Presumed Attorney Authority and the Procedural Treatment of Motions to Enforce Settlements in Iowa:
A Commentary on Recio v. Fridley

I. Introduction

The Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Oscar Recio and Maria Recio v. Frederick M. Fridley, D.L. Peterson Trust, Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., and Doe Corporation, No. 23-0990 (Iowa Dec. 5, 2025), addresses two interrelated issues that matter deeply in civil practice:

• When and how a client can escape a settlement their lawyer negotiated on their behalf; and
• How Iowa courts should procedurally handle motions to enforce those settlement agreements.

The case arises from an Iowa trucking accident involving Texas residents represented by Texas counsel. After the first lawyer negotiated a $125,000 settlement with the defendants’ insurer, the client, Oscar Recio, replaced counsel and denied ever authorizing any settlement. The defendants moved in Iowa district court to enforce the settlement.

The ruling offers an important reaffirmation—and practical sharpening—of several Iowa doctrines:

• The strong presumption that an attorney of record has authority to settle a client’s case;
• The client’s heavy burden—“clear and convincing” evidence—to rebut that presumption;
• The two-track approach to enforcing settlements (summary enforcement if facts are undisputed, factfinding if they are disputed); and
• The consequences of failing to object when the district court proceeds as the factfinder on a motion to enforce.

Justice Waterman’s majority opinion, joined by all but one justice, affirms the district court’s enforcement of the settlement and the court of appeals’ decision. Justice Oxley’s dissent forcefully critiques the procedural handling of such motions and calls for a clearer rule: a party seeking enforcement must choose upfront between a summary-judgment path and a plenary factfinding path.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Accident and Initial Representation

Oscar Recio, an over-the-road truck driver residing in Texas, was injured on December 7, 2020, while working underneath his parked semi-truck on an Interstate 80 on-ramp in Adair, Iowa. Defendant Frederick M. Fridley, driving a Ram utility van in the scope of his employment for D.L. Peterson Trust (and associated with Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.), dropped his cellphone and, distracted while retrieving it, crashed into Recio’s parked semi. Recio was underneath the truck and suffered injuries.

Recio retained Texas attorney Cesar Palma of the Tijerina Law Group to pursue his personal injury claim. Palma, acting as Recio’s counsel:

• Sent a policy-limits demand to the insurer in October 2021;
• Engaged in several rounds of negotiations after the insurer responded with a $105,000 offer in January 2022; and
• Ultimately instructed the insurer’s representative, Trent Merkley, to “[g]et authority for [$125,000] and send me a release.”

Merkley then emailed Palma a release for $125,000. Recio never signed it.

B. Change of Counsel and Lawsuit in Iowa

At some later point, dissatisfied with communication, Recio terminated Tijerina Law Group and retained a new Texas lawyer, Robert Cantu of Houston. Cantu informed Recio that Palma had negotiated for and requested a $125,000 settlement release. Cantu attempted to negotiate anew with the insurer but those efforts failed.

Recio, joined by his wife Maria, then filed suit in Iowa district court (Warren County) represented by Omaha counsel, naming Fridley and his employer-related entities as defendants.

C. Motion to Enforce Settlement

The defendants answered and moved to enforce the alleged $125,000 settlement. The motion:

• Was captioned as a “motion to enforce settlement” under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.431 (general motion practice);
• Did not cite Rule 1.981 (summary judgment) or use the phrase “summary judgment,” but
• Repeatedly invoked summary-judgment-like concepts (“no genuine issue as to any material fact,” “entitled to enforcement as a matter of law”).

Defendants attached:

• Palma’s emails with Merkley documenting settlement negotiations and the $125,000 agreement; and
• The unsigned release.

Nineteen days later, Recio filed a resistance with an affidavit. Key statements in the affidavit included:

• He was dealing specifically with Palma;
• “At no time” did Palma inform him that a demand letter was sent, obtain authority to accept/reject/negotiate, convey offers, or get authority to make counteroffers;
• He had “never signed any release” nor given approval to settle for $125,000; and
• He terminated Tijerina due to “lack of communication.”

Notably, the affidavit did not state that Recio had ever told Palma that he was not authorized to negotiate or that Palma was restricted from settlement discussions.

The resistance did not:

• Label the motion as one for summary judgment;
• Invoke Rule 1.981; or
• Argue that genuine issues of material fact precluded “summary” enforcement.

