Presumed Prejudice for Improper Mid-Trial Juror Dismissals: United States v. Carpenter

1. Introduction

United States v. Carpenter, No. 24-11076 (5th Cir. 2025) arises out of a multi-million-dollar scheme to defraud TRICARE, the military’s health-care insurer. Dr. Brian Carpenter, a podiatrist, and his co-defendant uncle, Jerry Hawrylak, were convicted of six counts of health-care fraud and one count of conspiracy after a two-week jury trial in the Northern District of Texas. On appeal, Carpenter challenged four distinct trial rulings:

Exclusion of exculpatory portions of a two-hour recorded conversation under Federal Rule of Evidence 106 (the “rule of completeness”).
Limitations on cross-examination of the key cooperating witnesses (the Hawrylak brothers) and exclusion of a Sentencing-Guidelines expert.
Admission of a personal prescription under Rule 404(b).
Mid-trial dismissal of a sworn juror under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c).

The Fifth Circuit rejected Carpenter’s evidentiary complaints but found prejudicial error in the juror dismissal, vacated all convictions, and remanded for a new trial. The decision cements—and clarifies—a strict standard: once a jury is sworn, a juror may be dismissed only on a finding that she is actually unable or disqualified to serve; “undue hardship” to her employer is not enough. Dismissing a juror for a legally irrelevant reason triggers a presumption of prejudice, requiring automatic reversal.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Rule 106 Issue: The district court wrongly excluded the remainder of a recording because it deemed the statements “self-serving hearsay.” Fifth Circuit precedent (United States v. Portillo) makes clear that Rule 106 overrides hearsay objections. Nonetheless, the panel held the error harmless because defense counsel elicited the substance of the excluded portions through cross-examination.
Confrontation / Guidelines Issue: The trial court limited cross-examination to three “approved questions” and barred expert testimony on the Guidelines ranges the Hawrylak brothers avoided. The appellate court held that the jury still learned enough about the witnesses’ incentives; no Confrontation Clause violation occurred.
Rule 404(b) Issue: A personal prescription Carpenter wrote for Jerry was deemed “intrinsic” to the charged scheme; admission was not abuse of discretion.
Juror Dismissal: The district court excused a seventh-grade math teacher mid-trial after an email from her principal lamented her absence during STAAR-test preparation. Because the court never found she was unable to perform her juror duties, and because hardship to an employer is not a legally relevant ground post-empanelment, Fifth Circuit precedent compelled reversal. Per Rodriguez, Pruett, and Virgen-Moreno, prejudice is presumed.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Rule 106 & Completeness: United States v. Portillo, 969 F.3d 144 (5th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Herman, 997 F.3d 251 (5th Cir. 2021) held that Rule 106 operates independently of the hearsay rules, a position codified in the 2023 amendment to Rule 106. The panel relied on these cases to brand the district court’s hearsay rationale erroneous.
Confrontation / Cross-Examination: United States v. Davis, 393 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Roussel, 705 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2013); and United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1993) framed the Sixth-Amendment inquiry. They emphasize that once bias is exposed, judges may reasonably cabin further interrogation.
Rule 404(b) / Intrinsic-Evidence Doctrine: The opinion leans on United States v. Watkins, 591 F.3d 780 (5th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Brown, 553 F.3d 768 (5th Cir. 2008) for the rule that conduct “inextricably intertwined” with the charged crime lies outside Rule 404(b)’s character evidence ban.
Juror-Dismissal Cases: The core authority is United States v. Rodriguez, 573 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978), which established that mid-trial dismissal is proper only when a juror’s ability to perform is “impaired.” Later cases—Huntress, Pruett, Virgen-Moreno—added that removing a juror for an irrelevant reason automatically creates prejudice and requires reversal. The panel distinguished the more permissive Dumas (1981), critiquing its misreading of Rodriguez.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Harmless-Error Treatment of Evidentiary Rulings. Even though the trial court misapplied Rule 106, the panel examined whether the exclusion affected “substantial rights” under Rule 52(a). Because the substance reached the jury via testimony, the error was harmless.

