Preserving the Strickland Presumption for Attorneys Under Discipline: Commentary on Airrion Blake v. United States (7th Cir. 2025)

I. Introduction

In Airrion S. Blake v. United States, No. 23-2399 (7th Cir. Dec. 9, 2025), the Seventh Circuit confronted a recurring but under-theorized problem in ineffective assistance of counsel litigation: what weight, if any, should be given to contemporaneous or subsequent attorney-disciplinary proceedings when deciding whether a criminal defendant received constitutionally adequate representation under the Sixth Amendment.

The case arises out of an unusual tax-fraud prosecution. Blake, influenced by fringe online theories about government “trusts” tied to Social Security numbers, filed a fiduciary tax return (Form 1041) for a fictitious “estate” and claimed a substantial refund based on fabricated income and withholding. He was convicted of making a false claim against the United States and theft of government funds. His trial lawyer, John Davis, not only misunderstood fundamental doctrines like Brady v. Maryland, but was also, during roughly the same period, under serious scrutiny by the Seventh Circuit itself for professional incompetence—culminating in his removal from the Seventh Circuit bar shortly after Blake’s trial.

On collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Blake argued that Davis’s performance was constitutionally deficient and that the usual presumption of competence recognized in Strickland v. Washington should be discarded or at least weakened where the lawyer is concurrently the subject of official discipline for professional incompetence. The court rejected that invitation, reaffirming a strong, case-specific application of Strickland, while expressly leaving open the possibility that in some extreme constellation of facts, concurrent discipline might affect the presumption.

This commentary analyzes the opinion’s doctrinal significance, particularly its treatment of:

The interaction between Strickland’s presumption of competent performance and attorney-disciplinary findings;
The boundary between per se or structural Sixth Amendment violations (Cronic) and case-specific ineffectiveness claims;
The continuing insistence on a concrete showing of prejudice, especially where counsel’s error concerns failure to investigate or misunderstanding of Brady.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Judge Pryor, writing for a unanimous panel (Judges Scudder, St. Eve, and Pryor), affirmed the district court’s denial of Blake’s § 2255 motion. The key holdings can be distilled as follows:

No categorical rule tied to concurrent discipline. The court declined Blake’s proposal to alter or discard Strickland’s “strong presumption” of competent performance where trial counsel is subject to official disciplinary action for professional incompetence during the representation. Instead, the court reaffirmed that ineffective assistance analysis remains largely case specific.
Discipline is relevant only if linked to case-specific errors. Consistent with prior circuit law, the court held that disciplinary investigations or sanctions matter for Sixth Amendment purposes only insofar as the defendant can link them to specific errors or omissions in the particular criminal case.
Cronic exceptions not triggered. The court held that the circumstances did not fit within the narrow categories where prejudice is presumed under United States v. Cronic—denial of counsel at a critical stage, complete failure to subject the prosecution’s case to adversarial testing, or such extreme circumstances that effective assistance was impossible.
No prejudice shown under Strickland. Although the district court found that Davis misunderstood Brady and failed to investigate properly, the Seventh Circuit agreed that Blake failed to show a “reasonable probability” that the result would have been different but for these errors, particularly in light of his own sworn admissions that the tax return contained false information.
Possibility left open for future cases. While rejecting Blake’s proposed categorical rule, the court explicitly “leave[s] open for another day” whether there may be circumstances in which counsel’s concurrent discipline might so fundamentally undercut the presumption of competence that the usual Strickland starting point is modified.

The ultimate disposition: the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Blake’s § 2255 motion and declined to order an evidentiary hearing, holding that Blake had not made the required showing of constitutional prejudice.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Blake’s “Trust” Theory and Tax Filing

Blake became convinced, via an online discussion forum, that the federal government allegedly creates a trust for every person born in the United States, in an amount equivalent to their lifetime earnings. He believed he could access this money—described as his “lifetime savings in Social Security”—by filing a fiduciary income tax return (Form 1041) on behalf of a fictional estate or trust bearing his name.