Defendants replied, arguing:

• The resistance was untimely under Rule 1.431(4)’s 10-day deadline; and
• Recio’s affidavit was insufficient, as a matter of “clear and convincing” evidence, to rebut the presumption of Palma’s authority.

D. The District Court Hearing and Ruling

The district court:

• Set a 30-minute hearing on a “Court Service Day” and advised counsel that if they planned to present testimony, a continuance would be necessary.
• Counsel for both sides replied they did not intend to present live testimony.
• Held a Zoom hearing, receiving exhibits and treating Oscar’s affidavit as his testimony.
• Offered the parties another opportunity to present testimony; both declined.

The court then issued an eight-page order:

• Finding that the emails showed Merkley accepted Palma’s demand to settle for $125,000;
• Recognizing the legal presumption that an attorney of record acts with client authority, rebuttable only by “clear and convincing” proof;
• Concluding that Recio’s affidavit was not clear and convincing evidence that Palma acted without authority; and
• Enforcing the settlement and dismissing the action, conditioned on payment of $125,000.

The order did not cite Rule 1.981 or reference “summary judgment.” The court treated itself as the factfinder (a bench trial on the settlement-enforcement issue).

E. Posttrial Motion, Appeal, and Court of Appeals Decision

Recio moved to reconsider, disputing the district court’s findings but:

• Accepting that “findings of fact in a law action are binding” if supported by substantial evidence; and
• Framing the standard in the classic deferential “light most favorable” terms—not as a summary-judgment issue.

The motion to reconsider did not:

• Challenge the procedure used (bench trial vs summary judgment);
• Cite Rule 1.981; or
• Claim entitlement to a jury determination.

On appeal, however, Recio’s brief for the first time characterized the ruling as “summary judgment” and argued the affidavit generated a “genuine issue of material fact” precluding enforcement.

The court of appeals:

• Rejected the premise that the district court had entered summary judgment;
• Held that the court had functioned as the factfinder on the settlement issue; and
• Applied substantial-evidence review, concluding the presumption of authority was not rebutted.

Recio sought further review, which the Iowa Supreme Court granted.

III. Summary of the Opinions

A. Majority Opinion (Justice Waterman)

The majority:

1. Characterizes the proceeding as a bench trial on the settlement-enforcement issue. Because no party invoked Rule 1.981 or objected to the court acting as factfinder, the court treats the hearing as a trial under Rule 1.914 (separate trial of an issue) rather than a summary-judgment hearing.
2. Applies substantial-evidence review to the district court’s factual findings, following Wende v. Orv Rocker Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
3. Reaffirms the presumption of attorney authority to settle under Iowa Code § 602.10114 and related precedent (Dillon, Gilbride), rebuttable only by clear and convincing (“clear and satisfactory”) proof.
4. Holds that Recio’s affidavit alone did not provide clear and convincing evidence that Palma acted without authority, especially:
   • In light of Palma’s emails referencing communication with his client;
   • The absence of testimony or affidavits from Palma or the insurer contradicting that authority;
   • The absence of any ethics complaint or malpractice claim against Palma; and
   • The serious ethical implications if Palma had fabricated authority.
5. Emphasizes error preservation. Because Recio never objected to the court acting as factfinder, he forfeited any argument that:
   • The court should have treated the motion as one for summary judgment; or
   • The issue of Palma’s authority should have been tried to a jury.
6. Affirms enforcement of the settlement and the dismissal with prejudice upon payment of $125,000.

B. Dissent (Justice Oxley)

Justice Oxley’s dissent argues:

1. Litigation “is not a game of gotcha.” Given the lack of a specific procedural rule for motions to enforce settlements, courts should not retroactively relabel proceedings as bench trials when they were argued as summary enforcement.
2. Parties seeking enforcement should be required to “pick a path” upfront:
   • Either seek summary enforcement under Rule 1.981 (summary judgment standard), or
   • Request a bench trial under Rule 1.914, with explicit notice that the court will make factual findings.
3. Recio’s affidavit created a genuine issue of material fact about Palma’s authority, which should have defeated any attempt at summary enforcement:
   • Defendants’ evidence of Palma’s authority came only through hearsay-laden negotiation emails, not through Palma’s “professional statement” or sworn testimony;
   • By contrast, Recio’s first-hand affidavit stated that he never authorized any negotiation or settlement.
4. Even under Wende, the record shows the parties treated the issue as legal, not factual. The defendants repeatedly used summary-judgment language in briefing (“no genuine issue as to any material fact”); both sides argued sufficiency of the affidavit as a legal matter; no witnesses were called; and the proceeding bore the hallmarks of a summary hearing, not a trial.
5. The district court erred by resolving fact disputes in the same summary proceeding, rather than denying the motion and moving to a plenary evidentiary hearing or jury trial on the settlement issue.