2. Constitutionally Adequate Cross-Examination. The majority found no Sixth-Amendment violation because jurors learned that the Hawrylaks faced greater statutory exposure, pled to lesser charges, and relied on the Government’s discretion for further leniency. The marginal increment of detail the Guidelines expert would have supplied was not constitutionally required.

3. Intrinsic Evidence and Rule 404(b). A single prescription written for the co-defendant was deemed part of the “single criminal episode,” making Rule 404(b) inapplicable. The district court’s similarity-and-timing findings fit squarely within Fifth-Circuit intrinsic-evidence doctrine.

4. Strict Construction of Rule 24(c).
  a) Different Standards Pre- and Post-Empanelment. During voir dire, 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) allows excusal for “undue hardship.” Post-empanelment, Rule 24(c) requires inability or disqualification.
  b) Absence of Findings. The district judge never found the teacher juror unable to sit; indeed, he kept her until day’s end “just in case.” The majority concluded the dismissal was based solely on her employer’s inconvenience—a legally irrelevant reason.
  c) Presumed Prejudice. Citing Pruett and Virgen-Moreno, the panel treated the improper dismissal as presumptively prejudicial, negating any harmless-error analysis. Because the wrongly removed juror was replaced by an alternate before deliberations, the only remedy was vacatur and remand for a new trial.

C. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

Tighter Constraints on Trial Judges. District judges within the Fifth Circuit must now articulate clear findings that a juror cannot perform her duties before invoking Rule 24(c). Employer hardship, scheduling conflicts, or administrative convenience are inadequate once the jury is sworn.
Emphasis on Record-Making. Trial counsel, especially prosecutors, must ensure the record supports any juror substitution or risk wholesale retrial months or years later.
Potential for En Banc or Supreme-Court Review. The majority questioned the “circular” nature of the presumed-prejudice doctrine and its tension with Rule 52(a)’s harmless-error rule, hinting that future panels—or the en banc court—may revisit the standard. The dissent (Judge Ho) offers the blueprint for such reconsideration.
Rule 106 Clarification Affirmed. Although not outcome-determinative, the opinion re-affirms that completeness may override hearsay and notes the 2023 amendment codifying that view, binding on all federal courts.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Federal Rule of Evidence 106 (Rule of Completeness): Prevents one side from presenting snippets of a statement out of context. If part of a recording is introduced, the opponent can demand any other portion that “in fairness” should be considered—even if it would normally be hearsay.
Confrontation Clause: Sixth-Amendment right of a defendant to cross-examine witnesses. Once the jury learns enough to assess credibility (e.g., a witness’s plea deal), the judge can limit cumulative or confusing interrogation.
Intrinsic Evidence vs. Rule 404(b): Acts “inextricably intertwined” with the charged offense—same scheme, same actors, same timeframe—are admissible without the character-evidence hurdles of Rule 404(b).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c): After a jury is sworn, a juror may be replaced only if unable to perform or disqualified. Mere hardship, absent inability, is insufficient.
Presumed Prejudice Doctrine: Under Fifth-Circuit precedent, dismissing a juror for a reason not authorized by Rule 24(c) automatically prejudices the defendant, mandating reversal without separate harmless-error analysis.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Carpenter is a cautionary tale about the sanctity of the empaneled jury. While evidentiary rulings are routinely subject to harmless-error review, meddling with the composition of the jury mid-trial is treated differently. The decision sharply delineates the lesser “undue hardship” standard applicable during jury selection from the stringent “unable to perform” standard once trial has begun. Any dismissal that blurs that line will—under current Fifth-Circuit doctrine—cause the entire conviction to unravel. Practitioners should heed the opinion’s dual lessons: preserve a meticulous record when challenging (or defending) juror substitutions, and remember that even seemingly minor courtroom management decisions can dictate appellate outcomes.