the State Police).

Although the summary order does not detail the reasoning, the likely contours follow standard standing doctrine:

Injury in fact: Corbett alleges a concrete injury — the burden imposed by the training requirement on his ability to obtain and carry a concealed handgun.
Traceability and redressability: Those elements are satisfied as to the City defendants who directly administer and enforce the licensing process (including the training requirement), but not as to the higher‑level State officials, whose connection to Corbett’s specific injury is too attenuated.

Corbett did not challenge on appeal the district court’s conclusion that he lacked standing as to the State defendants; the panel therefore treats that issue as abandoned under Shakur, 391 F.3d at 119.

B. The Preliminary Injunction Standard and Government Action

The court next recites the familiar four‑factor test for preliminary injunctions:

Likelihood of success on the merits;
Likelihood of irreparable harm absent injunctive relief;
Balance of equities tipping in the plaintiff’s favor; and
That an injunction is in the public interest.

However, the court emphasizes an important doctrinal refinement: when a preliminary injunction would alter or halt government action taken in the public interest under a statute or regulatory scheme, the plaintiff must meet a heightened merits standard. The plaintiff must show a:

“clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” (Giambalvo, 155 F.4th at 174).

This stricter requirement reflects judicial reluctance to disrupt democratically enacted public‑safety regimes absent a very strong showing that they are legally defective.

The panel does not analyze irreparable harm, balance of equities, or public interest in detail, because the decision turns on the first factor: Corbett’s failure to demonstrate the requisite likelihood of success on the merits.

C. The Second Amendment Framework: Heller and Bruen

The Second Circuit situates its analysis within the Supreme Court’s modern Second Amendment jurisprudence.

1. Heller (2008)

In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Supreme Court:

Recognized that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms unconnected with service in a militia;
Invalidated the District of Columbia’s handgun ban and trigger‑lock requirement; but
Made clear that the right is “not unlimited” and is subject to certain longstanding, presumptively lawful regulatory measures (such as prohibitions on possession by felons or in sensitive places).

Heller also suggested that laws imposing objective conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale or licensing of firearms could be compatible with the Second Amendment.

2. Bruen (2022) and the Two‑Step Framework

In N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), the Court clarified the method for adjudicating Second Amendment claims. The Second Circuit in Corbett (quoting Giambalvo) summarizes the two‑step framework as follows:

Textual inquiry: Ask whether “the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct.” If so, the conduct is presumptively protected.
Historical tradition inquiry: If the conduct is covered, the government must justify its restriction by showing that the regulation is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”

Critically for this case, Bruen distinguished between:

New York’s former “may‑issue” regime (unconstitutional), which vested broad discretion in licensing officials to deny permits based on subjective judgments of “proper cause”; and
“Shall‑issue” regimes (presumptively constitutional), which rely on “narrow, objective, and definite standards” such as background checks, fingerprinting, or training requirements.

In a key passage, the Bruen Court stated that “nothing” in its analysis should be read to suggest the unconstitutionality of the 43 states’ shall‑issue licensing regimes, which often include firearms training requirements. The Second Circuit leans heavily on this language.

D. Giambalvo: Binding Precedent on the CCIA Training Requirement

The decision in Giambalvo v. Suffolk County, 155 F.4th 163 (2d Cir. 2025), forms the backbone of the Second Circuit’s analysis in Corbett.

In Giambalvo, multiple plaintiffs challenged several CCIA provisions, including the same 18‑hour training requirement at issue in Corbett. The Second Circuit in Giambalvo:

Affirmed the denial of preliminary injunctive relief;
Expressly held that the “CCIA’s 18-hour firearms training requirement is likely constitutional.” (Giambalvo, 155 F.4th at 181); and
Concluded that both Heller and Bruen treat firearms training requirements as part of presumptively lawful, shall‑issue licensing regimes.

The Giambalvo panel reasoned that because Supreme Court precedent itself treats objective training rules as compatible with the Second Amendment, such requirements start from a position of presumptive constitutionality:

“[A] plaintiff seeking to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of a firearms training requirement must make at least some showing to overcome this presumptive constitutionality as part of their burden of establishing a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” (Giambalvo, 155 F.4th at 181) (emphasis in original).

In other words, training requirements are not treated as subject‑matter outliers in the Bruen framework; they fall within the category of objective, shall‑issue criteria that Bruen took pains not to disturb.

The Giambalvo plaintiffs had argued that the 18‑hour requirement was facially unconstitutional because courses were allegedly too expensive. The court rejected that argument, observing that:

“at least some of the training courses being offered are not so prohibitively expensive so as to rise to a Second Amendment violation.” (Giambalvo, 155 F.4th at 182).

This meant that the plaintiffs could not show that the requirement was invalid in all of its applications — a critical point that carries over directly into Corbett.