IV. Doctrinal Framework

A. Settlements as Contracts

The majority reaffirms that settlement agreements are contracts governed by ordinary contract principles:

• Sierra Club v. Wayne Weber LLC, 689 N.W.2d 696, 702 (Iowa 2004): settlement agreements are contracts; courts ask whether the parties manifested mutual assent.
• McNeal v. Wapello County, 985 N.W.2d 484, 491 (Iowa 2023): Iowa law strongly favors voluntary settlements and discourages undue second-guessing of settlement terms.

Thus, once an enforceable settlement is formed, it generally disposes of all claims arising from the subject event, absent an express reservation of rights.

B. Attorney as Agent; Authority to Settle

An attorney is an agent of the client. As the majority notes (citing the Restatement (Third) of Agency and Dillon v. City of Davenport, 366 N.W.2d 918 (Iowa 1985)):

• Actual authority: Authority the agent reasonably believes the principal wants them to exercise, based on the principal’s manifestations (can be express or implied).
• Apparent authority: Authority third parties reasonably believe the agent has, based on the principal’s manifestations to them.

Iowa Code § 602.10114(2) provides that an attorney may:

“[B]ind a client to any agreement, in respect to any proceeding within the scope of the attorney’s or counselor’s proper duties and powers.”

Gilbride v. Trunnelle, 620 N.W.2d 244, 251 (Iowa 2000) (en banc), adds that settlement offers are “generally within the scope” of an attorney’s litigation duties. But an attorney cannot settle without authority.

Importantly, under § 602.10114(2), proof of such an agreement with counsel normally must come from:

• The attorney’s in-person professional statement;
• The attorney’s written, signed agreement filed with the clerk; or
• An entry upon the court’s record.

The majority treats Palma’s negotiation emails (and his representations within them) as evidence that he possessed authority. The dissent stresses that there was no direct sworn statement or in-person professional representation from Palma himself in this record.

C. Presumption of Authority and Burden of Proof

Key Iowa precedents establish that:

• An attorney of record is presumed to act with authority when negotiating settlement (Dillon, Gilbride).
• This presumption is rebuttable, but only by “clear and satisfactory proof,” equated with the “clear and convincing” standard (Gilbride, 620 N.W.2d at 251).
• “Clear and convincing” means the factfinder must be left without “serious or substantial uncertainty” (Mendenhall v. Judy, 671 N.W.2d 452, 454 (Iowa 2003), quoted by the district court).

Once the presumption applies, the client carries a heavy evidentiary burden to show their attorney exceeded or lacked authority.

D. Procedural Mechanisms: Summary Enforcement vs Factfinding

Wende v. Orv Rocker Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995), is central to the procedural framework:

1. If important facts are undisputed, trial courts may “summarily enforce” a settlement upon motion—analogous to summary judgment—and appellate courts apply the summary judgment standard of review.
2. If material facts are disputed, the settlement’s existence/validity must be resolved by a factfinder (judge or jury) either:
   • as an additional claim in the original action, or
   • in a separate hearing under Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.914.

The current case revolves around which track this motion followed and whether the litigants preserved objections to the chosen path.

V. Detailed Analysis of the Majority Opinion

A. Standard of Review: Bench Trial, Not Summary Judgment

The majority views the core gateway question as: Are we reviewing a summary-judgment-style ruling, or a factual determination by the district court sitting as factfinder?

Key reasons the majority chooses the second path:

• The motion was brought under Rule 1.431, not 1.981, and neither the motion, the reply, nor the district court’s ruling used the phrase “summary judgment.”
• The court:
  • Held an evidentiary-type hearing;
  • Received exhibits and an affidavit treated as testimony;
  • Offered the parties the chance to present additional testimony (which both declined); and
  • Issued detailed factual findings.
• Recio’s resistance and motion to reconsider:
  • Never invoked Rule 1.981;
  • Never argued the presence of “genuine issues of material fact;” and
  • Explicitly acknowledged deferential substantial-evidence review of factual findings.