Following the forum’s instructions, Blake:

Created the “Airrion Socrates Blake Estate”;
Filed a Form 1041 for tax year 2011 as “fiduciary” of that estate;
Reported $298,716.69 in income, an equal amount in fiduciary fees, and $149,358.35 in federal income tax withheld;
Claimed a refund of the entire $149,358.35 allegedly withheld.

To guard against potential illegality, Blake says he called the IRS. According to his testimony, an IRS agent (whose name and date he later could not recall) advised him that he could write “void where prohibited by law” on the form. Blake believed that this phrase would cause the IRS not to process the return if anything was improper—a kind of imagined “safety valve.”

The IRS processed the 2011 return and issued the requested refund, which Blake deposited and spent. When he later attempted to obtain the “second half” of his supposed lifetime trust earnings, the IRS rejected the return and returned it for correction. In 2015, IRS criminal investigators interviewed Blake about the 2011 filing. Nearly a year after that interview, Blake filed a separate tax form falsely reporting that he had been deceased since 2012.

B. Criminal Charges and Trial

In May 2016, a grand jury indicted Blake on:

Count 1: Making a false, fictitious, or fraudulent claim against the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287;
Count 2: Theft of government money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641.

Blake retained attorney John Davis in February 2017. Davis filed a generic Brady v. Maryland motion requesting “all exculpatory materials,” which the government responded to by asserting compliance. After the court asked the defense to file a more specific reply if necessary, Davis did not do so, and the motion was denied.

Davis also moved to dismiss the indictment on the theory that the government had violated Brady by not seeking out additional information related to Blake’s supposed “trust” from the Treasury Department. The district court rejected this argument because Blake identified no suppressed evidence and because, even if such evidence existed, Brady does not require the government to perform the defense’s investigatory work where the evidence is available with reasonable diligence.

At trial in March 2018:

An IRS agent testified that Blake admitted the estate had not actually generated the income reported on the 2011 return.
On cross, Davis pressed the agent on whether he had searched for other funds that Blake might believe were “owed” to him by the Treasury—again tying his theory of the case to the supposed government trust.
At sidebar, Davis advanced a sweeping misinterpretation of Brady, insisting it required the government to “dig out everything” that might be exculpatory and to “find out anything else” potentially favorable to the defense. The district judge remarked, “I don’t understand Brady as you understand it apparently.”

Blake testified and admitted that:

The estate did not earn $298,716.69 in 2011;
The estate did not pay fiduciary fees in that amount;
The estate did not have $149,358.35 of federal tax withheld.

He nonetheless claimed he believed the filing was legitimate based on the online theory and his phone conversation with the IRS. Davis argued in closing that the case turned on mens rea: Blake supposedly thought he was accessing his own money, not stealing government funds.

After two days of deliberation, the jury convicted Blake on both counts.

C. Davis’s Removal from the Seventh Circuit Bar

Parallel to his representation of Blake, Davis was embroiled in disciplinary proceedings before the Seventh Circuit in an unrelated civil matter, Davis v. Anderson, 718 F. App’x 420 (7th Cir. 2017). There, the court described his conduct—including a sprawling, noncompliant complaint and disregard of court orders—as raising “serious concerns about his professional competence” and issued a show-cause order as to why he should not be disciplined.

Davis remained a member of the Seventh Circuit bar while representing Blake at trial. Shortly after trial:

On April 1, 2018, Davis withdrew as Blake’s counsel at Blake’s request.
By the end of April 2018, new counsel had appeared for Blake.
On May 29, 2018, the Seventh Circuit ordered Davis removed from its bar. In In re Davis, the court concluded that his “unwillingness or inability to respond” to its concerns about his professional competence showed that he could not adequately represent his own or his clients’ interests, and directed that order be sent to all district courts in the circuit.

