Presumption of Comprehensive §3553(a) Consideration in Sentencing: United States v. Ullman

Introduction

United States v. Ullman (2d Cir. Apr. 4, 2025) addresses two central sentencing questions: (1) whether a district court must explicitly enumerate each factor in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to satisfy procedural-reasonableness requirements, and (2) whether a 300-month downward‐variance sentence for sexually exploiting a child is substantively reasonable. Defendant Thomas Ullman, after pleading guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), received a 300-month term—60 months below the Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal, he challenged both procedural and substantive aspects of that sentence. The Second Circuit affirmed, setting forth important principles on the presumption that sentencing courts consider all relevant factors and reaffirming the deferential standard of review applicable to sentences within or near the Guidelines range.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit, sitting by summary order, affirmed the district court’s judgment. On procedural reasonableness, the panel held that absent affirmative evidence to the contrary, courts presume a sentencing judge has considered all § 3553(a) factors, even if not recited verbatim. Ullman’s unpreserved challenge to the failure to address unwarranted disparity (§ 3553(a)(6)) thus failed under plain‐error review. On substantive reasonableness, the court found the 300-month variance sentence well within the broad range of permissible outcomes, given the gravity of Ullman’s exploitation of over 200 teenage victims and production of thousands of illicit images. Because the sentence was neither “shockingly high” nor unsupported by the record, it survived deferential review.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Brooks, 889 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2018): Establishes the abuse‐of‐discretion standard for preserved sentencing challenges.
United States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2020): Confirms that unpreserved procedural‐reasonableness challenges are reviewed for plain error.
United States v. Gall, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Holds that a district court must calculate the Guidelines range, consider § 3553(a) factors, and explain the sentence to permit appellate review—but need not recite each factor verbatim.
United States v. Rosa, 957 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2020): Presumes a sentencing court considered all relevant § 3553(a) factors unless rebutted.
United States v. Cassesse, 685 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2012): Reiterates that § 3553(c) imposes no “specific formulas or incantations” in open‐court explanations.
United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2008): Declares that a sentencing explanation is adequate if it informs the defendant of the reasons and enables appellate review.
United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2007): Confirms district courts need not discuss every § 3553(a) factor individually.
United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009): Defines substantive‐reasonableness review as a “backstop” against sentences that are “shockingly high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable.”
United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008): Emphasizes deference to district courts in substantive‐reasonableness review.
United States v. Perez‐Frias, 636 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2011): Affirms that a sentence within the Guidelines is ordinarily reasonable.
United States v. Muzio, 966 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2020): Upheld a similarly severe sentence for internet‐facilitated child exploitation.

2. Legal Reasoning

The panel first addressed procedural reasonableness. The district court had calculated a Guidelines range of 360 months, heard argument on § 3553(a) factors, and varied downward by 60 months. Ullman’s sole procedural complaint was that the court did not expressly discuss the need to avoid unwarranted disparities (§ 3553(a)(6)). Under § 3553(c) and the circuit’s precedents (Gall; Rosa; Cassesse), no rote recitation of every factor is required. This Court presumes the district judge satisfied her obligations unless the record affirmatively shows otherwise. Because Ullman offered no evidence rebutting that presumption, his unpreserved challenge failed plain‐error review (Marcus, 560 U.S. 258).

On substantive reasonableness, the panel applied the “backstop” doctrine (Rigas), reviewing the totality of circumstances and giving “due deference” to the sentencing judge’s decision (Cavera). Ullman’s offense conduct—possession, direction and receipt of thousands of images from over 200 minor victims—and his admitted predatory intent justified a severe term. A 300-month sentence, though high, fell comfortably within the realm of reasoned sentencing judgments and aligned with Muzio and other child‐exploitation cases.

3. Impact

This decision cements several principles:

Presumption of Consideration: District courts are presumed to have considered all statutory factors unless the record rebuts that assumption.
No Formulaic Requirements: Sentencing judges need not engage in a factor‐by‐factor incantation so long as they explain their reasoning sufficiently for appellate review.
Deferential Review: Both procedural and substantive reasonableness challenges face a stringent standard—plain error for unpreserved objections, abuse of discretion for preserved ones, and a backstop against only the most extreme outcomes.
Sentences Near the Guidelines: Variances within or near the Guidelines range will rarely be overturned absent clear showings of unreasonableness.

Future appellants must therefore present clear evidence of omitted considerations or extreme unjustness to disturb a district court’s sentencing decision.

Complex Concepts Simplified

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) Factors: A list of factors (nature of the offense, history of the defendant, need for the sentence, unwarranted disparities, etc.) that district courts must consider in sentencing.
Plain‐Error Review: The most deferential appellate standard; applied to issues a defendant failed to raise below. Requires a clear or obvious error affecting substantial rights and the fairness or integrity of proceedings.
Abuse‐of‐Discretion Standard: Governs preserved sentencing appeals. Courts reverse only when the sentencing judge’s decision falls outside the broad range of reasonable outcomes.
Sentencing Guidelines Range: A recommended sentencing range calculated from the defendant’s offense level and criminal history category. Courts must calculate it but may vary above or below based on § 3553(a) considerations.
Variance: A non‐Guidelines sentence above or below the calculated range, justified by the judge’s assessment of statutory factors.

Conclusion

United States v. Ullman reinforces the principle that district courts are presumed to have thoughtfully considered the full panoply of § 3553(a) factors, even absent verbal enumeration. It underscores the broad deference granted to sentencing judges both procedurally—by eschewing formulaic explanations—and substantively—by permitting a wide range of reasonable sentences, especially in serious child‐exploitation cases. Going forward, appellants must produce concrete evidence of overlooked factors or extreme disproportionality to overcome these presumptions and deference.