On this record, the majority, echoing Wende and Cunningham, holds that the case fits the “factfinder” track. Therefore:

• The district court’s findings are binding if supported by substantial evidence (Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(a)); and
• The appellate court does not reweigh evidence or reassess credibility.

B. Substantial Evidence Supporting Attorney Authority

Under this deferential standard, the majority finds ample support for the district court’s determination that Palma had authority:

• Evidence favoring authority:
  • Recio’s own affidavit conceded Palma was his attorney at the relevant time.
  • Palma’s emails explicitly referenced consulting with his client.
  • Settlement negotiations over months are prima facie within counsel’s litigation duties.
• Evidence against authority:
  • Recio’s affidavit stating he was not informed of negotiations and never authorized settlement or counteroffers.
  • No signed release.
• Missing or absent evidence:
  • No affidavit or testimony from Palma contradicting his prior representations.
  • No evidence of an ethics complaint or malpractice claim against Palma for unauthorized settlement conduct (in contrast to cases like Sotak and Bellino where unauthorized settlements led to discipline).
  • No testimony from the insurer to challenge Palma’s authority.

Given:

• The strong presumption that an attorney acts with settlement authority;
• The need for “clear and convincing” evidence to rebut it; and
• The fact that the only contrary evidence was the client’s own uncorroborated affidavit,

the majority concludes that “reasonable minds” could accept the evidence as sufficient to find that the presumption was not overcome. Under substantial-evidence review, that ends the matter.

The majority expressly notes that appellate courts ask only whether the evidence supports the finding actually made—not whether it could have supported a different finding (Crow v. Simpson, 871 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2015); Postell).

C. Error Preservation and Waiver of Procedural Objection

The majority also grounds its holding in error-preservation doctrine:

• Recio did not object to the district court acting as factfinder at the hearing.
• He did not seek a continuance when the court noted that live testimony would require a different day.
• He did not request a jury determination of Palma’s authority.
• His motion to reconsider accepted, rather than challenged, the trial-court-as-factfinder framework.

Citing Wende and Cunningham, the majority holds that by “not object[ing] to the submission of the motion to enforce the settlement to the district court as factfinder,” Recio forfeited any claim that:

• The court should have applied summary-judgment standards; or
• The authority question should have gone to a jury.

This is a significant practical point: parties who silently proceed through a quasi-evidentiary hearing cannot later recharacterize it as an improper summary judgment to avoid deference on appeal.

D. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Footnote

The majority briefly dispatches a jurisdictional argument raised in the application for further review:

• Recio suggested the Iowa court lacked “subject matter jurisdiction” to adjudicate a Texas-reached settlement.
• The court explains this confuses subject matter jurisdiction (court’s authority over the type of case) with personal jurisdiction (authority over the parties).
• The Iowa district court clearly had subject matter jurisdiction over a tort arising from an accident in Iowa, and personal jurisdiction over Iowa-resident Fridley and others.

Thus, the challenge fails outright.

VI. Examination of Key Precedents Cited

A. Wende v. Orv Rocker Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 92 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995)

Wende is the principal foundational case:

• Recognized that no rule expressly governs motions to enforce settlements.
• Articulated the two-track approach:
  • Summary enforcement when material facts are undisputed; or
  • Factfinding (by judge or jury) when they are disputed, potentially via a separate trial under what is now Rule 1.914.
• Held that because the plaintiff did not object to the court acting as factfinder on the motion, she failed to preserve any procedural objections to that mode of adjudication.

The majority relies on Wende to:

• Justify treating the Recio hearing as a bench trial on the settlement’s validity; and
• Apply substantial-evidence review.

The dissent criticizes Wende for fostering procedural ambiguity and urges a clearer bifurcation—one that would not allow courts to collapse “summary enforcement” and “factfinding” into a single, ambiguous process.

B. Gilbride v. Trunnelle, 620 N.W.2d 244 (Iowa 2000) (en banc)

Gilbride confirms:

• The attorney’s authority to settle is presumed;
• To rebut, the client must present “clear and satisfactory proof;” and
• An attorney’s professional statement to the court regarding authority can satisfy § 602.10114(2).

