Preserving Johnson-Based AEDPA Timeliness Arguments: Seventh Circuit Affirms Forfeiture and Emphasizes Deference on Sentencing-Reliance Claims

Case: Devin Seats v. Mindi Nurse (Warden) — United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Date: September 24, 2025

Panel: Circuit Judges Easterbrook, Pryor, and Kolar (opinion by Judge Kolar)

Introduction

This appeal arises from an Illinois prisoner’s federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254 challenging the timeliness of his filing and, alternatively, the merits of his due-process claim. In 2012, after a bench trial, Devin Seats was convicted of aggravated battery with a firearm, armed habitual criminal, and aggravated discharge of a firearm, and sentenced to concurrent terms of 20, 12, and 10 years. His presentence investigation report (PSI) listed six prior felonies, including two 2007 convictions under Illinois’s aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) statute—provisions later deemed unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court.

After Illinois courts ultimately vacated the two 2007 AUUW convictions in 2019, and the Illinois Appellate Court later vacated his armed habitual criminal count but declined to order a full resentencing, Seats sought federal habeas relief. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, Seats invoked Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (2005), to argue that the vacatur of his AUUW convictions was a “new fact” triggering a later start date under §2244(d)(1)(D). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that Seats forfeited his Johnson-based timeliness theory by not raising it below and that no civil plain-error review warranted rescue. The court further explained that even if timely, Seats could not overcome AEDPA deference to the Illinois Appellate Court’s factual finding that the sentencing judge did not rely on the now-vacated AUUW convictions when fashioning his sentence.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirms dismissal as untimely. The district court correctly calculated the limitations period under §2244(d)(1)(A) (finality of judgment) because Seats did not present a §2244(d)(1)(D) (new fact) theory in the district court.
Johnson’s “vacatur-as-new-fact” framework can, in principle, trigger a later limitations start date, but that argument must be preserved in the district court. Seats forfeited it, and the stringent civil plain-error standard did not apply.
Even if timely, under AEDPA’s deferential standards, Seats failed to show that the state sentencing court actually relied on the vacated AUUW convictions. The Illinois Appellate Court reasonably found any weight afforded to them was “insignificant” and did not lead to a greater sentence.
Outcome: The dismissal of Seats’s §2254 petition as untimely is affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (2005)

Johnson held that a state-court order vacating a predicate conviction used to enhance a federal sentence is a “matter of fact” that can restart AEDPA’s one-year clock under §2255(f)(4), provided the petitioner exercised due diligence in seeking the vacatur. The Seats panel explains that §2255(f)(4) and §2244(d)(1)(D) have materially similar “new fact” language, a parity previously recognized in Seventh Circuit jurisprudence (see Lo v. Endicott, 506 F.3d 572, 575 n.2 (7th Cir. 2007)). Thus, Johnson’s logic could apply to §2244(d)(1)(D). However, the court declines to apply it here because Seats never raised it in the district court.

AEDPA timing framework: §2244(d)(1)(A) vs. §2244(d)(1)(D)

The opinion reiterates that AEDPA’s one-year limitations period runs from the latest of four statutory triggers (Walker v. Cromwell, 140 F.4th 878, 884 (7th Cir. 2025)):

§2244(d)(1)(A): finality of the judgment
§2244(d)(1)(D): the date the factual predicate could have been discovered with due diligence

The district court used §2244(d)(1)(A). Seats never asked it to use §2244(d)(1)(D). On appeal, he tried to pivot to Johnson and §2244(d)(1)(D), arguing the 2019 vacaturs were the “new fact.” The Seventh Circuit refused to entertain the new theory because it was not presented below.

Forfeiture and plain-error review in civil cases

The court distinguishes waiver from forfeiture (Bourgeois v. Watson, 977 F.3d 620, 629 (7th Cir. 2020)) and treats Seats’s omission as forfeiture. Under Seventh Circuit practice, arguments not raised in the habeas petition or in district court briefing are forfeited (Santiago v. Streeval, 36 F.4th 700, 710 (7th Cir. 2022); Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir. 2009)). Although an appellate court may select the correct legal rule to resolve an issue already presented (Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99–100 (1991)), the litigant still must have argued the relevant theory—the timeliness argument Seats actually made was anchored in §2244(d)(1)(A), not §2244(d)(1)(D).

Civil plain-error review is available only in rare cases when (1) exceptional circumstances exist, (2) substantial rights are affected, and (3) a miscarriage of justice would otherwise occur (Bourgeois, relying on Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 786 (7th Cir. 2020)). The panel found no such exceptional circumstances in a dispute framed as which AEDPA trigger applies to the statute of limitations.

