Preserving Parental Rights: The Imperative of Clear and Convincing Evidence in Termination Proceedings

Introduction

The consolidated appeals in In the Interest of E.D.A., III; B.W.; A.B.A.; R.M.A.; and E.J.A., 15–24 MAP 2024, presented to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania raise a fundamental question: May a trial court terminate parental rights based solely on the credibility of one witness when multiple other competent witnesses directly contradict that testimony? In a dissenting statement filed March 26, 2025, Justice Donohue insists that the majority’s summary dismissal as improvidently granted effectively endorses a termination decree unsupported by “clear and convincing evidence,” the constitutional and statutory standard required to sever the parent–child bond. This commentary examines the facts, procedural history, legal reasoning, and broader implications of Justice Donohue’s dissent and the reaffirmed rule that courts must anchor termination decisions in specific, corroborated record evidence.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal to address whether clear and convincing evidence supported the York County Orphans’ Court’s April 20, 2022 decrees terminating the parental rights of E.A., Jr. (father) and T.W.A. (mother) to five minor children. After briefing and argument, the majority dismissed the appeals as improvidently granted, thereby leaving in place the lower courts’ orders. Justice Donohue dissented, arguing that dismissal amounted to approval of a flawed termination ruling. He emphasized that:

The fundamental liberty interest in parent–child relationships demands at least “clear and convincing” proof before termination.
The trial court relied exclusively on one CYF caseworker’s testimony, ignoring multiple professionals (Pressley Ridge advocates, therapists, drug counselors) who testified to the parents’ substantial progress.
Appellate courts must scrutinize the record to ensure competent, specific, and corroborated evidence supports each statutory element under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and (b).
Where the record yields “close calls” or materially contradictory evidence, the high burden of proof is not met—and parental rights must be preserved.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Santosky v. Kramer (455 U.S. 745 (1982)): Established that due process requires “clear and convincing” evidence before parental rights may be terminated.
Hiller v. Fausey (904 A.2d 875 (Pa. 2006)): Recognized parental rights as “constitutionally protected,” “the civil equivalent of the death penalty.”
Addington v. Texas (441 U.S. 418 (1979)): Clarifies the purpose of standards of proof and their role in safeguarding individual rights in civil proceedings.
In re Adoption of C.M. (255 A.3d 343 (Pa. 2021)): Articulated that “credibility is not a substitute for competency” and that findings must be “specific” and “corroborated.”
In re T.R. (465 A.2d 624 (Pa. 1983)): Adopted the clear and convincing standard for termination proceedings post-Santosky.
Interest of S.K.L.R. (256 A.3d 1108 (Pa. 2021)): Reiterated the obligation to weigh all evidence and meet statutory grounds under § 2511(a) with exacting thoroughness.
Interest of K.T. (296 A.3d 1085 (Pa. 2023)): Reinforced that subsection (b) requires a child-focused analysis of developmental, physical, and emotional needs and that a bond alone does not mandate preservation if severance clearly serves those needs.

Legal Reasoning

Justice Donohue’s dissent underscores two central pillars of Pennsylvania termination jurisprudence:

Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard (§ 2511(a))
- Parental rights may not be terminated on the basis of “environmental factors” alone (inadequate housing, income beyond parental control).
- The trial court’s factual findings must rest on “competent, specific evidence of record,” not merely a credibility determination unsupported by corroboration.
- Where the record reflects substantial parental compliance—stable housing endorsed by Pressley Ridge, steady employment, drug-treatment success, active engagement in services—credibility findings inconsistent with that evidence cannot satisfy the high burden.
Child-Focused Welfare Analysis (§ 2511(b))
- After establishing statutory grounds, courts must consider each child’s “developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare.”
- Evidence of a strong parent–child bond requires inquiry into whether severance is “necessary and beneficial” to the child, examining therapy records, guardian-ad-litem reports, and risk of emotional harm if parental ties are cut.
- The trial court’s cursory subsection (b) analysis, limited to observing foster-care stability and children’s behavioral issues, failed to assess—child by child—the trauma of severance versus the benefits of reunification.

Impact

Justice Donohue’s dissent crystallizes a renewed precedent: appellate courts must perform a searching review of termination decrees for competent record support. The decision warns trial courts and child welfare agencies that:

Clear and convincing proof is not satisfied by untested suppositions or stale evidence reflecting only the conditions at case inception.
Court-appointed experts, therapy providers, and service-agency advocates—who interact extensively with parents and children—must be given full evidentiary weight.
Appellate courts shall not rubber-stamp terminations on “close call” records; hesitancy in the evidence mandates preservation of parental rights.

Going forward, practitioners will rely on this dissent to insist on comprehensive factfinding, detailed written opinions, and rigorous subsection (b) analyses tailored to each child’s needs.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Clear and Convincing Evidence” – A civil standard requiring proof so “clear, direct, weighty, and convincing” that there remains no reasonable doubt about the truth of key facts.
Competent Evidence – Testimony or documentation legally admissible, specific, and corroborated by record facts; more than a witness’s bare opinion.
Subsection (a) vs. Subsection (b) – Section 2511(a) identifies statutory grounds (e.g., prolonged removal, failure to remediate); subsection (b) focuses on the child’s best interests, weighing bonds, permanency needs, and emotional welfare.
“Environmentally-based” Termination Prohibition – The law forbids ending parental rights solely for poverty, housing instability, or lack of material resources if beyond a parent’s control.

Conclusion

In the Interest of E.D.A., et al., the dissent firmly reestablishes that the constitutional stakes in parental-rights terminations demand unwavering adherence to the clear and convincing standard. Trial courts must ground each § 2511(a) determination in specific, corroborated evidence and then conduct a child-centered § 2511(b) review examining whether severance truly serves the developmental, physical, and emotional needs of each child. Appellate courts, in turn, retain their duty to sift through the record for competent support. Where the evidence is mixed or “close,” the presumption must tilt toward preserving the parent–child bond. This precedent safeguards fundamental liberties and ensures that the Commonwealth’s most drastic intervention—destroying a family—occurs only upon proof that meets society’s highest civil evidentiary threshold.