E. Application in Corbett: Failure to Overcome the Presumption of Constitutionality

Against the Giambalvo backdrop, the Corbett panel’s merits analysis is relatively concise but decisive. It identifies:

The right at issue: the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms (applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment);
The Bruen framework: text and historical tradition; and
The existing binding precedent: Giambalvo’s determination that the same 18‑hour training requirement is likely constitutional and presumptively valid.

Corbett’s sole substantive merits argument, as characterized by the court, is:

“that there is no historical analog to training requirements for firearms licenses, and therefore the firearms-training requirement does not pass muster under the Bruen framework.”

The panel rejects this argument almost entirely by reference to Giambalvo and Bruen:

Bruen explicitly singled out shall‑issue licensing regimes (which often include training) as “not constitutionally suspect.”
Thus, Bruen “supports, rather than undermines, the constitutionality of the CCIA firearms-training requirement.”
As in Giambalvo, Corbett fails to provide a persuasive basis to rebut the “presumptive validity” of training as a licensing criterion under Supreme Court guidance.

Accordingly, the Second Circuit holds that Corbett has not established a clear or substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claim, and it finds no abuse of discretion in the district court’s refusal to enjoin the training requirement.

F. Facial Challenges and Rahimi’s “No Set of Circumstances” Standard

Corbett’s challenge to the CCIA training requirement is a facial challenge — i.e., he seeks to invalidate the provision in all its applications, not merely as applied to his particular circumstances. The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), is cited by the Second Circuit for the standard governing such facial attacks.

Quoting Rahimi, the panel notes:

“a facial challenge requires a [party] to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [challenged provision] would be valid.” (Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693).

The “no set of circumstances” standard is exceptionally demanding. It is not enough to show that the statute is unconstitutional in some or even many applications; the challenger must show that there is no constitutionally permissible application at all.

In light of Giambalvo’s finding that at least some implementation of the CCIA training regime (including reasonably priced courses) does not violate the Second Amendment, Corbett cannot possibly meet that standard. His facial challenge thus fails as a matter of law at the preliminary‑injunction stage.

G. Other Precedents Cited

Beyond Heller, Bruen, Giambalvo, and Rahimi, the panel cites several other precedents:

United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994): Provides the procedural mechanism for limited remands for fact‑finding (here, on standing) while retaining appellate jurisdiction.
Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2004): Reinforces the rule that issues not raised on appeal are deemed abandoned.

These precedents serve procedural and doctrinal housekeeping roles, ensuring that the court’s jurisdictional and preservation rules are respected.

H. The Nature and Role of a Summary Order

The panel expressly notes that this is a summary order, which “do[es] not have precedential effect.” Under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1:

Summary orders issued after January 1, 2007 may be cited in future filings, but
They are not binding precedent on other panels or courts.

Nonetheless, such orders often provide a valuable window into how a circuit is applying its precedential decisions (like Giambalvo) to individual disputes. In practice, they can be highly persuasive, particularly on closely related factual and legal questions.

V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

To make the decision more accessible, it is useful to unpack several core legal concepts invoked in Corbett.

A. Standing

Standing is a constitutional requirement (arising from Article III’s limitation of federal courts to “cases” and “controversies”) that determines who may bring a lawsuit.

To have standing, a plaintiff must show:

Injury in fact: A concrete, particularized harm that is actual or imminent (not speculative).
Traceability: The injury is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant (not the result of the independent action of some third party).
Redressability: A favorable court decision would likely redress the injury.

In Corbett, the district court (and the Second Circuit by adoption) found standing only against the City defendants, who directly administer and enforce the training requirement, not against the higher‑level State officials.

B. Preliminary Injunctions

A preliminary injunction is a court order issued at an early stage of a case to preserve the status quo or prevent irreparable harm before final judgment. Because it is an “extraordinary” remedy:

The plaintiff bears a heavy burden; and
The court routinely demands a strong showing on both the likelihood of success on the merits and the existence of irreparable harm.

When an injunction would restrain government action carried out under a statute or regulation (as in Corbett), courts apply a heightened merits standard: the plaintiff must show a clear or substantial likelihood of success, not merely a “serious question” going to the merits.

C. Facial Versus As‑Applied Challenges

Facial challenge: Attacks a law in all its applications. To succeed, the plaintiff must show that there is “no set of circumstances” under which the law is valid.
As‑applied challenge: Argues that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the particular plaintiff or in a specific context, even if the law might be valid in other situations.

Corbett mounted a facial challenge to the training requirement. Under Rahimi, this is extremely difficult. If the requirement can be constitutionally applied in even some circumstances (for example, where training is accessible and not overly burdensome), a facial challenge fails.