In Gilbride, the attorney expressly told the court that all clients had agreed. The dissent in Recio stresses that no similar professional statement exists here from Palma, whereas the majority reasons that Palma’s emails and the absence of contrary sworn evidence suffice under substantial-evidence review.

C. Dillon v. City of Davenport, 366 N.W.2d 918 (Iowa 1985)

Dillon established that:

• Attorneys, as agents, can bind clients by settlements within the scope of their authority;
• If an attorney exceeds actual authority (e.g., settles above a monetary limit given by the client), the unauthorized portion can be invalidated; and
• Presumptive authority attaches by virtue of representation.

Dillon illustrates that disputes over scope of authority may require parsing a settlement to excise unauthorized portions. In Recio, by contrast, the entire settlement was claimed to be unauthorized; there was no partial-authorization argument.

D. Cunningham v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co., 55 N.W.2d 552 (Iowa 1952)

Cunningham is an early case where:

• The issue of an attorney’s settlement authority was tried in a separate bench trial under the predecessor to Rule 1.914;
• Both parties agreed to let the court determine the fact questions; and
• The Supreme Court, applying deferential review, refused to disturb the factual finding that the settlement was authorized.

Recio largely replicates this structure, with the additional modern overlay of the presumption of authority and the clear-and-convincing standard for rebuttal.

E. Ethics Cases: Sotak and Bellino

The majority cites:

• Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Sotak, 706 N.W.2d 385 (Iowa 2005) (two-year suspension for various violations including settling a client’s claim without authority); and
• Bellino v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, 124 S.W.3d 380 (Tex. App. 2003) (disbarment for failing to communicate settlement offers and unauthorized settlements).

These cases illustrate:

• The seriousness with which unauthorized settlements are viewed in attorney discipline; and
• An implication in Recio: if Palma truly acted without authority, one might expect some ethics proceeding or malpractice claim—yet none appears in the record.

The majority uses this absence as part of the circumstantial basis for doubting Recio’s unaided affidavit; the dissent does not give that factor the same weight.

VII. The Dissent: A Competing Procedural Vision

A. Requiring the Moving Party to “Pick a Path”

Justice Oxley’s dissent is forward-looking, proposing a cleaner procedural regime for enforcing settlements:

• If a party wants summary enforcement, it should proceed under Rule 1.981 (summary judgment) and:
  • Show no genuine issue of material fact as to the existence and enforceability of the settlement; and
  • Accept that any genuine factual dispute requires denial of the motion.
• If a party wants factfinding, it should:
  • Request a separate bench or jury trial under Rule 1.914;
  • Allow for live testimony, credibility determinations, and typical evidentiary processes.

The dissent criticizes Wende (and by implication, the majority) for blurring these paths and forcing appellate courts to rummage through the record to determine, after the fact, whether the proceeding was more like summary judgment or more like a trial.

B. Recio’s Affidavit as Creating a Fact Issue

Substantively, the dissent argues that Recio’s affidavit should have been enough to create a genuine dispute of material fact, defeating summary enforcement:

• Defendants never produced a professional statement or sworn testimony from Palma asserting he had settlement authority, unlike Gilbride and Wende.
• The only evidence of Palma’s authority came from negotiation emails—effectively hearsay statements used to show what Palma claimed about his communications with Recio.
• Recio’s affidavit, if believed, directly contradicted those statements and asserted:
  • No notice of settlement talks;
  • No authority to negotiate or settle; and
  • No approval of any specific dollar amount.

For Justice Oxley, this conflicting evidence is exactly what “genuine issues of material fact” look like. The dissent also notes comparable authorities from other jurisdictions (e.g., Alexander v. Burch, Alabama; King v. Driscoll, Pennsylvania) emphasizing that an attorney’s authority to settle is not automatically inferred and must be proven when disputed.

C. The Character of the District Court Proceeding

Justice Oxley carefully catalogs the “summary-judgment-like” features of the proceeding:

• Defendants explicitly framed their motion around the “no genuine issue as to any material fact” standard and invoked Gilbride as a summary-judgment precedent.
• Both sides chose not to call witnesses or extend the short hearing time, relying entirely on the written record.
• Arguments at the hearing focused on whether Recio’s affidavit, taken as true, was sufficient to meet the clear-and-convincing burden—a classic question of law/sufficiency, not of credibility.
• The district court’s ultimate statement that the affidavit “is not clear and convincing evidence” is, in the dissent’s view, a legal sufficiency conclusion akin to summary judgment, not a credibility finding after weighing live testimony.