D. Post-Trial Motions, Direct Appeal, and § 2255 Proceedings

With new counsel, Blake moved for a new trial based on Davis’s alleged ineffective assistance. The district court:

Found that Davis was “quite effective at trial” in pressing the theory that Blake was a naïve taxpayer misled by the internet;
Held that Davis’s failure to review discovery differently, subpoena more documents, or call an expert did not undermine confidence in the verdict;
Concluded that the Seventh Circuit’s disciplinary action in unrelated litigation could not automatically be imported into the criminal case (citing United States ex rel. Ortiz v. Sielaff, 542 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1976)).

Blake ultimately received a 36-month prison sentence and two years of supervised release. On direct appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence, rejecting his claims of trial error, and dismissed his ineffective assistance arguments without prejudice so they could be raised via § 2255. United States v. Blake, 965 F.3d 554 (7th Cir. 2020).

Blake then filed a § 2255 motion in October 2020, arguing that Davis was constitutionally ineffective because:

He fundamentally misunderstood Brady and the government’s disclosure obligations;
He failed to conduct an adequate, independent defense investigation (e.g., regarding Blake’s communication with the IRS);
He had been deemed professionally incompetent by the Seventh Circuit in concurrent disciplinary proceedings.

The district court, applying Strickland, began with the “strong presumption” of effective assistance, acknowledged Davis’s disciplinary status, but concluded:

Subsequent discipline in other cases does not create a per se rule of ineffectiveness;
Davis’s misunderstanding of Brady and failure to investigate did fall below professional standards, but Blake could not show prejudice;
Davis’s trial performance, especially in advancing the mens rea theory, reflected reasonable strategic choices.

Recognizing the importance of the question whether disciplinary proceedings can undermine Strickland’s presumption, the court granted a certificate of appealability limited to that issue. Blake appealed.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Doctrinal Framework: Strickland and Cronic

The Seventh Circuit’s analysis is firmly anchored in the familiar two-step framework from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984):

Deficient performance: Defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. This inquiry is “highly deferential,” and courts must “indulge a strong presumption” that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.
Prejudice: Defendant must show a “reasonable probability” that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine confidence in the result; it does not require proof that a different result was more likely than not, but there must be a substantial, not speculative, likelihood of a different outcome.

The opinion also situates the case against the backdrop of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), which identifies rare situations where prejudice is presumed without a case-specific showing:

The defendant was completely denied counsel at a critical stage of the proceeding;
Counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing;
The circumstances surrounding the representation were so extreme that no lawyer could provide effective assistance.

The court emphasizes that Blake’s case does not fall within any of these categories; Davis was present, participated, cross-examined witnesses, and advanced a coherent (if ultimately unsuccessful) mens rea defense. Thus, the court proceeds under Strickland, not Cronic.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Strickland v. Washington and the Strong Presumption of Competence

The Seventh Circuit quotes and applies Strickland’s key principles:

No “particular set of detailed rules” can govern all defense counsel behavior; instead, the baseline is whether counsel’s conduct falls within a wide, reasonable range of professional judgment.
Courts must not engage in hindsight-driven second guessing; they must interpret counsel’s decisions as possible “sound trial strategy.”
The presumption of competence is “strong” and can be overcome only with specific evidence of unreasonable performance and resulting prejudice.

This presumption is central to the court’s rejection of Blake’s attempt to make concurrent disciplinary proceedings a categorical game-changer.

2. United States v. Cronic and Presumed Prejudice

The opinion invokes Cronic to highlight that not all serious concerns about counsel’s abilities trigger a presumption of prejudice. The Cronic categories are narrow and focus on the structural absence of meaningful adversarial testing, not on counsel’s general professional reputation or licensing status.

The court concludes that Davis’s representation, though imperfect, does not approach the level of non-representation or sham advocacy that Cronic contemplates. He actively litigated pretrial motions, cross-examined witnesses, and presented Blake’s narrative to the jury.