D. “Shall‑Issue” Versus “May‑Issue” Licensing

May‑issue licensing (New York’s former regime): Licensing officials have substantial discretion to deny permits even if objective criteria are met, often requiring applicants to show “proper cause” or “good reason” beyond mere desire for self‑defense.
Shall‑issue licensing (post‑CCIA New York and most states): If an applicant meets specified objective criteria (background checks, training, etc.), the official must issue the license; there is little to no discretionary judgment.

Bruen invalidated New York’s former may‑issue regime but expressly reassured that shall‑issue systems — which frequently include training mandates — remain constitutionally permissible, so long as they are not implemented in a way that effectively denies the right.

E. The “Historical Tradition” Test

Under Bruen, once the Second Amendment’s text is found to cover the conduct (e.g., carrying a handgun in public for self‑defense), the government must show that the challenged regulation is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

This does not mean that an identical law must have existed in 1791 or 1868. Instead, courts look for historical analogues that are “relevantly similar” in terms of:

Why the regulation was adopted (its justification); and
How the regulation operates (the burden it imposes on the right).

The Second Circuit in Giambalvo interpreted Bruen and Heller as having already essentially performed much of this work with respect to licensing regimes: the Court signaled that objective training and qualification standards are within the historical tradition of permissible regulation.

VI. Impact and Future Implications

A. Practical Effect on New York’s CCIA Training Requirement

After Giambalvo and Corbett, challengers face a steep uphill battle in seeking preliminary injunctions against New York’s CCIA training requirement:

The Second Circuit has now twice — once in a precedential opinion (Giambalvo) and once in a summary order (Corbett) — indicated that the requirement is likely constitutional under the Second Amendment.
The court treats the training mandate as part of a presumptively valid shall‑issue scheme explicitly blessed, at least at a high level of generality, by Bruen.

As a result, in the Second Circuit, broad facial challenges to this training requirement are unlikely to succeed, especially at the preliminary‑injunction stage.

B. Scope for Future As‑Applied Challenges

The fact that a law is not facially invalid does not foreclose all challenges. Litigants may still pursue as‑applied challenges under more specific factual scenarios. For example, future plaintiffs might argue that:

The cost, geographic availability, or scheduling of training is so onerous that, in practice, it operates as a de facto denial of the right for particular groups (e.g., low‑income applicants, rural residents, or disabled individuals); or
Specific implementation choices by licensing authorities (such as arbitrary obstacles in enrolling in courses) convert an otherwise valid training mandate into an unconstitutional barrier as applied to them.

However, such challenges would need to marshal concrete evidence and focus on the particular burdens involved, not merely rely on generalized historical arguments.

C. Influence Beyond New York

Although Corbett itself is a nonprecedential summary order, it reinforces a trend in Second Amendment jurisprudence:

Courts are increasingly distinguishing between categorical bans or subjective-discretion regimes (which invite strict scrutiny under Bruen’s history‑focused test) and
Objective licensing criteria such as training and background checks (which are more readily upheld, absent evidence of abusive implementation).

Other jurisdictions may look to Giambalvo and Corbett as persuasive authority in defending training or competency requirements, especially where those requirements are not excessively burdensome in cost or logistics.

D. Clarified Interaction Between Bruen and Rahimi

By invoking Rahimi in the context of a Second Amendment facial challenge, the Second Circuit underscores that:

The usual “no set of circumstances” standard for facial constitutional attacks applies in the Second Amendment context as well; and
Even post‑Bruen, courts will not lightly declare gun regulations facially invalid where there is any plausible constitutional application.

This synthesis of Bruen’s methodological framework with Rahimi’s facial‑challenge standard will likely influence how future Second Amendment claims are framed (pushing more toward as‑applied theories) and how courts evaluate them.

VII. Conclusion

Corbett v. Hochul confirms and applies a key development in post‑Bruen Second Amendment law within the Second Circuit: firearms‑training requirements in objective, shall‑issue licensing regimes are presumptively constitutional. Relying on its precedential decision in Giambalvo and the Supreme Court’s assurances in Bruen, the court holds that challengers seeking to preliminarily enjoin New York’s CCIA training mandate must overcome this presumption — a demanding task that Corbett, like the Giambalvo plaintiffs, failed to accomplish.

The order also:

Clarifies that facial Second Amendment challenges must satisfy the stringent “no set of circumstances” standard drawn from Rahimi;
Reiterates the heightened standard for preliminary injunctions against government action taken under a statutory scheme; and
Demonstrates careful adherence to standing requirements and issue‑preservation rules.

While nonprecedential, Corbett is a clear signal of how the Second Circuit intends to apply Bruen, Heller, and Rahimi to licensing‑related Second Amendment disputes: subjective, discretionary denials of public carry may still be vulnerable, but objective conditions like training — especially when not prohibitively burdensome — occupy a strong position within the historic tradition of permissible firearm regulation.