On this reading, the dissent would treat the proceeding as summary judgment, conclude that a material factual dispute exists, and reverse the enforcement order.

D. Critique of Using Error Preservation to Define the Procedure

The dissent acknowledges that Recio’s counsel could have done more to clarify or object to the procedure but resists the idea that silence should convert what functionally looks like summary judgment into a full bench trial:

• Parties should not be required to seek “clarification” that a motion to “summarily enforce” is being treated as a pseudo-trial; the onus should be on the moving party and the court to define the path.
• When a district court grants what amounts to summary judgment, appellate review typically does not hinge on whether the losing party sought clarification of the court’s role as factfinder.

In short, Justice Oxley’s position is that procedure should be defined by the motion as filed and argued, not retroactively inferred based on a lack of objection and then used to insulate the decision under deferential review.

VIII. Clarifying Complex Legal Concepts

A. “Clear and Convincing” Evidence vs. “Substantial Evidence”

• Clear and convincing evidence is a trial-level burden of persuasion. It requires that the evidence be “highly probable” and leave the factfinder without serious or substantial doubt about the fact in question.
• Substantial evidence is an appellate standard of review. The question is not whether the appellate court would have found the fact proven, but only whether reasonable minds could accept the evidence as sufficient to support the finding actually made—even if the evidence could also have supported the opposite conclusion.

In Recio:

• The client at trial had to rebut the presumption of attorney authority by clear and convincing evidence.
• On appeal, the Supreme Court asked only whether substantial evidence supported the district court’s conclusion that this burden was not met.

B. Summary Judgment vs. Bench Trial

• Summary judgment (Rule 1.981):
  • Is decided on written submissions (pleadings, affidavits, exhibits);
  • Is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and
  • Requires the court to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, without weighing credibility.
• Bench trial (or separate trial under Rule 1.914):
  • Involves the judge acting as the factfinder (instead of a jury);
  • Allows the judge to hear live testimony, assess witness credibility, and resolve conflicting evidence; and
  • Produces factual findings that are reviewed only for substantial evidence on appeal.

The crux of the procedural dispute in Recio is whether the motion to enforce the settlement should have been confined to the summary-judgment framework (where factual disputes defeat the motion) or whether the court properly took on a factfinding role in the same proceeding.

C. Error Preservation

Error preservation is a bedrock principle: parties generally must raise issues and objections in the district court to preserve them for appeal. In this case:

• Recio never objected to the court acting as factfinder or to deciding the issue without a jury.
• He did not argue, until appeal, that the proceeding should have been treated as summary judgment.

The majority therefore holds these procedural challenges were not preserved. The dissent would give more weight to how the motion was actually framed and litigated, rather than to the lack of explicit objection.

D. Subject Matter Jurisdiction vs. Personal Jurisdiction

• Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to hear a particular type or category of case (e.g., tort suits, contract disputes).
• Personal jurisdiction concerns the court’s authority over the particular parties (usually based on their contact with the forum state, residence, or where the events occurred).

Recio’s argument that Iowa courts lacked “subject matter jurisdiction” over a Texas-negotiated settlement was misplaced:

• The tort claim arose from an accident in Iowa, invoking Iowa courts’ general jurisdiction over such matters.
• The settlement’s geographic origin does not strip the court of subject matter jurisdiction.

IX. Practical Implications and Future Impact

A. For Clients: The Risk of Disowning a Lawyer’s Settlement

For personal injury plaintiffs (and other litigants), Recio sends a clear signal:

• Hiring counsel to pursue a claim carries a strong presumption that the attorney can negotiate and, absent clear limits, settle within what the attorney reasonably understands as the client’s objectives.
• If a client later tries to repudiate a negotiated settlement by claiming lack of authority, they must provide more than a bare, self-serving affidavit—absent other corroborating evidence, that will rarely meet the “clear and convincing” standard in Iowa.
• Clients who believe a lawyer has settled without authorization may need to:
  • Pursue ethics complaints or malpractice claims, which may provide supporting evidence of unauthorized conduct;
  • Create a paper trail (emails, texts, letters) contemporaneously limiting the attorney’s authority; and
  • Testify in detail about any explicit instructions they gave limiting settlement authority.

