Preserving the Status Quo: Prevailing-Party Attorney Fees for Defending Nonsuited Post-Divorce Petitions under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c)

Introduction

In Vanessa Colley v. John S. Colley, III, the Supreme Court of Tennessee was asked to resolve whether a former spouse defending an existing award of transitional alimony may recover attorney fees when the ex-spouse’s petition to modify or terminate that award is nonsuited before a merits adjudication. The case arises from a complex, multi-year post-divorce conflict between Vanessa Turner (formerly Colley) (“Wife”) and John S. Colley III (“Husband”). After their July 18, 2012 divorce, the parties entered a Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) providing Wife with transitional alimony and a requirement that Husband maintain a beneficiary designation in her favor on his life insurance policy. Seven years and multiple motions later, Husband filed a petition to terminate those obligations two months prior to Wife’s scheduled remarriage. Wife defended. Before trial, Husband took a voluntary nonsuit. At issue was whether Wife — as the defending party — became the “prevailing party” under both (1) the MDA’s attorney-fee clause and (2) Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c), thereby entitling her to recover the fees she incurred in defense of Husband’s modification petition.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Wife.
Under the contractual MDA, the Court held that Wife is the prevailing party because she successfully defended the status quo of her alimony and life-insurance rights when Husband voluntarily dismissed his post-divorce petition.
Under the statutory provision, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c), the Court likewise held that a defending obligee spouse may recover attorney fees upon voluntary nonsuit of the obligor spouse’s petition to alter or modify an existing decree of alimony (or child support or custody), even though there was no merits adjudication.
The Court awarded Wife her attorney fees at both the trial level and on appeal (to the Court of Appeals and to the Supreme Court), remanding for a calculation of the reasonable fee amounts.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Eberbach v. Eberbach, 535 S.W.3d 467 (Tenn. 2017): reaffirmed the American Rule and held that contractual or statutory fee-shifting provisions are exceptions.
Himmelfarb v. Allain, 380 S.W.3d 35 (Tenn. 2012): defined “favorable termination” in malicious-prosecution torts as requiring a merits adjudication (distinguished here as inapplicable to statutory fee provisions).
Stratienko v. Stratienko, 2023 WL 7326321 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2023): explained that requiring alimony recipients to spend support on lawyer fees frustrates public policy.
Pounders v. Pounders, 2011 WL 3849493 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2011) and Hansen v. Hansen, 2009 WL 3230984 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2009): under the pre-2018 statutory language, affirmed attorney-fee awards to respondents after voluntary nonsuit of custody or support petitions.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in two parallel tracks — contractual and statutory — with each path independently reaching the same conclusion that Wife prevailed and is therefore entitled to fees.

1. Contractual Basis (MDA)

As courts interpret MDAs as contracts, the language controls: “In the event it becomes reasonably necessary for either party to institute or defend legal proceedings related to the enforcement of any provision of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall also be entitled to a judgment for reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in connection with such proceedings.”
Husband’s petition to terminate transitional alimony and revoke the life-insurance beneficiary requirement forced Wife to defend the MDA’s award. Her only objective was to preserve the status quo.
Husband’s voluntary nonsuit meant Wife fully achieved her objective: the alimony award remained intact. Thus, she “prevailed” under the ordinary meaning of that term.
Because the MDA makes the fee award mandatory for the prevailing party, the trial court properly awarded Wife her reasonable fees at the trial level.

2. Statutory Basis (Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c))

Under the 2018 amendment, § 36-5-103(c) permits trial courts “to fix and allow” reasonable attorney fees to the “prevailing party” in “any proceeding to enforce, alter, change, or modify any decree of alimony, child support, or provision of a permanent parenting plan,” whether on the original divorce or in subsequent hearings.
The statute’s text specifically contemplates proceedings in which one spouse defends an existing award by resisting an effort to reduce or terminate it. It does not require a merits adjudication or a “material alteration” of the parties’ legal relationship.
By voluntarily nonsuiting his petition, Husband effectively conceded that he could not overcome Wife’s defense. Wife successfully maintained the status quo and thus “prevailed.”
Prior cases under the pre-2018 version (e.g., Pounders, Hansen) affirmed fee awards on nonsuit, and the 2018 changes broadened, rather than narrowed, the reach of § 36-5-103(c) by substituting “prevailing party” for “plaintiff spouse” and by explicitly including modification proceedings.

Impact

This decision has immediate and long-term consequences in Tennessee family law:

Discouraging Vexatious Litigation: An obligor spouse can no longer evade fee exposure simply by nonsuiting a modification petition — defendants who successfully resist will typically recover their fees.
Reinforcing Contractual Commitments: MDAs with prevailing-party fee provisions will be enforced even when one side seeks voluntary dismissal.
Clarifying “Prevailing Party”: Formal merits judgments are not a statutory prerequisite for fee awards under § 36-5-103(c); success in preserving an award suffices.
Focusing on Equitable Discretion: Although MDA awards are mandatory, statutory awards remain discretionary, allowing trial courts to consider the totality of the post-divorce conduct.

Complex Concepts Simplified

American Rule: The default principle that each party bears its own attorney fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.
Prevailing Party: A party who achieves its litigation objective — for a defender, maintaining the status quo of an existing decree.
Nonsuit: A voluntary dismissal of one’s own cause of action, effectively ending the case without adjudication on the merits.
Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA): A contract between divorcing spouses that sets terms for property division, support, custody, and often includes fee-shifting provisions for post-divorce enforcement disputes.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c): The family-law statute authorizing trial courts to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party in enforcement or modification proceedings concerning alimony, child support, custody, or parenting plans.

Conclusion

Vanessa Colley v. John S. Colley, III establishes a clear, precedent-setting rule: when an obligor spouse files a post-divorce petition to alter or terminate an existing award of alimony (or child support or custody) and then takes a voluntary nonsuit, the defending obligee spouse is the “prevailing party” under both a properly drafted MDA and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c). That obligee spouse may recover reasonable attorney fees for defending the original award — at the trial level and on appeal. This holding reinforces the deterrent against frivolous or harassing litigation, ensures the meaningful enforcement of contractual fee provisions, and affirms the legislature’s intent to protect economically disadvantaged spouses from being forced to spend their awarded support on lawyer fees.