3. Seventh Circuit Cases on Disciplinary Status and Ineffectiveness

Blake’s argument hinged on making Davis’s disciplinary problems dispositive. The Seventh Circuit therefore revisited and reaffirmed its longstanding line rejecting per se rules based on licensing or discipline:

Bond v. United States, 1 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 1993). The defendant argued that his lawyer’s ongoing disciplinary investigation showed ineffective assistance. The court held the investigation was relevant only to the extent the defendant could link it to an actual error or omission in his own case, and he still had to show prejudice.
United States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1991). The court rejected a per se rule that assistance is ineffective whenever counsel has been ordered suspended for professional misconduct. Again, the defendant must show specific errors and prejudice.
Reese v. Peters, 926 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1991). Representation by an attorney who had been suspended from the bar did not automatically amount to ineffective assistance. The analysis still turned on the quality of representation and its impact on the outcome.
Cole v. United States, 162 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 1998). Representation by an attorney not admitted to the local bar is not per se ineffective. Licensing irregularities do not alone establish a Sixth Amendment violation.
United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1948). The court reaffirmed the presumption that lawyers in good standing are competent, which applies to Davis during the period he represented Blake.

Collectively, these cases establish that:

Licensing defects or disciplinary actions do not themselves create a constitutional violation;
They may be context for evaluating performance, but the Sixth Amendment inquiry remains focused on case-specific conduct and prejudice.

4. Other Cited Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Cases

The opinion also relies on more recent Seventh Circuit authorities to refine Strickland’s application:

Skeens v. Neal, 147 F.4th 704 (7th Cir. 2025) and Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4 (2009) are cited for the formulation that counsel must not fall below “an objective standard of reasonableness” under “prevailing professional norms.”
Pierce v. Vanihel, 93 F.4th 1036 (7th Cir. 2024) and Meyers v. Gomez, 50 F.4th 628 (7th Cir. 2022) reiterate the “highly deferential” standard and the rule that ineffective assistance is found “only if no reasonable argument can be made” that counsel’s conduct was a legitimate strategic choice.
Elion v. United States, 76 F.4th 620 (7th Cir. 2023) and Lee v. Galloway, 106 F.4th 668 (7th Cir. 2024) are cited for the standard of prejudice (“reasonable probability” of a different result).
Sussman v. Jenkins, 636 F.3d 329 (7th Cir. 2011) and Wright v. Gramley, 125 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 1997) reinforce that prejudice must be assessed in light of the totality of the evidence and the strength of the prosecution’s case.
United States v. Lathrop, 634 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2011) sets out a key rule applied here: to show prejudice from a failure to investigate, a defendant must provide “specific information” about what a proper investigation would have uncovered and how it would have changed the outcome.
United States v. Lomax, 51 F.4th 222 (7th Cir. 2022) provides the standard of review for § 2255 denials: legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, factual findings for clear error.

These authorities collectively reinforce the court’s conservative, fact-intensive approach to ineffective assistance claims.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Whether Concurrent Discipline Alters the Strickland Presumption

The central doctrinal dispute is Blake’s attempt to recast the starting point of the Strickland analysis in light of Davis’s discipline. Blake argued:

The ordinary presumption that counsel acts within professional norms is “wholly incompatible” with the Sixth Amendment where counsel has already demonstrated professional incompetence in concurrent official proceedings;
The court should adopt a rule under which the presumption is discarded when:
1. Counsel is subject to official disciplinary action related to professional incompetence during the representation; and
2. Counsel’s acts do not appear reasonable or strategic in the criminal case.