B. For Attorneys: Communication and Documentation

For lawyers, the decision:

• Reinforces the importance of:
  • Documenting client discussions and settlement authority (e.g., written confirmation of authority to accept a settlement at a given range);
  • Keeping clients informed about negotiations, as required by ethical rules.
• Also offers some protection:
  • If counsel negotiates in good faith and reasonably believes they have authority, courts are likely to enforce settlements absent strong evidence to the contrary.
  • The presumption and clear-and-convincing standard operate as a buffer against opportunistic repudiation by clients.

But the ethics cases cited remind attorneys that unauthorized settlements can still lead to serious professional discipline.

C. For Insurers and Defendants: Reliance on Counsel’s Apparent Authority

Insurers and defense counsel gain comfort from Recio:

• They may generally rely on opposing counsel’s apparent authority to negotiate and bind the client.
• They are not expected to independently verify authority in every negotiation, though prudence may suggest safeguards in high-risk situations.
• When an insured later challenges a settlement, the existence of detailed negotiation emails and contemporaneous records will be powerful evidence supporting enforcement.

D. For Trial Courts: Managing Settlement-Enforcement Motions

As binding precedent, Recio tells Iowa trial courts:

• They may treat a “motion to enforce settlement” as:
  • A summary-judgment-like motion under Wende when facts are undisputed, or
  • A factfinding proceeding (including separate trial under Rule 1.914) when material facts are disputed.
• If parties do not object and proceed as though the court is the factfinder—even at a short hearing—appellate courts will likely treat the ruling as a bench-trial determination reviewed for substantial evidence.

The dissent’s concerns, however, may influence best practices even if not binding law:

• Judges may wish to explicitly clarify the procedural posture at the outset:
  • “We are proceeding under a summary-judgment standard; I will not weigh credibility”; or
  • “We are holding a bench trial on the issue of settlement validity; I will make factual findings.”
• Court administration may consider whether an explicit rule governing motions to enforce settlements should be proposed to reduce the ambiguity spotlighted by Justice Oxley.

E. For Appellate Practice

From an appellate-strategy standpoint:

• Parties must be vigilant about preserving procedural objections in the district court; silence will be construed as acquiescence.
• Litigants should be precise in:
  • Labeling motions (summary judgment vs general enforcement);
  • Invoking the relevant rule (1.981 vs 1.431 vs 1.914); and
  • Stating whether they consent to the court acting as factfinder on contested factual issues.

Failing to do so may foreclose de novo review and leave clients bound by a settlement under the deferential substantial-evidence standard.

X. Conclusion

Recio v. Fridley is not a radical reworking of Iowa law, but it meaningfully sharpens several important doctrines at the intersection of contract, agency, and civil procedure:

• It reaffirms the strong presumption that an attorney of record has authority to settle, placing a heavy clear-and-convincing burden on clients who later claim otherwise.
• It underscores that bare, self-serving affidavits from clients—without corroboration or supporting circumstances—will rarely suffice to rebut that presumption.
• It operationalizes Wende by treating unobjected-to enforcement hearings as bench trials whose factual findings are reviewed only for substantial evidence.
• It confirms that error preservation is critical: failure to object to the court’s role as factfinder or to demand a jury trial on settlement authority will foreclose such arguments on appeal.

Justice Oxley’s dissent, meanwhile, offers a compelling blueprint for future rulemaking or doctrinal refinement: require parties seeking enforcement to clearly choose between a summary-judgment track and a factfinding track, and do not collapse those two in a single ambiguous proceeding. Even if not adopted as binding law in this decision, that vision may influence how trial courts and practitioners structure settlement-enforcement disputes going forward.

In the broader landscape, Recio strengthens the stability and reliability of settlements in Iowa, bolstering the judiciary’s longstanding policy favoring final, enforceable compromises. It also serves as a cautionary tale: clients must understand the breadth of authority they confer when retaining counsel, and lawyers must carefully communicate and document that authority. Once an attorney communicates a settlement agreement to opposing counsel, undoing that commitment will be difficult absent truly compelling, well-supported proof.