AEDPA merits review and due-process claims at sentencing

On the merits, a federal court can grant §2254 relief only if the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts (§2254(d)(1)–(2); Cal v. Garnett, 991 F.3d 843, 848 (7th Cir. 2021); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)). State factual findings carry a presumption of correctness that may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence (§2254(e)(1)). For due-process claims alleging reliance on inaccurate information at sentencing, the petitioner must show that the sentencing court actually relied on the critical inaccurate information (Promotor v. Pollard, 628 F.3d 878, 888 (7th Cir. 2010); Lechner v. Frank, 341 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 2003), quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972)).

Applying those standards, the Seventh Circuit deferred to the Illinois Appellate Court’s factual finding that any consideration of the now-vacated AUUW convictions did not increase Seats’s sentence. The sentencing judge referenced a “considerable criminal background” generally, but the Illinois Appellate Court reasonably determined the most salient sentencing factors were the seriousness of the offense—shooting the victim in the face—and the weight of the trial evidence, not the now-vacated AUUW convictions. Because there was no demonstrated actual reliance on inaccurate information, the due-process claim fails.

Legal Reasoning and Application

Timeliness under AEDPA. The court begins by confirming the baseline: if calculated from finality of the judgment under §2244(d)(1)(A), the petition is untimely (and Seats did not contest that calculation on appeal). Seats asked the Seventh Circuit to instead apply §2244(d)(1)(D) by invoking Johnson’s vacatur-as-new-fact rationale. But because he never made that argument below—indeed, he did not even respond to the State’s timeliness motion—the argument was forfeited. The panel emphasizes that raising “timeliness” in general does not preserve a specific, alternative statutory trigger.
No civil plain-error rescue. Although the court acknowledges that civil plain-error review exists in rare cases, it applies only in exceptional circumstances where failure to review would result in a miscarriage of justice. A choice-of-trigger dispute for AEDPA’s statute of limitations, untethered to exceptional circumstances, does not qualify. Thus, the court declines to reach Johnson’s applicability in this case.
Merits fallback fails under AEDPA deference. Even assuming timeliness, the court explains that the Illinois Appellate Court’s finding—that the sentencing judge’s general reference to Seats’s record did not translate into reliance on the vacated AUUW convictions—is a reasonable determination of the facts. AEDPA’s presumption of correctness and deferential standard govern. Without “explicit attention” or “specific consideration” of the invalid convictions when imposing sentence, the due-process claim cannot succeed.

State-Law Backdrop and Its Relevance

The opinion situates Seats’s case in the evolving Illinois jurisprudence on AUUW:

People v. Aguilar (2013): Held the Class 4 felony in AUUW subsections (a)(1) and (a)(3)(A) unconstitutional as a “comprehensive ban” on public carry.
People v. Burns (2015): Clarified those subsections are facially unconstitutional regardless of “form,” capturing the two 2007 AUUW convictions in Seats’s PSI.
People v. Smith (2016): An enhanced sentence based on AUUW predicate vacated and remanded for resentencing at the appellate level (illustrating remedial effects when an invalid predicate directly drives an enhancement).
People v. McFadden (2016): An AUUW conviction can still serve as a predicate for a status offense (e.g., felon in possession) until vacated; unvacated convictions remain predicates.
In re N.G. (2018): When a statute is facially unconstitutional, convictions under it are void and cannot be used as predicates “for any purpose.”

Here, although the Illinois Appellate Court vacated Seats’s armed habitual criminal conviction because it rested on the now-void AUUW convictions, it declined to remand for resentencing on the remaining counts. Crucially, the 2012 sentencing was not under a mandatory recidivist enhancement regime. That made it more difficult for Seats to show that the now-void convictions materially increased his sentence and, consequently, to show an unreasonable factual finding by the state appellate court.

Impact

This decision carries several practical and doctrinal implications for habeas litigants and sentencing challenges in the Seventh Circuit:

Preservation is paramount. A §2244(d)(1)(D) theory premised on Johnson’s vacatur-as-new-fact rule must be presented in the district court. General invocations of “timeliness” under §2244(d)(1)(A) will not preserve an alternative trigger; failure to brief it constitutes forfeiture.
Do not count on civil plain-error review. The Seventh Circuit reiterates that civil plain error is reserved for exceptional cases. Routine procedural omissions, even in habeas matters, rarely qualify.
Due diligence still looms under Johnson. Although not decided here because of forfeiture, Johnson requires proof of due diligence in obtaining state-court vacatur. Petitioners contemplating Johnson-based timeliness should pursue vacatur promptly and document their diligence.
Deference on “reliance” findings at sentencing. To prevail on a due-process claim for reliance on inaccurate information, petitioners must show actual reliance by the sentencing judge, typically through explicit references or specific weighting. General references to “criminal background,” especially when other, graver factors are emphasized, will rarely suffice under AEDPA’s deferential standards and the presumption of correctness.
Consequences in AUUW-era cases. Even where Illinois AUUW convictions have been vacated as void following Aguilar/Burns and In re N.G., federal habeas relief tied to resentencing on other counts remains difficult unless the record shows the sentencing court materially relied on those convictions or a mandatory enhancement turned on them.
Procedural practice points. Always respond to motions to dismiss; plead alternative AEDPA triggers; and, where appropriate, consider filing “protective” petitions or seeking stays while pursuing state-court vacatur, to avoid limitations pitfalls.

Complex Concepts Simplified

AEDPA and the one-year limitations period: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act imposes a one-year deadline on state prisoners to file federal habeas petitions. The year usually starts when the conviction becomes final after direct review (§2244(d)(1)(A)). But it may start later when a “factual predicate” underlying the claim could have been discovered through due diligence (§2244(d)(1)(D)).
Johnson’s “vacatur-as-new-fact” rule: If a state court vacates a predicate conviction that underpinned the challenged judgment, that vacatur can be a new “fact” starting the AEDPA clock—provided the petitioner diligently sought the vacatur.
Forfeiture vs. waiver: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right; forfeiture is the failure to timely assert it. Forfeited arguments ordinarily are not considered on appeal.
Civil plain-error review: A very limited doctrine allowing appellate courts to consider unpreserved arguments in civil cases only in exceptional circumstances where substantial rights are affected and a miscarriage of justice would otherwise occur.
Due-process sentencing claims: To show a due-process violation based on inaccurate information, the petitioner must prove that the sentencing judge actually relied on the false or invalid information—typically through explicit or specific references in the sentencing rationale.
“Void” convictions after facial unconstitutionality: When a statute is facially unconstitutional, convictions under it are void ab initio and cannot serve as predicates “for any purpose” (In re N.G.). But until vacated, some Illinois decisions permitted their use as predicates for status crimes (McFadden), underscoring the importance of obtaining vacatur.
Recidivism regime vs. discretionary sentencing: Where sentencing enhancements are mandatory based on prior convictions, invalidating those priors often compels resentencing. Where the judge imposes a discretionary sentence and does not explicitly rely on the prior convictions, proving prejudice is more difficult.

Conclusion

Seats v. Nurse reinforces two central lessons in federal habeas practice in the Seventh Circuit. First, preservation matters: a petitioner who wishes to rely on Johnson’s vacatur-as-new-fact framework under §2244(d)(1)(D) must raise that argument in the district court. Appellate courts will not ordinarily consider such a theory for the first time on appeal, and the narrow civil plain-error doctrine will rarely salvage the omission. Second, on the merits of due-process claims alleging reliance on invalid criminal-history entries, AEDPA’s deferential standards and presumption of correctness make success unlikely absent clear evidence of actual reliance by the sentencing judge.

Against the backdrop of Illinois’s evolving AUUW jurisprudence, this decision confirms that even when prior convictions are later deemed void and vacated, federal habeas relief tied to resentencing depends on both procedural rigor in federal court and a strong, record-based showing of sentencing reliance. As a practical matter, litigants should plead all viable AEDPA triggers, respond to dispositive motions, document diligence in obtaining vacatur, and build a record that, if possible, demonstrates explicit reliance to meet the demanding standards of §2254.

Appendix: Key Timeline of Events

2012: Seats convicted and sentenced; PSI lists six priors including two 2007 AUUW convictions.
2013–2015: Illinois Supreme Court decisions (Aguilar, then Burns) find the relevant AUUW subsections unconstitutional, facially invalid.
Feb. 24, 2016: Seats’s convictions become final on direct review.
Dec. 22, 2016: Seats files state post-conviction petition; later moves to vacate the 2007 AUUW convictions.
Nov. 1, 2019: Two 2007 AUUW convictions are vacated.
June 2020: Illinois Appellate Court vacates armed habitual criminal count but declines resentencing on remaining counts, finding no increased sentence due to the vacated AUUW convictions.
Nov. 18, 2020: Illinois Supreme Court denies leave to appeal.
2021: Seats files §2254 petition; district court dismisses as untimely under §2244(d)(1)(A).
2025: Seventh Circuit affirms, holding Johnson-based §2244(d)(1)(D) argument was forfeited and, in any event, the state court’s no-reliance finding was reasonable under AEDPA.