The Seventh Circuit firmly rejects this restructuring of Strickland. Its reasoning rests on several points:

Existing precedent already addresses discipline-based claims. As the cases like Bond, Williams, and Reese show, the circuit has repeatedly declined to adopt per se rules tied to licensing or disciplinary status, insisting on a showing of actual errors and prejudice. Blake’s proposal directly conflicts with this line.
Discipline in other cases is not self-executing evidence of ineffective assistance here. Discipline may raise generalized concerns about competence, but the Sixth Amendment inquiry is not about global professional quality; it is about whether the particular representation in the criminal case fell below constitutional minima and affected the outcome.
The Cronic framework is the proper home for structural or categorical concerns. If there are circumstances where counsel’s external status (e.g., being a non-lawyer, being forced into impossible conditions) effectively denies the defendant a fair advocate, that might be addressed under Cronic. But Davis’s situation—licensed counsel, actively representing the client—does not fall there.
The court preserves doctrinal flexibility but refuses to decide more than necessary. The opinion explicitly “leave[s] open for another day” whether concurrent discipline might ever negate the presumption. This hedging avoids both (a) endorsing Blake’s broad rule, and (b) issuing a categorical rejection that might hamstring future courts faced with more extreme facts (for example, a lawyer declared mentally incompetent during a trial).

In short, the court reaffirms that Strickland begins with a strong presumption of competence and that professional discipline, even for incompetence, does not by itself displace that presumption. It is one factor among many, relevant only insofar as it is concretely tied to what counsel did or failed to do in the defendant’s case.

2. Application of Strickland to Blake’s Case

Having set the standard, the court evaluates Blake’s specific allegations.

a. Deficient Performance

The district court found, and the Seventh Circuit effectively accepts, that Davis:

Misunderstood Brady as obligating the government to “dig out everything” exculpatory, including evidence it did not possess but might uncover through further investigation;
On that misunderstanding, failed to conduct independent defense investigation into:
- The details of Blake’s purported call with the IRS;
- Potential documentary records of that call or other IRS interactions.

The district court concluded that this misunderstanding fell below professional standards, especially because competent defense counsel cannot rely on the prosecution to perform their own investigative work. Although the Seventh Circuit does not dwell on the deficiency prong, it does not disturb this conclusion.

b. Prejudice

The decision turns on the second Strickland prong: whether Davis’s errors created a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

The court emphasizes several points:

Specificity requirement for failure-to-investigate claims. Under Lathrop, a defendant must identify what an adequate investigation would have uncovered and how it would have affected the trial. Blake:
- Wants more documentation of his communication with the IRS and interviews of the unnamed IRS employee;
- But the substance of that communication was already before the jury via his own testimony; and
- He cannot articulate any additional exculpatory information that further investigation would have revealed.
Without a concrete proffer of new, material evidence, there is no basis to find prejudice.
The strength of the government’s case. The “totality of the evidence” was overwhelming:
- Blake admitted on the stand that the income, fiduciary fees, and withholding reported on the Form 1041 were false.
- He received a $149,358.35 refund on the basis of those false entries and spent the money.
- After being interviewed by IRS criminal investigators, he filed a document falsely declaring himself deceased, strongly suggesting consciousness of guilt.
Against this backdrop, the speculative possibility that an IRS employee might corroborate his belief that he could file such a form does not undermine confidence in the verdict—especially given his admitted falsity of the specific numbers.
The mens rea defense was fully aired. Davis’s overarching theory—that Blake honestly, albeit mistakenly, believed he was lawfully accessing his own money—was presented to the jury through Blake’s testimony and counsel’s closing. The jury was free to accept or reject it and chose to reject it after two days of deliberations.
Misstatements about Brady did not distort the trial’s outcome. While Davis’s insistence on an expansive view of Brady led to ill-conceived questions at sidebar and may have annoyed the trial judge, Blake does not show how these episodes resulted in exclusion of favorable evidence, misinstruction of the jury, or any substantive disadvantage at trial. Without a causal link to the verdict, there is no prejudice.

The court therefore concludes that, even assuming deficiencies in Davis’s understanding of the law and investigatory decisions, Blake has not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. The conviction rests on uncontroverted evidence of falsity and financial gain, significantly reinforced by the false-death filing after the IRS investigation.

