Presumption of Legislative Good-Faith Prevails: Eleventh Circuit Clarifies Equal-Protection Challenges to 8 U.S.C. § 1326

Introduction

United States v. Ignacio Felix-Salinas (consolidated with Ferretiz-Hernandez and Chiroy-Cac) is the Eleventh Circuit’s 2025 decision rejecting an equal-protection attack on 8 U.S.C. § 1326—the federal felony of re-entering the United States after removal. Three Latin-American defendants argued that § 1326 carries the discriminatory taint of its 1929 predecessor, the “Undesirable Aliens Act,” and therefore violates the Fifth Amendment’s equal-protection component. The panel (Jordan, Lagoa, Tjoflat J.J.; opinion by Tjoflat J.) held that:

Courts must begin with a strong presumption of legislative good-faith.
The burden of proving discriminatory purpose under Village of Arlington Heights rests on the challenger and does not shift merely because an earlier, now-repealed statute was discriminatory.
§ 1326 survives rational-basis review and, even under the Arlington Heights framework, the defendants failed to show discriminatory purpose in 1952 or later amendments.

By affirming the district court and aligning with every other circuit to consider the issue, the Eleventh Circuit cements a new, express precedent: a “tainted origins” argument—standing alone—cannot invalidate a recodified statute unless the challenger proves that the reenacting Congress itself acted with discriminatory intent.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court:

Reviewed the denial of the motions to dismiss under § 1326 for abuse of discretion, but examined constitutional questions de novo and historical fact-findings for clear error.
Assumed, without deciding, that the Arlington Heights discriminatory-purpose framework applies even in the immigration context.
Held that defendants did not establish discriminatory intent when Congress reenacted § 1326 in 1952 or in subsequent amendments.
Rejected disparate-impact statistics as insufficient without proof of discriminatory purpose, attributing the statistical skew to geographic proximity to Mexico.
Affirmed all convictions and sentences.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion weaves together a number of Supreme Court and circuit cases:

Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. (1977) – provides the multi-factor test for discriminatory intent.
Washington v. Davis (1976) – disparate impact alone is insufficient for constitutional violation.
Abbott v. Perez (2018) – reinforces the presumption of legislative good-faith and the challenger’s burden.
United States v. Carrillo-Lopez (9th Cir. 2023) – Ninth Circuit rejection of identical challenge; cited for consensus.
Additional supportive circuit precedents: Suquilanda (2d), Wence (3d), Sanchez-Garcia (4th), Barcenas-Rumualdo (5th), Viveros-Chavez (7th), Amador-Bonilla (10th).
Structural cases on separation of powers, e.g., United States v. O’Brien (1968) and Speech-or-Debate Clause jurisprudence.

These authorities collectively buttress the Eleventh Circuit’s twin holdings: (1) intent, not history alone, controls, and (2) judicial deference to Congress is heightened in immigration and criminal contexts.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

Step-Zero: Standard of Review
The court treated motive findings as factual (clear-error review) and constitutional validity as legal (de novo), aligning with Brnovich and Hunter.
Application of Arlington Heights
The court assumed Arlington Heights applies (though immigration doctrine is unsettled) and analyzed eight factors: historical background, sequence of events, departures, contemporaneous statements, impact, foreseeability, knowledge, and alternatives.
Historical Distinctions
Congress repealed the 1929 Act in 1952 via the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), after a multi-year codification effort primarily concerned with Cold-War security. Re-use of statutory language is “of little probative value.” Subsequent amendments in 1988, 1990, 1994, 1996, etc., further dilute any alleged “taint.”
Presumption of Good-Faith
Relying on Abbott/ Millar, the court emphasized that past discrimination cannot function as “original sin” perpetually condemning future legislation; challengers must show the reenacting legislature also discriminated.
Evaluation of Evidence
– Offensive rhetoric (“wetback”) by a Deputy AG and one Representative: isolated, not imputable to Congress as a whole.
– President Truman’s veto message: targeted national-origins quotas, not § 1326, and therefore neutral.
– Statistical impact: predictable product of geography and does not alone show motive.
– Expert testimony: largely derivative of prior cases; district court entitled to discount credibility and weight.
Rational-Basis Check (alternative holding)
Even if Arlington Heights were inapplicable, §1326 rationally deters unlawful reentry, protects border integrity, and promotes sentence uniformity—legitimate governmental objectives.

C. Impact of the Judgment

Forecloses “Tainted Origins” Strategy in the Eleventh Circuit. Litigants must produce new, legislature-specific evidence of discriminatory motive post-1952.
Solidifies Nationwide Consensus: all circuits to consider the issue now uphold § 1326, reducing likelihood of Supreme Court review unless a future split emerges.
Guidance for Equal-Protection Claims: provides a structured approach—focus on reenacting Congress, not merely historical antecedents.
Immigration Prosecutions: DOJ can confidently continue charging § 1326 without constitutional uncertainty; defense counsel must pivot to other avenues (e.g., statutory challenges under § 1326(d)).
Legislative Drafting: affirms that recodification projects are not constitutionally burdened by past discriminatory statutes if later Congresses act for neutral reasons.
Scholarly Discourse: decision pushes academic debate toward whether immigration plenary-power doctrine should evolve rather than relying on equal-protection “motive” attacks.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Arlington Heights Framework: A test used to decide if a law that is neutral on its face was nevertheless passed with discriminatory motive. Courts look at factors like legislative history, statistical impact, and contemporaneous statements.
Presumption of Legislative Good-Faith: Courts start with the assumption that lawmakers act constitutionally; challengers must rebut this with evidence.
Clear-Error Review: An appellate standard highly deferential to the trial court’s factual findings; reversal occurs only when the appellate court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Speech or Debate Clause: Constitutional provision that protects legislators from being questioned in court about their legislative acts or motives.
Disparate Impact vs. Discriminatory Purpose: A law can disadvantage a group statistically (impact) without having been enacted to harm that group (purpose); only the latter violates equal protection for facially neutral statutes.
Rational-Basis Review: The most deferential constitutional test—law upheld if reasonably related to a legitimate government objective.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Ignacio Felix-Salinas affirms the constitutional footing of § 1326 and establishes a clear doctrinal lesson: the discriminatory motives of a bygone Congress do not automatically infect a reenacted statute; challengers bear a heavy evidentiary burden to show contemporary discriminatory purpose. By reinforcing the presumption of legislative good-faith and aligning with other circuits, the court curtails equal-protection attacks that rely solely on historical taint and provides a roadmap for future challenges—demanding concrete proof tied to the reenacting or amending legislature. This judgment thus not only resolves the defendants’ claims but also shapes the litigation landscape for immigration-related criminal statutes, emphasizing careful historical scrutiny, respect for separation of powers, and fidelity to Arlington Heights principles.