Presumption of Possession for Intestate Heirs – Canty v. Burns Reinforces the 10-Year Limitations Framework for Quiet-Title Actions Involving Void Deeds

1. Introduction

Canty v. Burns (2025 NY Slip Op 02903) arose from a familial dispute over a residence in Queens, New York, once owned by Dorothy Anderson, who died intestate in 1995. After Anderson’s death, one of her children, Marilyn Burns, recorded a 1996 deed granting herself sole ownership. More than two decades later, Anderson’s grandchildren, Nahema Canty and James Gary (“the plaintiffs”), asserted that the deed was void because their interests had been knowingly omitted. They sued under Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) Article 15 to:

• Quiet title to the property;
• Partition if necessary; and
• Vacate a reverse mortgage subsequently given to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”).

The Supreme Court, Kings County, granted motions by Burns and MERS to dismiss, largely on statute-of-limitations grounds. On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed, clarifying how the 10-year limitation in CPLR 212(a) interplays with the presumption in RPAPL 311 when the deed relied upon is allegedly void.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Second Department held:

• The complaint adequately pleaded a cause of action to quiet title because it alleged constructive possession and a removable cloud on title in the form of the 1996 deed.
• The action was not time-barred. Legal title holders are presumed to have been in possession within ten years unless the defendant proves 10 years of adverse possession. Burns and MERS supplied no such showing.
• Consequently, the court denied dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(1), (5), and (7) and reinstated the notice of pendency.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v. Matamoro, 200 AD3d 79 (2021) – Reinforced that documentary evidence must “utterly refute” allegations to justify dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(1).
• Zuniga v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 147 AD3d 882 (2017) – Clarified pleading requirements for a quiet-title action: possession + cloud on title.
• Faison v. Lewis, 25 NY3d 220 (2015) and Cruz v. Cruz, 37 AD3d 754 (2007) – Stand for the proposition that a deed knowingly omitting heirs can be treated as void, not merely voidable, thereby tolling limitations and undermining reliance on record title.
• Feaster v. Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 227 AD3d 668 (2024); Covert Holdings, LLC v. 1019 Irving Realty, LLC, 206 AD3d 691 (2022) – Allocation of burdens on a CPLR 3211(a)(5) statute-of-limitations defense.
• Estate of Becker v. Murtagh, 19 NY3d 75 (2012) – Explains adverse-possession requirements; crucial because, absent proof of adverse possession, legal heirs are presumed in possession.

By weaving these authorities together, the panel underscored that where a deed is allegedly void ab initio, the 10-year clock of CPLR 212(a) does not start to run against the rightful heirs unless and until adverse possession is established.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Pleading Sufficiency (CPLR 3211(a)(7)). Accepting the allegations as true, the plaintiffs had constructive possession through intestacy (EPTL 4-1.1[a][3]) and identified a “removable cloud” in the 1996 deed. That was enough to fit within a cognizable legal theory.
2. Documentary Evidence (CPLR 3211(a)(1)). The 1996 deed did not “utterly refute” the plaintiffs’ claims because it on its face represented itself as executed by “all heirs,” a statement the plaintiffs claim was false. Thus, the deed could not conclusively establish Burns’s sole ownership.
3. Statute of Limitations (CPLR 3211(a)(5)).
   • Baseline Rule: CPLR 212(a) establishes a 10-year period to recover real property.
   • Statutory Overlay: RPAPL 311 creates a presumption that the one with legal title has been in possession within the limitations period unless there has been 10 uninterrupted years of adverse possession.
   • Application: Because the plaintiffs claimed legal title via intestacy and no party alleged adverse possession, the presumption preserved timeliness.
4. Void Deed Doctrine. Relying on Faison, the panel recognized that a deed procured through fraudulent omission of heirs is void, not merely voidable; therefore, no limitations period strengthens the void instrument, and subsequent mortgages fall with it.

3.3 Potential Impact on Future Litigation

• Greater Scrutiny of “Heir Deeds.” Real-estate practitioners and lenders will need to confirm that all heirs execute conveyances, especially in estates with pre-deceased children and grandchildren.
• Mortgage Market Ripples. Reverse-mortgage lenders (and assignees such as MERS) risk cancellation of their security interests if the underlying deed is later deemed void.
• Pleading Strategy. Plaintiffs can now confidently invoke RPAPL 311 presumptions to defeat limitations defenses at the pleadings stage when their claim is grounded in legal (intestate) title.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Quiet Title (RPAPL Art. 15): A lawsuit asking the court to declare who owns (or has a lien on) real property and to “quiet” any competing claims.
• Constructive Possession: Possession inferred by law, e.g., from title, even if the person does not live at the property.
• Notice of Pendency (Lis Pendens): A filing that warns prospective purchasers or lenders that the property is involved in litigation affecting its title.
• Void vs. Voidable Deed: A void deed is a legal nullity from inception; a voidable deed is valid until annulled. Fraud involving forgery or intentional omission of known owners renders a deed void.
• Adverse Possession: Gaining ownership by openly, notoriously, and exclusively possessing property for a statutory period (typically 10 years in NY) under a claim of right.
• CPLR 3211(a)(1), (5), (7): Subsections allowing dismissal for (1) documentary evidence, (5) statute of limitations, or (7) failure to state a claim.

5. Conclusion

Canty v. Burns cements the proposition that intestate heirs who acquire title by operation of law are presumed to have been in possession for statute-of-limitations purposes, shielding them from premature dismissal of quiet-title actions—even decades after a suspect deed. The decision:

• Reaffirms strict standards for CPLR 3211 dismissals;
• Clarifies the harmonious reading of CPLR 212(a) and RPAPL 311;
• Elevates the importance of verifying heir participation in conveyances; and
• Signals heightened vulnerability of mortgages predicated on void deeds.

As a result, Canty v. Burns will likely be cited wherever defendants wield the 10-year limitation against heirs challenging long-recorded but potentially void conveyances. The case underscores that in New York real-property law, legal title—and the presumptions it carries—remains a formidable shield until truly displaced by adverse possession or other decisive evidence.