3. The Role of Davis’s Disciplinary Proceedings

The court acknowledges the Seventh Circuit’s own prior order removing Davis from its bar and its statement that he could not adequately represent his clients’ interests. Nonetheless, it makes three key points:

Timing and scope. The disciplinary proceedings related to another case (Davis v. Anderson), and the ultimate removal order post-dated Blake’s trial, even though the show-cause order predated it.
No automatic importation. Disciplinary findings in unrelated litigation cannot be “automatically read into” the ineffective assistance analysis in a separate criminal case. They do not, by themselves, rebut the Strickland presumption.
Relevance depends on linkage. Consistent with Bond and Williams, discipline becomes relevant to Sixth Amendment analysis only if the defendant can show that the same types of incompetence identified in the disciplinary action manifested in specific, prejudicial errors in the criminal representation.

Thus, the existence of the disciplinary record may inform a judge’s skepticism about counsel’s performance, but does not change the defendant’s burden to demonstrate deficient performance and prejudice in the particular case.

D. Impact and Future Implications

1. Reinforcement of a Conservative, Case-Specific Strickland Approach

The opinion solidifies the Seventh Circuit’s longstanding reluctance to expand per se or categorical rules in ineffective assistance jurisprudence. The court:

Reaffirms that even serious professional concerns about an attorney—up to and including disbarment or removal from a court’s bar—do not, without more, establish a Sixth Amendment violation;
Emphasizes the centrality of the prejudice inquiry and the need for concrete, case-specific evidence of what would have been different absent counsel’s errors;
Confirms that discipline is a background fact, not a substitute for the Strickland analysis.

This will make it more difficult for defendants to prevail on ineffective assistance claims based solely or primarily on counsel’s disciplinary history, especially where that history arises in unrelated matters.

2. Guidance for Cases Involving Disciplined or Suspended Counsel

Blake also provides practical guidance in a recurring set of situations:

Defendants seeking relief based on discipline. They must:
- Identify specific deficiencies in the criminal representation (e.g., missed objections, failure to investigate obvious leads, misstatements of law that affected rulings); and
- Make a concrete showing of how those deficiencies likely affected the outcome, often requiring affidavits, proffers, or other evidence of what a competent lawyer would have produced.
District courts evaluating § 2255 motions. Courts may:
- Consider disciplinary records as relevant context but not as dispositive;
- Maintain the Strickland presumption while nonetheless scrutinizing counsel’s decisions more carefully when discipline raises red flags, as the district court explicitly did here;
- Grant narrow certificates of appealability on systemic issues (like the effect of discipline on Strickland) where “reasonable jurists could differ.”
Appellate courts addressing structural claims. Blake signals that the Seventh Circuit is not presently inclined to expand Cronic’s presumptive-prejudice categories to capture mere disciplinary status, but preserves room to do so in truly extraordinary circumstances.

3. Clarification of Brady and Defense Investigator Duties

Although not the main holding, the case underscores an important point about Brady:

Brady requires the government to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence in its possession or in the possession of the prosecution team.
It does not require the government to scour other agencies or databases for evidence the defense could reasonably obtain, nor to perform the defense’s investigative work.
Defense counsel may not abdicate their own duty to investigate by assuming that any exculpatory information “out there” will be fetched and delivered by the prosecution under Brady.

Davis’s contrary view—treating Brady as a broad mandate that the government “dig out everything”—is explicitly rejected. While that misunderstanding did not result in relief here due to lack of prejudice, the case serves as a cautionary note: reliance on such an erroneous understanding can itself constitute deficient performance where it leads counsel to neglect obvious investigative steps.

4. Implications for Tax-Fraud and “Sovereign Citizen”-Type Defenses

Substantively, the case reinforces that:

Belief in fringe or pseudo-legal theories about secret government trusts will not, standing alone, negate the mens rea for tax fraud;
When a defendant admits that the concrete factual statements in a tax return (income, fees, withholding) are false, a general belief that some other amount of money is “really” owed is unlikely to create reasonable doubt;
Efforts to obscure one’s status after an investigation—such as filing a false death notice—are powerful circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge.

This aspect of the opinion primarily affects fact patterns involving “sovereign citizen” or anti-tax theories, where defendants genuinely—or at least plausibly—believe they are engaging in lawful self-help, but do so through manifestly false factual representations.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel under the Sixth Amendment

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to “effective” counsel, not perfect counsel. Under Strickland, a defendant must prove two things:

Deficient performance. Did the lawyer’s work fall below what a reasonably competent criminal defense attorney would do in similar circumstances?
Prejudice. Is there a reasonable chance that a different lawyer, who did things properly, would have produced a different outcome—such as an acquittal, a lesser conviction, or a more lenient sentence?

The courts assume, at the outset, that lawyers act reasonably. The defendant has to bring evidence to overcome that presumption, and even then must show that the error actually mattered to the result.

2. Brady Obligations vs. Defense Investigative Duties

Brady v. Maryland requires prosecutors to disclose evidence that:

Is favorable to the defense (either exculpatory or useful for impeachment); and
Is material—meaning there is a reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed, the result would have been different.

But Brady does not mean:

The government must search for every potentially helpful piece of evidence in existence, everywhere;
The government must act as the defense’s investigator;
Defense counsel can sit back and rely on the prosecution to find and produce everything that might help the defense.

Defense counsel still has an independent duty to investigate, interview witnesses, secure documents, and build the case, rather than blaming the prosecution for not doing so.

3. Structural Errors (Cronic) vs. Ordinary Ineffectiveness (Strickland)

Some constitutional problems are so serious that courts assume they affected the outcome and automatically reverse the conviction. These are sometimes called “structural” errors. Under Cronic, this can include:

No lawyer at key stages of the case;
A lawyer who literally does nothing to oppose the prosecution;
Conditions so extreme that no lawyer could provide adequate assistance (e.g., no time to prepare, no opportunity to meet the client).

Most claims, however, fall under Strickland, where the defendant must actually prove prejudice. Even if the lawyer was generally incompetent, had other professional problems, or was later disbarred, the defendant must show that, in this case, the lawyer’s mistakes likely changed the outcome.

4. § 2255 Collateral Review and Standards of Review

A motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is a way for a federal prisoner to challenge a conviction or sentence after the direct appeal is over. It is not a second appeal; instead, it focuses on constitutional or jurisdictional errors and certain other fundamental defects.

On appeal from the denial of a § 2255 motion:

The appellate court reviews legal conclusions (such as how Strickland applies) from scratch (“de novo” review);
It reviews the district court’s factual findings (what actually happened, what witnesses said, what counsel did) only for clear error, a deferential standard.

A defendant generally needs a certificate of appealability, which is granted only when reasonable jurists could debate the correctness of the district court’s ruling on an issue of constitutional dimension.

VI. Conclusion

Airrion Blake v. United States is significant less for its resolution of Blake’s individual guilt—on which the evidence was overwhelming—than for its careful treatment of how attorney-disciplinary proceedings intersect with the right to effective counsel.

The Seventh Circuit:

Reaffirms the core Strickland framework and its “strong presumption” of competence, even where the lawyer faces or later receives disciplinary sanctions for professional incompetence;
Refuses to recognize a new categorical rule diminishing that presumption based solely on concurrent discipline, insisting instead on a case-specific showing of deficient performance and prejudice;
Clarifies that professional discipline is relevant only insofar as it can be concretely tied to specific, outcome-altering errors in the criminal representation;
Reasserts the limited scope of Brady and the continuing duty of defense counsel to pursue independent investigation.

By leaving open the theoretical possibility that in some extreme future case concurrent discipline might affect the Strickland presumption, the court preserves doctrinal flexibility. Yet the clear takeaway is that defendants cannot rely on their counsel’s disciplinary status as a shortcut to relief. They must still do the hard work of showing, with specificity, how counsel’s errors in their own case probably changed the outcome.

In that sense, Blake continues the judiciary’s trend toward a narrow, evidence-driven approach to ineffective assistance claims, guarding both the integrity of criminal convictions and the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial with competent advocacy.